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THE  CAMPAIGN   OF   WATERLOO 


SUPPLEMENTARY  VOLUME. 

AN   ATLAS   OF 
THE   CAMPAIGN    OF   WATERLOO. 

By  JOHN    CODMAN    ROPES. 

Designed  to  accompany  the  author's  "  Cannpaign  of 
Waterloo;  a  Military  History." 

Price,  $5.00  net. 


CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS, 

Publishers,   New  York. 


THE   CAMPAIGN   OF 


WATERLOO 


A  MILITARY   HISTORY 


JOHN   CODMAN   ROPES 


Member  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts, 

and  the  Harvard  Historical  Society;  Fellow  of  the  American  Academy  of  Arts  and  Sciences 

and  the  Royal  Historical  Society;  Honorary  Member  of  the  United  States  Cavalry 

Association,  etc.      Author  of  "  The  Army  under  Pope,"  in  the  Scribner 

Series  of  "  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War  ";  "  The  First 

Napoleon,  a  Sketch,  Political  and  Military,"  etc. 


THIRD  EDITION. 


NEW   YORK 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS 

1893 


«^3 


COPYRIGHT,  1892,  BY 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS, 


M£NRY  MORSE  STETrHERS 


a^ 


PREFACE 

The  need  of  another  narrative  of  the  campaign  of 
Waterloo  may  not  be  at  first  sight  apparent.  There  has 
been  a  great  deal  written  on  this  subject,  and  much  of  it 
has  been  written  by  eminent  hands.  The  last  and  the 
most  unfortunate  campaign  of  the  great  soldier  of  mod- 
ern times  has  naturally  attracted  the  repeated  atten- 
tion of  military  historians.  Jomini,  Clausewitz,  Charras, 
Siborne,  Kennedy,  Chesney,  Vaudoncourt,  La  Tour 
d'Auvergne,  Thiers,  Hooper,  and  many  others  have 
sought  to  explain  the  almost  inexplicable  result, —  the 
complete  defeat  in  a  very  brief  campaign  of  the  acknowl- 
edged master  of  modern  warfare.  One  would  suppose 
that  the  theme  had  been  exhausted,  and  that  nothing 
more  remained  to  be  said. 

But  several  circumstances  have  contributed  to  render 
the  labors  of  these  writers  unusually  difficult.  In  the 
first  place,  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon,  which  was  the 
immediate  result  of  the  campaign,  operated  to  prevent  a 
satisfactory  account  of  it  being  given  to  the  public  from 
the  French  point  of  view  at  the  time  when  the  facts 
were  fresh  in  men's  minds.  The  Emperor,  exiled  at  St. 
Helena,  could  indeed  give  his  story ;  but,  unable,  as  he 
was,  to  verify  or  correct  his  narrative  by  citations  from 
the  orders  that  were  given  at  the  time,  and  by  conferring 


-1C2G0 


IV  PREFACE. 

with  the  officers  who  had  served  under  him,  he  has  left 
us  an  account,  which,  though  by  no  means  without  his- 
torical value,  is  yet  so  defective  and  erroneous  in  parts 
that  it  has  aroused  in  the  minds  of  men  who  are  not 
alive  to  the  great  difficulties  which  always  attend  the 
composition  of  a  military  narrative,  and  who  are  not  con- 
cerned to  make  fair  allowance  for  the  unavoidable  and 
peculiar  difficulties  of  one  writing  in  the  circumstances 
which  surrounded  Napoleon  at  St.  Helena,  grave  doubts 
as  to  the  trustworthiness  of  his  recollection  and  even 
as  to  his  veracity.  The  chief  officers  of  the  army  have 
also  rendered  little  assistance  to  the  historian.  Ney  was 
shot  a  few  months  after  the  battle.  Soult,  Grouchy, 
d'Erlon  and  others  were  forced  into  exile.  No  detailed 
reports  were  ever  made  by  them.  The  royal  govern- 
ment did  not  concern  itself  about  this  episode  in  the 
experience  of  their  predecessors.  What  the  French 
commander  and  his  subordinates  had  to  say  about  the 
campaign  came  out  by  degrees,  and  much  of  it  only 
after  long  years  of  waiting.  Many  of  the  narratives  were 
written  and  published  before  all  the  facts  had  become 
known, — hence  were  necessarily  more  or  less  imperfect. 

With  a  few  exceptions,  too,  the  histories  of  this  cam- 
paign have  been  gravely  affected  by  the  partisanship  of 
their  authors.  It  is  well-nigh  impossible  for  Thiers  and 
La  Tour  d'Auvergne  to  admit  any  fault,  for  Charras 
and  Quinet  to  admit  any  merit,  in  Napoleon's  manage- 
ment of  affairs.  It  is  equally  difficult  for  the  majority 
of  English  writers  to  avoid  taking  sides  against  the 
Emperor  in  any  of  the  numerous  disputes  to  which  the 
campaign  of  Waterloo  has  given  rise.  These  influences 
have  operated  in  many  cases  to  deflect  the  narrative  of 
the  military  operations  into  a  criticism  of  those  who 
have  written  from  the  opposite  standpoint. 

Nevertheless,  all  this  discussion  has  not  been  by  any 
means  without  use.  We  have  had  many  obscure  corners 
cleared  up,  many  seemingly  inexplicable  problems  solved, 


PREFACE.  V 

and  we  are  now  in  possession,  taking  all  our  information 
together,  of  nearly  all,  if  not  quite  all,  the  facts.  It  only 
remains  to  collect  and  co-ordinate  them  in  a  spirit  of 
impartiality.  This  is  the  task  attempted  in  the  present 
volume.  It  may  be  added  that  the  narrative  and  discus- 
sions will  be  confined  to  purely  military  topics. 

In  the  treatment  of  the  subject,  Napoleon  will  natur- 
ally be  the  central  figure.  The  campaign  was  his  cam- 
paign, planned  and  executed  by  him,  frustrated  by  his 
opponents.  It  will  be  our  endeavor  to  get  at,  as  nearly 
as  we  can,  his  intentions,  his  expectations,  his  views  from 
day  to  day  of  the  facts  of  the  case,  so  that  we  may,  if 
possible,  carry  a  personal  interest  into  the  varying  for- 
tunes of  those  eventful  days.  This  will  be  found  entirely 
consistent,  it  is  believed,  with  an  equally  careful  attempt 
to  view  events  from  the  standpoints  which  the  English 
and  Prussian  commanders  must  have  occupied  from 
time  to  time  during  the  campaign. 

The  general  method  of  Colonel  Chesney  in  his  "  Water- 
loo Lectures "  is  adopted ;  that  is,  the  chapters  will  first 
contain  a  statement  or  narrative,  and,  afterwards,  notes. 
In  these  we  shall  have  occasion  to  examine  most  of  the 
controversies  concerning  this  campaign.  Those  persons 
who  do  not  care  for  these  discussions  can  read  the  chap- 
ters seriatim. 

Those  controversies  which  would  occupy  too  much 
space  if  given  in  the  text  proper  will  be  found  in 
appendices. 

A  partial  list  of  works  relating  to  the  campaign  is 
prefixed. 

A  map  of  the  theatre  of  war  in  Belgium  and  another  of 
the  field  of  Waterloo  are  inserted  in  the  book. 

For  those  students  who  desire  to  follow  the  campaign 
more  carefully,  an  Atlas  has  been  prepared,  which  is  sold 
separately.  It  contains  a  general  map  of  the  whole 
theatre  of  war,  eleven  maps  of  Belgium,  showing  the 
varying  positions  of  the  three  armies  during  the  campaign, 


VI  PREFACE. 

and  two  maps  of  the  field  of  Waterloo,  in  which  the  topo- 
.graphical  features  are  shown  by  contour  lines  taken  from 
the  government  survey,  and  on  which  the  positions  of 
the  troops  are  set  down  at  the  commencement  and  close 
of  the  battle.  The  references  in  the  text  to  maps  are  to 
the  maps  in  this  Atlas. 

Copies  of  all  the  important  orders  and  despatches  will 
be  found  in  Appendix  C. 

The  author  desires  to  express  his  thanks  for  val- 
uable manuscripts,  books  and  references  kindly  fur- 
nished him  by  Major  General  R.  Oldfield,  R.  A.,  and 
Colonel  F.  A.  Whinyates,  R.  A.;  also  for  many  useful 
suggestions,  and  for  assistance  in  many  ways,  to  Major 
\V.  R.  Livermore,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  Army,  and 
Captain  A.  H.  Russell,  Ordnance  Department,  U.  S. 
Army. 

He  desires  also  to  acknowledge  the  aid  rendered  him 
by  M.  Eugene  Wenseleers,  Barrister  of  the  Court  of 
Appeal,  Brussels,  in  ascertaining  the  location  of  the 
Chateau  Marette,  at  Walhain,  where  (and  not  at  Sart- 
a-Walhain,  as  has  been  generally  believed)  Marshal 
Grouchy  was  when  he  heard  the  sound  of  the  cannon  of 
Waterloo. 

99  Mount  Vernon  Street: 
Boston:  June  i,  1892. 

J.  C.  R. 

NOTE  TO  THE  THIRD  EDITION. 

Since  the  publication  of  this  book  the  writer  has  been 
put  in  possession  of  facts  which  have  led  him  to  reverse 
his  opinion  of  the  truth  of  the  story  that  the  Duke  of 
Wellington  rode  to  Wavre  on  the  evening  of  the  17th  of 
June,  1815.  J.  C.  R. 

99  Mount  Vernon  Street: 
Boston:  May  17,  1893. 


CONTENTS. 

Pagk 

PREFACE  

CHAPTER  I :  THE  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  .    .    .  i 

The  general  military  situation 2 

Reasons  for  taking  the  offensive      .          .         .         .         •  2?  3 
Napoleon  decides  to  move  against  Wellington  and 

Bliicher 3 

Positions  of  the  Anglo-Dutch  and  Prussian  Armies           .  3,  4 

Napoleon's  plan 4 

As  stated  in  Gourgaud's  Narrative 4 

And  in  the  "Memoirs" 5 

The  other  plans  which  were  open  to  him         ...  6 
His  expectation  that   Blucher  would  accept  battle 

single-handed  .         .         .         •         •         •         •         •  7'  ^ 

NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  I 9 

Napoleon's   plan  distinguished   from  certain   other 

plans  attributed  to  him 9 

Alison's  view  that   he  threw  himself  between   the 

two  allied  armies lO 

Condemned  by  Wellington  and  Clausewitz      ...  10 
But  adopted  by  Hooper  and  Quinet          .         .         .         .11 
Rogniat's  theory,  that  Napoleon  ought  to  have  aimed 
at  seizing  both  Quatre  Bras  and  Sombreffe  on 

the  first  day 12 

Jomini's  belief,  that  he  did  have  this  intention          .          .  12 

Adopted  by  La  Tour  d'Auvergne    .          .         .         .         •  ^3 

And  by  Charras 13 

Their  view  opposed  to  that  of  Napoleon,  Welling- 
ton and  Clausewitz 13 

Napoleon  desired   and   expected  a  battle  with  the 

Prussians K?  ^5 

vii 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  II :  THE  FRENCH  ARMY  . 

The  army  as   affected   by  Napoleon's  return  from 
Elba         ....... 

Confidence  of  the  soldiers  in  Napoleon    . 
Lack  of  confidence  in  the  high  officers     . 
Napoleon's  choice  of  Soult  to  take  Berthier's  place 
Soult's  unfitness  for  the  position  of  chief-of-staff 
The  five  corps-commanders     .... 

Estimate  of  the  defects  of  the  French  general  officers 

by  Napoleon  and  by  Charras     . 
Probability  of  the  truth  of  their  views 
What  Napoleon  expected  from  his  lieutenants 
Marshal  Ney  sent  for  at  the  last  moment 
Sudden   appointment  of  Marshal   Grouchy  to   the 

command  of  the  right  wing 
Napoleon's  error  in  not  taking  Marshal  Davout  with 
him  .... 

Estimate  of  Napoleon's  own  bodily  ana  mental  vigor 
at  this  period    .... 

Portrait  of  Napoleon  by  General  Foy 

Estimate  of  the  French  Army 

It  was  not  the  best  army  which  Napoleon  had  ever 

led 

But  it  was  a  better  army  than  either  that  of  WeL 

lington  or  of  Bliicher 
Its  strength  and  composition   . 
NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  II 

Napoleon's  health  —  Gardner  —  Segur 
The  Gudin  story      .... 
Napoleon  more  or  less  a  sufferer ;  but  on  the  w^hole 
possessed  of  good  health  and  strength 
CHAPTER  III :  THE  ALLIED  ARMIES 

Strength  and  composition  of  the  Prussian  army 

Location  of  the  different  corps 

Temper  and  spirit  of  the  army 

Marshal  Bliicher 

The  Duke  of  Wellington's  army 

Its  strength  and  composition    . 

Location  of  the  various  divisions 

Merits  and  defects  of  the  several  parts  of  the  army 


i6 
17 
17 

17 

iS 
18 

19 
19 
20 

2C 


22 


23-24 
24 
24 

25 
25-2S 

29 
29 
30 


30 


32 


31 
32 

33 
33 
34 
34 
34 
35-38 
38 
39 


CONTENTS.  IX 

The  generals :  the  Prince  of  Orange         .         ...  40 

Lord  Hill,— Sir  T.  Picton 4° 

The  Duke  of  Wellington         ......  40 

The  internal  economy  of  the  three  armies        .         .          4i»  4^ 

That  of  the  French  army 4^ 

That  of  the  English  army 42 

That  of  the  Prussian  army 42 

NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  III 43 

Defects  peculiar  to  the  inexperienced  English  regi- 
ments      ...         ......  43 

CHAPTER  IV:    THE    FIFTEENTH   OF    JUNE: 

NAPOLEON 44 

Napoleon  assembles  his  army  near  Charleroi  .         .  44»  45 

He  addresses  it  at  Avesnes  on  the  14th    ....       45 
His  letters   to  his  brother  Joseph  and   to  Davout 
confirm  the  view  above  given  of   his  plan   of 

campaign -45 

The  general  order  of  movement  issued  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  14th  of  June 45'  4^ 

Accident  in  the  transmission  of  his  orders  to  General 

Vandamme  on  the  15th    ......       46 

Desertion  of  General  Bourmont       .....       47 

The  operations  in  the  centre  under  Napoleon's  im- 
mediate supervision -47 

Positions  of  the  centre  and  right  on  the  night  of  the 

15th  and  i6th 4^ 

Operations  of  the  left  wing.     Arrival  of  Ney  .         .  48,  49 

He  pushes  the  divisions  of  Bachelu  and  Pire  to  Frasnes  .  49 
And  leaves  those  of  Jerome  and  Foy  at  Gosselies  .  .  49 
Backwardness  of  the  I  st  Corps         ....  50~52 

At  3  A.  M.  of  the  i6th  one  division  had  not  arrived 

at  the  Sambre 5^ 

D'Erlon  to  blame  for  this  tardiness 5^ 

Napoleon's  own   summary  of  the  situation  on  the 

eveningof  the  15th 53 

He  had  purposely  abstained  from  occupying  Som- 

breffe 53 

He  expected  Blucher  to  fight  the  next  day  for  the 
preservation  of  his  communications  with  Wel- 
lington      53 


X  CONTENTS. 

He  gets  a  few  hours'  sleep  during  the  evening  of 

the  15th 54 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  IV 55 

1.  Marshal  Ney's  lack  of  a  proper  staff  .         ...       56 

2.  Discussion  of  the  results  of   the   operations  on 

the  15th 56  e/  seq. 

Jomini  and  Charras  consider  them   incomplete  and 

unsatisfactory  .......       56 

A.  The  question,  as  regards  the  non-occupation  of 
Sombreffe  on  the  evening  of  the  15th         .  .  57-61 

Rogniat's  criticism 57 

Napoleon's  answer  .......  57 

Charras  and  Jomini 58,  59 

Re-statement  of  Napoleon's  plan  and  expectations  .         .  59 
The  plan  suggested  by  Rogniat,  Jomini  and  Charras 

no  improvement  on  that  of  Napoleon         ...  60 

B.  The  question  as  regards  the  non-occupation  o' 

Quatre  Bras  on  the  evening  of  the  15th  .  61-63 

(i.)     Reasons  why  the  effect    on   Bliicher  of  the 

occupation  of  Quatre  Bras  might  be  different 

from  that  of  the  occupation  of  Sombreffe  .         .       61 

(2.)     The  occupation  of  Quatre  Bras  on  the  evening 

of  the  15th  not  necessary  to  Napoleon's  scheme         .       62 

3.  Reasons   why  Napoleon  blamed  Ney  for    not 

having  occupied  Quatre  Bras  on  the  15th  .         .       63 

4.  Did    Napoleon   give    Ney    a    verbal   order   to 

seize  Quatre  Bras  on  the  15th?  ....       64 

The  statements  of  Gourgaud  and  the  Memoirs         .         .       64 
The  statement  in  the  Bulletin  of  the  Army,  sent  off 

in  the  evening  of  the  15th         .         .         .         .         ,       d^ 

The  published   statement  of   Marshal  Grouchy  in 
1 8 18  that  he  heard  the  Emperor  blame  Ney  for 
having   disobeyed   his   orders  to  seize  Quatre 
Bras  on  the  15th       ......     65,  n.  28 

The  subsequent  hearsay  evidence  of  little  value        .  66-67 

The  Bulletin  much  the  best  evidence  that  we  have  67-69 

That  no  mention  is  made  in  the  written  orders  of 
the  1 6th  of  the  verbal  order  of  the  day  before,  is 
not  material 69 


CONTENTS.  XI 

CHAPTER  V :   THE  FIFTEENTH  OF  JUNE :   BLUCHER 
AND   WELLINGTON 70 

Bliicher  on  the  14th  ordered  his  army  to  concentrate 

at  Sombreffe    ........       7^ 

And  without  consulting  Wellington  ....       70 

The  nature  of  the  understanding  between  them        .    70  et  seq. 

Miiffling's  statement  generally  misunderstood  .         .       7^ 

There  was  every  intention  to  act  in  concert,  but  no 

definite  agreement  as  to  details  ....       72 

Billow's  disobedience  of  orders 73 

Gneisenau's  remissness  in  not  giving  him  full  in- 
formation of  the  situation  .....       73 

Wellington's  desire  to  protect  Ghent  and  Brussels         .       74 

He  retained  his  headquarters  at  Brussels  ...       74 

He   thought   it   probable    that   the   French   would 

advance  by  way  of  Mons  .....       74 

Hence  he  would  not  hastily  move  in  force  in  the 

direction  of  Quatre  Bras 75 

The  Prince  of  Orange  hears  of  the  French  advance  .       76 

And  brings  word  of  it  to  the  Duke  at  Brussels  at 

3  P.  M.  of  the  15th 77 

Wellington's  first  orders  were  issued  between  5  and 

7  P.  M 77 

They  were  simply  for  the  concentration  of  the  vari- 
ous divisions  of  his  army  •         .         .         .  -7^ 

But  they  implied  that  Nivelles  and  not  Quatre  Bras 
was  likely  to  be  the  point  of  concentration  for 
the  whole  army 78 

Information  that  Bliicher  is  concentrating  at  Som- 
breffe arrives  in  the  evening  at  Brussels    ...       7^ 

And  Wellington  issues,  about  10  P.  M.,  his  "After 
Orders"  which  direct  a  general  movement 
towards  the  east 79 

Difficulty  of  reconciling  the  evidence  as  to  the  sub- 
sequent orders  of  the  Duke 79 

The  Duke's  oflEicial  report  states  that  he  ordered  the 
whole  army  to  Quatre  Bras  in  the  early  morn- 
ing of  the  i6th 80 

Miiffling's  statement 80 

The  Duke's  conversation  with  the  Duke  of  Rich- 
mond             81,  n.  37 


Xll  CONTENTS. 

The  instructions  issued  to  Colonel  de  Lancey  have 

been  lost 8i 

The  orders  to  Hill  in  the  early  morning  of  the  i6th  .       82 

They  indicate  that  no  decision  for  a  concentration 

at  Quatre  Bras  had  then  been  reached       ...       83 

This  inference  may  be  also  drawn  from  the  halt  of 

Picton's  division  at  Waterloo    .....       83 

It  has  even  been  maintained  that  as  late  as  10  A.  M. 
of  the  1 6th  the  Duke  had  not  decided  to  hold 
Quatre  Bras 84,  n.  50 

But  the  Letter  of  the  Duke  to  Marshal  Bliicher  and 
the  "Disposition"  of  Sir  W.  De  Lancey  con- 
tradict this  supposition     ......       85 

Character  and  meaning  of  the  "  Disposition  "  .         .       86 

The  "Disposition"  evidently  the  foundation  of  the 

Letter  to  Bliicher 87-88 

Taken  together,  they  show  that  the  Duke  ordered 
a  concentration  of  his  army  at  Quatre  Bras  in 
the  early  morning  of  the  i6th 88 

But  not  until  after  he  had  given  the  orders  above 

mentioned  to  Hill  and  Picton  ....       88 

His    decision  was  probably  arrived    at  while   he 

was  at  the  Duchess  of  Richmond's  ball     ...       89 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  V 90 

1.  The  Duke's  "Memorandum  on  the  Battle  of 

Waterloo" 90 

Its  surprising  statements  ......       9c 

2.  No  definite  plan  of  action  agreed  on  by  Wel- 

ington  and  Bliicher  in  the  event  of  a  French 

invasion 91 

3.  Wellington  does  not  deserve  credit  for  prompt- 

ness  in   deciding   to  concentrate  at    Ouatre 

Bras 92 

4.  Wellington's  original  intention  of  concentrating 

at  Nivelles  considered 93 

It  is  approved  by  Colonel  Maurice 93 

A.     But  when  Wellington  knew  that  the  French 
main  army  was  in  front  of  Bliicher  at  Som- 
breffe  he  could  run  no  great  risk  in  concen- 
,  trating  at  Qiiatre  Bras 94 


CONTENTS.  XIH 

B.  His  fault  was  in  delaying  to  issue  the  order  to 

do  so -94 

If  his  orders  had  been  strictly  carried  out,  Ney 
would  have  occupied  Quatre  Bras  without 
opposition,  and  been  able  to  assist  Napoleon 
atLigny 95 

C.  Napoleon  attached  great  importance  to  Quatre 
Bras,  and  gave  Ney  a  large  force  in  order  to 

make  sure  of  its  acquisition      .         .         .         .  95 »  9^ 

5.  The   extent   of   the   cantonments  of   the  allied 

armies  criticized 96 

Opinion  of  Sir  James  Shaw-Kennedy      ....       96 
Opinions  of  Charras  and  Napoleon  .         .         .  97?  98 

6.  Napoleon's  criticism  on  Bliicher  for  fixing  Som- 
breffe   as  the   point   of  concentration   for   his 

army,  well  supported 98 

But  his  censure  of  Wellington  for  concentrating  at 

Quatre  Bras  undesei-ved  .....       99 

Because  this   decision  of  Wellington's   was   based 

on  Napoleon's  having  already  concentrated  in 

front  of  Sombreffe 99,  100 

CHAPTER  VI:   THE   DUTCH-BELGIANS  .         .     loi 

Prince  Bernhard  of  Saxe-Weimar  occupies  Quatre 

Bras  in  the  afternoon  of  the  15th  ....  loi 
And  is  attacked  by  Reille's  advance  between  5  and 

6P.  M loi 

The  other   brigade   of  Perponcher's  division,  By- 

landt's,  ordered  there  also 102 

The  Prince  of  Orange  arrives  at  Quatre  Bras  at  6 

A.M.  of  the  1 6th 102 

NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  VI 103 

Maurice's   criticism  on   the   occupation  of   Qiiatre 

Bi-as  by  the  Dutch-Belgian  generals  .         .         .     103 

But  the  fact  that  they  knew  of  the  concentration  of 

the  French  and  Prussian  armies  near  Sombreffe 

fully  justifies  their  course  ....      103,  104 

CHAPTER  VII :  THE  MORNING  OF  THE  SIX- 
TEENTH OF  JUNE :  WELLINGTON  .  .105 
The  Duke  leaves  Brussels  about  7.30  A.  M.  of  the 

i6th 105 


XIV  CONTENTS. 

And  rides  at  once  to  Quatre  Bras    .....     io6 

His  letter  to  Bliicher io6 

Comparison  of  the  statements    in    the  Letter  with 
those   in    the    "Disposition"    of    Sir   \V.    De 
Lancey     ........       107-10S 

He  evidently  accepted   the  "Disposition"  as  con- 
clusive       108 

He  rides  over  to  Brj-e  to  confer  with  Bliicher  .  .      108 

And  returns  to  Quatre  Bras  between  2  and  3  P.  M.  .     109 

No  doubt  expecting  to  find  a  large  part  of  his  army 

there 109 

Delbriick's  theory,  that  the  Duke  deliberately  mis- 
represented the  situation  of  his  army,  entirely 
unsupported      .......     109,  no 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  VII in 

1.  Actual    positions   of    Wellington's  divisions  at 

7  A.M.  of  the  16th iii-ris 

2.  Whether,  if  the  Duke  had  known  the  truth,  he 

would    have   stayed    at    Quatre  Bras, —  qucere         .     114 

3.  Wellington  badly  served  by  his  subordinates   in 

the  matter  of  the  transmission  of  intelligence 
from  the  front  ......      114-115 

CHAPTER  VIII:  THE  MORNING  OF  THE  SIX- 
TEENTH OF  JUNE :  NEY  .         .         .         .116 

Ney  returns  f  rom  Charleroi  to  Gosselies  at  2  A.  M.  .     116 

And   at  first  orders   Reille  to  set   out  at   once  for 

Frasnes    .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .116 

But  afterwards  changes  his  mind,  and  allows  Reille, 
with  the  divisions  of  Jerome  and  Foy,   to  re- 
main in  Gosselies      .  .  .  .  .  .  .117 

He  ought  to  have  sent  them  to  Frasnes  at  once         .         -117 
And  to  have  filled  their  places  at  Gosselies  with  the 

divisions  of  the  ist  Corps  .  .  .  .  .118 

He  does  nothing  to  bring  up  the  ist  Corps  till  late 

in  the  forenoon         .  .  .  .  .  ,  .119 

Soult's  first  order  to  him  on  the  1 6th        .         .         .  .120 

Received  about  6  A.M. ,  and  answered  before  7  A.M.         .     1 20 
Ney  then  returns  to  Frasnes,  leaving  Reille  at  Gos- 
selies, with  instructions  to  march  to  the  front  at 
once  on  receipt  of  orders  from  army  headquar- 
ter   120 


CONTENTS.  XV 

About  9  A.  M.  Rellle  receives  word  from   Girard 

that  the  Prussians  are  massing  at  Fleurus  .  .121 

And  at  ic  A.  M.  he  reads  the  Emperor's  letter  to 

Ney,  brought  by  Flahaut  .         .         .         .  .121 

But  defers  his  march  to  Frasnes  till  he  gets  further 

orders  from  Ney .122 

He  gets  further  orders,  and  leaves  Gosselies  at  1 1 .45 

A.M 122 

Soult's  second  order  directs  Ney  to  march  on  Quatre 

Bras 122 

The  Emperor's  letter  to  Ney 123 

The  ist  and  2d  Corps  and  Kellermann's  cavalry  are 

all  put  at  Ney's  disposal 123 

The  third  order  to  Ney  from  Soult  that  morning      .      123,  124 

Its  peremptory  character 124 

Ney  refuses  fully  to  obey  his  orders  .         .         .  ,124 

His  unwillingness  to  take  the  risks  which  they  involve  .  124 
He  proposes  to  keep  half  his  force  in  reserve  „         .         .125 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  VIII 126 

1.  Summary  of  Ney's  conduct  on  the  morning  of 

the  i6th 126 

2.  He  evidently  did  not  intend  to  obey  his  orders 

strictly  .127 

3.  The  light  his  conduct  on  the  i6th  throws  on  his 

failure  to  seize  Quatre  Bras  the  day  before        .         .127 

4.  No  criticism  can  be  made  on  Napoleon  and  Soult         .     128 

5.  Why  Napoleon  did  not  send  Ney  an  earlier  order 

to  seize  Quatre  Bras,  answered  in  Chapter  IX  .128 

CHAPTER  IX:   THE  MORNING  OF  THE  SIX- 
TEENTH OF  JUNE :    NAPOLEON  .         .129 

Ney  and  Napoleon  at  Charleroi  during  the  night  of 

the  15th  and  i6th     .......     129 

Napoleon,  impressed  by  the  backwardness  of 
d'Erlon,  decides  to  wait  until  the  left  wing  is 
ready 130 

The  formal  order  to  Ney  to  seize  Quatre  Bras  not 
given  until  Ney's  report  of  the  state  of  his  com- 
mand  had   arrived — between  8  and  9  A.  M.         .     131 

The  advance  of  the  centre  and  right  also  delayed  to 

conform  to  the  movements  of  the  left        .         .      131,132 


XVI  CONTENTS. 

Napoleon's  expectations  as  to  the  forwardness  of 

Ney's  command 13^)  ^33 

Napoleon  prepares  and  sends  letters  to  Ney  and 
Grouchy,  in  view  of  the  possible  withdrawal 
of  Marshal  Bliicher I34'  ^35 

He  seems  to  have  thought  this  probable  .         .         .  136 

But  he  made  every  preparation  for  encountering  the 
enemy  in  force  both  at  SombrefTe  and  at  Quatre 
Bras 137 

The  6th  Corps  regarded  as  a  reserve  for  the  whole 

army 13^ 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  IX 139 

1.  The  censure  generally  passed  on  Napoleon  for 
his  delays  on  the  morning  of  the  i6th  not 
deserved 139 

Opinions  of  Wellington  and  Clausewitz  .  .  .      139,  n.  5 

2.  Ney  not   responsible    for  the  backwardness  of 

the  1st  Corps  during  the  night  ....     140 

3.  Ney's  inactivity  on  returning  to  Gosselies  .  .140 

4.  No  evidence  thus  far  of  indolence  or  irresolu- 
tion on  the  part  of  Napoleon  .         .         .  .140 

5.  Error  of  supposing  that  he  ever  thought  of 
pressing  on  to  Brussels  between  the  two  allied 

armies  —  Chesney  and  Clinton  ....     141 

His   letters    to   Ney   and    Grouchy   conclusive    as 

to  this 141,   142 

His  object  was  to  destroy  the  allied  armies  in  succes- 
sion—  Jomini  .......      142 

CHAPTER    X:       THE     BATTLE    OF     LIGNY: 
BLUCHER'S     DECISION    TO     ACCEPT 
BATTLE  NOT  DEPENDENT  ON  WEL- 
LINGTON'S ASSURANCE  OF  SUPPORT         .     143 
Bliicher   concentrated  his  army  without   receiving 

any  assurance  of  support  from  Wellington        .  .     143 

He  got  Wellington's  letter  about  noon  of  the  1 6th    .  .     144 

Wellington  arrived  at  Brye  at  i  P.  M 144 

Their  conversation  .......     144 

Wellington  gave  no  unconditional  promise       .  .  .145 

Bliicher's  decision  to  fight  was  arrived  at  before  he 

heard  from  or  saw  Wellington  ....     146 

And  on  entirely  independent  grounds     ....      147 


CONTENTS.  XVll 

NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  X 148 

Bliicher's  reasons  for  deciding  to  accept   battle  at 

Ligny  as  given  by  Damitz         .  .  .  .  .148 

He  was  unwilling  to  retreat 148 

Suggestions    of    Ollech    and    Delbriick  not  of    any 

value  here         ........      149 

Bliicher  expected  to  concentrate  his  whole  army  of 

120,000  men 149 

And  was  unwilling  to  change  his  decision  when  he 

found  he  could  not  count  upon  Billow's  arrival  .      150 

CHAPTER  XI:  THE  BATTLE  OF  LIGNY  .  .  151 
Position  of  the  Prussian  army  at  Ligny  .  .         .         »     151 

Napoleon  examines  the  position       .  .  .  .  .153 

The  most  obvious  plan   of  battle  was  to  turn  the 

Prussian  right  .  .  .  .  .  .  .153 

But  Napoleon  decides  to  attack  the  centre       .  .         •     ^53 

Positions  taken  by  the  French  ....      153,   154 

The  2  P.  M.  order  sent  to  Ney  to  cooperate  with 

the  main  army 154 

The   battle  begins   at  2.30  by  attacking  Ligny  and 

St.  Amand 154 

The  3.15  P.  M.  order  to  Ney 155 

Napoleon  determines  about  half-past  five  o'clock  to 

put  in  the  Guard     .......     156 

The    unexpected    appearance  of  d'Erlon's  Corps 

causes  a  delay  of  nearly  two  hours  ....  157 
The  attack  by  the  Guard  breaks  the  Prussian  centre  .  15S 
The  Prussians  fall  back  to  Brye  and  Sombreffe  .  '159 
Losses  of  the  Prussians  and  French  ....     159 

The  non-employment  of  the  6th  Corps    .  .         .     159,   160 

Extent  of  the  victory 160,   161 

It  was  not  equal  to  Napoleon's  hopes,  but  it  had 

disposed  of  the  Prussians  for  a  time  .         .     161,   163 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  XI 163 

1.  Napoleon's  delay  in  beginning  the  battle  .  .  '163 
His  reasons  considered    .......      164 

2.  His  plan  of  battle  criticised  by   Rogniat  and 

others       .........     164 

Napoleon's  reply  to  Rogniat   ......     165 


XVlll  CONTENTS. 

His  reasons  for  taking  the  course  he  did  •         .         .     i6k 

The  criticism  of  Davout  and  Clausewitz  considered 

3.  Ciausewitz's  doubts  as  to  the  decisive  result  of 
Ney's  movement       ...... 

The  question  fully  stated  and  Napoleon's  expecta- 
tions justified   ....... 

4.  What  Napoleon  had  a  right  to  expect  from  Ney 
5      Whether  Napoleon's  plan   v^^as   the   best,  con- 
sidering that  he  could   not  absolutely  rely  on 
Ney's  cooperation     ...... 

6.  Why  Napoleon  did  not  order  d'Erlon  to  remain 
and  take  part  in  the  battle         .... 

He  must  have  assumed  that  d'Erlon  had  come  upon 
the  field  for  this  purpose  .... 

And  there  was  not  time  to  send  him  orders 

7.  Napoleon's  skill  well  displayed  at  Ligny  . 
Ciausewitz's  review  of  the  battle       .... 
He  points  out  that  Napoleon  was  more  economical 

in  the  use  of  his  troops  than  Bliicher 
Severe  and  unwarranted  criticism  of  Marshal  Davout 

on  Napoleon's  tactics        ..... 
Napoleon    not    responsible    for    the    error    which 

brought  d'Erlon  on  the  field      .... 

8.  Whether  Napoleon  was  wise  in  arresting  the 
progress  of  the  battle  on  the  appearance  of  the 

strange  corps  (d'Erlon's), — ^ucsre  .         .       174-175 

9.  Napoleon  to  be  censured  for  not  having  made 

use  of  the  6th  Corps  .         .         .         .         .         -175 

CHAPTER  XII :     THE    BATTLE   OF    QUATRE 

BRAS 176 

Resume  of  Marshal  Ney's  doings  in  the  forenoon 

of  the  i6th 176 

He  should  have  ordered  Jerome  and  Foy  to  Gosse- 

lies  in  the  early  morning 177 

He  scattered  his  command  instead  of  uniting  it,  as 

he  was  ordered  to  do 177 

He  begins  the  action  at  2  P.  M.,  with  the  divisions 

of  Bachelu,  Foy  and  Pire  .  .  .  .  .  17S 
Jerome's  division  arrives  at  3  P.  M.  .  .  .  .  17S 
Wellington  returns  to  Quatre  Bras  at  2.30  P.  M.  .  .  17S 
Picton's  division  arrives  at  3.30  P.  M 178 


166 
167 

167 

1 68 

169 

170 

170 

170 

171 

71-173 


173 
174 


CONTENTS.  XIX 

Alten's  division  arrives  at  5  P.  M.  ....     179 

At  this  hour  Ney  has  only  the  3d  Corps  on  the  field  .     179 

Reasons  for  the  non-arrival  of  the  1st  Corps    .  .         -179 

Its  delay  in  starting 180 

Its  leading  division  —  Durutte's  —  turned  off  by  an 
aide  of  the  Emperor's  from  Frasnes  towards  St. 

Amand 180 

The  corps  is  seen  approaching  St.  Amand  about 

5  P.  M.  .  ' iSo 

It  must,  therefore,  have  left  the   Charleroi  road  at 

Frasnes  about  4.30  P.  M. iSi 

This  was  two  hours  and  a  half  after  Jerome's  divis- 
ion had  passed  through  Frasnes         .         .         .         .181 

Responsibility  of  Ney  and  d'Erlon  for  this  extra- 

ordinar}^  state  of  things     .         .         .         .         .         .     iSi 

Marshal  Ney  not  to  blame  for  recalling  D'Erlon  to 

Qiiatre  Bras 181 

It  was    probably   the  staff-officer  who  carried  the 
2  P.  M.  order  who  turned  the  ist  Corps  off  from 

the  turnpike 182 

For  the  non-arrival  of  Kellermann's  cavalry  Ney 

alone  was  responsible 182 

He  ordered  it  to  remain  in  the  rear  at  Frasnes  and 

Liberchies 182,    183 

In  this  he  deliberately  disobeyed  orders  .         .         -183 

He  finally,   at   6  P.  M.,   puts  in  one   brigade    of 

Kellermann's  Coi-ps  .         .         .         .  .         •183 

Which  is  at  first  successful,  but  is  afterwards  driven 

back  with  loss 184 

The  French  retire  to  Frasnes 184 

The  casualties  on  both  sides  184 

If  d'Erlon's  Corps  had  not  been  turned  off,  it  is 
probable   that   Wellington  would    have    been 

badly  beaten 184,  185 

If  Ney  had  concentrated  his  whole  command  be- 
tween 12  M.  and  2  P.  M.,  Quatre  Bras  would 
probably  have  been  evacuated  .         .         .      1S5,   186 

In  this  case  Ney  could  have  spared  10,000  or  20,000 

men  to  assist  Napoleon     ......     1S6 

Criticism  on  Marshal  Ney's  management  .         .         .     186 

Wellington's  skilful  handling  of  his  troops       .         .     1S7,  18S 


XX  CONTENTS. 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  XII      .         .         .         .         ;        .     189 

1.  Charras'  erroneous  statements  as  to  Ney's  orders 
in   regard  to  the   employment  of  Kellerman's 

cavalry     ......•••     189 

2.  Napoleon's   mistakes    in    his    account    of   the 

matter  in  his  Memoirs      .         .         .         .         •         .190 
But  his  principal  censure  on  Ney  for  not  having  got 
his  command  together  and  used  it  as  a  whole, 
is  fully  borne  out 191 

3.  Curious  error  of  Siborne's  .....     191 

4.  Jomini's  defence  of  Reille's  delay  to  march  to 
Frasnes •     192 

It  overlooks  the  necessity  of  occupying  Frasnes  in 

any  event,  and  therefore  cannot  be  accepted      .         -193 

5.  Baudus'  account  of  his  carrying  an  order  from 

Soult  to  d'Erlon 193 

Reasons  for  thinking  that  this  order  must  have  been 

directed  to  Ney 194 

Baudus  probably  carried  the  duplicate  of  the  3.15 

P.  M.  order  to  Ney 195 

The  evidence  on  certain  minor  points  conflicting  .  .196 
CHAPTER     XIII:       THE    SEVENTEENTH    OF 

JUNE:   NAPOLEON 197 

i?e'52<»/e  of  the  campaign  up  to  date  ....     197 

Napoleon  had  no  reason  for  delay 197 

He  had  a  disposable  army  composed  almost  entirely 

of  fresh  troops •  '197 

Reasons  for  thinking  that  the  Prussians  might  soon 

recover  from  the  defeat  of  Ligny      .         .  .         .198 

Opportunity  open   to   Napoleon   of   overwhelming 

that  part  of   Wellington's  army  which  was  at 

Quatre  Bras 199 

Napoleon's  inactivity  on  this  morning       ....     200 

Probably  the  result  of  fatigue 200 

Ney  sends  no  report  to  the  Emperor  ....  200 
Soult's  first  order  to  him  to  move  on  Quatre  Bras  .  .     201 

Napoleon  presumes  that  Wellington  has  long  since 

fallen  back 201 

Napoleon's  lack  of  energy  and  activity  this  morning  .  202 
Before  noon,  however,  the  6th  Corps  and  the  Guard 

are  ordered  to  Marbais 203 


CONTENTS.  XXI 

Second  order  to  Ney  at  noon 203 

Girard's  division  of  the  2d  Corps  left  at  Ligny         .         .     203 
Napoleon's  reasons  for  supposing  that  Bliicher  had 

retired  on  Namur 203,  204 

Of  which  the  principal  was  that  he  had  on  the  day 
before  employed  so  large  a  part  of  his  army  in 

holding  the  Namur  road 204 

Pajol  captures  some  prisoners  and  a  battery  on  the 

road  to  Namur 205 

Napoleon's  neglect  to  send  out  cavalry  to  explore 

the  country  to  the  north 205 

Napoleon  determines  to  send   Grouchy  with  the  3d 

and  4th  Corps  to  pursue  the  Prussians       .         .         .     206 
His  verbal   orders  to  Grouchy,  and  Grouchy's  re- 
monstrances   207 

Grouchy's  points  not  well  taken 207 

Grouchy's  denial  that  he  ever  received  on  that  day 

a  written  order 20S 

Berton  reports  a  whole  Prussian  corps  at  Gembloux         .     209 
The  Emperor,  then,   in  the  absence  of  Soult,  dic- 
tates to  Bertrand  an  order  to  Grouchy       .         .         .     209 

Full  text  of  this  order 209,210 

This   order   changes  entirely  the  task  assigned   to 

Grouchy 210 

He  is  to  ascertain  whether  the  Prussians  intend  to 
separate  from  the  English  or  to  unite  with  them 
to  cover  Brussels  or  Liege  in  trying  the  fate  of 

another  battle 211 

And  is  left  full   discretion  as  to  his  course  in  either 

event 211 

Strength  and  composition  of  his  command       .         .         .212 
He  reaches  Gembloux  that  evening  .         .         .         .212 

And  writes  to  the  Emperor  a  report  in  which  he 
says  he  shall  try  to  separate  the  Prussians  from 

Wellington 212,  213 

Strength  of  Welhngton's  force  at  Quatre  Bras         .         .214 
At  Quatre  Bras  the  Emperor   in  person  leads  the 

pursuit  of  the  English 214 

His  remark  to  d'Erlon 215 

Interesting  picture  of  the  march  by  the  author  of 

"  Napoleon  a  Waterloo " 215 


XXll  CONTENTS. 

Skirmish  at  Genappe 216 

The  English  take  up  positions  south  ot  the  hamlet  of 

Mont  St.  Jean 216 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  XIII 217 

1.  Napoleon  not  to  be  blamed  for  not  having  pur- 
sued the  Prussians  in  the  early  morning  of  the 

17th.     Clausewitz's  opinion      .  .  .  .  .217 

2.  Napoleon  probably  would   not   have  detached 
Grouchy  had  he  known  that  the  Prussians  had 

retired  on  Wavre 218 

3.  Effect     on    the    contemporary     historians     of 
Grouchy's  concealment  of  the  Bertrand  order — 

e.  ^.,  on  Clausewitz  .  .  .  .  .  .218 

4.  Curious  sur\4val  of  this  effect  on  historians  who 

wrote  after  the  order  had  come  to  light     .         .         .219 

OnChesney 219 

On  Maurice 219 

On  Hamley 221 

On  Hooper 222 

5.  Whether  the  Bertrand   order   was  sufficiently 
explicit.     Charras'  opinion       .....  222 

6.  The   reasons  for   directing  Grouchy  on  Gem- 

bloux  considered 223 

7.  Valuable  suggestions-  of  Maurice  as  to  the  rea- 
sons which  induced  Napoleon  to  suppose  that 

the  Prussians  had  retreated  to  Namur        .         .         .     223 

8.  It  was  an  error  for  Napoleon  to  trust  to  the  prob- 
abilities, when  so  much  was  at  stake         .         .      224,  225 

CHAPTER  XIV :  THE  SEVENTEENTH  OF  JUNE  : 

BLUCHER  AND  WELLINGTON       .         .         .226 

Zieten  and  Pirch  I.  fall  back  towards  Wavre            .          .  226 

Renunciation  of  the  line  of  Namur 226 

But  a  general  concentration  at  Wavre  not  necessanly 

implied 226 

Although  it  was  rendered  possible  by  Gneisenau's 

action       .........  227 

Gneisenau  unwilling  to  renounce  all  hope  of  union 

with  the  English 228 

Although  he  recognized  the  difficulties  attending  it  .  228 
And  doubted  whether  he  could  rely  on  Wellington  .         .329 

Bliicher  carried  off  the  field  to  Mellery    ....  229 


CONTENTS.  XXlll 

Hardinge's  story  of  the  discussion  between  Bliicher 

and  Gneisenau           .......  230 

The  Prussian  generals  decide  to  march  to  join  Wel- 
lington     .........  230 

Movements  of  Thielemann  and  Billow     ....  231 

Admirable   conduct    of    the    Prussian    corps-com- 
manders .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  '231 

The  Prussians  fall  back  on  Wavre 232 

Leaving  a  detachment  at  Mont  St.  Guibert      .         .         .  232 

The  artillery  trains  arrive  at  Wavre  at  5  P.  M.  .  .  232 
Wellington  at  Qiiatre  Bras  on  the  morning  of  the 

17th 233 

His  message  to  Bliicher  sent  through  Lieut.  Massow         .  233 
Bliicher  replies  about  midnight,  promising  support  .          .  234 
Wellington's  uncertainty  during  the  day  and  even- 
ing of  the  17th          .......  234 

The  risk  which  he  ran     ......      235,  236 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  XIV 237 

1 .  Maurice's  correction  of  Siborne         ....  237 

2.  The  story  of  the  Duke's  ride  to  Wavre  on  the 
evening  of  the  17th  .....      23S-242 

Lockhart's  brief  statement        ......  239 

Lord  Ellesmere's  denial  of  Lockhart's  statement  .  .  239 
The  story  as  told  by  the  Rev.  Julian  Charles  Young  239-241 
Mr.  Coltman's  recollection  of  his  father's  statement 

about  it .  241 

Reasons  for  rejecting  the  story         .....  242 

3.  Napoleon's  criticism  on  the  course  of  Welling- 
ton and  Bliicher  after  the  battle  of  Ligny  .         .          .  243 

Clausewitz  denies  that  Wellington  ran  any  risk  .  .  243 
His  view  not  tenable        .......     244 


The  question  of  the  advisability  of  running  the  risk 


stated 


244 


CHAPTER  XV :  THE  EIGHTEENTH  OF  JUNE  : 

GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER  .  .  .  .245 
Grouchy's  letter  from  Gembloux  of  10  P.  M.  not 

really  satisfactory      .......     245 

But  Napoleon  and  Soult  do  not   give  him  further 

instructions  or  any  information  ....      246 

Napoleon  thinks  Grouchy  may  arrive  by  the  bridge 

of  Moustier  and  sends  Marbot  to  look  out  for  him         .     247 


XXIV 


CONTENTS. 


Grouchy  was  acting  under  the  Bertrand  order  . 
Which  laid  upon  him  the  task  of  ascertaining  the 

intentions  of  the  Prussians         .... 
And  then  left  him  entire  Hberty  of  action 
Errors  of  Gardner  and  Maurice  as  to  this  latter  point 
Grouchy  at  lo  P.  M.  of  the  17th  issues  his  orders 

for  the  next  day  to  move  on  Sart-a-Walhain  at 

6  and  8  A.  M 

But  at  daybreak  he  has  learned  that  the  Prussians 

had  retired  on  Brussels      .... 
Yet  he  does  not  change  his  orders   . 
He  should  have  marched  for  the  bridge  of  Moustier 

at  daybreak       ...... 

Opinion  of  Jomini 

Opinion  of  Clausew^itz  ..... 
Opinion  of  Charras  ..... 

Grouchy  neglects  to  reconnoitre  to  his  left 
He  arrives   at  Walhain  and  stops  at  the  house  of 

M.  Hollert,  a  notary  .         .         . 

He  writes  a  despatch  to  the  Emperor 
Analysis  of  this  despatch  .... 

The  sound  of  the  cannon  of  Waterloo  is  heard 

Grouchy's  plain  duty 

Gerard's  advice 

Grouchy  refuses  to  follow  it    . 

And  resumes  his  march  on  Wavre  . 

Condition  of  the  roads  and  bridges  . 

Grouchy  might  have  crossed  the  Dyle  after  having 

arrived  at  La  Baraque       .... 
Three  general  misconceptions 

1.  As  to  the  place  where  the  sound  of  the  cannon 
was  heard  ...... 

2.  As  to  the  necessity  of  marching  by  way  of  JMont 
St.  Guibert 

3.  As  to  the  resistance  to  be  expected  at  the  bridges 
Grouchy  might  have  been  across  by  4  P.  M. 
Positions   of  the  IVth  and   lid  Prussian  Corps  at 

that  moment  ..... 

And  of  the  1st  Corps  ..... 
Probability  that  Grouchy  would  have  arrested  the 

march  of  Biilow  and  Pirch  I.  .         .         . 


.     248 

•     249 

.     249 

249,  250 


255> 


250 


252 

253 
253 
253 
253 
254 

255 
255 
256 
256 
256 
256 
257 
257 
258 

259 
259 

259 

259 
260 
260 

261 
261 

261 


CONTENTS.  XXV 

Zieten's   march,   however,   would   not   have   been 

interfered  with 261 

Billow  reaches  St.  Lambert  at  noon  ....  262 
Pirch  I.  and  Zieten  do  not  leave  Wavre  till  nearly 

noon 262 

Tardiness  of  these  movements 263 

Accounted  for  by  Gneisenau's  distrust  of  Wellington  .     263 

His  postscript  to  the  letter  to  Muffling     .  .  .  .263 

His  doubts  as  to  Wellington's  accepting  battle  dis- 
pelled by  the  sound  of  the  cannon  of  Waterloo  .     264 

The  combat  at  Wavre 264,  265 

The  bridge  of  Limale  carried  by  the  French  between 

6  and  7  P.  M 265 

Soult's  10  A.  M.  order  to  Grouchy  ....     265 

Analysis  of  this  order 266 

Its  main  object •         •     266 

It  furnishes  no  justification  for  Grouchy's  course      .  .     267 
Inconsistency  between  this  despatch  and  the  instruc- 
tions given  to  Marbot 268-270 

The  despatch  probably  not  revised  by  Napoleon  .  .  270 
The  I  P.  M.  order  to  Grouchy  ....  270,271 
Both  despatches  show  that  Napoleon  was  relying  on 

Grouchy 272 

The  postscript  to  the  second  shows  that  the  Emperor 

had  become  alarmed 272 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  XV 273 

I.     The  wisdom  of  detaching  Grouchy  with  33,000 

men  considered         ....•••     273 
This  course  was  decided  on  when  it  was  believed 

that  the  Prussians  had  retreated  on  Namur        .         .     273 
For  Grouchy  was  not  needed  for  the  battle  with  the 

Anglo-Dutch  army 274 

But  the  Bertrand  order  shows  that  Napoleon  feared 
that   Blucher   might   have  undertaken   to  join 

Wellington 274 

In  which  case  he  would  have  had  a  long  start  by 

the  time  when  Grouchy  could  move           .         .         .     275 
Yet  Napoleon  adhered  to  the  original  decision  to 
send  Grouchy  off,  although  he  gave  him  a  dis- 
tinct warning             ....•••     270 
Risks  incurred  by  this  course 276 


XXVI  CONTENTS. 

It  would  have  been  far  safer  to  have  taken  Grouchy 

and  his  two  corps  with  the  main  army      .  .  .      277 

2.  Kennedy's  reason  against  the  detachment  of 
Grouchy 277 

But  it  was  not  to  beat  Wellington  that  Grouchy  was 

needed,  but  to  keep  off  Bliicher         ....      27S 

3.  Importance  of  treating  independently  of  the 
conduct  of  Napoleon  and  Grouchy    .  .  .  .279 

4.  Hamley's  opinion  as  to  Grouchy's  proper  course 

given  and  commented  on  .....     2S0 

5.  The  probable  results,  if  Grouchy  had  marched 

for  Moustier  at  daybreak  .  .  .  .  .      2S1 

It  would  seem  that  he  might  easily  have  concealed 

the  object  of  his  marcli     .         .         .         .         .         .281 

Charras,  however,  is  of  a  different  opinion      .         .  .     282 

Examination  of  his  views         ......     2S2 

Probability   that   Grouchy    could    have   effected   a 

crossing  at  Moustier  and  Ottignies  by  1 1  A.  M.         .     2S3 
And  that  Biilow  would  have  stopped  to  concentrate 

his  corps  and  fight   .......     2S3 

And  that  Pirch  I.  and  Thielemann  would  have  rein- 
forced Biilow    ........     284 

Zieten,  however,  if  he  chose  to  do  so,  might  have 

continued  his  march  ......     284 

6.  Charras'  view  as  to  the  difficulty  of  Grouchy's 
eflecting  a  crossing  after  he  had  arrived  at  La 
Baraque  ........      284 

His    statements   as   to   the   Prussian   force   in    the 

vicinity  of  the  lower  bridges  unsupported  .  .     285 

7.  It  is  generally  stated  that  Grouchy  was  at  Sart- 
a-Walhain  when   he  heard   the  sound   of  the 

cannon  of  Waterloo  ......     2S6 

Statements  of  the  different  narratives       .  .         .      2S6,  287 

He   was,    hovv^ever,    at   Walhain,    at   the    Chateau 
Marette,  then  the  residence  of  M.  Hollert,  the 
Notary  of  Nil  St.  Vincent         ....      287,  2S8 

CHAPTER  XVI:     THE    BATTLE   OF  WATER- 
LOO         289 

Napoleon  examines  the  allied  position  at  i  A.  M.     .         .     289 
Early  in  the  morning  he  again  goes  to  the  front  to 

see  if  the  English  are  there       .....     290 


CONTENTS. 


XXVI 1 


His  expectation  of  victory 

The  role  which  he  expected  Grouchy  to  play 

He  does  not  seem  to  have  drawn  the  very  natural 

inference     that     Wellington    was      expecting 

Bliicher  ;   or,  if  he  did,  he  certainly  did  not  act 

upon  it     ......         . 

The  rain  ceased  about  S  A.  M. 

The   original   intention   was  to  begin  the  battle  at 

9  o'clock  ...... 

But  Drouot  suggested  delay  and  Napoleon  acquiesced 

Napoleon  forms  the  army  in  three  lines  . 

His  delay  in  beginning  the  action  criticised 

And  his  neglect  to  send  word  to  Grouchy 

Every  hour's  delay  a  gain  to  Wellington 

Whose  army  was  unequal  to  the  shock  without  the 

assistance  of  the  Prussians 
Kennedy's  explanation  of  Wellington's  course 
Risks  that  Wellington  took     .... 
Wellington  had  had  the  field  surveyed 
Description  of  the  English  position 
Composition  and  strength  of  Wellington's  army 
Positions  of  the  various  troops 
Hougomont  and  La  Haye  Sainte     . 
Strength  and  composition  of  the  French  army 

Positions  of  the  corps 

Napoleon's  plan  of  battle         .... 
Establishment  of  a  great  battery  east  of  the  Charleroi 

turnpike  ...... 

It  has  been  universally  commended 

The   attack  on   Hougomont,  ordered    as  a  prelim 

nary  to  the  main  attack,  which  was  to  be  on 

the  centre,  very  rashly  and  carelessly  conducted 
The  assault  by  d'Erlon's  Corps 
Formation  of  the  troops  .... 

No  assignable  reason  for  such  a  peculiar  and  un 

wieldy  formation       ..... 
The  attack  is  made  and  repulsed 
Napoleon  sees  the  Prussians  on  the  heights  of  St 

Lambert 

Capture  of  La  Haye  Sainte     .... 
The  great  cavalry  attacks  on  the  English  centre 


290 
290 


291 
291 

293 
292 
293 

293 
294 
294 

294 
295 
295 
296 
297 
298 

299 
300 
301 
301 
302 

303 
303 


303^  304 

304-307 

•  305 


305 
307 

307 
307 
308 


CONTENTS. 


They  were  made  against  troops  in  good  condition  to 

stand  them        ...... 

Napoleon  is  called  away  at  4  P.  M.  to  take  charge 

of  the  resistance  to  the  Prussians     . 
Necessity    of   maintaining  the  Charleroi  road  and 

Planchenoit  against  their  assaults     . 
Napoleon's  personal  supervision  needed  . 
The  great  cavalry  charges        .... 
They  accomplish  little  and  the  cavalry  is  ruined 
French   batteries  placed  to  the   south  of  La  Haye 

Sainte  enfilade   the  English    line  west  of   the 

turnpike  ....... 

But  this  was  only  done  to  a  limited  extent 

The  attack  by  the  heavy  cavalry  of  the  Guard 

Napoleon  succeeds  in  repulsing  Biilow    . 

The  battle  against  the  English  not  actively  carried 

on  after  the  cessation  of  the  cavalry  attacks 
But  the  English  line  at   this   period   becomes  from 

various  causes  very  weak.     Kennedy's  descrip 

tion  of  it 

What  Napoleon  might  have  accomplished  against 

the  English  had  he  not  been  fighting  the  Prus 

sians  at  this  time      ..... 
The  fight  with  the  Prussians  terminated,   Napoleon 

returns  to  the  front  .... 

Wellington   has   made   every  effort   to  restore  hi 

line ;  its  condition  to  the  west  of  the  pike 
Ney  is  ordered  to  make  preparations  for  an   attack 

to  be  made  by  the  Imperial  Guard    . 
Disposition  at  this  time  of  the  various  battalions  of 

the  Guard         ...... 

Strength  and  composition  of  the  attacking  force 
The  Emperor  leads  up  and  hands  to  Ney  two  regi 

ments  of  grenadiers  and  two  of  chasseurs 
They  are  formed  in  columns  of  battalions  and  march 

in.  echelon,  the  right  in  advance 
Premature  attack  of  a  body  of  French  horse  on  th 

left  of  the  Guard       .         .         .         .         . 
No  support  furnished  by  Reille 
Admirable  conduct  of  d'Erlon 


.     316 


CONTENTS. 


XXIX 


The  leading  battalions  of  the  Guard  strike  Maitland's 

brigade  of  guards     .         .         .         .         .         .         .319 

Captain  Powell's  account 319 

The  leading  battalions  of  the  Guard  are  beaten        .         .  320 

General  Maitland's  account     .         .         .         .         .         •  321 

Skilful  and  gallant  conduct  of  Sir  C.  Halkett  .  .  322 
The  left  and  rear  battalions  of  the  Guard  continue 

to  advance        ........  323 

But  are  attacked  in  flank  by  the  5 2d  regiment           .         .  324 

And  are  completely  overthrown       .....  324 

The  failure  of  the  attack  largely  due  to  the  absence 

of  supports       ........  324 

Arrival  of  the  van  of  Zieten's  Corps  on  the  field       .          .  324 

The  French  right  wing  retires  in  confusion  .  .  .  325 
Charge  of  the  cavalry-brigades  of  Vivian  and  Van- 

deleur 325 

Exertions  of  Napoleon  to  restore  order    .         .         .         -325 

He  is  finally  forced  to  retire 326 

The  French  retreat  blocked  at  Genappe  .  .  .  326 
The  result  of  the  battle  due  to  the  intervention  of 

the  Prussians -32  7 

Probable  course  of  Zieten  if  Grouchy  had  detained 

Billow  and  Pirch  I.            ......  32S 

Grouchy,   however,  not  solely  responsible  for  the 

defeat 32S 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  XVI 329 

1.  The  French  tactics  generally  censured  .  .  .  329 
Napoleon  and  Ney  both  to  blame  .....  329 
Injurious  effect  on  the  French  chances  of  success  of 

Napoleon's  absence  at  Planchenoit   ....  330 

The  attack  on  Hougomont  criticised        ....  330 

The  defence  of  Planchenoit  praised          .         .         .         •  33^ 

2.  The  English  tactics  exceedingly  good        .         .         •  33^ 

3.  The  attack  of  the  Imperial  Guard     .         .         .         •  33^ 

A.  No  foundation  for  the  hypothesis  of  two  columns      .  332 

B.  The  claims  of  the  52d  regiment  considered  .  .  333 
The  notion  that  it  was  only  the  skirmishers  of  the 

Imperial  Guard  who  were  driven  off  by  Mait- 
land's brigade  refuted  by  the  testimony  of  eye 

witnesses 334 

The  great  credit  due  to  Colborne 335 


XXX  CONTENTS. 

4.  Napoleon's  reasons  for  ordering  the  attack  con- 
sidered    .........     336 

Zieten's  inter\-ention  not  anticipated  ....  336 
The  English  reported  as  growing  weaker  .  .  .  337 
Ney  ordered  and  expected  to  support  the  attack  by 

Bachelu's  division  and  by  cavalry  on  the  left  .  337 
Ney  disappoints  the  Emperor's  expectations  in  both 

respects  337 

The  charge  of  the  Guard  might  have  been  properly 

supported  ........     338 

Contrast  between  Ney  and  Wellington  .         .         .     33S 

Note  on  Ney's  state  of  mind    ....  33S,  n.  22 

5.  Wellington's  course  in  leaving  i8,ooo  men  at 

Hal  and  Tubize,  not  to  be  defended  .         .  .     339 

6.  As  to  the  effect  upon  the  Prussians  of  the  ap- 
pearance  of  Grouchy's   force   marching   from 

the  Dyle 339 

7.  The  rout  of  the  French  army  due  to  the  irrup- 
tion of  Zieten's  Corps        ......     340 

The   comparative    weakness   of   the    Anglo-Dutch 

army  at  the  close  of  the  action         ....     341 

8.  Relative  responsibility  of  Napoleon  and  Grouchy 

for  the  intervention  of  the  Prussians  .         .         .     341 

Both  are  responsible  for  it 343 

CHAPTER    XVH:     CONCLUDING     OBSERVA- 
TIONS   343 

The  principal  points  treated  of  in  this  book      .         .      343-350 

Appendix  A. 
On  some  characteristics  of  Napoleon's  Memoirs       .         •351 
Injustice  done  Napoleon  by  Charras  and  others        .         •     351 

Peculiarity  of  Napoleon's  memory 352 

He  recalls  his  expectations,  but  not  the  tenor  of  the 

orders  which  he  gave 352 

Illustration  from  the  orders  sent  to  Ney  on  the  after- 
noon of  the  i6th 3-2 

The  same  thing  probably  true  as  to  the  order  sent 

to  Grouchy       ........     353 

The  orders  given  in  the  "Memoirs"  were  probably 

never  sent -^-^ 

x\nd  the  Bertrand  order,  which  was  sent,  was  for- 
gotten        3^4 


CONTENTS.  XXXI 

Appendix  B. 

On  Marshal  Grouchy  and  the  Bertrand  order           »         .  355 
Denials  by  Marshal  Grouchy  in  his  pamphlets  pub- 
lished in  Philadelphia  that  he  received  on  the 

17th  any  written  order.     ......  355 

He  relied  on  the  fact  that  no  copy  of  the  Bertrand 

order  was  among  the  major-general's  papers     .          .  356 

Publication  of  the  order  in  1842 357 

It  is  now  recognized  in  the  Grouchy  Memoirs          .          .  357 

Original  text  of  the  Bertrand  Order          ....  358 
Grouchy's  report  to  the  Emperor  dated  Gembloux, 

10  P.  M.,  June  17,  given  in  full        ....  359 

It  is  in  reality  a  reply  to  the  Bertrand  order     .         .          .  360 
Mutilation  by  Marshal  Grouchy  of  the  text  of  this 

report       .........  360 

Object  of  the  change 360 

No  doubt  as  to  the  correct  reading  .         .         .         •361 

Appendix  C. 

I.     Napoleon's  Address  to   his  army,  June  14, 

1815 363 

II.     Order  of  movement,  June  14,  1815       .         .  .     363 

III.  Order  to  the  Count  Reille,  8.30  A.  M.,  June 

15'  1S15 .366 

IV.  Order  to  the  Count  d'Erlon,  10  A.  M.,  June 

^5^  1815 367 

V.     Order  to  the  Count  d'Erlon,  3  P.  M.,  June  15, 

1815 367 

VI.     Subsequent  Order  to  the  Count  d'Erlon,  June 

15.  1815 367 

VII.     Order  to  Gen.  Nogues,  3  A.   M.,  June  16, 

1815      .         .         /       .  ....     368 

VIII.     Bulletin  of  the  army,  June  15,  1815,  evening  .     369 

IX.     Wellington's   first  Memorandum  of  Orders, 

June  15,  1815 370 

X.     Wellington's  letter  to  the  Due  de  Feltre,  10 

P.  M.,  June  15,  1815 371 

XL     Wellington's  "  After  Orders,"  10  P.  M.,  June 

i5»  1815 371 

XII.     Extract    from   Wellington's   Report   of   the 

Operations,  June  19,  1815 373 


XXXll 


CONTENTS. 


XIII.  Wellington's   Conversation   with   the    Duke 
of  Richmond,  June  i6,  1S51 

XIV.  Wellington's  Orders  to  Lord  Hill,  June  16, 
1S15 

XV.     Extract   from  Wellington's    "Memorandum 
on  the  Battle  of  Waterloo  "  . 
XVI.     Wellington's  Letter  to  Bliicher,  10.30  A.  M., 
June  16,  1815        ...... 

XVII.     Soult's  first  order  to  Ney,  June  16,  18 15 
XVIII.     The  Emperor's  Letter  to  Ney,  June  16,  1S15 
XIX.     Count  Reille's  Letter  to  Ney,  June  16,  181 5 
XX.     Ney's  Orders  to  Reille  and  d'Erlon,  June  16, 

1815 

XXI.     Soulf  s  formal  Order  to  Ney  to  carry  Quatre 

Bras,  June  16,  1815 

XXII.     Soult's  second  Order  to  Ney  to  carry  Quatre 
Bras,  June  16,  1815 

XXIII.  Flahaut's  Letter  to  the  Duke  of  Elchingen     . 

XXIV.  Napoleon's  Letter  to  Grouchy,  June  16,  18 15 
XXV.     The  2  P.  M.  —June  i6th  —  Order  to  Ney      . 

XXVI.     The  3.15  P.  M.  —June  i6th  — Order  to  Ney 
XXVII.     Soult's  Letter  to  Ney,  June  17,  1815      . 
XXVIII.     Soult's  Order  to  Ney,  12  M.,  June  17,  1S15 
XXIX.     Capt.  Bowles'  story  of  Wellington  at  Qiiatre 

Bras,  June  17,  1815 

XXX.     Grouchy's  report  to  Napoleon  from  Sart-a- 

Walhain,  11  A.M.,  June  18,  1815 
XXXI.     General  Order  of  preparation  for  the  Battle 
of  Waterloo,  June  18,  1815 
XXXII.     Order  for  the   attack   to   begin   at  i  P.M., 
June  18,  1815 

XXXIII.  The  10  A.  M.— June  i8th— Order  to  Grouchy 

XXXIV.  The  I  P.  M.— June  1 8th— Order  to  Grouchy 


373 

374 

374 

376 
377 
377 
379 

379 

3S0 

381 

3S2 
3S2 

383 
384 
384 
385 

386 
386 

387 

388 
388 
389 


MAPS. 

(At  end  of  this  volume.) 

The  Theatre  of  War. 

The  Field  of  Waterloo  at  ii  A.M.,  June 


'I5. 


Jov  CrVK£^  irv^-   vX 


A    PARTIAL    LIST   OF   WORKS    RELATING    TO    THE 
CAMPAIGN.' 

^    ALISON: 

History  of  Europe  from  the  commencement  of  the  French  Revolution 
to  the  Restoration  of  the  Bourbons  in  1815.  By  Archibald  Alison,  LL.  D. 
New  Edition  with  Portraits.  Vols.  XIII  and  XIV.  Wm.  Blackwood  & 
Sons,  Edinburgh  &  London,  MDCCCL. 

\j(    BATTY: 

An  Historical  Sketch  of  the  Campaign  of  1815,  illustrated  by  Plans  of 
the  Operations  and  of  the  Battles  of  QuatreBras,  Ligny  and  Waterloo.  By 
Captain  Batty,  of  the  First  or  Grenadier  Guards.  2d  Edition,  Considerably 
Enlarged.    London,  1820. 


Y<oi'^f 


vX 


BAUDUS: 

Etudes  sur  Napoleon.    Par  le  lieutenant-colonel  de  Baudus,  ancien  aide-  .4^ 

de-camp  des  Mardchaux  Bessiferes  et  Soult.  2  Vols.  Paris  :  Debdcourt :  1841. 

BERTON: 

Precis,  historique,  militaire  et  critique,  des  batailles  de  Fleurus  et  de 
Waterloo.  Avec  une  Carte.  Par  le  Mar^chal-de-Camp  Berton.  Paris: 
Delaunay.     1818. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN: 

v/'  Prepared,  with  critical  estimates,  in  October,  1875,  by  Justin  Winsor, 
now  Librarian  of  Harvard  College,  in  Bulletin  No.  35  of  the  Public  Library 
of  the  City  of  Boston,  of  which  Mr.  Winsor  was  then  Librarian.  It  includes 
a  notice  of  Maps  and  Plans. 

Colonel  Chesney  gives  a  list  of  works  cited  by  himself  just  after  the 
Table  of  Contents  in  his  Waterloo  Lectures. 

Colonel  Maurice  in  his  book  entitled  "War,"  —  London  and  New  York:      ^  ^^    . 

Macmillan  &  Co.,   1891,  — gives  in  the  Appendix,  pp.  128  et  seg.,  a  list  of    "    jOO  '  * 
books  relating  to  the  campaign  of  Waterloo,  —  with  comments  and  estimates. 

BROWNE: 

Wellington:  or  Public  and  Private  Life  of  Arthur,  first  Duke  of  Wel- 
lington.   By  G.  Lathom  Browne.    London,  W.  H.  Allen  &  Co.     1888. 

^X  BULLOCK'S  DIARY: 

Journal  of  R.  H.  Bullock,  nth  Light  Dragoons.  English  Historical 
Magazine.    July,  1888. 


I  Where  these  works  are  cited  in  this  book  they  are  cited  by  the  word  which  is  Drinted  in 
capitals;  as  ALISOM,  BATTY,  BAUDUS. 

xxxiii 


XXXIV  PARTIAL   LIST   OF   BOOKS 

VCAMPAGNE   DE   LA   BELGIQUE: 

Contenant 

1.  L'Ode  sur  la  Bataille  de  Waterloo  ou  de  Mont  St.  Jean : 

2.  Relation  Beige  sur  la  Bataille  de  Waterloo,  et  de  la  part  qu'y  a  prise 
la  troisibme  division  militaire  du  Royaume  des  Pays  Bas : 

ti^3.     Relation  Fran^aise,  par  un  tdmoin  oculaire : 

4.  Campagne  de  Walcheren  et  d'Anvers ;  1809: 

5.  Relation  Anglaise,  traduite  sur  le  texte,  publi^e  k  Londres  en  Sep 
tembre  dernier. 

Bruxelles,  1816.    (With  a  portrait  of  the  Prince  of  Orange,  and  maps.) 

\^  ^   V/  CHARRAS  : 

Tv       t   >  Histoire  de  la  Campagne  de  1815  :  Waterloo :  Par  le  Lt-Colonel  Charras, 

5  0  ^  J/  >v|  -IZ  5me  Edition,  revue  et  augmentde.    Avec  un  Atlas  nouveau.     Leipzig :  F.  A, 
Brockhaus.    (No  date.)/i' a)  ^  2,*-;^'     • 

^  V  CHESNEY: 

Waterloo  Lectures:  A  Study  of  the  Campaign  of  1S15.  By  Colonel 
Charles  C.  Chesney,  R.  E.,  late  Professor  of  Military  Art  and  History  in 
the  Staff  College.    Third  Edition.    London :  Longmans,  Green  &  Co.    1874. 

,  /CHURCHILL'S   LETTER: 

Letter  to  his  father  written  by  Major  Chatham  Horace  Churchill,  of  the 
ist  Foot  Guards,  Aide  to  General  Lord  Hill.  (Waterloo  Roll  Call,  pp.  2,  14, 
92,  and  Appendix.)  The  letter  was  first  printed  in  the  Life  of  Sir  William 
Napier,  pp.  175  et  seq.  It  was  reprinted,  with  some  omissions  and  some  ad- 
ditions, in  an  English  magazine  called  Atalanta,  in  November,  1887,  where  it 
erroneously  said  to  have  been  "  hitherto  unpublished."  The  writer's  name 
is  not  given.  Mr.  Dalton,  the  compiler  of  the  Waterloo  Roll  Call,  states  in 
the  Appendix  (p.  235)  that  a  copy  of  the  letter  is  in  his  possession.  It  would 
be  weU  worth  while  to  republish  it  textually  with  notes. 

i^"  V  CLAUSEWITZ: 

Der  Feldzug  von  1815  in  Frankreich.  Hinterlassenes  Werk  des  Gen- 
erals Carl  von  Clausewitz. 

Zweite  Auflage.     Berlin:  Ferd.  Diimmler's  Verlagsbuchhandlung:  1862. 

CLINTON: 

The  War  in  the  Peninsula,  and  Wellington's  Campaigns  in  France  and 
Belgium.  With  original  maps  and  plans.  By  H.  R.  Clinton.  London: 
Frederick  Warne  &  Co.    1878. 

ir»  4  -  5  ■/  CORRESPONDANCE  de  Napoldon  ler,  publiee  par  ordre  de  I'Empereur 

/  Napoleon  III. 

Tome  XXVI I L 

Tome  XXXT,  CEuvres  de  Napoleon  lerk  St.  H^lbne.  Paris:  Imprimerie 
Imp^riale.     1869. 


^ 


/ 


RELATING  TO  THE   CAMPAIGN.  XXXV 

COTTON :  i' 

A  Voice  from  Waterloo :  a  history  of  the  battle,  &c.    By  Sergeant-     *^ 

major  Edward  Cotton,  late  7th  Hussars.  •,  ^  ,--, 

Fifth  Edition,  revised  and  enlarged.    Printed  for  the  author.     London.    '■   "^  •'  •>  - 

R.  Green.    1854. 

CRAAN,  W.  B. : 

Plan  du  Champ  de  Bataille  de  Waterloo.    Bruxelles:  1816. 

DAMITZ:  Histoire  de  la  Campagne  de  1815 :  Par  le  major  de  Damitz, 
ofificier  prussien,  d'apr^s  les  documents  du  Gdndral  Grolman,  Quartier- 
Maitre-G^n^ral  de  I'armde  prussienne  en  1815. 
Traduite  de  I'AUemand  par  L^on  Griffon.     Avec  Plans.    2  Volumes. 

Paris.     Correard.     1840. 

D'AUVERGNE: 

See  La  Tour  d'Auvergne. 

DAVOUT: 

Histoire  de  la  Vie  Militaire,  Politique,  et  Administrative  du  Mardchal 
Davout,  Due  de  Auerstaedt,  Prince  d'EckmiihI.      D'aprfes  les  documents  ^^   )r%,^    \^ 

officiels.    Par  L.  J.  Gabriel  de  Chenier.    Paris:  Gosse,  Marchal  &  Cie:  1866. 

^DOCUMENTS   INfiDITS: 

Documents    inddits    sur   la    campagne  de   1815,  publics  par  le  Due 
d'Elchingen.    Paris.     1840.  ^^  Oq'J)  C 

DRAME   DE  WATERLOO: 

Le  Drame  de  Waterloo :  Grande  Restitution  Historique.    Avec  un  plan. 
3me  edition.    Paris:  Au  Bureau  de  la  Revue  Spiritualiste.     1868. 


& 


»v«; 


J   #      ^ 


\J     V'^t 


DROUET: 

Le  Mardchal  Drouet,  Comte  d'Erlon.  Notice  sur  la  vie  militaire,  dcrite 
par  lui-meme  et  dedide  k  ses  amis.  Publide  par  sa  famille.  Avec  portrait. 
Paris :  Gustave  Barba :  Libraire  fiditeur.    34  Rue  Mazarine.    1844. 

xXeLLESMERE: 

Essays  on  History,  Biography,  Geography,  Engineering,  &c.  Contrib- 
uted to  the  Quarterly  Review :  By  the  late  Earl  of  Ellesmere.  London : 
John  Murray.     1858. 

FRAGMENTS   HISTORIQUES : 

See  Grouchy.  / 

tV    ERASER:  Letters  written  during  the  Peninsula  and  Waterloo  Campaigns.    \J    j3r~ 
By  Sir  A,^  Fra^r.  London:  1859.  y    .  «^*-;  /*    .    ^ 

YX   FRASER: 

Words  on  Wellington  —  the  Duke  —  Waterloo  —  the  Ball.  By  Sir  Wm. 
Eraser,  Baronet.    London.    John  C.  Nimmo:  1889.  ^ 


XXXVl  PARTIAL   LIST   OF   BOOKS 


v/. 


J 


GARDNER: 

Quatre  Bras,  Ligny  and  Waterloo.     A  narrative  of  the  campaign  in 
Belgium  in  1815.    By  Dorsey  Gardner.     London:  Kegan  Paul,  Trench  & 
Co.    1882. 
GAWLER : 

The  Crisis  and  Close  of  the  Action  at  Waterloo.  By  an  Eyewitness. 
Dublin.     Richard  Milliken  &  Son:  104  Grafton  Street.     1833. 

I  A  /)l)^  \1^  GfiRARD  : 
V  hJ/ at       /  I.    Quelques  Documents  sur  la  Bataille  de  Waterloo,  propres  k  dclairer 

question  portee  devant  le  public  par  M.  le  Marquis  de  Grouchy.     Par  le 
G^n^ral  Gerard.     Paris:  Denain:  Novembre,  1829.    (With  a  Map.) 

2.  Derniferes  Observations  sur  les  Operations  de  I'aile  droite  de  TArmde 
Frangaise  h  la  Bataille  de  Waterloo,  en  rdponse  h.  M.  le  Marquis  de  Grouchy. 
Par  le  G^ndral  Gdrard.    Paris:  Denain:  1830.     (With  a  Map.) 

3.  Lettre  h  MM.  Germain  Sarrut  et  B.  Saint  Edme,  Rddacteurs  de  la 
Biographie  des  Hommes  du  Jour.     Paris:  12  Mars,  1840. 

GIRAUD: 

The  Campaigns  of  Paris  in  1814  and  1815,  etc.  Translated  from  the 
French  of  P.  F.  F.  J.  Giraud  by  Edmund  Boyce.  2d  Edition,  enlarged. 
London.     1816. 


""^r  la  qui 


iD  lo 


^ 


6-f:ji| 


\     ^   /    GNEISENAU: 

Das  Leben  des  Feldmarschalls  Grafen  Reithardt  von  Gneisenau. 
Vierter  Band.  1814,  1815.  Von  Hans  Delbriick.  Fortfetzung  des  Gleich- 
namigen  Werkes  von  G.  H.  Pertz.    Berlin.     18S0. 

/    GOMM: 
v'  Letters  and  Journals  of   Field-Marshal  Sir  William  Maynard   Gomm, 

G.  C.  B.    From  1799  to  Waterloo,  1815.    Edited  by  Francis  Culling  Carr- 
Gomm.    London:  John  Murray.     18S1. 

GORE: 

An  Historical  Account  of  the  Battle  of  Waterloo ;  intended  to  elucidate 
the  topographical  plan  executed  by  W.  B.  Craan,  J.  U.  D.  Translated  from 
the  French,  with  explanatory  notes,  by  Captain  Arthur  Gore,  30th  Regiment 
of  Foot.    With  Plates.     London.    Printed  for  Samuel  Leigh.     1817. 

aV     ^.  GOURGAUD  (original) : ' 
"^      '  Campagne  de  dix-huit  cent  quinze :  ou  Relation  des  Operations  Mili- 

aires  qui  ont  eu  lieu  en  France  et  en  Belgique,  pendant  les  Cent  Jours. 
£crite  h.  Sainte  H^lfene.     Par  le  Gdn^ral  Gourgaud.     Paris :  iSi8. 

GOURGAUD  (translation) : 

The  Campaign  of  1815.  Written  at  St.  Helena  by  General  Gourgaud. 
London:  1818. 


'  Our  citations  are  from  this  (original)  edition. 


RELATING   TO   THE   CAMPAIGN,  XXXVU 

^,  GRENADIER  GUARDS: 

The  Origin  and  History  of  the  First  or  Grenadier  Guards.     By  Lieut. 
Gen.   Sir  F.  W.  Hamilton,  K.  C.  B.     In  three  volumes.     London:  John 
Murray,     1874. 
GROUCHY: 

1.  Observations  sur  la  Relation  de  la  Campagne  de  1815,  publide  par 
le  Gdndral  Gourgaud,  et  Refutation  de  quelques  unes  des  Assertions  d'autres 
Merits  relatifs  k  la  bataille  de  Waterloo.  Par  le  Mardchal  de  Grouchy. 
Philadelphie.     1818. 

2.  The  same,  with  omissions  and  changes.     Philadelphia,  1819. 

3.  The  same  title  except  that  the  author's  name  is  given  as  "  le  Comte  de 
Grouchy."  Reprinted,  with  many  omissions  and  changes,  from  the  Phila- 
delphia edition  of  1819.  Paris:  Chez  Chaumerot  Jeune,  Libraire,  Palais 
Royal.     1819.' 

4.  Doutes  sur  I'Authenticitd  des  Mdmoires  historiques  attribuds  h  Napo- 
Idon  et  premifere  refutation  de  quelques  unes  des  assertions  qu'ils  renferment. 
Par  le  Comte  de  Grouchy:  Philadelphie:  Avril,  1820. 

5.  Fragments  Historiques  relatifs  k  la  Campagne  de  1815  et  k  la  Bataille 
de  Waterloo.     Par  le  G^ndral  Grouchy. 

Lettre  k  Messieurs  Mdry  et  Barthdlemy. 

Paris:  Firmin  Didot  Frferes,  20  Novembre,  1829. 
yV , —    6.     Fragments  Historiques,  &c.  ^    /     ..,^^  y. 

De  I'influence  que  peuvent  avoir  sur  I'opinion  les  documents  publics  par      •'^ 
M.  le  Comte  Gerard.  O^^-^J/' 

Paris:  Firmin  Didot  Frferes,'2oDecembre,  1829.        "  ^'Aa    7) 

\X  *—  7-     Le  Mardchal  de  Grouchy  du  16  au  19  Juin  1815.     Par  le  G^ndral  de  '  ^^9kjy   ' 

Division  Sdnateur  Marquis  de  Grouchy.     Paris.     E.  Dentu.     1864.  »     -• 

_.  8.     Mdmoires  du  Marechal  de  Grouchy.     Par  le  Marquis  de  Grouchy, 
officier  de  I'^tat-major.    vol.4.    Paris  :  E.  Dentu.     1874. 


/ 


■^ 


:  <y- 


^ 


GURWOOD: 

The  Despatches  of  Field  Marshal  the  Duke  of  Wellington.  Compiled 
from  official  and  authentic  documents,  by  Lieut.-Colonel  Gurwood.  Vol.  XII. 
London:  John  Murray:  1838. 


yV    HAMLEY: 


^X 


The  Operations  of  War  explained  and  illustrated.  By  Edward  Bruce 
Hamley,  Colonel  in  the  Army,  etc.  Second  Edition.  William  Blackwood  & 
Sons.     Edinburgh  and  London.     1869. 

HILL: 

The  Life  of  Lord  Hill,  G.  C.  B.  By  the  Rev.  Edwin  Sidney,  A.  M. 
Second  edition.     London:  John  Murray :  1845. 

HISTOIRE  DE  L'EX-GARDE: 

Depuis  sa  formation  jusqu'k  son  licenciement.     Paris:  Delaunay:  1S21. 


■^^lof 


Unless  otherwise  stated,  our  quotations  are  from  this  edition. 


XXXVlll  PARTIAL   LIST   OF   BOOKS 

aV_j       >    ^     HOOPER: 

'   fC    ^'  Waterloo :  the  Downfall  of  the  First  Napoleon :  A  History  of  the  Cam- 

,  ■]  paign  of  1815.     By  George  Hooper:  author  of  "The  Italian  Campaigns  of 

General  Bonaparte."    With  Map  and  Plans.    London:  Smith,  Elder  &  Co. 
1862.  .  y  ,  y      ' . 

I  IMPERIAL  GUARD : 

See  Histoire  de  I'Ex-Garde. 
See  St.  Hilaire. 

\X  -^     V  JOMINI  (original) : 

^         ^  '         Precis  Politique  et  Militaire  de  la  Campagne  de  1815,  pour  servir  de 

iO  ^-Jy  X  i"  supplement  et  de  rectification  k  la  Vie  Politique  et  Militaire  de  Napoldon 

'  racont^e  par  lui-meme.    Par  le  Gdn^ral  J.    Paris:  1839. 

JOMINI  (translation):* 

The  Political  and  Military  History  of  the  Campaign  of  Waterloo. 
Translated  from  the  French  of  General  Baron  de  Jomini,  by  Capt.  S.  V. 
Ben^t,  Ordnance  Dept.  U.  S.  Army.  Second  Edition.  New  York:  D.  Van 
Nostrand:  1862. 

JONES : 

The  Battle  of  Waterloo,  with  those  of  Ligny  and  Quatre  Bras, 
^described  by  eye-witnesses,  and  by  the  series  of  official  accounts  published 
by  authority.  To  which  are  added  Memoirs  of  F.  M.  the  Duke  of  Welling- 
ton, F.  M.  Prince  Bliicher,  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  etc.,  etc.  Illustrated  by 
Maps,  Plans,  and  Views  of  the  Field,  and  Thirty-four  Etchings  from  Draw- 
ings. By  George  Jones,  Esq.,  R.  A.  Eleventh  Edition,  enlarged  and  cor- 
rected.   London:  L.  Booth:  Duke  Street.    1852. 

KENNEDY: 

Notes  on  the  Battle  of  Waterloo.  By  the  late  General  Sir  James  Shaw- 
Kennedy,  K.  C.  B.,  acting  at  the  time  of  the  battle  on  the  Quarter- Master- 
General's  Staff  of  the  Third  Division  of  the  Army.  London :  John  Murray  : 
1865. 

LA  TOUR  D'AUVERGNE: 

Waterloo:  £tude  de  la  Campagne  de  1815.  Par  le  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Prince  fidouard  de  La  Tour  d'Auvergne.  Avec  Cartes  et  Plans.  Paris : 
Henri  Plon:  1870. 

LEEKE: 

The  History  of  Lord  Seaton's  Regiment  (the  52d  Light  Infantry)  at  the 
Battle  of  Waterloo.  By  the  Reverend  William  Leeke,  M.  A.  2  vols.  Lon- 
don:  Hatchard  &  Co.     1866. 

LOBEN  SELS: 

See  Van  Loben  Sels. 


pih 


i^^ 


xT 


i^^V 


A^ 


'  Our  citations  are  from  this  translation. 


vV 


RELATING  TO  THE   CAMPAIGN.  XXXIX 

LOCKHART: 

The  History  of  Napoleon  Buonaparte.    By  J.  G.  Lockhart.    Third  edi-  '201  C  i^-H'X 

tion.    2  vols.     London :  John  Murray.     1835. 

The  History  of  Napoleon  Buonaparte.  Reprinted  from  the  Family 
Library.    London:  William  Tegg.    1867. 

MARfiCHAL  DE  GROUCHY  EN  1815  : 

See  Grouchy. 
MAURICE:  ARTICLES  ON  WATERLOO: 

By  Col.  J.  Fo  Maurice,  R.  A.  From  the  United  Service  Magazine. 
Vol.  123.     In  the  years  1890  and  1891. 

^MfiMOIRES  (original): 

M^moires  pour  servir  k  I'Histoire  de  France  en  1815,  avec  le  plan  de  la      §  '^OoD^S 
bataille  de  Mont  St.  Jean.  ^  Paris:  1820. 1  Ij-^iX'^fiXj^i/u^  ^  r-  '^    '-•  ^  /^^a;,*s  . 
MEMOIRS  (translation):  Ywf'CR^t^  \  £>^\^-^x<^  , 

Historical  Memoirs  of  Napoleon.  Book  IX.  1815.  Translated  from 
the  original  Manuscript  by  B.  E.  O'Meara.  London:  Printed  for  Sir  Rich- 
ard Phillips  &  Co.     1820. 

MERCER: 

Journal  of  the  Waterloo  Campaign.  Kept  throughout  the  Campaign 
of  1815.  By  the  late  General  Cavalid  Mercer,  commanding  the  9th  Brigade 
Royal  Artillery.  In  2  vols.  Wm.  Blackwood  &  Sons,  Edinburgh  &  London. 
1870. 

MORRIS,  O'CONNOR: 
See  O'Connor  Morris. 

MUDFORD : 

An  Historical  Account  of  the  Campaign  in  the  Netherlands  in  18 15 
under  his  Grace  the  Duke  of  Wellington  and  Marshal  Prince  Bliicher.  By 
William  Mudford.    Illustrated.    London.    1817. 

MUFFLING :  PASSAGES : 
-^  Passages  from  my  Life ;  together  with  Memoirs  of  the  Campaign  of  1813 

and  1814.  By  Baron  von  Miiffling.  Edited  with  notes  by  Col.  Philip  Yorke, 
F.  R.  S.  Second  Edition,  revised.  London :  Richard  Bentley,  New  Burling, 
ton  Street.     1853. 

Part  II.,  beginning  with  page  197,  contains  an  account  of  the  Waterloo 
Campaign. 

^    MyjlKLlNG :  SKBT€H  : 

A  Sketch  of  the  Battle  of  Waterloo,  to  which  are  added  the  Official 
Despatches  of  Field  Marshal  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  Field  Marshal  Prince 
Bliicher,  and  Reflections  on  the  Battles  of  Ligny  and  Waterloo.  By  General 
Muffling.  With  Craan's  Map  of  the  Field.  Sbcth  Edition.  Waterloo. 
H.  Gerard,  Publisher.    1870.        ^^  f<|    !  J^'  I'XOS"  Z' 

Au  \^c^  LA^..     h^,^  ip^    ^  IcfoVec, 


1^^ 


v/ 


Xl  PARTIAL   LIST   OF   BOOKS 

MUQUARDT: 

Precis  de  la  Campagne  de  1815  dans  les  Pays-Bas.  Bruxelles .  Libraire 
Militaire  C.  Muquardt :  Merzbach  and  Falk,  Editeurs.     1887. 

NAPIER: 

Life  of  General  Sir  William  Napier,  K.  C.  B.,  Author  of  the  "  History  of 
the  Peninsular  War."  Edited  by  H.  O.  Bruce,  M.  P.  2  vols.  London: 
John  Murray.     1864. 

NAPOLEON: 

See  Correspondance. 
"     Memoires. 
"     Memoirs. 

NAPOLfiON  A  WATERLOO : 

Souvenirs  Militaires.  Napoldon  k  Waterloo,  ou  Precis  rectifid  de  la 
Campagne  de  1S15.  Avec  des  Documents  nouveaux  et  des  Pieces  in^dites. 
Par  un  ancien  officier  de  la  Garde  Imp^riale,  qui  est  rest^  pr^s  de  Napoldon 
pendant  toutela  campagne.    Paris:  J.  Dumaine,  1866. 

NIEMAN'S  DIARY: 

The  Journal  of  Henri  Nieman  of  the  6th  Prussian  Black  Hussars. 
From  the  English  Historical  Magazme  for  July,  1S88. 

O'CONNOR  MORRIS: 

Great  Commanders  of  Modern  Times,  and  the  Campaign  of  1815.  By 
William  O'Connor  Morris.    London:  W.  H.  Allen  &  Co.:  1891. 

OLDFIELD: 

Letters  on  the  Battle  of  Waterloo.  MSS.  By  John  Oldfield,  Captain 
and  Brigade-Major,  Royal  Engineers. 

y      \}  /  OLLECH : 

v/\     y^      \j  Geschichte  des  Feldzuges  von  1815  nach  archivalischen  Quellen.    Von 

^3s0^l)  11      Ollech,  General  der  I nfanterie.    Berlin:  1876. 

'  /        O'MEARA: 

See  Memoirs. 


/ 


\)^ 


f 


^ 

'V 


PAJOL: 

Pajol,  Gdndral  en  Chef.  Parle  g^n^ral  de  division  Comte  Pajol  —  son 
fils  aind.    3  vols.    Paris.    Firmin  Didot  Frferes.     1S74. 

PASCALLET: 

Notice  Biographique  sur  M.  le  Mardchal  Marquis  de  Grouchy,  Pair  de 
France,  avec  des  Eclaircissements  et  des  Details  historiques  sur  la  Campagne 
de  1815  dans  le  midi  de  France,  et  sur  la  Bataille  de  Waterloo.  Par  M.  E. 
Pascallet,  Fondateur  and  Rddacteur  en  chef  de  la  Revue  Gdndrale,  Biograph- 
ique, Politique  and  Litteraire.    ae  Edi.tion.     Paris.     1842. 


\X 


RELATING  TO  THE   CAMPAIGN.  xH 

/ 
QUINET:  •    / 

Histoire  de  la  Campagne  de  1815.    Par  Edgar  Quinet.    Paris:    Michel   ' 
L^vyFr^res.     ,862.  S3^^2)^^     ^T 

RELATION   BELGE:  ^  ^" 

See  Campagne  de  la  Belgique. 

ROGNIAT: 

Rdponse  aux  notes  critiques  de  Napoleon  sur  I'ouvrage  intituld  "  Con- 
siderations sur  I'Art  de  la  Guerre."     Paris.     1823. 

SIBORNE: 

History  of  the  War  in  France  and  Belgium  in  1815.  Containing  minute 
Details  of  the  Battles  of  Quatre  Bras,  Ligny,  Wavre  and  Waterloo.  By 
Capt.  W.  Siborne;  Secretary  and  Adjutant  of  the  Royal  Military  Asylum 
Constructor  of  the  "Waterloo  Model."  2d  Edition.  2  vols.  London 
T.  &  W.  Boone :  1^44.    With  an  Atlas  of  Maps  and  Plans. 

STANHOPE:^       ' ''  O'l0^J\^  ^ 

f 
Notes  of  Conversations  with  the  Duke  of  Wellington.     1831-185 1.     By 
Philip  Henry,  sth  Earl  Stanhope.  New  York,  Longmans,  Greene  &  Co.  1886. 


ST.  HILAIRE: 

Histoire,  anecdotique,  politique  et  militaire,  de  la  Garde  Impdriale.  Par 
Emile  Marco  de  Saint-Hilaire.    Paris:  Eugfene  Penaud.     1847. 

.   y     SUPPLEMENTARY  DESPATCHES: 

^  The  Supplementary  Despatches,  Correspondence  and  Memoranda  of         j  ^Ht 

Field  Marshal  Arthur,  Duke  of  Wellington,  K.  G.    Edited  by  his  son,  the        '     "■ 
Duke  of  Wellington,  K.  G.    Volume  X.    London :  John  Murray.     1863. 

.V     THIERS: 

V  History  of  the  Consulate  and  the  Empire  of  France  under  Napoleon. 

By  M.  A.  Thiers.    Vol.  XX.    London:  Wilhs  and  Sotheran.    1861. 

TREUENFELD: 

Die  Tage  von  Ligny  und  Belle-Alliance.  Von  v.  Treuenfeld,  Premier- 
Lieutenant  im  2  Hessischen  Infanterie-Regiment  No.  82.  Mit  11  Karten. 
Hanover,  1880.     Helwing'sche  Verlags-Buchhandlung :  Schlagerstrasse  20. 


VANDAMME: 

Le  Gdndral  Vandamme  et  sa  Correspondance.  Par  A.  Du  Casse.  2 
Vols.    Paris :  Didier  et  Cie.    1870.  L\b  \3^  2f 

VAN   LOBEN   SELS: 

Prdcis  de  la  Campagne  de  1815  dans  les  Pays-Bas.  Par  le  major  d'artil- 
lerie  E.  Van  Loben  Sels,  aide-de-camp  de  S.  A.  R.  le  Prince  Fr^ddric  des 
Pays-Bas.  Avec  Plans.  Traduit  du  HoUandais.  La  Haye  :  Chez  les  Heri- 
tiers  Doorman :    1849. 


I 


VAUDONCOURT: 

Histoire  des  Campagnes  de  1814  et  1815  en  France.    Par  le  Gdndral 
Guillaume  de  Vaudoncourt.    Tome  Quatri^me.    Paris.     1826.     {         ■, 


Xlii     PARTIAL  LIST  OF  BOOKS  RELATING  TO  THE  CAMPAIGN. 

VAULABELLE: 

\Onl)  55^'  Campagne  et  BataiUe  de  Waterloo.    Par  AchUle  de  Vaulabelle.     Brux- 

/        '^        elles.    1853. 


0( 


J 


WATERLOO  LETTERS: 

Waterloo  Letters.  A  selection  from  original  and  hitherto  unpublished 
letters  bearing  on  the  operations  of  the  i6th,  17th  and  1 8th  June,  1815,  by 
officers  who  served  in  the  campaign.  Edited,  with  explanatory  notes,  by 
Major  General  H.  T.  Siborne,  late  Colonel  R.  E.  Illustrated  with  numerous 
Maps  and  Plans.    London :  Cassell  &  Co.    Limited.     1891. 

WATERLOO   ROLL  CALL: 

The  Waterioo  Roll  Call.  By  Charies  Dalton,  F.  R.  G.  S.  London, 
Wm.  Clowes  &  Sons,  Limited.    13  Charing  Cross,  S.  W.     1890. 

WELLINGTON : 

See  Gurwood,  and,  also,  Supplementary  Despatches. 


CHAPTER  I. 
THE    PLAN    OF   CAMPAIGN. 

Napoleon  entered  Paris  on  his  return  from  Elba  on 
the  twentieth  of  March,  1815.  His  first  endeavor,  after 
quieting  the  not  very  formidable  movements  of  the 
royalists  in  the  south  and  west  of  France,  was  to  open 
communications  with  the  great  powers.  He  proclaimed 
his  policy  to  be  strictly  one  of  peace,  and  we  have  every 
reason  to  believe  that  his  intentions  were  sincerely 
pacific.  But  his  agents  were  turned  back  on  the  frontier. 
The  nations  of  Europe  refused  to  treat  with  him  on  any 
terms,  and  entered  into  an  offensive  and  defensive  alli- 
ance against  him  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  driving  him 
from  the  throne  of  France.  The  armies  of  the  neighbor- 
ing powers  began  immediately  to  concentrate  on  the 
border,  and  even  Russia  set  her  troops  in  motion  for  the 
general  attack  upon  France  and  her  Emperor. 

To  meet  this  formidable  coalition  Napoleon  bent  all 
his  energies.  The  army  had,  since  his  first  abdication, 
been  reorganized,  and  many  high  commands  had  natur- 
ally been  given  to  the  chiefs  of  the  royalist  party.  Much 
had  to  be  done  before  the  new  arrangements,  necessitated 
by  the  re-establishment  of  the  Imperial  government,  could 
be  effected. 

These  changes  in  the  military  organization  of  the 
country    required    time.     Besides,    Napoleon    was    not 


'2        '    '   "     '  ""th*e''plan  of  campaign.  [chap.  I.] 

desirous  to  precipitate  matters.  He  was  naturally  solicit- 
ous not  to  appear  to  commence  an  avoidable  war.  He 
was,  moreover,  much  occupied  with  domestic  politics,  but 
of  his  dealings  with  the  chambers  and  of  his  new  consti- 
tution we  do  not  propose  to  speak. 

Besides  increasing  and  reconstituting  the  army,  work 
was  begun  on  the  fortifications  of  the  principal  cities. 

By  the  first  of  June,  no  change  having  taken  place  in 
the  relations  of  France  with  her  neighbors,  it  became 
incumbent  on  the  Emperor  to  decide  what  he  would  do. 

The  situation  was,  in   brief,   as  follows:     Two    large 
armies,  one  composed  of  English,  Dutch,  Belgian   and 
Hanoverian  troops,  with   contingents   from    Brunswick 
and  Nassau,  the  whole  under  command  of  the  Duke  of 
Wellington,  the  other  composed  of    Prussians,  Saxons, 
and  other  Germans  under  Marshal  BlUcher,  lay  scattered 
in  their  cantonments  in  Belgium  to  the  north  and  east 
of  the  rivers  Sambre  and  Meuse.     On  the  eastern  fron- 
tier, the  Austrians  were  collecting  a  formidable  force,  and 
were  expecting  to  be  reinforced  in  July  by  a  powerful 
Russian  army.     If  Napoleon  should  maintain  a  strictly 
defensive  attitude,  France  would  again  be  the  theatre   of 
hostilities,  as  in  the  previous  year.     True,  time  would  be 
gained  by  the  delay,  and  time  was  most  important  for 
filling  the  ranks  of  the  army,  completing  the  fortifications, 
manufacturing  ammunition,  and  generally  putting   the 
country  into  a  state  of  defence.     But  when  the  invasion 
came,  it  would  be  made  in  overwhelming  force.     It  was 
possible,    certainly,   to   hope   for   the   repetition  of  the 
exploits  of  1814,  for  victories  like  Champ  Aubert,  Mont- 
mirail  and    Rheims;    on   the   other   hand,   bloody   and 
indecisive  battles  like  those  of  Brienne,  Laon,  and  Arcis- 
sur-Aube  were  to  be  expected   with   equal   probability. 
The  thing  for  Napoleon  to  do,  if  possible,  was  to  reduce 
this  tremendous  disparity  of  numbers,  and  this  could  only 
be  effected  by  beating  his  enemies  in  detail.     If  he  could 
dispose  of  the  armies  of  Wellington  and  BlUcher  now,  he 


[chap.    I.]  THE    PLAN    OF   CAMPAIGN.  3 

would  have  so  much  the  better  chance  against  the  Aus- 
trians  and  the  Russians.  And  Napoleon  undoubtedly 
hoped  that  if  fortune  should  favor  him  in  1815  as  in  1805 
and  1806,  for  instance, — if  he  should  be  able  to  repeat  in 
Belgium  the  astonishing  successes  of  Austerlitz  and 
Jena, — he  would  not  find  it  impossible  to  make  peace  with 
his  father-in-law,  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  and  that  Russia, 
whose  interests  in  the  war  were  remote  and  really  theoret- 
ical, would  willingly  retire  from  the  contest.  When  we 
add  to  this  that  Napoleon's  y^r/^?  was  the  offensive,  that 
his  genius  was  specially  adapted  for  enterprising  and 
daring  strategy,  we  are  not  surprised  that  he  should  have 
decided  to  move  at  once,  with  all  his  available  force,  upon 
the  armies  of  Wellington  and  Blucher. ' 

These  armies  were,  as  has  been  stated,  lying  in  their 
cantonments  on  and  behind  the  Belgian  frontier.  (See 
Map  I.)  Their  front  covered,  roughly  speaking,  an  ex- 
tent of  a  hundred  miles,  from  Namur  and  Huy  on  the 
east  to  Mons  and  Tournay  on  the  west.  They  were 
distributed  in  numerous  towns  and  villages,  some  of 
these  being  as  far  back  as  forty  miles  from  the  frontier. 
With  the  location  of  the  various  detachments  Napoleon 
was  undoubtedly,  to  a  great  extent,  acquainted.  He  cal- 
culated that  Wellington's  forces,  which  were  scattered 
over  a  wide  extent  of  country,  could  not  be  concentrated 
in  less  than  two  days;  and  that  it  would  require  more 
than  one  day  for  Bliicher  to  assemble  the  four  corps  of 
which  his  army  was  composed. 

The  high-road,  which  runs  from  Charleroi  north 
through  Quatre  Bras,  Genappe  and  Waterloo  to  Brussels, 
ran  between  these  armies,  —  that  of  the  Duke  of  Welling- 
ton lying  to  the  westward  of  the  road  and  that  of  Marshal 
Blucher  lying  to  the  eastward  of  it.  The  Prussians  lay 
considerably  closer  to  the  frontier  than  the  English  and 
Dutch.    Wellington's    headquarters   were  at    Brussels; 


See  Clausewitz,  chaps.  8,  14. 


4  THE    PLAN    OF    CAMPAIGN.  [CHAP.    I.] 

Blucher's  at  Namur.  The  turnpike,  which  runs  from 
Namur  through  Quatre  Bras  to  Nivelles,  was  the  main 
avenue  of  communication  between  these  two  armies. 

The  Prussian  lines  of  supply  extended  by  way  of 
Liege  and  Maestricht  to  the  Rhine;  the  English  by 
way  of  Ostend  and  Antwerp  to  the  sea.  The  bases  of 
the  two  armies  were  thus  situated  in  opposite  directions. 
It  was,  of  course,  probable  that  if  either  of  these 
armies  should  be  obliged  to  retreat,  it  would  retreat 
towards  its  own  base.  But  to  retreat  towards  its  own 
base  would  be  to  march  away  from  its  ally.  On  this 
peculiarity  in  the  situation  Napoleon's  plan  of  campaign 
was,  to  a  great  degree,  founded.  The  situation  was  far 
more  favorable  for  him  than  if  the  220,000  men  in  Bel- 
gium had  all  belonged  to  one  army,  for  now,  not  only 
were  there  two  armies,  under  two  commanders,  in  whose 
operations  he  might  safely  count  upon  the  existence  of 
more  or  less  misunderstanding  and  failure  fully  to  meet 
each  other's  expectations,  but  the  two  armies  were  bound, 
in  case  of  disaster  to  either  or  both,  to  follow  lines  of 
retreat  which  were  wholly  divergent. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  consider  Napoleon's  plan. 
He  proposed  to  assemble  his  own  forces  with  all  possible 
secrecy  in  the  neighborhood  of  Charleroi,—  near  the  point 
of  junction  of  the  two  opposing  armies.  He  expected 
that,  on  the  first  news  of  his  approach,  the  two  armies 
would  respectively  concentrate,  and  then  endeavor  to 
unite.  He  expected  that  the  Prussians,  being  less  scat- 
tered than  the  English,  and  being  likely  to  know  of  the 
approach  of  the  French  before  the  English  could  possibly 
hear  of  it,  would  be  the  first  to  concentrate,  and  he 
expected  therefore  to  encounter  them  alone  and  unsup- 
ported by  their  allies. 

The  statement  of  Napoleon's  plan  of  campaign  in 
Gourgaud's  narrative  is  as   follows :  —  ^ 


■Gourgaud,  pp.  42,  43. 


[chap.    I.]  THE    PLAN    OF   CAMPAIGN.  5 

"•The  Prussian  army,  having  intimation  of  the  enemy's  intentions 
eight  or  ten  hours  before  the  English,  would  accordingly  be  first 
concentrated.  Hopes  were  even  entertained  of  attacking  the  Prus- 
sians before  their  four  corps  were  united,  or  of  obliging  them  to  fall 
back  in  the  direction  of  Liege  and  the  Rhine,  which  was  their  line 
of  operations  ;  and  by  thus  separating  them  from  the  English,  to 
create  an  opportunity  for  new  combinations. 

"In  these  calculations,  the  characters  of  the  enemy's  commanders 
were  much  to  be  considered.  The  hussar  habits  of  Marshal  Bliicher, 
his  activity  and  decided  character,  formed  a  strong  contrast  with  the 
cautious  disposition,  the  deliberate  and  methodical  manner  of  the 
Duke  of  Wellington.  Thus,  it  was  easy  to  foresee,  that  the  Prus- 
sian army  would  be  the  first  to  be  concentrated,  and  also  that  it 
would  evince  more  decision  and  promptitude  in  hastening  to  the  aid 
of  its  ally  [than  the  English  army  would  if  the  Piiissians  should  be 
the  first  to  be  attacked] .  If  Bliicher  had  only  two  battalions  ready  to 
act,  he  would  be  sure  to  employ  them  in  support  of  the  English 
army ;  but  there  was  reason  to  believe  that  Wellington,  unless  his 
whole  army  was  united,  would  not  attack  the  French  to  succor 
Bliicher.  All  these  considerations  rendered  it  desirable  that  the  attack 
should  be  commenced  against  the  Prussian  army  ;  It  necessarily 
would,  so  we  thought,  be  the  first  to  be  concentrated,  and  this 
turned  out  to  be  the  fact." 

To  the  same  effect  the  Emperor  says  in  his  "Me- 
moirs":—  ^ 

"The  [Prussian]  army  was  to  assemble  in  rear  of  Fleurus. 
*  *  *  In  the  night  between  the  14th  and  15th,  confidential 
messengers  returned  to  the  French  headquarters  at  Beaumont, 
and  announced  that  everything  was  tranquil  at  Namur,  Brussels 
and  Charleroi  ;  this  was  a  happy  presage.  To  have  thus  succeeded 
in  concealing  from  the  enemy  the  movements  which  the  French 
army  had  made  for  the  last  two  days,  was  to  have  already  obtained 
a  great  advantage.  The  Prussian  army  found  itself  obliged  either 
to  establish  a  point  of  concentration  further  back  than  Fleurus,  or 
to  receive  battle  in  that  position  without  being  able  to  be  assisted 
by  the  Anglo-Dutch  army.  *         *  *  ^jj  j-j^g  measures 

of  Napoleon  had  therefore  for  their  object  to  attack  the  Prussians 
first." 


^Corresp.,  vol.  31,  pp.  195,  197,  198. 


6  THE    PLAN    OF   CAMPAIGN.  [CHAP.    I.] 

In  a  word,  Napoleon  believed  that  the  allied  generals 
had  fixed  the  points  of  concentration  of  their  armies  too 
near  the  frontier  for  that  concentration  to  be  effected  in 
season  to  oppose  to  his  army  an  overwhelming  force ;  he 
thought  it  very  likely  also,  for  the  reasons  above  stated, 
that  he  would  have  only  the  Prussian  army  to  deal  with 
in  the  first  encounter  of  the  campaign. 

There  were,  to  be  sure,  other  courses  open   to   him. 
He  might  direct  his  army  upon  the  communications  of 
the  Prussians  by  passing  to  the  eastward  of  them  and 
turning  their  left  flank.     But  this    operation    involved 
a  wide  detour  over  a  difficult  country,  and  in  the  battle 
which  was  certain  to  result,  the  Prussian  and  the  Eng- 
lish armies  would,  beyond  a  doubt,  both  be  united  against 
him.     On  the  other  hand  he   could   turn   Wellington's 
right  by  moving  via  Lille,  Valenciennes  or  Mons  upon 
Ghent  or  Brussels.    An  advance  in  this  direction  pre- 
sented,  to  be  sure,  fewer  difficulties  than   the  one   just 
spoken  of,  and  promised  greater  advantages.     The  Duke 
himself  always  maintained  that  this   would   have   been 
Napoleon's  best  move.     It  probably  would  have  cut  the 
English  communications  with  Ostend,  and  would  very 
likely  have  forced  Wellington  to  evacuate  Brussels  with- 
out a  battle,  that  is,  unless  he  cared  to  risk  an  engage- 
ment without  the  aid  of  his  ally.     But  the  Prussians  in 
the  meantime  would  have  concentrated  without  molesta- 
tion their  whole  army  of  120,000  men,  and  if  Wellington 
had  been  successful  in  avoiding  a  battle  with  the  French 
superior  force,  the  two  allied  generals  ought  to  have  been 
able  either  to  manoeuvre  Napoleon  out  of  Belgium  or  to 
force  him  to  battle  on  disadvantageous  terms.  It  is  prob- 
able that  in  neither  of  these  flanking  movements  would 
there  be  an  opportunity  afforded  for  a  direct,  immediate, 
crushing  blow  upon  one  of  the  allied  armies,  such  as  that 
which  Napoleon  thought  it  very  possible  that  the  temerity 
of  Marshal  Bliicher  was  going  to  present  to  him,  if  he 
advanced  by  way  of  Charleroi. 


[chap.    I.]  THE   PLAN   OF   CAMPAIGN.  7 

We  have  seen  that  Napoleon  seems  to  have  thought  it 
very  likely  that  Bliicher  would  fight,  but,  of  course.  Napo- 
leon could  but  conjecture  what  Bliicher  would  do;    he 
could  not  certainly  know  that  he  would  not  now,  as  he 
had  done  in  Germany  in  1813,  avoid  a  direct  conflict  with 
him,  and  retire  on  his  base  of  operations.     If   Bliicher 
should  do  this,  the  two  armies,  it  is  true,  would  be  separ- 
ated and  could  be  dealt  with  accordingly;  but  the  difficul- 
ties of  the  campaign  would  be  vastly  greater  than  if  the 
Prussian  army  should  be  practically  disposed  of  by  a  de- 
cisive victory  at  the  outset.     For  if  the  Prussians  should 
fall  back  without  hazarding  a  battle,  they  would  have  to 
be  pursued,  certainly  far  enough  to  ascertain  their  real 
intentions,  and  to  become  assured  that  they  were,  for  the 
time  being  at  least,  definitely  separated  from  the  army  of 
Wellington.     If  this    should    appear    to    be    the    case 
the    question    would   then    arise,    which     of    the    two 
armies  should  be  followed  up;    and  in  considering  this 
question,  the  importance  of  the  occupation  of  Brussels,  at 
that  time  the  capital  of  the  Netherlands,  would  naturally 
influence  Napoleon  in  favor  of  throwing  the  bulk  of   his 
forces  against  the  Anglo-Dutch.     Napoleon,  however,  as 
we  have  already  said,  seems  to  have  thought  it  on  the 
whole  probable,  knowing,  as  he  did,  the  daring  and  reso- 
lute character  of  the  man,  that  Bliicher  would  fight,  with 
or  without  the  assistance  of  the   English  army,   and  he 
also  thought  that  the  situation  of  the  English  army  was 
such  that  Bliicher  would  not  be  likely  to  get  much  assist- 
ance from  it.     Napoleon,  therefore,  hoped  to   open    the 
campaign  with  a  signal  victory,  crippling,  perhaps  de- 
stroying, the  Prussian  army,  and  he  knew  that  the  result 
of  such  a  victory  must  be  the  retreat  of  the  beaten  Prus- 
sians in  a  direction  certain  to  separate  them  entirely  and 
definitely  from   their   English   and    Dutch   allies.     The 
French  Emperor  would  then  be  free  to  carry  the  great 
bulk  of  his  forces  against  the  English  and    Dutch.     If 
Wellington  stood,  he  expected  to  beat  him ;  if  he  retreated. 


8  THE    PLAN    OF   CAMPAIGN.  [CHAP.    I.J 

he  would  leave  Belgium  and  perhaps  Holland  at  the  dis- 
posal  of  the  French. 

Such,  in  brief,  were  Napoleon  s  calculations  and  expec- 
tations. 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  I. 

The  view  given  above  of  Napoleon's  plan  has  been  by 
no  means  universally  accepted.  It  is  often  stated  that 
he  intended  to  separate  the  two  armies  and  attack  them 
in  detail,  but  if  this  expression  is  to  be  understood  as 
meaning  that  the  former  operation  was  to  precede  the 
latter  in  point  of  time,  it  is  not  in  our  judgment  a  correct 
statement.  There  never  was,  we  believe,  any  expecta- 
tion on  Napoleon's  part  that  he  could,  by  throwing  his 
army  between  those  of  Wellington  and  Bllicher,  or  by 
merely  occupying  strategic  points,  separate  the  allied 
armies  definitely  from  one  another.  What  he  did  expect, 
was,  as  we  have  seen,'  to  encounter  one  of  these  armies, 
that  commanded  by  Marshal  BlUcher,  alone  and  unsup- 
ported by  its  ally.  If  it  should  decline  an  engagement, 
or  should  fight  and  be  beaten,  he  calculated  on  its  retir- 
ing towards  its  own  base  of  operations,  and  so  separat- 
ing itself  by  every  march  taken  in  that  direction  from  its 
ally. 

But  several  writers  on  the  campaign  present  us  with 
quite  other  ideas  of  Napoleon's  intended  operations. 
And  as  it  is  obviously  of  the  first  importance  that  we 
should  start  with  a  correct  idea  of  Napoleon's  plan,  if  we 
would  follow  the  events  of  the  campaign  intelligently, 
we  will  examine  these  other  theories  somewhat  in  detail. 

Take  first  the  view  that  Napoleon's  intention  was  to 
throw  his  army  between  those  of  Wellington  and  BlUcher. 


^Ante,  pp.  4  et  seq. 


10  THE    PLAN    OF   CAMPAIGN. — NOTES.        [CHAP.    I.] 

This  is  Alison's  view.  We  cite  him,  not  because 
his  name  carries  any  weight  as  a  military  authority,  but 
because  his  error  has  been  so  clearly  pointed  out  by 
no  less  a  person  than  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  in  a 
criticism^  of  Alison's  History  of  Europe  written  by  the 
Earl  of  Ellesmere,  who  wrote,  as  is  well  known,  under 
the  Duke's  inspiration.  In  the  following  passage  a 
quotation  is  made  from  the  work  of  the  famous  German 
military  critic,  Clausewitz :  — 

"Mr.  Alison  (Hist,  of  Europe,^  etc.,  vol.  x,  p.  991)  speaks  of 
'Buonaparte's  favorite  military  manoeuvre  of  interposing  between 
his  adversaries,  and  striking  with  a  superior  force  first  on  the  right 
hand  and  then  on  the  left,'  as  having  been  attempted  by  him  and 
baffled  in  this  campaign.  We  doubt  whether  the  expression  of 
interposing  between  two  adversaries  can  be  correctly  applied  to 
any  of  Buonaparte's  successful  campaigns,  and  we  almost  suspect 
that,  if  he  had  in  contemplation  a  manoeuvre  of  so  much  hazard  on 
this  occasion,  it  was  the  first  on  which  he  can  be  said  to  have 
attempted  it.     Hear  Clausewitz  on  this  matter : — 

"All  writers  who  have  treated  of  this  campaign  set  out  by  say- 
ing that  Buonaparte  threw  himself  between  the  two  armies,  in 
order  to  separate  them.  This  expression,  however,  which  has  be- 
come a  terminus  technicus  in  military  phraseology,  has  no  clear 
idea  for  its  foundation.  The  space  intervening  between  two 
armies  cannot  be  an  object  of  operation. ^  It  would  have  been 
very  unfortunate  if  a  commander  like  Buonaparte,  having  to  deal 
with  an  enemy  of  twice  his  force,  instead  of  falling  on  the  one  half 
with  his  united  strength,  had  lighted  on  the  empty  interval,  and 
thus  made  a  blow  in  the  air,  losing  his  time,  whilst  he  can  only 
double  his  own  force  by  the  strictest  economy  of  that  commodity. 


'^Ellesmere,  pp.  161,  162.    See  Maurice,  pp.  333  et  seq.;  Jan.  1891. 

^In  the  edition  of  1850,  this  passage  (as  we  suppose  it  to  be)  is  found  iu 
vol.  xiii,  p.  625,  and  reads  somewhat  differently,  but  the  idea  is  precisely  the 
same. 

^Thiers ;  vol.  xx,  book  Ix,  p.  23,  says :  "  He  had  conceived  the  belief  that 
the  English  and  Prussians  *  *  *  would  leave  between  their  respective 
forces  a  space,  not  very  strongly  guarded,  and  he  thought  that,  by  bringing 
the  whole  strength  of  his  army  to  bear  upon  this  point,  he  might  become 
master  of  the  position." 


[chap.    I.]         THE    PLAN    OF   CAMPAIGN. — NOTES.  II 

Even  the  fighting  the  one  army  in  a  direction  by  which  it  will  be 
pressed  away  from  the  other,  even  if  it  can  be  effected 
without  loss  of  time,  incurs  the  great  danger  of  being  attacked 
in  the  rear  by  the  other.  If  the  latter,  therefore,  be  not 
far  enough  removed  to  put  this  risk  out  of  the  question,  a  com- 
mander will  scarcely  ventui'e  on  such  a  line  of  attack.  Buonaparte, 
therefore,  chose  the  direction  between  the  two  armies,  not  in  order 
to  separate  them  bywedgmg  Jiim  self  between  y>  but  because  he  ex- 
pected to  find  and  fall  on  Bliicher's  force  in  this  direction,  either 
united   or   in  separate  bodies  [corps]."     Feldzug  von  1815,  &c., 

******** 

His  main  object  was  evidently  to  find  the  Prussian  army,  and 
beat  it." 

Nevertheless  we  find  Hooper,^  who  wrote  long  after 
Clausewitz,  making  the  very  statement  which  Clause- 
witz  thought  so  objectionable : — 

"He  (Napoleon)  calculated  that  if  he  struck  at  the  centre  of  the 
two  armies  he  should  be  able  to  -wedge  himself  in  between  them, 
crushing  any  divisions  which  attempted  to  obstruct  his  progress, 
and,  having  won  a  position  of  vantage,  he  imagined  that  it  would 
be  in  his  power  to  manoeuvre  with  rapidity  from  side  to  side  and 
defeat  each  army  in  succession." 

To  the  same  effect  writes  Quinet : — 

"He  (Napoleon)  will  place  himself  between  the  two  armies,  at 
the  centre  of  the  line,  that  is  to  say,  at  the  extreme  right  of  the 
Prussian  cantonments.  By  this  move,  the  Duke  of  Wellington  and 
Marshal  Bliicher  will  be  separated  from  the  first  hour.  The  occa- 
sion, the  moment,  will  decide  on  which  of  the  two  armies  it  will 
be  best  to  strike  the  first  blow."^ 

It  is  unnecessary  to  repeat  what  has  been  so  well  said 
above  in  opposition  to  this  view.  It  is  plain  that  these 


^The  italics  are  our  own. 

*In  the  edition  of  1S62,  this  passage  is  found  in  Chap.  22  on  pages  46  and  47. 

^Hooper,  p.  58.  See  also,  by  the  same  author,  Wellington,  p.  207.  To 
the  same  effect,  see  Clinton,  p.  378.  Cf.  Rogniat,  Considerations,  p.  339,  who 
was  the  first  to  announce  this  theory. 

^Quinet,  p.  75. 


12  THE    PLAN    OF   CAMPAIGN. — NOTES.         [CHAP.    I.] 

writers   have   misconceived   Napoleon's  plan.      But  we 
must  consider  this  more  fully. 

This  conception  of  the  campaign  is  practically  identi- 
cal with  the  theory  first  put  forth  by  Rogniat  in  hij 
"  Considerations  de  I'Art  de  la  Guerre,"  and  repeated  ir 
his  "Reponse  aux  Notes  critiques  de  Napoleon,"  in  th- 
form  of  a  criticism  of  Napoleon's  operations.  He  main- 
tains that  Napoleon  should  have  aimed  first  at  seizing 
the  two  points  of  Quatre  Bras  and  Sombreffe  on  the 
Nivelles-Namur  road,  over  which  the  allied  armies  com- 
municated with  each  other. 

"If,  instead  of  six  leagues,  he  had  made  eight  or  nine  (and  he 
had  time  enough,  inasmuch  as  the  Sambre  was  crossed  at  two 
o'clock),  in  pushing  his  left  to  Frasnes  and  his  advance-guard  to 
Qiiatre  Bras,  the  centre  and  right  to  Sombreffe,  with  the  reserves  at 
Fleurus,  he  would  have  obtained  the  precious  advantage  he  ought 
to  have  aimed  at,  that  of  separating  the  two  opposing  armies,  of 
retarding  the  union  of  their  corps,  of  taking  a  central  position  and  of 
attacking  them  one  at  a  time.  In  fact,  Quatre  Bras  and  Sombreffe 
are  on  the  high-road  from  Namur  to  Brussels;  master  of  these 
points,  he  could  then  have  opposed  the  junction  of  the  English  on 
one  side,  of  the  Prussians  on  the  other."9 

This  view  has  also  received  the  endorsement  of  Jom- 
ini,'°  who  evidently  thinks  that  Napoleon  must  have 
entertained  it. 

"Napoleon  perceived  that  their  (the  Prussian)  army  sought  to 
assemble  between  Namur  and  the  causeway  leading  from  Charleroi 
to  Brussels,  as  it  was  by  this  route  that  the  English  would  come  to 
their  assistance :  now,  under  this  supposition,  the  Emperor  had 
but  one  wise  course  to  follow;  the  most  simple  glance  at  the  map 
would  sufficiently  indicate  that  it  was  essential  to  seize  upon  Som- 
breffe on  the  one  side,  and  the  central  point  of  Qiiatre  Bras  on  the 
other.  *  *  *  Because,  once  master  of  these  two 
points,  he  was  in  position  to  act  at  will  on  either  of  the  opposing 
armies,  and  prevent  their  junction." 

To  the  same  effect  is  the  sketch  of  Napoleon's  plan 


'Reponse,  &c.,  pp.  261,  262. 

*°Jomini,  p.  122,  123  ;  also,  pp.  213,  225,  226. 


[chap.    I.]        THE    PLAN    OF   CAMPAIGN. — NOTES.  1 3 

put  forth  by  his  advocate,  the  Prince  de  la  Tour 
d'Auvergne  in  his  "  Waterloo  " : 

"The  Sambre  crossed,  he  (Napoleon)  would  seize  the  line  of 
communication  of  the  Anglo-Dutch  and  Prussians.  Two  columns 
would  be  charged  to  establish  themselves,  one  at  Qiiatre  Bras,  the 
other  at  Sombreffe. 

"The  separation  consummated,  he  would  easily  make  an  end 
of  both  the  Prussians  and  the  Anglo-Dutch.  For  this  would  only 
be  to  renew  a  manoeuvre  familiar  to  him,  and  which  had  so  often 
given  him  the  victory.  "" 

Charras,  one  of  the  Emperor's  hostile  critics,  takes  the 
same  view  of  his  intentions : 

"It  requires  only  a  glance  at  the  map  to  indicate  with  certainty 
the  point  which  it  was  his  intention  to  reach  in  dictating  his  order 
of  movement.         *         *         * 

"The  French  army,  occupying  these  places  [Qtiatre  Bras  and 
Sombreffe]  in  force,  would  find  itself  placed  between  the  Anglo- 
Dutch  and  the  Prussians,  thenceforward  really  capable, —  to  borrow 
from  Napoleon  his  own  expression, —  of  attacking  them  in  detail, 
leaving  to  them,  if  they  would  escape  from  this  misfortune, —  the 
greatest  that  could  befall  them, —  only  the  alternative  of  yielding 
ground  and  of  uniting  their  forces  at  Brussels  or  beyond  it."'^ 

Against  this  array  of  authority  we  oppose  with  confi- 
dence that  of  Napoleon  himself,  of  Wellington,  and  of 
Clausewitz.  It  was  Napoleon's  expectation,  as  we  have 
seen  above,  that  the  Prussian  army  would  be  the  first  to 
be  concentrated,  that  it  would  offer  battle  at  or  near 
Fleurus,  and  that  he  would  be  able  to  attack  and  over- 
come it  before  it  could  be  joined  by  the  Anglo-Dutch 
forces.'^  If  BlUcher  fought  at  all  at  that  stage  in  the 
campaign,  it  stood  to  reason  that  he  would  fight  to  the 
zouth  of  Sombreffe,  for  the  preservation  of  his  line  of 


"La  Tour  D'Auvergne,  pp.  41, 42  :  also,  pp.  73  et  scq. 

'-Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.  115,  116.  See  also  Quinet,  p.  loi,— "  Pour  empecher 
la  reunion  (of  the  English  and  Prussian  armies)  il  etait  indispensable  de 
farmer  k  la  fois  les  deux  passages  (Sombreffe  and  Quatre  Bras)." 

"Siborne  (vol.  i,  p.  47)  is  perfectly  clear  on  this  point. 


14  THE    PLAN   OF   CAMPAIGN. — NOTES.        [CHAP.    I.] 

co7mnu7iicatio7i  with  Wellingfoft,  —  the  Namur-Nivelles 
road.  Hence,  the  intention  of  occupying  Sombreffe,  as 
a  prelimmary  to  a  battle  with  the  Prussians,  could  not, 
as  we  venture  to  think,  have  entered  Napoleon's  mind 
On  the  contrary,  he  believed  that  the  seizure  of 
Sombreffe  would  inevitably  necessitate  the  retreat  of  the 
Prussians  to  some  point  further  north,  as  Wavre,  or 
even  to  the  neighborhood  of  Brussels,  where  their  junc- 
tion with  the  English  could  be  effected  without  moles- 
tation. '^ 

But  the  last  thing  which  Napoleon  wanted  was  that 
the  allied  armies  should  retire  to  Wavre,  or  to  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Brussels,  and  there  unite.  He  needed  a 
battle,  and  a  decisive  success,'^  and  he  needed  it  at  once. 
A  war  of  manoeuvres  was  not  the  game  for  him  to  play 
at  this  crisis.  It  was  of  vital  importance  for  him  to  rout, 
if  possible,  in  succession,  the  armies  of  Bliicher  and 
Wellington ;  a  battle,  therefore,  was  what  he  sought,  and 
he  expected  that  Bliicher  would  fight  him,  and  fight  him 
alone.  It  was  only  by  routing  BlUcher's  army,  or  forc- 
ing it  to  retreat,  that  he  expected  to  separate  it  from 
that  of  Wellington. 

It  must  also  be  borne  in  mind,  that  the  mere  occupation 
of  two  points  on  the  line  of  communication  between  two 
allied  armies  does  not  in  any  way  prevent  the  unimpeded 
concentration  of  each  army,  and  its  being  moved,  when 
concentrated,  in  any  direction  that  its  commander  may 
decide  on.  The  "line  of  communication"  seized  is  not 
to  be  confounded  with  the  line  of  supplies  or  the  line  of 
retreat  of  either  army.  No  doubt,  the  occupation  of  any 
point  or  points  on  the  line  by  which  two  allied  armies 
communicate  with  each  other  tends  to  embarrass  them, 
to  hinder  any  combined  movements,  and  to  delay  their 
union;  but  to  direct  the  march  of  an   invading  army 


'"»  Corresp. :  vol.  31,  p.  471. 
"  Cf.  Clausewitz,  ch.  14. 


[chap.    I.]        THE    PLAN   OF   CAMPAIGN. — NOTES.  1 5 

merely  to  compass  this  end,  when  it  is  possible  to  defeat 
one  of  these  opposing  armies  by  engaging  it  where  it 
cannot  be  supported  by  its  ally,  is  to  miss  the  opportu- 
nity of  the  campaign. 


I 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE   FRENCH    ARMY. 

The  French  army,  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  state,  had 
been  seriously  affected  by  the  sudden  and  complete 
change  in  government  through  which  France  had  passed 
in  April,  1814.  Without  going  into  particulars,  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  say  that  Napoleon  found  on  his  return  from  Elba 
much  which  needed  to  be  undone  and  more  which  it  was 
necessary  to  do.  But  the  details  of  this  partial  reorgan- 
ization do  not  greatly  concern  us.  Napoleon  unquestion- 
ably did  his  utmost  to  bring  the  troops  into  a  state  of 
efficiency.  And  he  certainly  was  in  great  measure  suc- 
cessful. The  larger  part  of  the  Marshals  and  high  offi- 
cers remained  in  France  and  took  command  with  cheer- 
fulness, and  the  younger  officers  and  the  men  were 
unanimous  in  their  devotion  to  the  cause  of  their  country 
against  the  coalition.  But  some  of  the  Marshals  and 
generals  high  in  rank  had  retired  into  Belgium  with 
Louis  XVIII.;  others  declined  active  service;  and  where 
there  were  so  many  defections,  there  was  inevitably  not 
a  little  suspicion  and  disquietude.  In  the  reorganization, 
which  was  beyond  a  question  necessary,  great  changes 
had  to  be  made  in  the  higher  commands,  and  the  regi- 
ments, even,  were  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  recast. 
The  Guard  was  also  reconstituted,  a  measure  obviously 
wise,  taking  account  of  the  prestige  which  this  famous 
corps  had  always  possessed,  but  a  measure  which,  car- 


[chap.    2.]  THE    FRENCH    ARMY.  17 

ried  out  as  it  had  to  be,  in  a  very  brief  period  of  time, 
could  not  but  injure  to  a  considerable  extent  the  value  of 
the  reg-iments  of  the  line.  It  is  true  that  France  at  this 
time  was  full  of  veteran  soldiers ;  some  200,000  men  had 
returned  into  the  country  from  foreign  prisons.  There 
was  an  abundance  of  excellent  material.  But  the  circum- 
stances under  which  the  existing  military  force  was  re- 
organized and  increased  in  numbers  were  unfavorable 
to  the  moral  of  the  soldiers  and  of  the  army  generally, 
and  there  was  not  sufficient  time  before  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities  to  overcome  the  disturbing  influences  insepar- 
able from  such  a  state  of  things.  The  men  were  full  of 
enthusiasm  for  and  confidence  in  Napoleon;  but  they 
mistrusted  many  of  their  commanders.  They  were  old 
soldiers,  nearly  or  quite  all  of  them,  and  understood  their 
work  perfectly;  but  the  changes  of  the  last  eighteen 
months  had  been  so  utterly  perplexing,  —  so  thorough, — 
the  new  organization  had  been  so  recent  and  attended 
by  so  many  disquieting  circumstances  and  disturbing 
rumors,  that  the  absolute  confidence,  which  ought  to  ex- 
ist between  the  officers  and  men  of  an  army  as  strongly 
as  between  the  members  of  a  family,  did  not  prevail. ' 

Coming  now  to  \}lv<^ personnel oi  the  army:  Napoleon's 
old  chief-of-staff,  Berthier,  who  had  served  him  in  this 
capacity  for  twenty  years,  who  had  grown  accustomed  to 
his  ways,  and  was  able  by  reason  of  his  long  experience 
to  supplement  his  defects,  had  retired  into  Belgium  with 
the  King.  To  supply  his  place  the  Emperor  selected 
Marshal  Soul t,  certainly  a  very  singular  choice.*  Soult 
was  a  man  of  Napoleon's  own  age, — he  had  for  several 
years  commanded  an  army  in  Spain,  and  had  had,  of 
course,  a  chief-of-staff  of  his  own.  To  place  such  a  man 
at  such  a  time  of  his  life  on  staff  duty  when  he  should  be 


'Charras,  vol.   i,  pp.  69,  70:     Histoire  de  la  Garde   Imperiale:    Saint 
Hilaire,  p.  654. 
*  lb.,  pp.  653,  654- 


1 8  THE  FRENCH  ARMY.  [CHAP.  2.] 

commanding  troops,  must  strike  any  one  as  strange. 
Such  an  officer  is  not  fitted  by  his  experience  in  an  in- 
dependent command  for  the  duties  of  a  chief-of-staff. 
Those  duties  he  has  been  for  years  accustomed  to  turn 
over  to  a  subordinate.  The  personal  attention  which  they 
need  he  has  for  years  expected  to  be  given  by  a  junior 
officer.  It  is  out  of  the  question  that  he  can,  all  at  once, 
assume  the  extremely  laborious  duties  which  belong  to 
the  chief-of-staff.  We  shall,  before  we  get  through,  have 
more  than  one  opportunity  to  see  how  Soult  performed 
his  new  tasks.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  there  was  many  a 
younger  officer  in  the  French  army  who  would  have 
served  with  much  more  efficiency  in  this  all-important 
place,  for  which  the  utmost  vigor  and  alertness  of  mind 
and   body  are  wellnigh  indispensable. 

For  the  invasion  of  Belgium,  Napoleon  destined  the 
I  St,  2d,  3d,  4th,  and  6th  Corps,  and  the  Imperial  Guard, 
besides  a  large  force  of  cavalry.  The  five  corps-com- 
manders, d'Erlon,  Reille,  Vandamme,  Gerard  and  the 
Comte  de  Lobau  were  all  men  of  experience  and  admitted 
capacity.  Vandamme  was  known  specially  as  a  hard 
fighter.  Gerard  was  a  comparatively  young  officer  of 
great  promise.  The  Comte  de  Lobau,  under  his  origi- 
nal name  of  Mouton,  had  distinguished  himself  in  the 
Austrian  campaign  of  1809.  But  no  one  of  them  equalled 
in  military  talent  the  leading  generals  in  the  Italian 
or  Austerlitz  campaigns,  —  Massena,  Lannes,  Davout, 
Desaix,  and  their  fellows.  The  commander  of  the  cav- 
alry, Grouchy,  was  a  veteran  of  twenty  years'  hard  fight- 
ing, but  was  not  credited  with  possessing  any  great 
capacity.  The  fact  is  that  Napoleon  himself  could  not 
do  for  his  own  army  what  the  turmoil  and  chaos  of  the 
Revolution  had  done  for  the  army  of  the  republic,  and 
that  was  to  override  seniority  and  all  ordinary  claims 
to  promotion,  and  to  open  the  door  wide  to  youthful 
vigor  and  ambition.  It  was  to  the  confusion  created 
by   the  Revolution  that  the   formidable  list  of  warriors 


[chap.    2.]  THE    FRENCH    ARMY.  IQ 

who  served  France  so  brilliantly  for  twenty  years  owed 
in   great  measure   their  rapid  advancement.     Napoleon 
himself  constitutes  no  exception  to  this  remark. 
Napoleon^  says  of  his  officers  at  this  period :  — 
"The  character  of  several  of  the  generals  had  been  weakened  by 
the   events   of  1S14  ;  they  had  lost   something  of  that   audacity,  of 
that  I'esolution,  of  that  confidence,  which    had         *         *         * 
contributed  so  much  to  the  successes  of  former  campaigns.  "  '• 
Charras  has  a  passage  to  the  same  effect :  ^  — 
"Enriched,  systematically  corrupted,  by  the  prodigality   of   the 
Empire  ;  enervated  by  luxury   and   pleasure  ;   fatigued   by    twenty 
years  of  war,  several  among  the  generals  would  have  preferred  the 
tranquil  life  of  their  own  homes  to  the  labors  of  the  march  and  the 
discomforts  of  the  bivouac.     They  had  tasted  of  peace  for  a  whole 
year ;  they  looked  back  on  that  period  with  regret.     Some   among 
them  had  met  with  rude  defeats  while  in  independent  commands, 
and  they  I'emembered  them  well.     Others,    shaken   by   the   cruel 
recollections  of  1813  and  1S14,  despaired  of  the  issue  of  the  war  in 
view  of  the  enormous  armies  of  the  coalition  and  of  the  feebleness 
of  our  means  of  defence.     All  remained  brave,  intrepid  ;  but  all 
had  not  preserved  the  activity,  the  resolution,  the  audacity  of  their 
early    days.     Their  moral   was  no  longer  equal   to    sustaining   a 
reverse." 

These  statements  may  very  possibly  be  somewhat  too 
highly  colored,  but  there  is  little  doubt  that  there  was  a 
good  deal  of  truth  in  them.  It  is  significant  that  they 
are  made  by  writers  who  wrote  of  the  campaign  from 
opposite  points  of  view.  Napoleon  in  his  narrative  of 
the  campaign  sought  to  show  that  he  was  not  the  sole  or 
even  the  chief  cause  of  its  failure,  and  claimed  that  his 
orders  were  not  carried  out  with  the  spirit  and  energy 
which  his  lieutenants  had  once  possessed.  Charras  on 
the  other  hand,  throughout  his  history,  is  uniformly  harsh 
in  his  comments  on  the  Emperor's  conduct,  and  insists 


^  Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  249. 

*  Cf.  Gourgaud,  pp.  67,  68. 

*  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  70. 


20  THE  FRENCH  ARMY.  [CHAP.  2.] 

that  he  was  greatly  lacking  both  in  physical  strength  and 
in  energy  of  character.  That  both  Charras  and  Napo- 
leon, therefore,  state  that  the  higher  ofHcers  of  the  army 
were  not  up  to  the  mark  of  their  earlier  campaigns  ren- 
ders it  very  probable  that  such  was  the  actual  fact. 

The  importance  of  this  fact  is  to  be  seen  in  its  true 
light  only  when  we  bear  in  mind  to  how  great  an  extent 
Napoleon's  campaigns  required  for  their  successful  con- 
duct qualities  in  his  lieutenants  by  no  means  universally 
found  even  in  respectable  corps-commanders,  —  qualities 
far  in  excess  of  those  commonly  demanded.  Napoleon 
was  not  content  with  mere  obedience ;  he  expected  from 
his  chief  ofificers  an  intelligent  comprehension  of  his  views, 
and  a  vigorous  and  daring  execution  of  the  parts  assigned 
to  them,  —  a  sort  of  cooperation,  in  fact.  The  movements 
with  which  the  campaign  of  1809  opened  will  best  illus- 
trate, perhaps,  what  is  here  referred  to.  It  is  not  too 
much  to  say  that  without  this  hearty  and  intelligent  work 
on  the  part  of  his  lieutenants  many  of  Napoleon's  most 
brilliant  and  successful  campaigns  could  never  have  been 
carried  out.  We  shall  see  in  the  course  of  this  narrative 
how  much  he  expected  from  Ney  and  Grouchy.  Hence 
any  inability  or  unwillingness  on  the  part  of  the  leading 
officers  to  render  this  assistance  must  be  fully  taken  into 
account  when  we  are  seeking  to  understand  this  cam- 
paign of  Waterloo. 

We  have  not  spoken  of  the  commander  of  the  Guard, 
Marshal  Mortier,  because  he  was  taken  ill  just  before  the 
opening  of  the  campaign,  and  no  one  replaced  him.  Gen- 
eral Drouot,  an  artillery  officer  of  great  merit,  was  the 
adjutant-general  of  the  Guard,  and  orders  were  given 
through  him. 

At  the  last  moment,  on  the  eve  of  the  opening  of  hostil- 
ities, the  Emperor  sent  for  Marshal  Ney.  Why  the 
orders  to  this  distinguished  officer  were  not  given  earlier, 
we  are  not  informed;  it  seems  like  an  unpardonable  over- 
sight, to  say  the  least.     As  such  Ney  certainly  regarded 


[chap.  2.]  THE  FRENCH  ARMY.  21 

it/  Ney  was  given  no  time  for  preparation ;  it  was  only 
by  the  exercise  of  great  diligence  that  he  reached  the 
front  when  he  did,  and  that  was  at  five  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  15th,  after  the  Sambre  had  been  crossed. 
He  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  ist  and  2d  Corps, 
commanded  by  the  Counts  d'Erlon  and  Reille  respect- 
ively; but  he  was  ignorant  of  their  organization,  and  had 
even  to  learn  the  names  of  the  division  commanders. 
It  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  understand  this 
strange  neglect  of  Napoleon.  No  one  knew  better  than 
he  how  important  it  is  that  the  commander  of  an  army  or 
of  a  wing  of  an  army  should  have  ample  time  to  know 
his  troops  and  to  be  known  by  them,  and  that  this  was 
especially  necessary  where  a  reorganization  had  recently 
taken  place. 

In  the  army,  thus  constituted,  there  were,  then,  three 
Marshals.  Of  these,  one,  Soult,  was  serving  in  a  new 
capacity  for  him,  that  of  chief-of-staff ;  another,  Ney,  had 
not  been  given  a  fair  chance  to  get  a  good  hold  on  the 
troops  assigned  to  him;  the  third.  Grouchy,  was  not  a 
man  of  superior  capacity,  had  never  commanded  an 
army-corps  in  his  life,  and  had  only  just  been  made  a 
Marshal.  Grouchy  was  at  first  assigned  to  the  command 
of  the  reserve  cavalry,  consisting  of  the  four  cav- 
alry corps  of  Pajol,  Exelmans,  Kellermann  and  Milhaud, 
numbering  in  all  13,784  men.  But  the  campaign  had 
scarcely  opened  when  he  was  relieved  from  this  duty,  and 
placed  in  command  of  the  right  wing  of  the  army,  con- 
sisting of  the  3d  and  4th  Corps,  those  of  Generals  Van- 
damme  and  Gerard,  together  with  a  considerable  force 
of  cavalry.  Here  again  was  a  singular  neglect  on  Napo- 
leon's part  of  the  importance  of  allowing  the  new  Marshal 
time  to  get  used  to  his  new  duties;  and,  as  we  shall 
ultimately  have  occasion  to  see,  this  circumstance  oper- 
ated most  unfavorably  when  Grouchy  found  himself  in 


^Ney's  letter  to  the  Duke  of  Otranto ;  Jones,  p.  385. 


22  THE  FRENCH  ARMY.  [CHAP.  2.] 

an  independent  command.  It  looks  very  much  as  if  Na- 
poleon only  decided  to  send  for  Ney  at  the  last  minute, 
and  as  if  the  assignment  of  Grouchy  to  the  command  of 
the  two  corps  of  Vandamme  and  Gerard  was  not  deter- 
mined on  until  the  campaign  had  opened. 

But  not  only  was  the  organization  of  the  army  not  as 
perfect  as  it  might  have  been  by  reason  of  the  course 
which  Napoleon  pursued  in  regard  to  Ney  and  Grouchy; 
there  was  an  officer  whom  he  ordered  to  stay  behind 
when  he  might  have  had  him  with  himself  as  well  as  not, 
a  man  of  the  highest  reputation,  the  Duke  of  Auerstadt, 
the  Prince  of  Eckmlihl,  Marshal  Davout.  The  Emperor 
had  made  him  Minister  of  War,  but  Davout  begged  to 
have  a  command  in  the  field.  He  represented  to  the 
Emperor,  —  ^ 

"That  the  defence  of  Paris,  notwithstanding  its  incontestable  im- 
portance, was,  like  all  questions  of  interior  defence,  only  second- 
ary, and  essentially  subordinate  to  the  result  of  military  operations ; 
that  when  it  was  a  question  of  jilaying  a  decisive  part  on  the  field 
of  battle,  it  was  not  the  time  to  make  experiments  with  new  men  ; 
that  it  was  necessary,  on  the  contrary,  for  the  Emperor  to  surround 
himself  with  men  who  had  given  good  account  of  themselves  and 
who  had  had  long  experience  in  high  command.  The  Marshal  did 
not  succeed  in  convincing  the  Emperor,  who  contented  himself 
with  replying:  'I  cannot  entrust  Paris  to  any  one  else.'  'But, 
sire,'  replied  Davout,  '  if  you  are  the  victor,  Paris  will  be  yours ; 
and  if  you  are  beaten,  neither  I  nor  any  one  else  can  do  anything 
for  you.' " 

There  can  be  no  question  that  the  Marshal's  reason- 
ing was  sound;  but  Napoleon  persisted  in  his  course. 
What  he  lost  by  not  having  Davout  with  him  in  this 
campaign,  it  is  not  easy  to  estimate ;  it  is  perhaps  foolish 
to  conjecture.  But  it  would  probably  not  be  going  too 
far  to  say  that  Davout  in  the  place  of  either  Ney  or 
Grouchy  would  have  prevented  the  catastrophe  of 
Waterloo. 


'Davout,  p.  540. 


[chap.    2.]  THE    FRENCH    ARMY.  •  2$ 

This  sketch  of  the  personnel  of  the  French  army  natur- 
ally leads  up  to  an  estimate  of  its  chief,  that  is,  of  his 
comparative  fitness  at  this  period  of  his  life  to  undertake 
the  tasks  of  such  a  daring-,  laborious  and  perilous  cam- 
paign as  this  attack  on  Blucher  and  Wellington  was 
sure  to  prove. 

Most  historians  have  agreed  that  in  point  of  bodily 
activity  the  Emperor  did  not  show  himself  in  this 
campaign  the  equal  of  his  former  self;  in  fact,  most 
writers  have  gone  farther  than  this ;  they  have  attributed 
to  him  a  lassitude  of  mind  as  well  as  of  body,  they  have 
found  a  want  of  the  mental  activity  and  a  lack  of  the 
resolute  will,  which  had  been  so  characteristic  of  him  in 
his  earlier  days.  The  portrait  of  Napoleon  by  General 
Foy  is  one  of  the  best  we  have,  and  is  of  especial  value 
as  having  been  drawn  by  a  contemporary,  who  served 
throughout  his  wars  and  commanded  a  division  at 
Waterloo. 

"With  his  passions,  and  in  spite  of  his  errors,  Napoleon  is,  tak- 
ing him  all  in  all,  the  greatest  warrior  of  modern  times.  He  car- 
ried into  battle  a  stoical  courage,  a  profoundly  calculated  tenacity, 
a  mind  fertile  in  sudden  inspirations,  which  by  unhoped-for  re- 
sources disconcerted  the  plans  of  the  enemy.  *  *  * 
Napoleon  possessed  in  an  eminent  degree  the  faculties  requisite  for 
the  profession  of  arms ;  temperate  and  robust,  watching  and  sleep- 
ing at  pleasure,  appearing  vinawares  where  he  was  least  suspected, 
he  did  not  disregard  the  details  to  which  important  results'  are 
sometimes  attached.  *  *  *  He  carried  with  him  into  bat- 
tle a  cool  and  impassible  courage ;  never  was  a  mind  so  deeply 
meditative  more  fertile  in  rapid  and  sudden  illuminations.  On  be- 
coming Emperor  he  ceased  not  to  be  the  soldier.  If  his  activity 
decreased  with  the  progress  of  age,  this  was  owing  to  the  decrease 
of  his  physical  powers."  And  in  a  note  he  adds  :  "  In  the  latter  yeai^s 
the  Emperor  had  grown  fat ;  he  ate  more,  slept  longer,  and  rode 
less ;  but  he  retained  all  the  vigor  of  his  mind,  and  his  passions  had 
lost  little  of  their  strength."^ 


^Foy's  History  of  the  War  in  the  Peninsula;  vol.  i,  pp.  110-112 :  Histoire 
de  la  Guerre  de  la  Peninsula ;  pp.  161-164. 


24  THE   FRENCH   ARMY.  [CHAP,    2.] 

There  is  in  fact  no  reason  to  doubt  that  Napoleon's 
habitual  activity  and  even  his  capacity  for  physical  exer- 
tion had  in  1815  sensibly  diminished.  Like  most  men  of 
forty-five,  he  was  not  so  full  of  energy  as  he  had  been  at 
five  and  twenty.  He  had  also  grown  stout,  and  he  was 
furthermore  a  sufferer  from  some  painful  maladies  which 
rendered  it  difHcult  for  him  to  keep  on  horseback  for 
any  great  length  of  time.^  All  these  circumstances 
would  naturally  tend  to  diminish,  more  or  less,  the  once 
ceaseless  activity  of  his  mind;  we  may,  therefore,  expect 
to  find  him  less  thoughtful,  less  vigilant,  less  careful, 
than  he  had  been  in  his  earlier  campaigns.  But  it  is 
plain  that  the  standard  by  which  the  Napoleon  of  181 5  is 
tested  is  no  ordinary  standard,' °  and  it  may  well  be  that 
although  he  may  have  failed  to  come  up  to  the  high 
mark  which  he  formerly  attained,  we  shall  nevertheless 
find  in  this  campaign  of  Waterloo  no  conspicuous  lack  of 
ordinary  activity  and  energy. 

In  conclusion,  we  may  fairly  say  that  while  we  recog- 
nize that  the  army  with  which  Napoleon  was  preparing 
to  take  the  field  in  June,  181 5,  was  not  as  well-organized 
a  body  of  troops  as  some  of  the  armies  which  he  had  led 
to  victory,  that  its  corps-commanders  were  not  as  bril- 
liant soldiers  as  were  many  of  the  distinguished  generals 
of  that  period,  that  peculiar  circumstances  rendered 
Soult,  Ney  and  Grouchy  less  serviceable  than  they  prob- 
ably would  have  been  had  things  been  otherwise  ordered, 
and  that  the  Emperor  himself  was  more  or  less  deficient 


'Thiers,  vol.  xx,  book  Ix,  p.  37,  n.:  Grouchy  M6m.,  vol.  4,  p.  44,  n.  2  ;  id.  in 
Le  Mai  de  G.,  p.  18,  n.  2. 

'°Soult  told  Sir  W.  Napier :  "  The  Emperor  seemed  at  times  to  be 
changed  ;  there  were  moments  when  his  genius  and  activity  seemed  as  pow- 
erful and  fresh  as  ever ;  at  other  moments  he  seemed  apathetic.  For  exam- 
ple, he  fought  the  battle  of  Waterloo  without  having  himself  examined  the 
enemy's  position.  He  trusted  to  General  Haxo's  report.  In  former  days  he 
would  have  examined  and  re-examined  it  in  person."  Life  of  Sir  W.  F.  V/. 
Napier,  vol.  i,  p.  505. 


[chap.    2.]  THE   FRENCH    ARMY.  2$ 

in  the  never-resting  activity  of  mind  and  body  which  he 
had  once  possessed,  we  must  not  forget  that  the  soldiers 
and  their  officers  were  all  veterans,  that  their  generals 
had  won  their  rank  by  distinguished  service  on  many  a 
bloody  field,  and  that  no  man  living  surpassed  their 
leader  in  military  talent.  It  is  not  correct  to  say"  that 
the  army  which  Napoleon  led  into  Belgium  was  the 
finest  he  had  ever  commanded,  but  it  is  quite  certain  that 
it  was  by  far  the  best  of  the  three  armies  then  in  the  field. 
The  strength  and  composition  of  this  army,  was, 
according  to  Charras,'''  whom  we  may  safely  follow,  as 
follows :  — 

ist  Corps:  d'Erlon. 
Four  divisions  of  infantry, — 
Allix,  Donzelot,  Marcognet,  Durutte  16,885  Men 

One  division  of  cavalry,— J aquinot     1,506 
Artillery,— 46  guns,— engineers,  etc.  1,548 

Total,  19,939  " 

2d  Corps:  Reille. 
Four  divisions  of  infantry, — 
Bachelu,  Jerome  Napoleon,'^  Girard,  Foy 

20,635  Me^ 

One  division  of  cavalry, — Pire  1,865 

Artillery,— 46  guns,— engineers,  &:c.  1,861 

Total,  24,361  " 


Carried  forward  44,300 


"As  do  Chesney,  p.  67,  and  Hooper,  pp.  62,  161. 

'^Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.  65-68.  — 

"Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  196,  n.,  says  that  Jerome's  command  was  purely  nomi- 
nal, and  that  Guilleminot,  his  chief-of-sta£f,  really  commanded  this  division. 


26  THE  FRENCH  ARMY.  [CHAP.  2.] 

Brought  forward  44,300  Men 

3d  Corps:  Vandamme. 
Three  divisions  of  infantry, — 
Lefol,  Habert,  Berthezene  16,851 

One  division  of  cavalry, — Domon       1,017 
Artillery, — 38  guns, — engineers,  &c.  1,292 


Total,  19,160  " 

4th  Corps:  Gerard. 

Three  divisions  of  infantry, — 

Pecheux,  Vichery,  Bourmont"*  12,800 

One  division  of  cavalry, — 
Maurin  1,628 

Artillery, — 38  guns, — engineers,  &c.,  1,567 


Total,  15,995 

6th  Corps:  Lobau. 

Three  divisions  of  infantry, — 

Simmer,  Jeannin,  Teste  9,218 

Artillery, — 32  guns, — engineers,  &c.,  1,247 


Total,  10,465 

Imperial  Guard: 
Old  Guard: 

One  division, — Friant, — grenadiers    4,140 
Middle '5 Guard: 
One  division, — Morand, — chasseurs  4,603 


Carried  forward  8,743     89,920 


'"Bourmont  deserted  to  the  enemy  early  on  the  15th  June,  and  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Hulot. 

"We  here  follow  many  historians  in  calling  Morand's  command  the 
Middle  Guard,  "  la  moyenne  Garde." 


[chap.    2.]  THE   FRENCH    ARMY.  27 

Brought  forward  8,743    89,920  Men 

Young*  Guard : 

One   division,  —  Duhesme,  —  volti- 

geurs,  &c.,  4,283  " 

Two  divisions  of  cavalry,  Guyot, 

Lefebvre-Desnouettes  3,795  " 

Artillery, — 96  guns, — engineers,  &c.,  4,063  " 


Total,  20,884  " 

Reserve  Cavalry :  Grouchy. 
1st  Cavalry  Corps  :  Pajol. 
Two  divisions, — Soult,  Suber- 

vie  2,717 

Artillery, — 12  guns,  329 

3,046 

2d  Cavalry  Corps  :  Exelmans. 
Two  divisions :  Stroltz,  Chastel  3,220 
Artillery, — 12  guns,  295 

3,515 

3d  Cavalry  Corps :  Kellermann. 
Two  divisions, — L'Heritier,   Roussel 

3>36o 
Artillery, — 12  guns,  319 

3,679 

4th  Cavalry  Corps :  Milhaud. 
Two  divisions, — Wathier,  Delort 

3,194 
Artillery, — 12  guns,  350 

3,544 

Total,  13,784  " 

Workmen,  waggoners,  &c.,  about  3,500  " 


Grand  Total,  128,088 


28  THE  FRENCH  ARMY.  [CHAP.  2.] 

Leaving  out  the  last  item  as  consisting  chiefly  of  non- 
combatants,  we  have  an  army  consisting  of  124,588  men. 
Of  these,  the  infantry  numbered,  89415  Men 

the  cavalry,  including  the  horse  artillery  of 

the  reserve  cavalry,  numbered,  23,595     " 

the  artillery  (344  guns  including  the  above) 
numbered,  11,578    " 


Total,'^  as  above,  124,588 


'^Charras'  summing  up  of  the  cavalry  and  artillery  varies  from  ours,  and 
would  seem  to  be  500  less  than  the  number  before  given  by  him. 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  IT 

The  opinion  expressed  here  In  regard  to  the  health  of 
the  Emperor  is  substantially  that  entertained  by  Thiers 
and  Chesney.  The  former  says  that  the  Emperor's 
brother  Jerome,  and  also  one  of  the  surgeons  on  the  Em- 
peror's staff,  both  told  him  that  Napoleon  was  a  sufferer 
at  this  time  from  an  affection  of  the  bladder.  But  this 
was,  he  says,  denied  by  Marchand,  the  Emperor's  valet. 
*'  Whatever  may  have  been  the  health  of  Napoleon  at 
this  epoch,  his  activity  was  not  diminished."' 

To  the  same  effect  is  Chesney's  opinion,^  opposing  that 
of  Charras.^  Further  evidence  on  the  subject  has  been 
collected  by  Mr.  Dorsey  Gardner.^  His  conclusion  is 
entirely  opposed  to  that  of  Colonel  Chesney,  and  in  our 
judgment  he  places  altogether  too  much  reliance  on  that 
delightful,  but  gossipy,  writer,  the  Comte  de  Segur. 
Segur's  History  of  the  Russian  Campaign  is  the  best 
known  work  on  the  subject,  but  It  is  essentially  a 
romance.  In  it  he  advances  with  great  boldness  his 
favorite  theme  of  the  breaking  down  of  Napoleon's 
health.^     But  the  Emperor's  health  was  able  to  endure 


'  Thiers,  vol.  xx,  book  Ix,  p.  37,  n. 

*  Chesney,  p.  72,  n. 

'Charras,  vol.  2,  p.  203,  n.  H. 

< Gardner;  Quatre  Bras,  Ligny  and  Waterloo;  pp.  31-37;  p.  220,  n.  138. 

^Histoirede  Napoleon  et  de  la  Grande  Armde  pendant    I'ann^e  1812. 
Paris,  1825.    Book  4,  chaps.  2  and  6. 


30  THE   FRENCH    ARMY. — NOTES.  [CHAP.    2.] 

without  injury  that  terrible  strain ;  he  certainly  showed 
in  1813  and  1814  every  evidence  of  physical  vigor.  No 
doubt  the  peculiar  maladies  from  which  he  suffered  occa- 
sionally impaired  the  activity  of  both  mind  and  body;  but 
the  talk  of  Segur  verges  at  times  on  puerility.  Gour- 
gaud  s  Exameii  Critique  of  Segur's  work  points  out  its 
defects  cleverly  and  unsparingly.  As  for  the  conversa- 
tion, referred  to  by  Gardner,  which  the  Earl  of  Albe- 
marle^ reports  as  having  taken  place  in  1870  between  his 
son  and  General  Gudin,  who  was,  in  1815,  a  page  in  wait- 
ing on  the  Emperor,  to  the  effect  that  Napoleon 
secluded  himself  all  the  forenoon  of  the  day  of  the  battle 
of  Waterloo,  and  that  "  it  was  nearly  noon  when  the  Em- 
peror descended  the  ladder  that  led  to  the  sleeping 
room  and  rode  away,"  it  is  really  impossible  to  accept  the 
story.  Charras,  who  for  his  own  reasons  (and,  by  the 
way,  not  for  the  reasons  which  Chesney  very  naturally 
supposes  actuated  him),  endeavors  to  magnify  Napo- 
leon's inactivity  throughout  this  campaign,  represents 
him  as,  on  this  morning  of  the  i8th,  reconnoitring  the 
position  after  eight  o'clock,  ^  giving  his  orders  for  the 
marshalling  of  the  army,  watching  the  deployment  of 
the  troops  between  nine  and  half-past  ten,  riding  along 
the  lines,  and  dictating  the  order  of  battle  before  eleven 
o'clock.  On  all  such  points  we  are  quite  safe  in  follow- 
ing Charras,  and  we  must  consider  Gudin's  story  as 
having  (to  say  the  least)  suffered  greatly  in  its  transmis- 
sion. Besides,  there  was  no  "ladder  that  led  to  the 
sleeping  room,"  in  the  house  ^  in  which  Napoleon  slept 
the  night  before  Waterloo. 


^  Fifty  Years  of  my  Life :  by  the  Earl  of  Albemarle,  p.  98.  Cf.  Thiers,  vol. 
XX,  p.  37,  note, 

'  Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.  270,  271.  This,  as  will  be  seen  later  on,  was  the  third 
recormoissance  since  midnight. 

*  Cf.  Fraser,  Words  on  Wellington,  p.  250.  The  Caillou  house  was  set  on 
fire  by  the  Prussians,  but  the  principal  rooms  were  spared,  and  the  house  was 
afterwards  carefully  restored. 


[chap.    2.]  THE    FRENCH    ARMY. — NOTES.  3I 

To  repeat,  then,  once  more.  Napoleon  in  this  cam- 
paign was  troubled  by  and  doubtless  suffered  consider- 
ably from  some  painful  maladies ;  and,  even  apart  from 
this  fact,  we  cannot  look  for  the  youthful  vigor  and 
activity  of  1796  or  1805  in  the  year  18 15.  He  was  not  in 
these  respects  equal  to  his  former  self;  and  it  was  further 
to  be  expected  that  the  deficiency  of  his  physical  energy 
would  be  accompanied  by  a  diminished  mental  alertness 
and  vigilance.  All  the  same,  we  think  it  will  be  found 
that  he  showed  in  this  campaign  a  very  fair  degree  of 
strength  and  activity.  But  we  shall  know  more  about 
this  as  we  proceed  with  the  narrative. 


CHAPTER  III. 
THE   ALLIED   ARMIES. 

The  army  which  was  commanded  by  Field  Marshal 
BlUcher  numbered  about  124,000  men,  and  was  thus 
composed:  — ' 

1st  Corps :  Zieten. 

Four  divisions  of  infantry, — 
Steinmetz, — Pirch  II., — Jagow, — 

Henckel  27,887  Men 

One  division  of  cavalry, — Roder         1,925  " 

Artillery, — 96  guns, — engineers,  &c.    2,880 


Total  32,692 

lid  Corps:  Pirch  I. 

Four  divisions  of  infantry, — 
Tippelskirchen, — Krafft, — Brause, — 

Langen  25,836 

One  division  of  cavalry, — Jiirgass        4,468 
Artillery, — 80  guns, — engineers,  &c.     2,400 


Total  32,704 


Carried  forward  65,396 


» Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.  8i,  82.    See  vol.  2,  p.  202,  note  G,  where  it  is  shown 
that  the  number  of  men  in  the  artillery  given  by  Wagner  is  much  too  small 


I 


[chap.    3.]  THE   ALLIED   ARMIES.  ^^ 

Brought  forward  65,396  Men 

1 1  Id  Corps:  Thielemann. 
Four  divisions  of  infantry, — 
Borcke, — Kampfen, — Luck, — 

Stiilpnagel  20,611  " 

One  division  of  cavalry, — Marwitz       2,405  " 

Artillery, — ^48  guns, — engineers,  &c.    1,440  " 


Total  24,456 

IVth  Corps:  Billow. 
Four  divisions  of  infantry, — 
Hacke, — Ryssel, — Losthin, — Hiller    25,381 
One  division  of  cavalry, — 
Prince  William  of  Prussia  3,o8i 

Artillery, — 88  guns, — engineers,  &:c.    2,640 


Total  31,102 

Workmen,  waggoners,  &c.,  about  3,120 


Grand  total  124,074 

Leaving  out  the  last  item,  we  have  an  army  consisting 

of  120,954  men.     Of  these, 

the  infantry  numbered  99,7 15  Men 

"  cavalry  "  11,879    " 

"  artillery,  312  guns,  numbered  9,360     " 


Total  as  above  120,954    " 

The  headquarters  of  Zieten's  Corps  were  at  Charleroi, 
of  Pirch  I.  at  Namur,  of  Thielemann  at  Ciney,  and  of 
Biilow  at  Liege.  The  first  three  of  these  places  were 
near  the  frontier. 

The  Prussian  army  was  mainly  composed  of  veterans ; 
even  of  the  youngest  soldiers  most  had  seen  service  in 
181 3  or  1814.     The  corps-commanders  were  experienced 


34  THE    ALLIED   ARMIES.  [CHAP.    3.] 

officers,  though  only  one  of  them,  Billow,  had  ever  had  an 
independent  command.  Biilow  had  in  1813  won  the  bat- 
tle of  Dennewitz  against  Marshal  Ney.  The  troops  were 
certainly  not  so  inured  to  war  as  were  those  of  Napo- 
leon's army,  nor  were  they  so  well  led ;  but  they  knew  their 
trade,  and  were  prepared  for  battle.  Bliicher  himself  was 
a  veteran  of  the  Seven  Years'  War.  He  had  seen  more 
than  fifty  years  of  service.  In  the  campaigns  of  1806  and 
1807  he  had  displayed  conspicuous  zeal  and  courage.  In 
those  of  1813  and  1814,  although  too  old  and  infirm  to  as- 
sume all  the  tasks  which  ordinarily  devolve  on  an  army- 
commander,  he  had  yet,  with  the  assistance  of  his  chief- 
of-staff,  markedly  increased  his  reputation.  Nevertheless 
no  one  considered  him  a  general  of  a  high  order  of  talent. 
His  conceptions  of  strategy  were  crude  and  imperfect, 
and  his  blunders  caused  his  command  to  be  more  than 
once  badly  defeated  by  Napoleon  in  the  winter  campaign 
in  France  in  1814.  But  Bliicher  was  a  thorough  soldier, 
active,  daring  and  resolute,  and  never  was  afraid  of  tak- 
ing responsibility.  He  was  moreover  a  great  favorite 
with  the  army.  He  was  animated  by  an  almost  insane 
hatred  of  Napoleon,  and  he  entered  on  the  work  as- 
signed to  him  by  the  allied  powers  with  an  eager  deter- 
mination that  bordered  upon  ferocity.  This  spirit  of  his 
infused  itself  into  the  army;''  every  man  was  ready  to 
fight,  and  every  man  expected  to  beat  in  the  end.  His 
chief-of-staff,  Gneisenau,  was  an  able  administrator,  and 
relieved  the  old  field-marshal  from  all  attention  to  de- 
tails. 

The  army  commanded  by  the  Duke  of  Wellington 
was  a  very  heterogeneous  body  of  troops.  Although 
nominally  divided  into  corps,  after  the  fashion  of  the 
armies  of  the  continent,   this   arrangement,   being   one 


*  The  view  of  the  Prussian  army  presented  here  is  that  of  Charras  (vol.  r,  p. 
89);  but  Delbriick,  the  biographer  of  Gneisenau,  states  that  many  of  the 
troops  were  inexperienced,  and  some  were  half-hearted  in  the  cause. 
Gneisenau,  vol.  4,  pp.  381,  382.    Cf.  Siborne,  vol.  i,  pp.  302,  303. 


[chap.    3.]  THE   ALLIED  ARMIES.  35 

which  had  never  been  adopted  by  the  Duke  before,  was 
only  imperfectly^  practised  in  the  campaign  of  1815. 
We  shall  get  a  better  idea  of  the  strength  of  Wellington's 
forces  if  we  enumerate  them  according  to  their  different 
nationalities.  Leaving  out  the  troops  employed  on  garri- 
son duty  at  Antwerp,  Ostend,  Ghent  and  other  places, 
estimated  at  12,233  men,'*  we  find  the  forces  available  for 
the  field  to  have  been  thus  composed:  — 

British: 

Nine  brigades  of  infantry, — 
Maitland  (Guards), — Byng  (Guards), — 

Adam,— Mitchell,— Halkett,— John- 
stone,— Kempt, — Pack, — Lambert  20,310  Men 
Three  brigades  of  cavalry, — 
Somerset  (Guards), — Ponsonby, — 

Vandeleur  367^  " 

Six  regiments  contained  in  four 

brigades 
Dornberg, — Grant, — Vivian, — Arents- 

schildt,  —  composed  of   British 

troops   and   those    of  the    King's 

German  Legion  2,335  *' 

Artillery, — 102  guns  5,030  " 


Total  British  force. 
King's  German  Legion: 
Two  brigades  of  infantry,— 
Duplat,— Ompteda 
Add  men  on  detached  service 

3,285 
16 

-3,301 

31 

>253 

- 

Carried  forward 

3,301 

31 

>253 

3  For  instance,  at  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  troops  of  the  ist  Corps,  that  of 
the  Prince  of  Orange,  were  stationed  on  both  ends  of  the  line. 

'^  These  figures  are  taken  from  Siborne. 


36  THE  ALLIED   ARMIES.  [CHAP.    3.] 

Brought  forward  3,301  31,253  Men 

Cavalry: 

Five  regiments  contained  in  the  four 
brigades  of  Dornberg,  Grant,  Vivian 
and  Arentsschildt.  2,560 

Artillery,— 18  guns  526 


Total  King's  German  Legion  6,387  " 

Hanoverians : 

Five  brigades  of  infantry, — 
Kielmansegge, — Halkett, — Best, — 

Vincke, — Lyon  1 3)788 

One  brigade  of  cavalry, — Estorff        1,682 
Artillery, — 12  guns  465 


Total  Hanoverians 

15,935 

Dutch-Belgians: 

Seven  brigades  of  infantry,— 

Bylandt, — Prince  Bernard  of  Saxe 

Weimar,5— 

Ditmers, — d'Aubreme, — Hauw, — 

Kerens,— Anthing 

24,174 

Three  brigades  of  cavalry, — 

Trip,— Ghigny— Merlen 

3,405 

Artillery,— 48  guns 

1,635 

Total  Dutch-Belgians 

29,214 

Carried  forward 

82,789 

*This  brigade  was  composed  of  one  regiment  of  Nassau,  in  three  battal- 
ions, and  one  regiment  of  Orange-Nassau,  and  numbered  4,300  men. 


HAP.    3.]                    THE   ALLIED   ARMIES. 

37 

Brought  forward 
Brunswickers : 

82,789  Men 

Two  brigades  of  infantry, — 
Buttlar,— Specht 
Two  regiments  of  cavalry,— 
Artillery, — 16  guns 

5,376 
922 
510 

Total  Brunswickers  6,808    " 

Nassau  Contingent:  Kruse. 

One  regiment  of  infantry : 
three  battalions  2,880    " 

Engineers,  sappers,  miners, 

waggon-trains  and  staff-corps  1,240    " 

Total  disposable  army  in 
the  field  93>7i7    " 

Of  these  the 
Infantry  numbered  69,829 

Cavalry  "  14,482 

Artillery         "        196  guns  8,166 

Engineers,  waggon-trains,  &c.  1,240 

93,717     " 


Or,  according  to  nationality, 

the  British  numbered 

31,253 

"    King's  German  Legion 

^,?>^7 

"    Hanoverians            " 

15,935 

"     Dutch-Belgians'     " 

29,214 

"     Brunswickers 

6,808 

"     Nassau  contingent 

2,880 

"    Engineers,  &c., 

1,240 

93,717 

This  army  was  organized,  as  we  have  said  above,  into 
two  corps  and  a  reserve,  in  addition  to  which  was  a  large 


Including 4,300  Nassauers. 


38  THE   ALLIED   ARMIES.  [CHAP.    3.] 

body  of  cavalry,  and  a  small  force  of  reserve  artillery. 
There  were  six  (so-called)  British  divisions  in  the  army, 
only  one  of  which,  the  ist,  Cooke's,  was  composed  entirely 
of  British  troops, — the  Guards;  the  others  contained 
troops  of  the  King's  German  Legion  and  Hanoverians. 
To  each  of  these  divisions  were  attached  two  batteries. 
Six  troops  of  horse-artillery  were  attached  to  the  cav- 
alry. 

The  ist  and  3d  British  divisions,  those  of  Cooke  and 
Alten,  with  the  2d  and  3d  Dutch-Belgian  divisions  of 
Perponcher  and  Chasse,  composed  the  ist  Corps  under 
the  Prince  of  Orange.  They  covered  the  front  of  the 
army  from  Quatre  Bras  to  and  beyond  Enghien,  occupy- 
ing the  country  in  and  around  Nivelles,  Roeulx,  Soignies 
and  Braine-le-Comte.  They  numbered  25,233  men,  with 
48  guns. 

The  2d  and  4th  British  divisions,  those  of  Clinton 
and  Colville,  with  the  ist  Dutch-Belgian  division  of 
Stedmann,  and  Anthing's  Indian  brigade,  constituted 
the  2d  Corps  under  Lord  Hill.  They  continued  the 
line  of  the  army  to  the  north  and  west,  occupying  the 
country  in  and  around  Ath,  Grammont  and  Audenarde. 
They  numbered  24,033  men,  with  40  guns. 

The  Reserve,  or  rather  that  portion  of  it  destined  for 
service  in  the  field,  and  not  counting  the  troops  on  gar- 
rison-duty, was  under  the  immediate  direction  of  the 
commander-in-chief.  It  was  composed  of  the  5th  and  6th 
British  divisions,  those  of  Picton  and  Cole,  of  the  Bruns- 
wick Corps  under  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  and  of  the 
Nassau  contingent  under  General  Kruse.  They  num- 
bered 20,563  men,  with  64  guns. 

The  British  and  King's  German  Legion  cavalry  was 
composed  of  seven  brigades,  the  whole  under  Lord 
Uxbridge.  They  numbered  8,473  n^en.  To  this  corps 
were  attached,  as  has  been  stated,  six  horse  batteries. 
This  cavalry  was  stationed  mainly  in  rear  of  the  2d  Corps, 
near   Ninove   and   Grammont;   but  one  brigade  under 


[chap.    3.]  THE   ALLIED    ARMIES.  39 

General  Dornberg  was  at  and  in  the  neighborhood  of 

Mons. 

The  Hanoverian,  Brunswick  and  Dutch-Belgian  cav- 
alry were  attached  respectively  to  the  various  divisions 
of  these  troops.  They  numbered  6,009  men,  with  one 
horse-battery  of  8  guns. 

To  recapitulate:  — 

ist  Corps:  Prince  of  Orange  25,233  Men 

2d  Corps:  Lord  Hill  24,033      || 

Reserve  20,563 

Lord  Uxbridge's  cavalry  corps  8,473 

Other  Cavalry  6,009      '^'^ 

Artillery— 196  guns  8,166 
Engineers,  &c.  1,240 

Total  as  above  given  93>7i7 

Of  this  miscellaneous  force  the  Duke  relied  really  only 
on  his  English  troops  and  those  of  the  King's  German 
Legion,  a  corps  raised  originally  in  Hanover,  which  had 
for  many  years  belonged  to  the  English  crown.  These 
troops  had  served  in  the  Peninsula  for  several  years  with 
great  credit.  The  Hanoverian  contingent,  strictly  so 
called,  was  composed  of  very  raw  troops,  and  the  same 
was  true  of  the  Dutch-Belgians.  Little  was  known  about 
the  Brunswickers  and  Nassauers.  The  fidelity  of  many 
of  the  allied  troops  was  strongly  suspected,  as  they  had 
been  raised  in  countries  which  had  for  the  past  few  years 
been  subject  to  France,  and  the  sympathies  of  the 
soldiers  were  supposed  to  be  with  Napoleon.^  The 
Duke's  opinion  of  his  army  is  well  known.  He  con- 
sidered it  the  poorest  he  had  ever  led.^  Very  possibly 
he  may  have  underestimated  its  quality;  but  certain  it 


^Muffling,  Passages;  pp.  204,  223. 

*Gurwood,  vol.  xii,  pp.  358,  509,— letters  to   Lt.  Gen.  Stewart,  May  8,  and 
to  Earl  Bathurst,  June  25,  i£iS- 


40  THE   ALLIED   ARMIES.  [CHAP.    3.] 

is  that  the  force  which  he  commanded  was  a  very  hetero- 
geneous collection  of  troops,  that  they  had  never  acted 
in  the  field  as  an  army  before,  and  that  the  character  and 
steadiness  of  a  considerable  number  were,  on  account  of 
either  disaffection  or  inexperience,  gravely  doubted  by 
their  commander. 

All  this  was  in  all  probability  known  to  Napoleon, 
and  served  as  the  basis  of  his  expectations,  as  we  shall 
see  later  on. 

Of  the  principal  ofHcers  of  this  motley  force,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  say  much.  The  Prince  of  Orange,  who 
commanded  the  ist  Corps,  though  an  officer  of  experi- 
ence, had  not  distinguished  himself  as  a  general.  Lord 
Hill,  who  led  the  2d  Corps,  was  a  very  valuable  man, 
whose  merit  had  been  thoroughly  ascertained  in  the 
Peninsula.  Sir  Thomas  Picton  had  a  well-won  repu- 
tation as  a  man  of  energy,  courage,  and  capacity  in  all 
the  positions  in  which  he  had  served.  Then  there  were 
many  junior  officers  of  great  merit. 

The  Duke  himself  was  in  the  prime  of  life,  having  just 
passed  his  forty-sixth  birthday.  He  had  never  met 
Napoleon  before,  but  he  had  often  met  and  defeated  his 
Marshals.  His  career  had  been  one  of  almost  uninter- 
rupted success.  His  experience  in  the  field  against 
French  soldiers  had  been  large,  and  he  was  for  this 
reason  peculiarly  fitted  for  the  work  he  had  now  in  hand. 
He  had  shown  very  varied  ability.  His  military  imagi- 
nation, if  one  may  use  such  a  word,  may  not  have  been 
large,  but  he  had  few  equals  in  the  faculty  of  making  up 
his  mind  what  it  was  best  to  do  under  ascertained  cir- 
cumstances. His  decisions  were  always  dictated  by 
practical  reasons.  He  never  allowed  sentiment  to 
hinder  the  exercise  of  his  common  sense.  He  could 
advance  or  retreat,  fight  or  decline  to  fight,  with  equal 
ease, —  with  him  it  was  a  mere  question  of  what  it  was 
best  under  the  circumstances  to  do.  Though  esteemed 
a  cautious  officer,  he   had   shown  over  and  over  again 


[chap.    3.]  THE   ALLIED   ARMIES.  4I 

that  he  possessed  not  only  courage  and  firmness,  but 
that  in  daring,  and  in  coolly  taking  great  risks,  he  was 
equal  to  any  emergency.  His  hold  on  his  army,  that  is, 
on  his  own  troops,  was  perfect.  In  ability,  reputation, 
and  in  social  rank,  his  preeminence  among  the  officers 
of  the  British  army  and  the  King's  German  Legion  was 
cheerfully  acknowledged,  and  over  these  parts  of  his 
army  he  exercised  a  perfect  and  unquestioned  control. 
And  his  long  experience  in  dealing  with  his  Spanish 
allies  had  given  him  an  uncommon  facility  in  adminis- 
tering the  affairs  of  such  a  composite  body  of  troops  as 
he  was  now  to  command. 

These  three  armies  were  curiously  different  in  their 
internal  economy.  Napoleon,  as  we  have  said  before, 
expected  from  his  high  officers  a  sort  of  cooperation. 
The  "  Correspondence  of  Napoleon  "is  full  of  long  and 
confidential  letters  to  his  marshals,  written  during  his 
campaigns,  explaining  the  situation,  stating  his  own 
intentions  at  length,  giving  them  not  only  orders  to  be 
executed,  but  suggestions  for  their  guidance  in  case  of 
the  happening  of  certain  contingencies.  We  shall  see 
excellent  specimens  of  these  letters  in  the  course  of  this 
narrative.  Napoleon  had  been  for  years  constantly  in 
the  habit  of  directing  complicated  movements,  in  which 
the  active  and  intelligent  comprehension  of  his  main 
object  and  purpose  on  the  part  of  his  lieutenants  who 
were  operating  at  a  greater  or  less  distance  from  him, 
was  essential  to  success.  Hence  these  elaborate  commu- 
nications, in  which  the  style  of  the  military  order  is  but 
barely  preserved,  and  in  which  the  effort  of  the  writer  to 
impart  all  the  information  in  his  power  to  his  corre- 
spondent and  to  give  him  an  intelligent  and  precise 
knowledge  of  the  objects  of  the  campaign,  is  very 
evident. 

In  the  English  army  there  was  nothing  of  this  sort. 
Obedience,  not  cooperation,  was  what  Wellington  re- 
quired, and  it  was  all  he  needed.     Operating  as  he  did 


42  THE    ALLIED   ARMIES.  [CHAP.    3.] 

on  a  much  smaller  scale  than  Napoleon,  his  simpler 
methods  were  quite  adequate  to  his  wants.  It  is  need- 
less to  say  that  such  a  relation  as  that  which  existed 
between  Napoleon  and  his  old  companions  in  arms,  who 
had  begun  their  careers  with  him  in  Italy  or  Egypt, 
never  existed  to  the  least  extent  in  the  English  service. 

The  Prussian  army  was  managed  differently  from 
either  the  English  or  French.  Baron  Muffling,  who  was 
the  Prussian  attache  at  the  headquarters  of  the  Duke  of 
Wellington,  says :  — ^ 

"  I  perceived  that  the  Duke  exercised  far  greater  power  in  the 
army  he  commanded  than  Prince  Bliicher  in  the  one  committed  to 
his  care.  The  rules  of  the  Enghsh  service  permitted  the  Duke's 
suspending  any  officer  and  sending  him  back  to  England.  * 
*  *  Amongst  all  the  generals,  from  the  leaders  of  corps  to 
the  commanders  of  brigades,  not  one  was  to  be  found  in  the  active 
army  who  had  been  known  as  refractory. 

"  It  was  not  the  custom  in  this  army  to  criticise  or  control  the 
commander-in-chief.  Discipline  was  strictly  enforced ;  every  one 
knew  his  rights  and  his  duties.  The  Duke,  in  matters  of  service, 
was  very  short  and  decided." 

It  is  clear  that  Baron  Muffling  had  seen  a  very  differ- 
ent state  of  things  prevailing  in  the  Prussian  service,'" 
where  it  would  seem  that  advice  was  sometimes  thrust 
upon  the  general-in-chief,  and  even  criticism  was  not 
silent.  Perhaps  the  fact  that  the  Prussian  army  was 
always  organized  in  corps,  and  that  the  chiefs  of  corps 
and  all  the  other  high  officers  were  men  of  an  equal 
social  rank,  rendered  it  hard  to  conduct  matters  accord- 
ing to  the  far  more  soldierly  ways  prevailing  in  the 
English  service.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  reason, 
however,  such  would  seem  to  have  been  the  fact  in  the 
early  part  of  this  century. 


'Miiflaing,  Passages;  pp.  213,  214. 

'°See,  for  instances,  Muffling,  Passages;  pp.  15-18,  83,  304,311:  See  also 
Stanhope,  p.  no,  for  the  "great  discussion"  the  night  after  the  battle  of 
Ligny,  when  "Bliicher  and  Grolmann  carried  the  day  for  remaining  in  com 
munication  with  the  English  army"  against  Gneisenau.    See  post,  p.  230. 


NOTE   TO  CHAPTER  III. 

The  Earl  of  Ellesmere,  who  wrote,  as  has  been  before 
said,  under  the  inspiration  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington, 
has  given  us  the  following  critical  estimate  of  a  portion 
of  the  Duke's  army.  He  is  speaking  of  the  English  and 
German  infantry,  some  thirty  thousand  in  all,  which 
fought  at  Waterloo.' 

"Of  this  very  body,  which  bore  the  brunt  of  the  whole  contest, 
be  it  remembered  that  not  above  six  or  seven  thousand  had  seen  a 
shot  fired  before.  It  was  composed  of  second  battalions  to  so  great 
an  extent  that  we  cannot  but  imagine  that  this  disadvantage  would 
have  been  felt  had  the  Duke  attacked  the  French  army,  as  he  would 
have  attacked  it  at  Quatre  Bras  on  the  17th,  if  the  Prussians  had 
maintained  their  position  at  Ligny  —  as  he  would  have  attacked  it 
on  the  1 8th  at  Waterloo,  if  the  army  with  which  he  entered  the 
south  of  France  had  been  at  his  disposal.  For  purposes  of  resist- 
ance the  fact  is  unquestionable  that  these  raw  British  battalions 
were  found  as  effective  as  the  veterans  of  the  Peninsula ;  but  it 
might  have  been  hazardous  to  manoeuvre  under  fire,  and  over  all 
contingencies  of  ground,  with  some  of  the  very  regiments  which, 
while  in  position,  never  flinched  from  the  cannonade  or  the  cavalry 
charges  through  the  livelong  day  of  Waterloo." 


'Ellesmere,  page  299. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE    FIFTEENTH    OF   JUNE.  —  NAPOLEON. 

Napoleon,  as  we  have  said  above,'  "proposed  to  assem- 
ble his  own  forces  with  all  possible  secrecy  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Charleroi,"  and  this  step  was,  of  course,  the 
essential  preliminary  to  the  opening  of  the  campaign. 
The  five  corps  of  which  the  army  was  to  be  chiefly  com- 
posed, were  widely  separated  from  each  other,  and  each 
was  at  a  considerable  distance  from  Charleroi.  The  ist 
and  2d  Corps  lay  to  the  westward  of  Charleroi,  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Lille  and  Valenciennes  respectively, 
the  3d  and  4th  Corps  to  the  southeastward  of  Charle- 
roi, near  Mezieres  and  Metz ;  the  6th  Corps  was  at 
Laon,  about  half  way  from  Charleroi  to  Paris,  and  the 
Guard  partly  at  Paris,  and  partly,  not  far  off,  at  Com- 
piegne.  The  four  cavalry  corps  were  stationed  to  the 
north  of  Laon,  between  that  place  and  Avesnes.  The 
larger  part  of  these  commands  were  placed  on  or  near 
the  frontier,  and  any  movements  on  their  part  were  likely 
to  be  observed  by  the  enemy.  Nevertheless  the  concen- 
tration of  the  army  was  safely  and  secretly  effected.  The 
4th  Corps,  which  was  near  Metz,  broke  camp  as  early 
as  the  6th  of  June,  the  ist  Corps,  which  was  near  Lille, 
as  early  as  the  9th,  the  Guard  left  Paris  on  the  8th,  the 
other  corps  left  their  encampments  at  somewhat  later 
dates.    The  Emperor  left  Paris  at  half-past  three  o'clock 

^Ante,  p.  4. 


[chap.   4.]  THE    FIFTEENTH    OF    JUNE. — NAPOLEON.  45 

on  the  morning  of  the  12th,  and  so  well  were  his  calcu- 
lations made  that,  on  the  evening  of  the  14th,  his  head- 
quarters were  at  Beaumont,  not  more  than  sixteen  miles 
south  of  Charleroi,  with  the  entire  army  within  easy 
reach.  And,  by  the  expedient  which  he  adopted,  of  caus- 
ing demonstrations  to  be  made  at  various  points  on  the 
frontier,  from  the  English  Channel  on  the  west  almost  to 
Metz  on  the  east,  he  diverted  the  attention  of  the  enemy's 
pickets  and  created  false  alarms,  so  that  his  formidable 
army  was  concentrated  without  arousing  the  serious  con- 
cern of  the  chiefs  of  the  allied  armies. 

On  the  evening  of  the  14th,  at  Avesnes,  the  Emperor 
issued  to  his  soldiers  one  of  his  stirring  orders ; ""  he  re- 
minded them  that  this  was  the  anniversary  of  Marengo 
and  Friedland;  he  called  upon  them  to  conquer  or  die. 

As  confirming  what  has  been  said  above  as  to  his  plans 
and  expectations,  he  wrote  to  his  brother  Joseph  the 
same  morning,  as  follows :  ^  "  To-morrow  I  go  to  Charleroi, 
where  the  Prussian  army  is ;  that  will  occasion  either  a 
battle  or  the  retreat  of  the  enemy."  To  the  same  effect 
he  wrote  at  the  same  time  to  Davout :  ^  "  I  shall  pass  the 
Sambre  to-morrow,  the  15th.  If  the  Prussians  do  not  re- 
tire, we  shall  have  a  battle."  These  letters  show  how  per- 
fectly clear  his  plan  lay  in  his  own  mind,  —  not  as  a  pro- 
ject of  separating  the  allied  armies  from  one  another  by 
occupying  any  points  on  the  line  by  which  they  commu- 
nicated with  each  other,  but  as  an  intention  of  attacking 
and  defeating  the  army  of  Bliicher  before  it  could  be  sup- 
ported by  that  of  Wellington,  unless,  indeed,  it  should 
fall  back  before  him. 

That  evening  at  Beaumont  was  issued  a  general  order' 
for  the  forward  movement  of  the  army,  to  commence  at 


*Corresp.,  vol.  28,  p.  324,  No.  22,052  :  App.  C,  I ;  post^  p.  362, 

3  lb.,  vol.  28,  p.  322,  No.  22,050. 

*Ib.,  vol.  28,  p.  323,  No.  22,051. 

*Ib.,  vol.  28,  p.  325,  No.  22,053:  App.  C,  II ;  post,  p.  363. 


46  THE   FIFTEENTH    OF   JUNE. — NAPOLEON.  [CHAP.   4.] 

half-past  two  o'clock  the  next  morning,  the  15th.  For 
each  corps  special  directions  were  given,  and  also  for 
each  of  the  three  divisions  of  the  Imperial  Guard, — 
Marshal  Mortier,  its  commander,  having  through  illness 
been  obliged  to  remain  at  Avesnes.  The  2d  Corps, 
followed  by  the  ist,  was  to  advance  on  the  left  of  the 
army;  the  3d  and  6th  and  the  Guard  on  the  centre;  and 
the  4th  Corps,  which  was  at  Philippeville,  on  the  right. 
Charleroi  was  stated  to  be  the  general  objective  point 
of  the  movement:  but  Reille  was  warned  that  the  2d 
Corps  would  probably  cross  the  Sambre  at  Marchienne, 
a  few  miles  higher  up,  and  Gerard  was  by  a  later  order ^ 
directed  to  cross  with  the  4th  Corps  at  Chatelet,  a  little 
lower  down.  The  sappers  were  to  precede  each  column 
to  repair  the  roads  and  bridges,  which  had  been  in  the 
past  few  months  broken  up  by  the  French,  in  order  to 
obstruct  the  march  of  the  allies,  should  they  cross  the 
frontier.  The  centre  columns  were  to  be  preceded  by 
the  cavalry  of  the  3d  Corps  and  by  the  cavalry-corps  of 
General  Pajol.  The  other  three  cavalry-corps,  under 
the  command  of  Marshal  Grouchy,  were  to  follow  the 
army.     (See  Map  2.) 

By  the  carelessness  of  the  headquarters-staff  in 
sending  but  one  officer  to  Vandamme,  and  in  not  requir- 
ing a  receipt^  from  him,  and  by  the  accident  of  this  officer 
being  thrown  from  his  horse  and  failing  to  deliver  his 
message,  Vandamme  did  not  get  this  order  in  season ;  he 
consequently  was  not  able  to  get  the  3d  Corps  on  the 
road  till  seven  o'clock.  This  delay  was,  of  course,  vexa- 
tious, and  operated  to  hinder  the  movement  upon 
Charleroi,  and  to  render  it  less  decisive  than  it  otherwise 
would  have  been. 


^La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  p.  62. 

'Charras,    vol.  i,    pp.    101,117:    La  Tour    d'Auvergne,    p.    57,11.     Cf. 
Stanhope,  pp.  65,  24S. 
*  Maurice,  p.  547 :  Sept.  1890. 


[chap.    4.]  THE   FIFTEENTH    OF   JUNE. — NAPOLEON.  47 

An  unhappy  incident  occurred  to  the  4th  Corps. 
General  Bourmont,  who  commanded  its  leading  division, 
deserted  to  the  enemy,  accompanied  by  his  staff.  Bour- 
mont was  an  old  royalist,  but  he  had  apparently  given  in 
his  unqualified  adhesion  to  the  imperial  cause.  His  trea- 
son could  not  but  have  a  very  unfortunate  effect  on  the 
soldiers,  creating  a  feeling  of  distrust  in  their  officers, 
particularly  in  those  of  high  rank. 

With  these  deductions,  the  day  of  the  fifteenth  of  June 
was  decidedly  a  successful  one  for  the  French.  Although 
the  Prussian  General  Zieten,  who,  with  the  ist  Prus- 
sian Corps,  held  the  line  of  the  Sambre,  having  advance- 
posts  on  the  right  or  south  bank,  opposed  at  all  points  to 
the  French  a  skilful  and  obstinate  resistance,^  the  superi- 
ority of  his  adversaries  was  too  decided  for  a  successful 
stand  to  be  made  anywhere. 

In  the  centre,  the  operations  were  under  the  immediate 
direction  of  the  Emperor,  who  mounted  his  horse  at  three 
in  the  morning.'"  In  the  march  on  Charleroi  the  Young 
Guard  followed  the  cavalry,  Vandamme's  Corps  having 
been,  as  we  have  seen,  delayed.  Everywhere  the  enemy 
were  pushed  back.  Pajol  entered  Charleroi  about  noon. 
Here  a  halt  was  made  to  allow  Vandamme  time  to  arrive, 
and  the  enemy  took  up  a  strong  position  on  the  heights 
of  Gilly,  a  little  to  the  north  and  east  of  Charleroi.  Their 
firm  attitude  seems  to  have  imposed  somewhat"  on 
Marshal  Grouchy,  who  had  come  up  with  the  cavalry- 
corps  of  Exelmans,  and  on  Vandamme,  who  in  the  after- 
noon arrived  and  took  his  proper  post  in  the  advance ; 
and  it  was  not  until  about  five  o'clock,"  when  Napoleon 
assumed  command  in  person,  and    with   a  vigor  that 


'For  a  valuable  discussion  of  Zieten's  conduct,  see   Col.  F.  Maurice's 
Article  on  Waterloo  in  the  United  Service  Magazine  for  October,  1890. 

'°  Corresp.  vol.  28,  p.  330,  No.  22,055  :  Baron  Fain  to  Prince  Joseph. 

"  But  see  Grouchy  :  Observations,  pp.  60  et  seq. 

'^  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  iii. 


48  THE    FIFTEENTH    OF   JUNE. — NAPOLEON.  [CHAP.   4.] 

savored  perhaps  of  impatience  assaulted  the  position,  put- 
ting in  even  the  cavalry  of  the  headquarters-guard,  that 
the  enemy  gave  way,  and  retired  to  Fleurus. 

Vandamme  and  Grouchy,  with  Pajol's  and  Exelmans' 
cavalry,  bivouacked  a  mile  or  two  south  of  Fleurus. 
The  Guard  rested  between  Charleroi  and  Gilly;  the 
6th  Corps  on  the  south  bank  of  the  river,  near  Charleroi. 

On  the  right,  the  corps  of  Gerard  crossed  the  river  at 
Chatelet,  and  remained  for  the  night  on  the  road  to 
Fleurus. 

Thus,  three  corps,  — the  3d,  4th,  and  6th,— the  Guard, 
and  the  greater  part  of  the  cavalry,  were  concentrated 
near  Charleroi  and  between  that  place  and  Fleurus, 
ready  to  attack  the  Prussians  at  Fleurus  or  Sombreffe 
the  next  day. 

The  Emperor's  headquarters  were  fixed  at  Charleroi. 

Coming  now  to  the  operations  of  the  left  wing,— Reille, 
at  the  head  of  the  2d  Corps,  starting  from  Leers,  on 
the  Sambre,  at  three  in  the  morning,  drove  the  enemy 
from  point  to  point,  occupying  the  various  bridges  across 
the  river,  until  he  reached  Marchienne.'^  By  the  terms 
of  an  order ''^  dated  8.30  A.  M.  he  was  allowed  to  pass 
the  Sambre  at  this  point,  and  by  another  order,  which  is 
not  preserved,  but  only  referred  to  in  an  order  to  d'Erlon,'^ 
he  was  directed  to  march  on  Gosselies,  and  to  attack  a 
body  of  the  enemy  which  appeared  to  be  there.  In 
obedience  to  his  instructions,  Reille  crossed  the  bridge 
at  Marchienne  and  moved  directly  upon  Jumet,  a  village 
on  the  road  leading  from  Charleroi  to  Brussels.  Here 
he  encountered  a  Prussian  rear  guard,  which  he  quickly 
overthrew,  and  at  once  moved  upon  Gosselies.  It  was 
"  at  this  moment,"  when  he  was  marching  on  Gosselies, 


"  Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.  99,  100. 

^  Doc.  Indd.,  Ill,  p.  22  ;  App.  C,  III ;  post,  p.  366. 

«  lb.,  V,  p.  25  ;  App.  C,  V ;  post,  p.  367.    See  Napolifon  ^  Waterloo,  p.  58. 


[chap.   4.]  THE   FIFTEENTH    OF   JUNE. — NAPOLEON.  49 

he  says,  that  Marshal  Ney  arrived  and  took  command.'^ 
This  was  about  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.'' 

Ney,  who  had  just  overtaken  the  army  on  the  march, 
had  ridden  over  from  Charleroi,  where  he  had  seen  the 
Emperor,  and  had  received'^  from  him  the  command  of 
the  1st  and  2d  Corps.  Napoleon  had  told  him  that 
Reille  was  marching  on  Gosselies,  and,  when  he  reached 
Reille,  he  found  him,  as  we  have  just  seen,  in  the  very 
act. 

On  his  arrival  at  Gosselies,  Ney  carried  forward  with 
himself  to  Frasnes  the  cavalry  of  the  2d  Corps,  Pire's, 
and  the  division  of  Bachelu.  About  half-past  six,'^ 
Ney  with  these  troops  drove  the  enemy,  —  a  brigade 
under  Prince  Bernard  of  Saxe  Weimar, — from  Frasnes. 
They  fell  back  to  Quatre  Bras.  The  division  of  Girard 
was  sent  in  pursuit  of  the  Prussians,  who  had  retired  from 
Gosselies  on  Fleurus.  The  other  two  divisions,  —  those 
of  Jerome  and  Foy,  —  remained  at  Gosselies.  A  division 
of  cavalry  of  the  Guard,  under  Lefebvre-Desnouettes, 
about  2000  strong,  which  had  been  lent  temporarily  to 
Ney,  was  placed  by  him  in  support  of  the  troops  at 
Frasnes.'°  Ney  remained  at  Frasnes  till  a  late  hour  in 
the  evening. 


'^  Doc.  Indd.,  p.  56  :  Statement  of  General  Reille. 

"  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  123. 

'^  Doc.  Ined.,  p.  4,  statement  of  Colonel  Heym^s.  The  hour  given  by 
Heymes,  seven  o'clock,  is  much  too  late.  We  can  fix  the  time  of  this  conver- 
sation from  a  statement  of  Marshal  Grouchy's.  That  officer  (Observations, 
p.  61)  tells  us  that  on  going  to  Charleroi  to  take  his  orders  from  the  Emperor 
just  before  the  attack  on  Gilly,  he  found  him  giving  instructions  to  Ney. 
The  attack  on  Gilly  was  ordered,  as  we  have  seen  above,  at  five  o'clock,  so 
that  Ney  must  have  joined  the  Emperor  some  time  before  five,  and  probably 
reached  Reille  about  half  or  three-quarters  of  an  hour  later.  Cf.  Van  Loben 
Sels,  p.  140. 

'9  Report  of  Prince  Bernard,  given  in  full  in  Van  Loben  Sels,  p.  134,  n. 
Heymes'  statement  is  all  wrong  as  to  the  hours.  He  says  Ney  met  the 
Emperor  at  seven,  put  himself  at  the  head  of  the  2d  Corps  at  eight,  and 
occupied  Frasnes  at  ten.     Doc.  In^d.,  p.  4. 

^°Doc.  Indd.,  pp.  4,  5.     Col.  Heym&s' Statement. 


50  THE    FIFTEENTH    OF   JUNE. —  NAPOLEON.  [CHAP.    4.] 

Thus  the  2d  Corps  had  accomplished  its  tasks  for 
the  day.  Its  commander  had  shown  himself  energetic 
and  capable.  The  advance  at  Frasnes  observed  the 
enemy's  post  at  Quatre  Bras.  The  troops  had  had  a  very 
exhausting  day  and  needed  a  good  night's  rest. 

The  ist  Corps,  under  the  Count  d'Erlon,  did  not  do 
so  well  by  any  means.  To  begin  with,  d'Erlon  did  not 
start  at  3  A.  M.,  as  he  was  ordered  to  do,  but  at  4 
o'clock.^'  His  troops  had  no  fighting  to  do;  they  simply 
followed  in  the  rear  of  the  2d  Corps."  They  had, 
to  be  sure,^^  five  miles  farther  to  go,  having  bivouacked 
at  Solre-sur-Sambre,  and  they  were,  no  doubt,  affected 
by  that  tendency  to  delay  \vhich  seems  always  to  attend 
the  last  half  of  a  long  marching  column ;  it  is  well  known 
that  the  last  half  never  keeps  up,  relatively,  with  the  first 
half.  D'Erlon  had  also  been  required  to  detach  part  of 
his  troops  at  the  various  crossings  of  the  Sambre."^  But 
these  facts  afford  no  adequate  explanation  of  the  tardi- 
ness of  this  corps.  At  night  d'Erlon's  headquarters  were 
at  Marchienne;  his  leading  division,  Durutte's,  had 
reached  Jumet;^^  but  at  least  one-fourth  of  his  troops 
had  not  crossed  the  river.  Nevertheless,  by  an  order'^ 
dated  3  P.  M.,  d'Erlon  had  been  informed  that  Reille  had 


"See  Napoldon  k  Waterloo,  p.  53,  where  d'Erlon's  order  to  his  troops 
to  break  camp  at  4  A.  M.,  instead  of  at  3  A.  M.,  as  had  been  directed, 
is  given  in  full,  and  severely  commented  on. 

"Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  98.  Cf.  the  10  A.  M.  order  to  d'Erlon :  Doc.  Ined., 
\Y,  p.  24 ;  App.  C,  iv ;  post,  p.  367.  This  directed  d'Erlon  to  cross  the 
Sambre  at  Marchiennes  or  Ham,  and  take  up  a  position  close  to  that  of 
ReiUe. 

^^Ib.,  p.  98,  n. 

^Charras,  vol.  2,  pp.  207,  208. 

^5 Durutte's  statement,  Doc.  I n^d.,  p.  71,  that  this  Corps  camped  at  night 
beyond  Gosselies,  is  wholly  unsupported.  Durutte  probably  meant  Jumet, 
not  Gosselies.  The  divisions  of  Foy  and  Jerome,  of  the  2d  Corps,  occupied 
Gosselies. 

^'Doc.  In^d.,  v.,  p.  25  ;  App.  C,  v ;  post.  d.  '567. 


[chap.   4.]  THE   FIFTEENTH    OF   JUNE. — NAPOLEON.  5 1 

been  ordered  to  march  on  Gosselies  and  to  attack  the 
enemy  there,  and  that  the  Emperor  wished  him,  d'Erlon, 
also  to  march  on  Gosselies  and  to  support  this  operation. 
Later  in  the  day,  or  perhaps  in  the  evening,''^  after 
Marshal  Ney  had  assumed  command  of  the  two  corps, 
d'Erlon  was  informed'^  that  it  was  the  Emperor's  inten- 
tion that  he  should  join  the  2d  Corps  at  Gosselies, 
and  that  Ney  would  also  give  him  orders  to  that  effect.''^ 
This  last  sentence  must  imply  that  Napoleon  had  en- 
joined on  Ney  to  bring  up  these  troops.  It  is  true  that 
Charras^°  says  that,  on  the  evening  of  the  15th,  the  ist 
Corps  was  in  echelon  from  Marchienne  to  Jumet,  imply- 
ing that  all  the  troops  had  crossed  the  river;  and  this  is 
the  generally  accepted  belief.^'  But  we  find  a  despatch,^' 
dated  at  Marchienne  at  3  A.  M.  of  the  i6th,  from  the 
chief-of-sta£f  of  the  3d  division  of  the  ist  corps, 
Marcognet's,  to  General  Nogues,  who  commanded  the 
ist  brigade  of  that  division,  informing  him  that  the 
2d  brigade  would  remain  at  Marchienne  until  the 
arrival  of  the  ist  division,  that  of  General  Allix.  This 
shows  beyond  a  doubt  that,  notwithstanding  the  order  of 
three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  for  the  ist  Corps  to 
reach  Gosselies  and  support  Reille  in  attacking  the 
enemy,  and  the  subsequent  order  to  the  same  effect,  yet, 


^^At  six  or  seven  o'clock,  Charras  thinks.    Charras,  vol.  2,  p.  224. 
^^Doc.  Indd.,  VI.,  p.  25  ;  App.  C,  vi ;  post,  p.  368. 

^9In  some  unaccountable  way  Chesney  (Waterloo,  pp.  118,  119)  has  over- 
looked these  orders  that  Napoleon  gave  to  d'Erlon  to  close  up  on  ReUle  at 
Gosselies.  The  Documents  Itiedits  are  not  among  the  authorities  given  in 
the  List  which  follows  his  Table  of  Contents,  although  they  are  referred  to 
on  page  119,  and  this  may  account  for  this  regrettable  oversight.  His  blame 
of  Napoleon,  which  is  very  severe,  is,  therefore,  entirely  undeserved. 

^°Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  no. 

3'La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  p.  91 ;  Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  82  ;  Quinet,  p.  90 ;  Hooper, 
p.  76 :  The  author  of  "  Napoleon  k  Waterloo  "  alone  states  (p.  34)  that  a  part 
of  the  ist  Corps  had  not  crossed  at  night.     See  also  p.  60. 

^Napoldon  h.  Waterloo,  p.  144 ;  App.  C,  vii ;  post,  p.  368. 


52  THE   FIFTEENTH   OF   JUNE. — NAPOLEON.    [CHAP.    4.] 

at  three  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  i6th,  twelve  hours 
afterwards,  one  division  had  not  arrived  at  the  river,  and 
another  division  (two  brigades)  was  still  at  Marchienne. 
This  state  of  facts,  it  must  be  recollected,  existed 
when  the  whole  2d  Corps  had  been  at  and  beyond 
Gosselies  for  more  than  eight  hours!  It  is  impossible 
not  to  blame  d'Erlon  for  this  excessive  tardiness  in  the 
movements  of  his  corps, —  not  only  for  not  having  exe- 
cuted the  order  of  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  to  pro- 
ceed at  once  to  Gosselies,  but  generally,  for  not  having 
seen  to  it  that  his  troops  were,  during  the  entire  march, 
within  a  short  distance"  of  the  2d  Corps,  a  measure 
certainly,  when  all  the  circumstances  are  taken  into 
account,  —  and  especially  that  the  advance  of  Reille  was 
to  be  made  in  an  enemy's  country  and  was  actually 
stoutly  resisted,  —  of  the  most  obvious  necessity.  And 
it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  in  Belgium  in  the  middle 
of  June,  it  is  light  until  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening,  and 
the  sun  rises  before  four. 

It  may  be  remarked  that  the  controversies  which  have 
been  waged  in  regard  to  the  truth  of  Napoleon's  state- 
ment that  he,  on  the  15th,  gave  Ney  verbal  orders  to 
seize  and  occupy  Quatre  Bras,  have  deflected  the  atten- 
tion of  historians  from  the  subject  now  under  considera- 
tion,—the  conduct  of  d'Erlon  in  regard  to  the  march  of 
the  I  St  Corps  on  the  15th,— a  subject  closely  connected, 
as  we  shall  hereafter  see,  with  the  operations  of  the 
army  on  the  succeeding  day. 

In  regard  to  the  much  vexed  question  referred  to 
above,  we  shall  say  nothing  here.  It  is  not  pretended 
that  Napoleon  gave  to  Ney  on  the  15th  any  written 
orders  to  go  to  Quatre  Bras.  Napoleon's  statement^  ^ 
that  he  gave  him  verbal  orders  to  that  effect  has  been 


^^Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  98. 

^•Corresp.  vol,  31,  p.  199 :  Gourgaud,  p.  47. 


[chap.   4.]  THE   FIFTEENTH   OF  JUNE. — NAPOLEON.  53 

denied,  and  is  widely  disbelieved.  We  prefer,  for  many 
reasons,  to  confine  our  narrative  to  generally  admitted 
facts,  or  to  those  which  admit  of  definite  proof.  What 
we  have  to  say  about  this  matter  will  be  found  in  the 
Notes  to  this  chapter. 

In  summing  up  the  situation,  we  may  fairly  conclude, 
that,  with  the  exception  of  the  backwardness  of  the  ist 
Corps,  the  progress  made !  during  the  day  had  been 
satisfactory  to  the  Emperor.     He  says  himself : — 

"All  the  Emperor's  manoeuvres  had  succeeded  to  his  wishes;  he 
had  it  thenceforth  in  his  power  to  attack  the  armies  of  the  enemy 
in  detail.  To  avoid  this  misfortune,  the  greatest  that  could  befall 
them,  the  only  means  they  had  left  was  to  abandon  the  ground,  and 
assemble  at  Brussels  or  beyond  that  city."35 

Napoleon  had  in  fact  concentrated  in  front  of  Fleurus 
a  sufficient  force  wherewith  to  fight  the  Prussians,  if,  as 
he  thought  it  not  unlikely,  they  should  risk  a  battle  on 
the  next  day.  He  was  not  apprehensive  of  the  Anglo- 
Dutch  army  joining  their  allies  in  this  battle,  for  Wel- 
lington, as  he  calculated,  could  not  concentrate  in  sea- 
son a  sufficient  force  to  overcome  the  two  corps  which, 
under  Ney,  he  intended  should  occupy  Quatre  Bras  the 
next  forenoon.  He  had  purposely  abstained  from 
occupying  Sombreffe,  for  he  feared  that  if  he  did  this, 
Blucher,  finding  his  communications  with  Wellington 
blocked  at  this  point,  would  retire  without  a  battle,  and 
endeavor  to  effect  a  junction  with  the  English  at  Wavre, 
or  elsewhere  to  the  northward ;  whereas,  so  long  as  the 
road  which  connected  his  army  with  that  of  Wellington 
remained  free,  BlUcher  might  with  confidence  be  ex- 
pected to  risk  a  battle  for  the  preservation  of  that  line  of 
communication,  that  is,  at  or  near  Fleurus,  with  the  ex- 
pectation of  being  reinforced  by  his  ally.  But  if  he 
ventured  upon  this  course.  Napoleon  expected  to  beat 
him,  for   Napoleon  calculated  that,  by  the  occupation 


^^Corresp.  vol.  31  ;  p.  202. 


54  THE    FIFTEENTH    OF   JUNE. — NAPOLEON.  [CHAP.    4.] 

of  Quatre  Bras  the  next  morning,  he  could  prevent 
Bliicher's  receiving  any  assistance  from  his  Anglo- 
Dutch  allies. 

A  letter  ^^  written  by  Baron  Fain,  one  of  the  Emperor's 
secretaries,  to  Joseph  Bonaparte,  dated  Charleroi,  June 
15th,  at  9  o'clock  in  the  evening,  states  that  the  Emperor 
has  just  returned,  very  much  fatigued,  having  been  on 
horseback  since  three  in  the  morning,  and  has  thrown 
himself  on  his  bed  for  a  few  hours' repose;  but  that  he 
will  mount  his  horse  again  at  midnight.  This,  how- 
ever, as  we  shall  see  hereafter,  he  did  not  do,  as  at  mid- 
night Marshal  Ney  came  to  confer  with  him,  having  just 
ridden  back  from  his  extreme  front  at  Frasnes. 


^Corresp.  vol.  28;  p.  330,  No.  22,055. 


NOTES   TO    CHAPTER  IV. 

I.  Marshal  Ney  was  acting  under  considerable  dis- 
advantage during  this  afternoon  and  evening.  We  have 
spoken  of  this  subject  before.  His  difhculties  are  well 
pointed  out  by  Colonel  Maurice  in  a  recent  paper,'  in 
which  much  stress  is  laid,  and  very  justly,  on  the  fact 
that  Ney  had  not  with  him  a  proper  staff.  It  is  true 
that  Ney  was  no  neophyte  in  the  practice  of  war,  and 
that  he  was  perfectly  well  known  to  his  corps-command- 
ers, and  in  fact  to  his  entire  command.  But  he  arrived 
at  the  front  late  in  the  day,— at  nearly  five  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon, —  and  with  but  a  single  staff -officer.  It  was 
only  natural  and  right  that  he  should  personally  occupy 
himself  with  the  conduct  of  the  advance  to  Frasnes,  that 
he  should  accompany  the  cavalry,  and  should  attend  to 
the  posting  of  Bachelu's  infantry  division  in  support. 
And  he  may  very  possibly  have  found  the  leading  divis- 
ion of  the  I  St  Corps,  Durutte's,  between  Jumet  and 
Gosselies"  on  his  return,  late  in  the  evening,  from 
Frasnes  to  the  latter  place.  That  the  ist  Corps  had 
not  fully  executed  its  part  of  the  programme  must  have 
been,  however,  only  too  plain  to  him ;  and  the  necessity 
of  exerting  himself  energetically  to  bring  it  up  to  the 


'United  Service  Magazine  :  Sept.,  1890  :  pp.  541  et  seq. 

*Doc.  Indd.,  p.  71.  Statement  of  General  Durutte.  As  we  have  before 
remarked,  this  officer  probably  mistook  Jumet  for  Gosselies.  See  ante,  p.  50, 
note  25. 


55 


56  JUNE    15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES.         [CHAP.   4.] 

front^  if  he  would  have  his  whole  command  well  in  hand 
for  to-morrow's  work  must  have  appeared,  in  view  of 
d'Erlon's  slowness,  most  imperative.  At  least,  there  is 
every  reason  to  suppose  this. 

2.  As  to  whether  Napoleon  accomplished  as  much 
as  he  had  intended  to  accomplish,  or  as  much  as 
he  ought  to  have  intended  to  accomplish,  on  this  day 
of  the  fifteenth  of  June,  writers  have  differed.  Those 
who,  like  Jomini  and  Charras,'*  maintain  the  theory  that 
his  intention  was  to  seize  both  Sombreffe  and  Quatre 
Bras  at  once,  and  those  who,  like  Rogniat,  insist  that 
this  ought  to  have  been  his  intention,  whatever  it  may  in 
reality  have  been,  hold  that  the  operations  of  this  first 
day  were  incomplete.    Jomini  sa^^s: — ^ 

*' Napoleon  had  to  renounce  the  idea  of  pushing  on  the  15th  as 
far  as  Sombreffe  and  Qiiatre  Bras,  which  were  to  be  the  pivots  of 
all  his  after  movements."  "One  may  feel  assured,"  says  Charras,^ 
"  that  the  haste  which  Napoleon  intended  should  characterize  the 
march  of  the  army  had  for  its  object  the  occupation  of  Quatre 
Bras  and  Sombreffe  on  the  first  day  of  the  campaign.  This  occu- 
pation failed,  in  consequence  of  a  considerable  loss  of  time;  the 
principal  avenue  of  communication  between  Bliicher  and  Welling- 
ton remained  free,  although  menaced ;  it  is  for  this  reason  that  we 
hold  that  Napoleon  told  the  truth  in  writing  that  'this  loss  of 
time  was  very  injurious'  and  that  we  add, —  the  day  of  the  15th 
had  been  incomplete." 


^"An  error  was  committed  by  suffering  it  [the  ist  Corps]  to  remain,  dur- 
ing the  night  of  the  15th,  echeloned  between  Marchienne  and  Jumet." 
Gourg.  p.  66. 

*A7ite,  pp.  12,  13. 

sjomini,  p.  125.  Jomini  says  (p.  123J  that  "Napoleon  gave  Grouchy  a 
verbal  order  to  push  as  far  as  Sombreffe  that  very  evening,  if  possible  ";  but 
no  evidence  of  such  an  order  is  cited.  See  Jomini's  letter  to  the  Due 
d'Elchingen,  pp.  225,  226.  Cf.  La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  p.  69.  That  Napoleon 
nowhere  blames  Grouchy  for  not  having  pushed  on  to  Sombreffe  on  the 
15th, —  taken  in  connection  with  his  censure  of  Ney  for  not  having  seized 
Quatre  Bras  that  evening, —  is  pretty  good  evidence  that  he  neither  ordered 
nor  expected  Grouchy  to  reach  Sombreffe. 

^Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  116  :  cf.  vol.  2,  p.  225,  Note  K. 


[chap.   4.]         JUNE    15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES.  57 

The  passage  to  which  Charras  here  refers  is  to  be 
found  in  the  Memoirs/  and  it  runs  thus:  — 

"On  the  same  day  [the  15th],  the  attack  of  the  woods  before 
Fleurus,  which  had  been  ordered  to  commence  at  four  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon,  did  not  take  place  until  seven  o'clock.  Night 
came  on  before  the  troops  could  enter  Fleurus,  where  it  had  been 
the  project  of  the  chief  to  place  his  headquarters  that  very  day. 
This  loss  of  seven  [^sicY  hours  was  very  injurious  at  the  opening  of 
a  campaign." 

A.  Let  us  first  consider  this  question  so  far  as  it 
affects  the  operations  of  the  centre  and  right  of  the 
army, — that  is,  with  reference  to  the  non-occupation  of 
Sombreffe  on  the  15th. 

Rogniat's  criticism,  that  the  Emperor  ought  to  have 
aimed  at  seizing  Sombreffe  on  the  15th,  is  especially  in- 
teresting, as  it  was  answered  by  Napoleon  himself  from 
St.  Helena. 

"  He  [Napoleon]  ought  to  have  carried  his  whole  army  the  same 
day  as  far  as  Fleurus,  by  a  forced  march  of  eight  to  ten  leagues, 
and  to  have  pushed  his  advance  guard  as  far  as  Sombreffe ;  but, 
instead  of  hastening  to  arrive  in  the  midst  of  his  enemies,  he 
stopped  at  Charleroi,  whether  because  he  was  retarded  by  the  bad 
weather  or  for  other  motives. "9 

To  this  Napoleon  replied: — '° 

"The  Emperor's  intention  was  that  his  advance  guard  should 
occupy   Fleurus,"    keeping  [the   bulk    of]    his   troops    concealed 


'  Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  249. 

^Evidently  a  misprint  for  "three" ;  the  word  "seven"  having  obviously  been 
carelessly  repeated. 

'Rogniat :  Consid.,  p.  339  :  cited  in  Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  471. 

'°  Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  471. 

"Rogniat  claims  that  there  is  a  serious  inconsistency  between  this  state- 
ment, as  to  the  occupation  of  Fleurus  by  the  advance  guard,  and  that  in  the 
Memoirs,  where  it  is  said  that  the  Emperor  intended  to  place  his  head- 
quarters there.  This  seems  rather  hypercritical.  Charras  (vol.  2,  p.  221) 
says  "It  stands  to  reason  that  if  he  had  had  his  headquarters  in  that  city 
[Fleurus],  he  would  have  occupied  Sombrefife."    But  this  is  surely  going  too 


58  JUNE    15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES.         [CHAP.   4.] 

behind  the  wood  near  this  city;"  he  took  good  care  not  to  let  his 
army  be  seen,  and^  above  all,  not  to  occupy  So?7ibreffe.^'^  This  [the 
occupation  of  Sombreffe]  would  of  itself  have  caused  the  failure  of 
all  his  manoeuvres;  for  then  Marshal  Bliicher  would  have  been 
obliged  to  make  Wavre  the  place  for  the  concentration  of  his  army, 
the  battle  of  Ligny  would  not  have  taken  place,  and  the  Prussian 
army  would  not  have  been  obliged  to  give  battle  [as  it  did]  in  its 
then  not  fully  concentrated  condition,  and  not  supported  by  the 
English  army." 

In  his  "  Reponse  aux  Notes  critiques  de  Napoleon,"''* 
Rogniat  criticises  this  observation  as  follows : — 

"In  occupying  Sombreffe  on  the  15th,  Napoleon  would  have 
won,  without  striking  a  blow,  the  immense  result  of  isolating  the 
two  opposing  armies  in  order  to  fight  them  separately,  a  result 
which  the  victory  of  Ligny,  so  dearly  purchased,  did  not  obtain  for 
him."'S 

While  Rogniat  thus  condemns  Napoleon  for  not  hav- 
ing proposed  to  himself  to  occupy  Sombreffe  on  the 
15th,  Charras'^  summarily  dismisses  Napoleon's  state- 
ment just  quoted,  as  unworthy  of  serious  attention.  Not 
to  have  aimed  at  occupying  Sombreffe  on  the  15th,  he 
says,  would  have  been  contrary  to  "  the  very  principles 
of  his  strategy."     He  accordingly  finds  that  in  this  re- 


far.  Headquarters  might  well  have  been  in  Fleurus,  while  the  Prussians 
held  the  heights  of  Brye  and  Sombreffe,  and  even  the  villages  of  Ligny  and 
St.  Amand;  and  this  actually  was  the  case  the  next  day,— the  i6th. 
Fleurus,  half  way  between  Charleroi  and  Sombreffe,  was  a  very  natural 
place  for  the  Emperor  to  aim  at  as  his  resting  place  for  the  night  of  the 
15th. 

"Clausewitz,  ch.  30,  p.  60.    But  see  Rogniat,  Rdponse,  p.  262. 

"The  italics  are  our  own. 

'''pp.  264,  265. 

"It  is  not  easy  to  see  what  is  meant  here.  It  is  certam  that,  without  hav- 
ing occupied  Sombreffe  on  the  15th,  Napoleon  did  fight  the  Prussians 
separately  on  the  i6th.  That  Ligny  was  not  a  more  decisive  victory  was  due 
to  special  causes. 

"■Vol.  I,  p.  115,  note.    Quinet,  p.  102,  does  not  follow  Charras  here. 


[chap.   4.]         JUNE    15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES.  59 

spect  Napoleon  had  failed  on  the  evening  of  the  15th  to 
attain  his  objective  point. 

Jomini's  view''  of  Napoleon's  plan,  as  we  have  seen 
above,  coincides  with  that  of  Charras.'^ 

In  respect  to  these  criticisms,  we  observe  in  the  first 
place  that  these  writers  have  adduced  no  sufficient  rea- 
son for  distrusting  Napoleon's  own  account  of  his  plan 
and  intentions.  That  account  is  perfectly  clear  and  con- 
sistent throughout.  He  wanted,  he  tells  us,  to  fight  at 
the  outset  a  decisive  battle  with  one  of  the  allied  armies. 
He  looked  for  great  results  from  such  a  battle.  He  ex- 
pected, he  says,  that  the  Prussians  would  be  promptly 
concentrated,  and  would  offer  battle  near  Fleurus,— to 
the  south  of  Sombreffe ;  and  that  owing  to  the  unreadi- 
ness of  the  Anglo-allied  army,  and  his  proposed  seizure 
of  Quatre  Bras  on  the  first  day  of  the  campaign,  he 
would  be  able  to  fight  the  Prussians,  isolated,  for  the 
time  being,  from  the  English.'^  While  he  claims  to  have 
ordered  the  occupation  of  Quatre  Bras  on  the  first  day, 
he  nowhere  says  that  he  proposed  to  occupy  Sombreffe 
on  the  first  day.  When  he  is  criticised  for  not  having 
attempted  this,  he  maintains  that  he  was  right.  He  con- 
sidered, he  says,  that  Bllicher's  object  in  fighting  a  battle 
at  this  stage  in  the  campaign  must  be  the  maintenance  of 
his  communications  with  his  allies;"  the  Prussians 
would,  therefore,  fight,  if  they  fought  at  all,  to  the  south 
of  the  Namur-Quatre-Bras  turnpike,  somewhere  to  the 
south  of  Sombreffe.  And,  as  he  expected  great  and 
perhaps  decisive  results''  from  such  a  battle,  he  con- 


"Jomini,  pp.  123,  125. 

"La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  pp.  73  et  seq.  takes  the  same  view. 

'5Vaudoncourt,  vol.  3,  2d  part,  pp.  134,  135,  states  the  Emperor's  plan  with 
admirable  clearness.     But  on  pp.  165, 166,  he  slides  into  the  theory  of  Jomini. 

^"Cy.  Clausewitz,  ch.  22,  p.  46.  "  It  was  certainly  to  be  assumed  that 
both  generals  would  remain  in  communication  with  each  other." 

^"'  Bonaparte  hoped,  if  he  met  Blucher's  main  body,  to  destroy  it  by  a 
quick  attack,  before  WeUington  could  arrive."     lb.,  ch.  22,  p.  46. 


60  JUNE    15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES.         [CHAP.   4.] 

tented  himself  on  the  15th  of  June  with  threatening  with 
his  centre  and  right  this  turnpike,  and  purposely  ab- 
stained from  occupying  Sombreffe.  For  if  Bllicher  should 
find  Sombreffe  occupied  and  his  line  of  communications 
with  Wellington  actually  in  the  enemy's  hands,  it  was 
probable,  so  Napoleon  thought,  that  he  would  retire  to 
some  point  further  north,  where  a  union  of  the  two 
armies  could  easily  be  effected,  and  so  this  opportunity 
of  fighting  the  Prussians  alone  and  isolated  from  the 
English  would  be  lost. 

In  the  second  place,  we  fail  to  see  that  the  plan  which 
Rogniat  blames  Napoleon  for  not  having  adopted,  and 
which  Jomini  and  Charras  believe  he  really  entertained, 
but  failed  to  carry  into  effect,  that  is,  the  plan  of  occupy- 
ing both  Sombreffe  and  Quatre  Bras  on  the  15th,  was  an 
improvement  in  any  way  over  Napoleon's  plan  as  de- 
scribed by  himself,  as  stated  above.  These  WTiters  would 
have  Napoleon  begin  the  campaign  by  separating  the 
two  hostile  armies  by  occupying  two  points  on  the  road 
by  which  they  communicated  with  each  other.  Napo- 
leon says  that  if  he  had  done  this,  while  the  two  armies 
would  certainly  have  been  separated,  his  chances  of  deal- 
ing decisively  with  one  of  them,  alone  and  unsupported 
by  its  ally,  would  most  likely  have  vanished.  And  the 
probabilities  are  that  Napoleon  was  right  in  this  opinion. 
Bllicher  would  naturally  have  retired,  if  he  had  found  the 
N am ur- Quatre- Bras  road  occupied  at  Sombreffe  by  the 
French  in  force;  he  would  have  tried  to  concert  with 
Wellington  some  combined  operation  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Wavre  or  Brussels;  and  thus  the  opportunity 
which  Napoleon  had  at  Ligny,  where  the  Prussians 
were  exposed  to  the  attack  of  the  main  French  army 
without  the  assistance  of  a  single  English  soldier,  would 
not  have  been  offered  by  Bllicher. 

It  seems  to  us  that  Napoleon  is  right  in  his  conten- 
tion, and  that  the  great  chance  which  he  had  at  the  bat- 
tle of  Ligny  of  defeating  one  of  his  two  adversaries  alone 


[chap.   4.]         JUNE    15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES.  61 

and  unsupported,  was  in  exact  accordance  with  his  ex- 
pectations, and,  was,  as  much  as  such  things  ever  are,  the 
result  of  his  well-calculated  dispositions. 

We  conclude,  therefore,  that  there  is  no  good  reason 
to  suppose  that  Napoleon  intended  on  the  evening  of 
the  15th  to  push  forward  to  Sombreffe  and  hold  the 
Namur-Nivelles  road  at  that  point.  He  may  very  possi- 
bly have  expected  to  fix  his  headquarters  at  Fleurus, 
but,  although  he  did  not  succeed  in  doing  this,  his  object 
had  been  substantially  attained  at  the  close  of  the  first 
day  of  the  campaign,  so  far  as  the  operations  of  the  right 
and  centre  were  concerned. 

B.  Let  us  now  consider  the  other  branch  of  the  ques- 
tion,—  Did  Napoleon  intend  to  occupy  Quatre  Bras  on 
the  15th? 

(i.)  If  we  are  correct  in  the  view  taken  above,  namely, 
that  Napoleon  did  not  intend  to  seize  Sombreffe  on  the 
15th,  because  he  feared  that  if  Bliicher  found  his  line  of 
communications  with  Wellington  occupied  in  force  at 
Sombreffe,  he  would  retire  to  the  northward,  and  there 
form  a  junction  with  the  Anglo-Dutch  army,  it  would 
seem  at  first  blush  as  if  Bliicher  might  be  expected  to  take 
the  same  course  if  he  found  the  turnpike  to  Nivelles  oc- 
cupied in  force  by  the  enemy  at  Quatre  Bras.  But  this 
seems  to  be  pushing  the  argument  too  far.  Bliicher 
could  hardly  be  expected  to  be  affected  by  the  report  of 
the  occupation  of  Quatre  Bras  so  much  as  by  the  expul- 
sion of  Zieten's  Corps  from  Sombreffe,  and  by  the  occu- 
pation of  that  place  by  the  main  French  army.  Theo- 
retically, so  to  speak,  the  seizure  of  any  one  point  on  the 
Namur-Nivelles  turnpike  ought  to  produce  the  same 
effect  on  Marshal  Bliicher's  mind,  and,  therefore,  on  his 
subsequent  movements,  as  the  seizure  of  any  other.  Yet 
one  can  easily  see  that,  practically,  this  might  not  be  so. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  was  certainly  the  risk  that 
Bliicher  would  not  fight  at  or  near  Sombreffe  unless  he 
thought  he  could  count  on  receiving  aid  from  Welling- 


62  JUNE    15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES.         [CHAP.    4.] 

ton,  and  this  expectation  could  hardly  be  entertained,  if 
he  knew  that  the  French  were  in  possession  of  Quatre 
Bras.  Still,  the  importance  of  preventing  Wellington, 
by  an  early  occupation  of  Quatre  Bras,  from  assisting  the 
Prussians  in  their  resistance  to  the  attack  which  he 
hoped  to  make  upon  them  the  next  day,  may  well  have 
induced  Napoleon  to  give  on  the  15th  to  Marshal  Ney 
orders  to  occupy  Quatre  Bras  at  once,  and  to  take  the 
chance  of  the  result  of  this  step  being  the  withdrawal  of 
the  Prussian  army  to  Wavre  or  Brussels, 

(2.)  But  the  matter  is  really  of  very  little  consequence, 
so  far,  at  least,  as  the  successful  carrying  out  of  Napoleon's 
plan  is  concerned.  Let  us  assume  that  Napoleon  is  cor- 
rect in  his  statement  that  he  gave  a  verbal  order  to  Ney 
on  the  15th  to  push  forward  to  Quatre  Bras.  We  have 
nevertheless  just  seen  that  the  Memoirs  testify  to  the 
Emperor's  general  satisfaction  on  the  evening  of  the  15th 
with  the  progress  that  had  been  made  during  the  day, 
notwithstanding  the  non-occupation  of  Quatre  Bras. 
Napoleon  has  in  fact  nowhere  said  that  it  was  necessary 
to  occupy  Quatre  Bras  on  the  15th.  The  written  orders 
to  Ney,  on  the  morning  of  the  i6th,  which  we  shall 
shortly  have  occasion  to  consider,  imply  that,  at  the  time 
he  wrote  them,  Napoleon  was  content  with  Ney's  having 
on  the  15th  occupied  Frasnes  and  threatened  Quatre  Bras, 
and  that  he  then  desired  the  movement  on  the  latter  point 
to  take  place  on  the  forenoon  of  the  i6th,  while  he  himself 
was  massing  his  troops  for  the  advance  on  Sombreffe  and 
the  expected  battle  with  the  Prussians  in  the  afternoon. 
In  truth,  when  we  consider  that  the  bulk  of  the  army 
under  Napoleon  in  person  could  hardly  have  been  in 
condition  to  engage  the  Prussians  at  daybreak  of  the 
1 6th,  we  can  easily  comprehend  that  Napoleon, — what- 
ever he  might  have  enjoined  on  Ney  at  five  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  before,  when  he  no  doubt  expected  that  much 
more  progress  would  be  made  before  the  next  morning 
than  actually  was  made, — should  have  been  quite  con- 


[chap.   4.]         JUNE    15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES.  63 

tent  with  Ney's  not  having  reached  a  point  so  far  to  the 
front  as  Quatre  Bras.^' 

As  for  Jomini"  and  Charras,'^  they  admit  that,  when 
Napoleon  perceived  the  impossibility  of  seizing  Sombreffe 
on  the  15th,  he  ceased  to  desire  the  occupation  of  Quatre 
Bras,  and  was  quite  content  with  Ney's  advance  remain- 
ing for  the  night  at  Frasnes.  In  their  conclusion  we 
may,  for  the  reasons  we  have  just  given,  well  agree,  with- 
out committing  ourselves  to  their  theory  of  Napoleon's 
plan,  which,  as  we  have  seen  above,  differs  materially 
from  his  own  account  of  it. 

We  conclude,  therefore,  that  the  result  of  the  operations 
of  the  first  day  had  also  been  satisfactory  so  far  as  the 
non-occupation  of  Quatre  Bras  was  concerned.  But 
Marshal  Ney's  command  was  far  from  being  well  in  hand 
at  the  close  of  the  day,  as  we  have  had  occasion  to  point 
out  above."* 

3.  But,  it  may  fairly  be  asked,  in  view  of  what  has  been 
said,  assuming  that  Napoleon  gave  Ney  a  verbal  order  at 
five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  15th,  why,  if  the  non- 
occupation  of  Quatre  Bras  by  Ney  on  that  evening  did 
not  really  disarrange  Napoleon's  plans,  did  Napoleon 
blame  Marshal  Ney  for  not  having  occupied  it }  Because, 
in  the  first  place,  it  was  a  disobedience  of  orders ;  secondly, 
because  Napoleon  believed  that  Ney's  stopping  at 
Frasnes,  this  side  of  Quatre  Bras,  was  dictated  by  an 
exaggerated  caution,  which  it  was  equally  surprising  and 
annoying  to  find  in  a  man  like  Ney;  and,  thirdly 
because  when  he  came  to  write  his  narrative  of  the  cam- 
paign, he  connected  this  hesitation  to  take  risks,  which 
Ney  had  evinced  on  the  15th,  with  Ney's  very  singular 
management  of  his  command  on  the  next  day,  —  of  which 


"  But  see  La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  pp.  75,  76. 
^  Jomini,  pp.  125,  215. 

^'Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  124.     Cf.  Quinet,  p.  102. 
^  Ante,  PP-  5I)  52-     Gourg.  p.  66. 


64  JUNE    15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES.         [CHAP.   4.] 

we  can  here  say  nothing  without  anticipating  our  story. 
It  was  to  Ney's  supposed  faulty  arrangements  on  the 
1 6th  that  the  Emperor — who  never  knew  all  the  facts  of 
the  case,  by  the  way,  —  naturally  attributed  the  failure  of 
the  ist  Corps  to  take  part  either  in  the  battle  of  Quatre 
Bras  or  in  that  of  Ligny.  Hence  we  find  Napoleon  severe 
on  Ney  for  not  boldly  pushing  out  to  Quatre  Bras  on  the 
evening  of  the  15th,  not  because  it  was  necessary  to  oc- 
cupy the  cross-roads  that  night, —  for  the  next  morning 
would  have  done  quite  as  well, — but  because  Ney's  hesi- 
tation seemed  to  the  Emperor  to  indicate  in  him  a  lack 
of  that  boldness  and  energy  on  which  he  had  always 
counted  hitherto  with  entire  confidence. 

4.  In  what  has  just  been  said,  we  have  assumed  that 
Napoleon  gave  to  Ney  a  verbal  order  at  five  o'clock  on 
the  15th  to  push  forward  with  the  two  corps  and  seize 
Quatre  Bras.     But  was  this  the  fact  ? 

This  question  has  been  the  subject  of  a  great  deal  of 
controversy,  as  every  student  of  the  campaign  knows  to 
his  cost.  In  our  view,  as  we  have  just  pointed  out,  it  is 
not  a  matter  of  much  consequence.  Napoleon  nowhere 
claims  that  the  failure  of  Marshal  Ney  to  carry  out  this 
order  was  a  serious  matter,  although  he  does  attribute 
his  failure  to  carry  it  out  to  an  undue  prudence  and  an 
unnecessary  caution,  for  which  he  censures  him.  Still, 
the  matter  has  been  so  hotly  contested,  that  it  may  be 
best  to  address  ourselves  to  it  briefly. 

The  statements  in  Gourgaud's  narrative'^  and  the 
Memoirs,'^  that  Napoleon  ordered  Ney,  at  their  meeting 
near  Gilly,  to  advance  boldly  to  Quatre  Bras  with  his  two 
corps  and  to  take  up  a  position  beyond  it,  with  guards  on 
the  roads  to  Nivelles,  Brussels  and  Namur,  are  exceed- 
ingly positive  and  explicit.  These  statements  were  written 
in  18 18  and  1820.    The  only  piece  of  strictly  contempo- 


^5  Gourgaud,  p.  47. 

"'  Corresp.  vol.  31,  p.  199. 


[chap.   4.]         JUNE    15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES.  65 

raneous  evidence  that  we  have  is  the  statement  in  the 
official  bulletin  of  the  army,'"'  which  was  sent  off  from 
Charleroi  on  the  evening  of  the  15th,  that  Ney's  head- 
quarters were  that  evening  at  Quatre  Bras,  —  and  it  cer- 
tainly is  a  very  strong  confirmation  of  Gourgaud  and  the 
Memoirs.  ^^ 


^'  Corresp.,  vol.  28,  p.  333  :  "  L'Empereura  donnd  le  commandement  de  la 
gauche  au  prince  de  la  Moskowa,  qui  a  eu  le  soir  son  quartier  gdndral  aux 
Quatre  Chemins,  sur  la  route  de  Bruxelles."  This  Bulletin  was  printed  in 
the  "Moniteur"  of  the  i8th.  App.  C,  viii;  post^  pp.  369,  370.  It  is  to  be 
found  in  Jones,  pp.  378,  379. 

*^  Marshal  Grouchy,  in  1S18,  only  three  years  after  the  battle,  in  the  first 
edition  of  the  pamphlet  which  he  published  in  Philadelphia,  entitled  "  Observa- 
tions sur  la  Relation  de  la  Campagne  de  i8i5,publi^e  par  le  G^n^ral  Gourgaud," 
in  defending  himself  for  having,  on  the  i8th  of  June,  as  he  claims,  strictly 
obeyed  his  orders,  instead  of  marching  to  the  sound  of  the  cannon  of  Water- 
loo, says  (p.  32):— 

"  Besides,  this  way  of  looking  at  the  matter  was  fortified  in  my  eyes  by  the 
disapproval  which  Napoleon  had  shown  in  my  presence  of  the  conduct  of 
Marshal  Ney.  /  had  heard  him  blame  him  for  having  stispended  the  move- 
ment of  his  troops  on  the  13th  at  the  sound  of  the  cannonade  between  Gilly 
and  Fletirus,  for  having  halted  Reille's  Corps  between  Gosselies  and  Frasnes, 
and  for  having  sent  a  division  towards  Fleurus,  where  the  fighting  was  going 
on,  in  place  of  keeping  himself  to  the  execution,  pure  and  simple,  of  his 
orders,  which  p7'escribed  to  hifn  to  march  on  Quatre  Bras.  (The  italics 
are  ours.) 

And  again,  when  speaking  of  his  own  refusal  to  entertain  the  suggestion 
that  he  should  march  to  the  sound  of  the  cannon,  he  says  (p.  61) :  — 

"Could  I,  moreover,  so  soon  forget  that  Napoleon  had  censured  Marshal 
Ney  for  having  halted  at  the  sound  of  the  cannon  which  were  being  fired 
near  Fleurus,  for  having  sent  troops  in  that  direction,  and  for  having  per- 
mitted himself  to  depart  from  the  Hteral  execution  of  his  orders  ?  " 

Grouchy  must  be  referring  here  to  the  scene  at  the  Emperor's  headquar- 
ters on  the  night  of  the  15th  and  i6th  {sto.  post,  p.  116). 

In  the  edition  published  in  Philadelphia  in  1819,  and  in  the  reproduction 
of  the  pamphlet  from  this  edition  in  Paris  in  the  same  year.  Grouchy  omits 
the  statement  that  he  heard  the  emperor  blame  Ney,  and  rests  his  argument 
on  the  censure  on  Ney's  conduct  contained  in  the  Gourgaud  Narrative.  One 
may  not  unreasonably  conjecture  that,  after  publishing  the  edition  of  i8i8, 
he  was  informed  that  Ney's  family  denied  that  Ney  had  received  on  the  15th 
any  order  to  go  to  Quatre  Bras,  and  that  Grouchy  was  unwilling  to  give 
evidence  in  this  controversy  against  this  contention  of  the  friends  of  the 
Marshal. 

Captain  Pringle,  R.  E.,  in  an  Appendix  to  Scott's  Napoleon  (Paris  edition, 


66  JUNE    15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES.         [CHAP.   4.] 

Again,  the  reason  given  in  Gourgaud^^  and  the 
Memoirs  ^°  as  inducing  Ney  to  halt  this  side  of  Quatre 
Bras,  namely,  that  he  deemed  it  unwise  to  advance  further 
to  the  front  than  the  main  body  had  proceeded,  —  judg- 
ing by  the  sound  of  the  cannon,  which  came  from  the 
neighborhood  of  Fleurus  and  Gilly,  —  is  a  very  natural^' 
one.  It  is  no  doubt  the  reason  he  gave  to  the  Emperor 
at  their  interview  that  very  night  at  Charleroi. 

Neither  Ney  nor  Soult  have  left  any  statements  in 
writing  ^^  about  the  matter.  Nor  is  it  claimed  that  Ney 
ever  made  any  verbal  statement  on  the  subject.  Thiers  " 
asserts  that  Soult  "frequently  said  *  *  * 
that  on  the  afternoon  of  the  fifteenth  of  June  he  heard 
Napoleon  order  Marshal  Ney  to  proceed  to  Quatre  Bras," 
and  he  cites  the  memoirs  of  General  Berthezene,  who 
commanded  one  of  Vandamme's  divisions,  to  the  effect 
that  Soult  had  told  him  that  Napoleon  gave  these  orders 
to  Ney. 


1828,  p.  833,  n.),  is  the  only  author  who  cites  the  above-quoted  statements  of 
Marshal  Grouchy. 

^9  Gourgaud,  p.  48,  n. 

3°Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  200. 

^'  C/.  Jomini,  p.  214,  to  whom  the  hesitation  of  Ney  to  occupy  Quatre  Bras 
seems  justifiable,  "  unless  the  order  to  rush  headlong  on  Quatre  Bras  had 
been  expressed  in  a  formal  manner." 

^  In  his  letter  to  the  Duke  of  Otranto  (Jones,  386),  Ney  says :  "  The 
Emperor  [on  the  15th]  ordered  me  immediately  to  put  myself  at  the  head  of 
the  ist  and  2d  Corps,  &c.,  &c.  With  these  troops  *  *  *  I  pursued  the 
enemy,  and  forced  him  to  evacuate  Gosselies,  Frasnes,  Millet,  Heppignies. 
There  they  took  up  a  position  for  the  night.    *    *    * 

"  On  the  i6th  I  received  orders  to  attack  the  English  in  their  position  at 
Quatre  Bras." 

It  will  be  observed  that  Ney  omits  to  state  what  directions,  if  any,  the 
Emperor  gave  him  on  the  15th.  He  confines  himself  to  enumerating  the 
troops  placed  under  his  orders  and  to  stating  what  he  accomplished  with 
them.  The  remark  that  he  was  ordered  on  the  i6th  to  attack  Quatre  Bras 
throws  no  light  on  the  question  we  are  examining,  viz. :  —  what  orders  were 
given  to  him  on  the  15th. 

"Thiers,  vol.  xx,  p.  31,  n. 


[chap.   4.]         JUNE    15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES.  67 

On  the  other  hand  we  have  a  statement  of  Ney's  son, 
then  Duke  of  Elchingen,  that  Colonel  Heymes,  Ney's 
aide-de-camp,  said  in  1841  to  him,^'^  that  the  name 
of  Quatre  Bras  was  not  pronounced  in  the  conversation 
between  the  Emperor  and  Marshal  Ney  on  the  after- 
noon of  the  15th.  The  Duke  furthermore  tells  us^^  ^j-j^f 
in  1829,  Marshal  Soult  told  him  and  Colonel  Heymes 
that  the  Emperor  had  no  idea  of  having  Quatre  Bras 
occupied  on  the  evening  of  the  15th,  and  gave  no  orders 
to  that  effect. 

But  how  is  it  possible  to  reconcile  this  hearsay  evidence, 
with  the  undeniable  fact  that  the  official  bulletin  states 
Ney's  headquarters  on  the  evening  of  the  15th  to  be  at 
Quatre  Bras  ?  It  is  surely  much  more  likely  that  these 
reports  by  Marshal  Ney's  son,  of  statements  by  Heymes 
and  Soult,  of  their  recollections,  given  respectively  four- 
teen and  twenty-six  years  after  the  occurrence,  are  defect- 
ive in  some  way,  than  that  the  bulletin  made  up  on  the 
very  evening  should  have  contained  a  statement  that 
Ney  was  at  Quatre  Bras  when  he  had  never  been 
directed  to  go  there.  The  contents  of  the  bulletin  must 
have  been  known  to  Soult,  the  chief-of-staff  of  the  army; 
in  fact,  the  bulletin  itself  must  have  been  either  actually 
composed  by  him  or  under  his  immediate  direction ;  and 
it  is  simply  incredible  that  he  should  have  inserted  a 
statement  that  Ney's  headquarters  were,  on  the  evening 
of  the  15th,  at  Quatre  Bras  if  he  knew  that  the  Emperor 
had  no  intention  of  having  Quatre  Bras  occupied  that 
evening,  and  had  given  no  orders  to  that  effect.  It  is  to 
be  noted  also  that  Charras  makes  but  an  incidental  men- 
tion of  the  bulletin,^^  which  is  the  only  bit  of  contempo- 


*•  Letter  from  the  Duke  of  Elchingen  to  General  Jomini,  i6  October,  1841, 
published  in  the  "Spectateur  Militaire,"  Dec.  15,  1841,  as  cited  in  Charras, 
vol.  I,  p.  119,  n.  Cf.  Heymes'  Statement,  Doc.  Ined.,  p.  4. 

^Doc.  Indd.,  p.  30. 

^See/^j/y  p.  69,  n.  38. 


68  JUNE    15th. — NAPOLEON.— NOTES.         [CHAP.   4.] 

raneous  evidence  that  we  have,  and  confines  his  discus- 
sion of  the  testimony  to  an  examination  of  these  reported 
sayings  of  Soult  and  Heymes.  When  we  take  also  into 
account  that,  in  his  carefully  drawn  Narrative,"  Heymes 
does  not  explicitly  state  that  Quatre  Bras  was  not  men- 
tioned, that  there  is  nothing  whatever  from  Soult  over 
his  own  signature,  that  these  sayings  of  Soult  and 
Heymes  rest  on  mere  hearsay  evidence,  and  that  they 
Vv^ere  spoken,  if  spoken  at  all,  many  years  after  the 
campaign,  it  is  evident  that  the  statement  in  the  bulletin 
is  by  far  the  best  evidence  that  we  have.  The  mention 
of  Quatre  Bras  in  the  bulletin  was  made  at  the  time,  — 
before  any  controversy  had  arisen,  —  it  was  mxoreover  a 
mere  incidental  mention,  and  cannot  be  supposed  to 
have  been  intended  to  serve  a  purpose  of  any  kind. 

Where  the  evidence  is  so  conflicting,  it  is  impossible 
for  many  persons  to  make  up  their  minds.  As  we 
remarked  before,  the  matter  is  not  one  of  any  great  im- 
portance in  its  bearing  on  the  fortunes  of  the  campaign. 
The  question,  whether  Ney  received  at  five  in  the  after- 
noon of  the  15th  of  June  verbal  orders  to  seize  Quatre 
Bras  that  evening,  is  of  consequence  mainly  with  refer- 
ence to  the  scope  of  Napoleon's  plan  at  that  moment, 
and  also  with  respect  to  his  reproach  of  unwarrantable 
hesitation  on  the  part  of  Marshal  Ney.  It  seems  to  us, 
we  frankly  say,  on  the  whole,  almost  certain  that  the 
order  was  given.  At  any  rate,  we  can  hardly  doubt  that, 
when  the  bulletin  was  sent  off  that  evening  to  Paris,  it 
vras  believed  at  the  headquarters  of  the  army  that  Mar- 
shal Ney  was  at  Quatre  Bras ;  we  must  admit  this,  unless 
v/e  gratuitously  invent  an  intention  to  deceive  the  pub- 
lic on  a  point  of  this  kind.  And  as  Ney  could  hardly 
have  been  supposed  to  occupy  Quatre  Bras  without 
orders,  he  must  have  been  supposed  by  those  who  drew 
up  the  bulletin,  —  that  is,  Soult,  the  chief-of-staff  of  the 


"  Doc.  In^d.,  p.  4. 


[chap.   4.]         JUNE    15th. — NAPOLEON, — NOTES.  69 

army,  and  the  Emperor  himself,  —  to  have  proceeded  to 
Quatre  Bras  in  conformity  with  the  verbal  order  given 
him  that  afternoon.^^ 

The  fact  that  the  subsequent  written  orders  to  proceed 
to  Quatre  Bras,  issued  on  the  morning  of  the  i6th,  make 
no  mention  either  of  this  verbal  order,  or  of  Ney's  failure 
to  comply  with  it,  does  not  seem  to  us  to  tend  in  any 
way  to  show  that  the  verbal  order  had  not  been  given. 
There  would  not  only  be  no  need  of  referring  to  such  a 
fact  in  a  subsequent  written  order,  but  such  a  mention 
of  it  would  be  unusual  and  unmilitary.^^  What  light, 
if  any,  the  contents  of  the  written  orders  throw  on  the 
question  of  the  previous  giving  of  a  verbal  order,  is  a 
matter  that  will  be  considered  hereafter. 


33  We  cannot  find  any  allusion  to  the  evidence  furnished  by  this  bulletin  in 
any  of  the  authorities,  except  in  the  "  Waterloo  "  of  La  Tour  d'Auvergna 
(P-  75)>  in  Mr.  William  O'Connor  Morris's  "  Campaign  of  1815  "  (Great  Com- 
manders of  Modern  Times,  p.  327,  note),  and  in  the  work  entitled  "Napoleon 
h  Waterloo,"  p.  24,  n.,  where  the  proper  weight  is  given  to  the  matter. 
Hence  the  elaborate  discussions  of  Charras  and  Chesney,  failing  as  they  do, 
to  meet  this  important  piece  of  evidence,  do  not  greatly  assist  in  arriving  at 
a  decision.  The  bulletin  is  not  alluded  to  in  the  Duke  of  Elchingen's 
notes  to  the  despatches  collected  in  his  "•  Documeiits  Incdits." 

The  probability  is  that  the  existence  of  this  Bulletin  escaped  Chesney's 
attention.  Charras,  however,  cites  the  Bulletin  (vol.  i,  pp.  113,  114,  notes). 
The  fact  that  "  Napole'on  k  Waterloo"  was  a  reply  to  the  work  of  Charras,  and 
that  the  "  Waterloo  "  of  La  Tour  d'Auvergne  was  a  reply  to  Chesney,  accounts 
for  our  not  finding  the  subject  discussed  by  Chesney  and  Charras.  It  is,  how- 
ever, difficult  to  understand  why  Charras  in  his  elaborate  work  should  have 
overlooked  the  inference  to  be  drawn  from  the  statement  in  the  bulletin. 

39  Cf.  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  120. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE   FIFTEENTH  OF  JUNE:    BLUCHER    AND    WELLINGTON. 

Marshal  Blucher  had  long  since  fixed  upon  Som- 
breffe  as  the  point  of  concentration  for  his  army,  in  the 
event  of  the  French  crossing  the  Sambre  at  or  near 
Charleroi,  and  he  had  even  chosen  the  Hne  of  the  brook 
of  Ligny,  which  borders  the  villages  of  St.  Amand, 
Ligny,  and  Balatre,  as  a  possible  battlefield.' 

On  the  night  of  the  13th  of  June,  Zieten,  who  com- 
manded the  1st  Prussian  Corps,  and  whose  headquar- 
ters were  at  Charleroi,  saw  the  French  bivouac  fires 
at  Beaumont  and  Solre;''  and,  on  the  evening  of  the 
14th,  Bliicher  ordered  the  lid,  1 1  Id  and  IVth  Corps 
to  concentrate  at  or  near  Sombreffe.  Zieten  with  the 
1st  Corps  was  to  make  as  obstinate  resistance  as  possible 
and  fall  back  to  and  hold  the  village  of  Fleurus,  thus 
gaining  time  for  the  concentration  of  the  whole  army.^ 

These  measures,  it  is  admitted  by  all  writers,  were 
taken  without  any  consultation  being  had  with  the  Duke 
of  Wellington  at  the  moment.  But  it  is  claimed  that 
there  existed  a  definite  understanding  between  the  two 
commanders,  in  pursuance  of  which  Bliicher  acted.'* 

There  had  been  a  meeting  between  Wellington  and 


'Clausewitz,  ch.  15,  ch.  16.     Sib.,  vol.  i,  p.  39. 

*Chesney,  p.  71  :  Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  54. 

^Clausewitz,  ch.  23,  p.  48:  Chesney,  p.  71. 

*Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  127,  states  this  to  be  the  fact,  but  cites  no  authority. 


[chap.    5.]  BLiJCHER   AND   WELLINGTON.  7 1 

Blucher  at  Tirlemont  on  May  3d,  which  the  Duke^  in  a 
letter  to  the  Prince  of  Orange  pronounces  "very  satis- 
factory." Baron  Miiffling,  who  was  the  Prussian  military 
attache  at  the  Duke's  headquarters,  states^  that  the  lines 
of  march  which  the  English  and  Prussian  armies  should 
respectively  pursue  in  case  France  should  be  invaded,  were 
definitely  agreed  upon  and  laid  down  in  writing.  This 
agreement  may  have  been  arrived  at  at  that  interview, 
though  Muffling  does  not  say  so.  He  then  goes  on  to 
say:  —  ^ 

"The  junction  of  the  English  and  Prussian  armies  for  a  defen- 
sive^ battle  *  *  *  y^diS  so  distinctly  prescribed  by 
circu77istances  and  by  the  locality  that  no  doubt  whatever  could  be 
raised  on  the  point." 

He  then  proceeds  to  give  his  views,  and  ends  by 
saying:  — 

"The  point  of  concentration  for  the  Prussian  army  was  accord- 
ingly marked  out  between  Sombreffe  and  Charleroi,  and  for  the 
English,  en  dernier  tieu^  between  Gosselies  and  Marchiennes." 

We  do  not  think^  that  Muffling  intends  here  to  state 
that  Bliicher  and  Wellington  had  made  any  agreement 


^Gurwood,  vol.  xii,  p.  345.  Clausewitz,  ch.  11,  p.  28,  probably  refers  to  this 
meeting,  though  he  locates  it  at  St.  Trond.    Cf.  Chesney,  p.  77. 

^Passages,  p.  231. 

'lb.  p.  232. 

*The  italics  are  ours. 

'As  does  Chesney,  for  instance  (p.  77),  who  says  that  the  English  and  Prus- 
sian chiefs  agreed  to  assemble  their  armies  respectively  at  the  points  given  in 
the  above  citation  from  Muffling.  Maurice  also  (pp.  145,  146,  May,  1890)  makes 
the  same  statement.  Both  these  writers  evidentiy  rest  on  the  statement  of 
Muffling,  cited  above,  which  does  not  seem  to  us  to  sustain  them.  They  are, 
howev^er,  careful  to  confine  the  agreement  to  the  measures  to  be  taken  in 
case  the  French  advanced  by  way  of  Charleroi.  Cf.  IjSi  Tour  D'Auvergne, 
p. 107. 

Siborne  (vol.  i,  pp.  39  and  40)  says  that  Bliicher  and  Wellington  had 
agreed  in  the  above-mentioned  event  to  concentrate  respectively  at  Som- 
breffe and  Quatre  Bras,  but  he  gives  no  authority  for  the  statement.  Jomini 
(p.  122)  says  substantially  the  same  thing.  Charras  (vol.  i,  p.  84)  makes  the 
same  statement,  also  without  citing  any  authority  for  it.  Very  possibly  he 
took  it  from  Siborne.     Cf.  Chesney,  p.  93. 


72  THE    15111    OF   JUNE:  [CHAP.    5.] 

as  to  their  respective  action  in  case  Napoleon 
should  be  the  invader;  he  only  tells  us  what  in  his 
judgment  was  the  true  course  for  them  to  take, — 
the  course  marked  out,  as  he  thought,  by  the  cir- 
cumstances and  the  locality.  That  we  are  right  in  this, 
will  appear  when  the  likelihood  of  Wellington's  having 
definitely  agreed  to  advance  his  army  to  the  very  borders 
of  the  Sambre  and  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Charleroi, 
in  view  of  his  well-known  anxiety  for  his  communica- 
tions, is  considered  for  a  moment.'"  We  believe  that  the 
Duke,  although  doubtless  informed  of  Marshal  Bliicher's 
intention  to  concentrate  his  army  at  Sombreffe  in  case 
the  enemy  advanced  by  way  of  Charleroi,  made  no 
agreement  whatever  with  him  as  to  his  own  movements. 
The  two  commanders  no  doubt  fully  intended  to  act  in 
concert,  and  expected  and  relied  upon  the  hearty  support 
of  each  other,  but  there  was  not,  as  we  believe,  any  defi- 
nite agreement  as  to  the  particular  steps  to  be  taken  in 
the  event  of  a  French  invasion. 

This  matter  is  an  important  one  to  settle,  because 
some  Prussian  historians  claim  that  Bl'dcher  gave  battle 
at  Ligny  relying  on  Wellington's  agreement  to  support 
him.  We  cannot  decide  on  this  question  at  the  present 
stage  of  our  narrative;  but  we  have  already  seen  that 
Blucher  gave  orders  for  his  four  corps  to  concentrate  at 
Sombreffe  without  any  definite  agreement  or  under- 
standing with  Wellington  that  he  was  to  be  assisted  by 
the  English  in  the  battle  that  was  almost  certain  to  occur 
as  a  consequence  of  this  concentration.  All  he  had  a 
right  to  expect  was,  that  the  Duke,  as  soon  as  he  was 
informed  of  the  situation,  would  at  once  assemble  his 
forces,  and,  if  he  could  safely  and  wisely  do  so, 
would    march   to  the  assistance    of   his    ally."      But 


^°Cf.  Supp.  Desp.,  vol.  X,  p.  521 :  Memorandum  on  the  Battle  of  Waterloo. 
App.  C,  XV ;  post,  pp.  374,  375.  376. 
""Naturally,  then,  Prince  Blucher        *        *        *        would  expect  to  be 


[chap.    5.]  BLUCHER   AND   WELLINGTON.  73 

the  Prussian  Marshal  took  the  risk  of  the  EngHsh 
general's  not  coming  to  his  support  in  the  next 
day's  battle ;  for,  in  the  first  place,  he  knew  the  scattered 
situation  of  the  Anglo-Dutch  troops,  and  that  it  would 
take  a  couple  of  days  or  so  to  get  them  together ;  and, 
secondly,  he  could  not  be  sure  that  Napoleon  might  not, 
by  operating  with  a  part  of  his  army  by  way  of  Mons 
and  Hal,  induce  the  Duke  to  concentrate  his  forces  so 
far  to  the  westward  as  to  put  it  out  of  his  power  to 
render  any  help  to  an  army  that  was  fighting  in  front  of 
Sombreffe. 

We  have  stated  that,  on  the  evening  of  the  14th, 
Bliicher  ordered  the  lid,  1 1  Id  and  IVth  Corps  to 
concentrate  at  or  near  Sombreffe.  In  compliance  with 
these  directions  the  lid  and  1 1  Id  Corps  respectively 
concentrated,  and  marched  rapidly  towards  Sombreffe. 
But  Biilow,  whose  headquarters  were  at  Liege,  and 
who  had,  in  obedience  to  his  first  orders,  concentrated 
his  corps,  took  it  upon  himself  to  disobey  a  subsequent 
order  which  he  received  about  eleven  o'clock  in  the 
morning  of  the  15th,  directing  him  to  march  at  once  upon 
Hannut,  and  to  put  off  the  execution  of  this  order  until 
the  next  day.  It  is  hardly  worth  while  to  undertake  to 
decide  how  far  Gneisenau,  Bllicher's  chief-of-staff,  was, 
as  has  been  often  asserted,  partly  to  blame  for  this  mis- 
chance, by  not  inserting  in  the  order  a  statement  to  the 
effect  that  hostilities  were  imminent.  The  matter  has 
been  often  discussed;''  it  would  seem  that  Biilow  ought 
to  bear  the  largest  share  of  the  blame;  but  why 
Gneisenau,  upon  whose  shoulders  lay  the  burden  of 
effecting  a  concentration  of  the  entire  army  by  the 
morning  of    the    i6th,   should    have    omitted,  when   a 

supported  by  Wellington,  so  far  as  the  existing  situation  would  make  this 
support  possible  to  the  Duke."    OUech,  p.  124. 

'^Clausewitz,  ch.  20;  Chesney,  pp.  82,  loi  ;  Siborne,  vol.  i,  pp.  70,  71,  n. 
Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  128,  n.;  Gneisenau,  vol.  4,  pp.  360  et  seq.\  Ollech,  pp.  90  et 
seq.     Cf.  Maurice,  p.  259:  June,  1890;  also,  p.  546:  Sept.,  1890. 


74  THE    15th   OF   JUNE:  [CHAP.    5.] 

battle  was  imminent,  to  put  the  commander  of  his  most 
distant  corps  in  possession  of  the  facts  of  the  situation 
and  of  Marshal  Bllicher's  intentions,  it  is  certainly  not 
easy  to  see.  In  such  an  exigency,  the  chief-of-staff  must 
be  held  to  the  duty  of  omitting  nothing  that  would  tend 
to  accomplish  his  task. 

The  Duke  of  Wellington  had  been,  as  had  Marshal 
Bliicher,  aware  for  the  last  few  days  of  the  movement  of 
large  masses  of  French  troops  near  the  frontier,  but  he 
had  not  deemed  it  necessary  or  desirable  in  any  way  to 
alter  his  dispositions.  He  felt  that  his  army  was  the 
force  relied  upon  to  protect  Brussels,  where  the  King  of 
the  Netherlands  was,  and  Ghent,  where  the  King  of 
France  was,  and  that  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance 
that  Napoleon  should  not  be  allowed  to  gain  the  politi- 
cal advantage  of  putting  those  newly  made  sovereigns  to 
flight,'^  and  repossessing  himself  of  Belgium  and  Hol- 
land. Moreover,  of  the  importance  of  preserving  his 
own  communications  with  Antwerp  and  Ostend  the 
Duke  was  well  aware.  He  believed  that  Napoleon's  best 
move  would  be  against  his  communications;''^  and  he 
felt  that,  under  this  belief,  he  ought  to  hesitate  before 
concentrating  his  army  and  moving  it  by  its  left  to  gain 
a  union  with  that  of  Marshal  Bliicher.' ^ 

Hence  he  retained  his  own  headquarters  at  Brussels, 
thirty-four  miles'^  from  Charleroi.  His  army,  as  has 
been  already  stated,  lay  in  cantonments  to  the  westward 
of  the  Charleroi-Brussels  turnpike.  It  is  well  known 
that  Wellington  looked  for  a  movement  of  the  French 
either  on  the  road  from  Mons  to  Brussels  or  to  the 
westward  of  that  road.     He  had  repaired  the  fortifica- 


"Supp.   Desp.,  vol.  X,  p.  521;   Memorandum  on  the  Battle  of  Waterloo; 
App.  C,  XV  ;  post,  pp.  374,  375.  376;  Ellesmere,  p.  171. 

'*  Supp.  Desp.,  vol.  X,  p.  530.     App.  C,  x\';  post,  pp.  374,  375.  376. 
'^Maurice,  pp.  148, 149:  May,  1890. 
"Chesney,  p.  76. 


[chap.    5.]  BLiJCHER   AND   WELLINGTON.  75 

tions  of  Mons,  Ypres,  Tournay  and  other  places,  and  put 
them  in  a  state  of  defence.' ^  It  is  also  to  be  observed 
that  for  the  last  three  days  before  the  opening  of  hostili- 
ties the  information  that  came  to  him  of  the  enemy's 
movements  indicated  a  probable  concentration  of  their 
forces  near  Mons.'^  Wellington's  troops,  if  they  re- 
mained in  the  positions  which  they  occupied  on  June 
12th,  for  instance,  could  be  concentrated  at  Braine-le- 
Comte  or  Hal, —  towns  on  the  road  from  Mons  to  Brus- 
sels,—  much  more  readily  than  at  Quatre  Bras  or 
Gosselies, —  that  is,  they  were  well  situated  to  oppose 
such  a  movement  of  the  French  as  that  which  the  Duke 
thought  it  most  likely  Napoleon  would  make.  They 
were,  it  is  true,  still  in  their  cantonments,  scattered 
about  in  the  towns  and  villages,  but  the  Duke  evidently 
thought  that  he  would  have  time  enough  to  assemble  his 
various  detachments  and  concentrate  his  army  after  the 
movements  of  his  adversary  should  have  been  clearly 
ascertained.  For  holding  this  opinion  he  has  been 
sharply  criticised,  but  this  we  will  consider  in  another 
place. 

We  must,  therefore,  bear  in  mind,  first,  that  Welling- 
ton thought  it  likely  that  Napoleon  would  advance,  if  he 
advanced  at  all,  by  way  of  Mons,  or  to  the  westward 
of  it,  and,  secondly,  that  he  thought  his  own  army 
was  well  placed  to  meet  such  an  advance.  In  fact 
we  may  go  further,  and  say  that  Wellington  having  this 
opinion  about  the  line  which  the  French  would  prob- 
ably take,  felt  it  all  the  more  necessary  to  retain  his 
troops  in  their  existing  positions,  from  which  they  could, 
as  he  judged,  easily  be  assembled  to  meet  such  an  attack, 
because  he  saw  clearly  that  no  assistance,  certainly  no 


"Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  33. 

"See  this  information  collated  in  Maurice,  pp.  147,  148 :  May,  1890.  He  is 
also  inclined  to  think  that  Napoleon  ordered  the  temporary  occupation  of 
Binche,  with  the  intention  of  creating  the  belief  that  a  part,  at  least,  of  the 
French  army  was  moving  on  Mons. 


76  THE    15th    OF   JUNE:  [CHAP.    5.] 

immediate  assistance,  could  be  expected  from  the  Prus- 
sians, in  such  an  emergency,  so  remote  were  they  from 
the  Mons-Brussels  route.  If  Napoleon  was  to  be  met  or 
baffled  in  such  a  movement  it  must  be  by  the  Anglo- 
Dutch  army.  And  the  Duke  also  saw  with  equal  clear- 
ness that  nothing  could  serve  the  purpose  of  the  French, 
if  they  were  making  their  main  attack  by  way  of  Mons, 
better  than  a  premature  movement  of  the  Anglo-Dutch 
army  towards  Quatre  Bras  and  Sombreffe,  by  which  the 
communications  of  that  army  would  be  exposed  through- 
out their  whole  length.  Hence  it  was  to  be  expected 
that  the  Duke  would  be  most  careful  not  to  make  such  a 
premature  movement,  and,  therefore,  that  he  would 
insist  on  being  convinced  that  the  main  French  attack 
was  by  way  of  Charleroi  before  doing  more  than  effect- 
ing the  assembling  of  his  scattered  troops  at  their 
respective  places  of  rendezvous. 

It  so  happened  that  the  Prince  of  Orange,  who  com- 
manded, as  we  have  said,  the  ist  Corps,  left  his  head- 
quarters at  Braine-le-Comte  early  on  the  morning  of  the 
15th,  rode  to  the  outposts,  heard  some  firing  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Thuin,  a  village  some  ten  miles  west  of  Charleroi, 
and  then  rode  straight  to  Brussels'^  without  stopping  on 
his  way  at  his  own  headquarters.  During  his  absence'" 
reports  had  been  forwarded  to  him  from  Generals  Dorn- 
berg  and  Behr,  who  were  at  Mons,  to  the  effect  that  all 
was  quiet  in  their  front,  and  from  Van  Merlen,  whose 
command  lay  a  little  to  the  eastward  of  Mons,  that 
Steinmetz's  Prussian  brigade  had  been  attacked  early  in 
the  morning-'  and  that  the  enemy's  movements  seemed 
to  be  directed  on  Charleroi.  These  reports  remained 
some  hours  at  the  Prince's  headquarters,  and  were  then 


''Ollech,  p.  115. 

^°Ib.,  pp.  114,  115.     Maurice,  p.  540:  Sept.,  1890. 

"Steinmetz  sent  this  message  to  Van  Merlen  at  S  A.  M.    Van  Loben  Sels, 
p.  125,  note.    Chesney,  p.  94,  note. 


[chap.    5.]  3LUCHER   AND   WELLINGTON.  77 

forwarded  to  the  Duke  at  Brussels,  where  they  arrived 
in  the  evening.  But  before  that  time,  in  fact  by  or  before 
3  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  Prince  himself  had  arrived, 
bringing  his  own  report,  which  was  a  very  indefinite 
one,  and  which  was  to  the  effect  that  the  enemy  had 
attacked  the  Prussian  outposts  near  Thuin.  This  was 
the  first  information  which  the  Duke  received  of  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities."  About  the  same  time,  also,  a 
despatch^^  sent  by  Zieten  to  Miiffling  arrived,  announc- 
ing that  he  had  been  attacked  before  Charleroi. 

Wellington  gave  sufficient  credence  to  these  reports 
to  issue  orders^'*  for  the  immediate  concentration  of  the 
different  divisions'^  at  the  points  designated  for  them  re- 
spectively, and  for  their  being  in  readiness  to  march  at  a 
moment's  notice,  but  waited  till  further  reports  from 
Mons  should  come  in  before  doing  more.^^  These 
orders  were  despatched  between  five  and  seven 
o'clock.^^ 

They  provided  simply,  as  we  have  said  above,  for  the 


^Charras,  who  says,  vol.  1,  p.  130,  that  Wellington  received  at  nine  o'clock 
in  the  morning  a  despatch  from  Zieten,  announcing  that  his  advance  posts 
had  been  attacked,  is  clearly  in  error.  Hooper,  p.  83,  points  out  that  the  ex- 
pression on  which  Charras  bases  his  conclusion  really  means  that  9  A.  M. 
was  the  date  of  the  latest  intelligence  from  Charleroi. 

Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  164,  n.,  severely  criticises  the  arrangements  of  the  Prince 
of  Orange  for  the  transmission  of  intelligence. 

^^Miiffling,  Passages,  p.  22S. 

'^^Gurwood,  vol.  xii,  p.  472.  App.  C,  ix;  post,  p.  370.  We  rely  mainly  on 
the  "  Memorandum  for  the  Deputy  Quartermaster  General,"  from  which  he 
drafted  the  orders.  In  some  cases  we  know  that  the  orders  actually  sent 
varied  somewhat  from  the  terms  of  the  Memorandum ;  this  was  no  doubt 
true  in  all  cases;  but  the  differences  were  not  material.  See  Van  Loben 
Sels,  p.  177.  note  (i). 

'^^Ollech  (p.  1 16)  says  Cooke's  division  was  not  mentioned  in  these  orders. 
He  is  in  error ;  it  is  Clinton's  division  that  is  not  mentioned.  Cooke's  was 
ordered  to  collect  at  Ath,  not  Clinton's,  as  Ollech  has  it. 

^^Miiffling,  Passages,  p.  229. 

"Chesney,  p.  83,  n.  MiifHing,  p.  229.  Maurice,  p.  69:  April,  1S90. 
Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  132,  n.,  says  between  eight  and  half-past  nine. 


78  THE    15th   OF   JUNE:  [CHAP.    5.] 

assembling  of  the  various  divisions  of  the  army  at  cer- 
tain convenient  places.  There  is,  however,  one  passage 
in  these  orders  that  requires  attention.  Alten's  divis- 
ion—the  third  British  division  —  had  been  directed  in 
the  first  part  of  the  order  to  assemble  at  Braine-le-Comte, 
but  it  was  further  ordered  to  march  to  Nivelles  (where 
the  two  Dutch-Belgian  divisions  of  Chasse  and  Per- 
poncher  had  been  directed  to  assemble),  if  Nivelles  had 
been  attacked  during  the  15th,  yet  not  until  it  should  be 
found  "  quite  certain  that  the  enemy's  attack  is  upon  the 
right  of  the  Prussian  army  and  the  left  of  the  British 
army."^^  This  concentration  of  three  divisions  of  in- 
fantry with  cavalry  and  artillery,  say  about  25,000  men, 
at  Nivelles,  seven  miles  west  of  Quatre  Bras,  was  thus 
the  only  provision  made  in  this  first  order  or  set  of 
orders  for  the  contingency  of  the  French  attack  being 
made  on  the  lines  on  which  it  actually  was  made ;  and 
it  would  seem  to  be  a  legitimate  inference  from  this  ar- 
rangement that  Nivelles,  and  not  Quatre  Bras,  had  been 
selected  by  Wellington  as  the  point  of  concentration  for 
his  army  in  case  Napoleon  advanced  by  way  of  Charleroi. 
In  this  connection  it  is  important  to  note  that  in  a  letter 
dated  7  P.  M.,  but  probably  not  sent  off  till  midnight, 
Muffling  wrote  to  Bliicher  that  the  Duke  would  be  in 
the  morning  in  the  region  of  Nivelles  with  his  whole 
force.^^ 

Later  in  the  evening,  a  despatch  from  Bliicher  to 
Muffling,  sent  from  Namur,  arrived,^"  announcing  the 
concentration  of  the  Prussian  army  at  Sombreffe,  and 

requesting  Muffling 

"  To  give  him  speedy  intelligence  of 
the  concentration  of  Wellington's  army.  I  immediately,"  says 
Muffling,  "communicated  this  to  the  Duke,  who  quite  acquiesced 


='«Gurwood,  vol.  xii,  p.  473 ;  App.  C,  ix ;  post,  p.  370. 
*9Gneisenau,  vol.  4,  p.  365,  note. 
'"Muffling,  Passages,  p.  229. 


[chap.    5.]  BLUCHER   AND   WELLINGTON.  79 

in  Blucher's  dispositions.  However,  he  could  not  resolve  on  fixing 
his  point  of  concentration  before  receiving  the  expected  news  from 
Mons." 

This  inforrtiation  from  Bllicher,  however,  induced  the 
Duke  to  issue,  about  ten  o'clock  in  the  evening,^'  a  sec- 
ond set  of  orders,  having  for  their  object  a  general 
movement  of  the  army  towards  the  east.^^  Alten's  divis- 
ion was  now  positively  ordered  to  Nivelles;  Cooke's 
division  of  guards,  which  had  been  ordered  to  collect  at 
Ath,  some  thirteen  miles  south-west  of  its  headquarters 
at  Enghien,  was  now  ordered  on  Braine-le-Comte,  eight 
miles  south-east  of  Enghien ;  and  the  second  and  fourth 
divisions,  and  the  cavalry  of  Lord  Uxbridge,  which  con- 
stituted the  extreme  right  of  the  army  and  had  been 
cantoned  between  Ath  and  Audenarde  on  the  Scheldt, 
were  now  ordered  to  Enghien.  Enghien  is  about  eight 
miles  north-west  of  Braine-le-Comte,  which  is  about 
nine  miles  west  of  Nivelles,  which  in  its  turn  is  about  seven 
miles  west  of  Quatre  Bras.  No  orders  were  issued  to 
the  reserves. 

Up  to  this  point  we  can  go  by  the  records.  But  here 
we  encounter  serious  difficulties  in  the  evidence.  Every- 
body knows  that,  somehow  or  other,  the  Duke  of  Wel- 
lington collected  the  next  day  at  Quatre  Bras  a  consider- 
able part  of  his  army.  We  also  know  that  it  has  been 
claimed  that  during  the  night  of  the  15th  and  i6th  the 
Duke  ordered  the  whole  army  to  Quatre  Bras.  We 
shall  presently  have  occasion  to  describe  how  the  Dutch- 
Belgian  troops  got  there  without  his  orders;  but  our 
task  now  is  to  examine  the  orders  which  Wellington 
gave  after  the  despatch  of  those  the  substance  of  which 


3' At  10  o'clock,  however,  it  was  not  known  at  Brussels  that  Charleroi  had 
been  taken.  In  a  letter  to  the  Due  de  Feltre,  dated  lo  P.  M.,  the  Duke  says 
that  the  enemy  "  appears  to  menace  "  Charleroi.  Gurwood,  vol.  xii,  p.  473  ; 
App.  C,  x;  post,  p.  371. 

^Gurwood,  vol.  xii,  p.  474;  App.  Q,  xi j  4)ost,  p.  371. 


80  THE    15th   OF  JUNE:  [CHAP.    5.] 

has  just  been  given,  and  his  Report  of  the  campaign,  and 
also  his  own  doings  on  the  morning  of  the  i6th,  and  see 
what  hght  these  documents  and  doings  throw  upon  the 
statements  and  claims  which  have  been  made  and  set  up 
in  his  behalf. 

The  Duke's  official  report,"  dated  Waterloo,  June  19th, 
seems  to  contain  express  reference  to  three  sets  of 
orders. 

"I  did  not  hear,"  he  says,  "  of  these  events  [the  French  attack  on 
the  Prussian  posts  on  the  Sambre]  till  in  the  evening  of  the  15th; 
and  I  immediately  ordered  the  troops  to  prepare  to  march,"  that  is, 
by  the  orders  which  were  sent  off  betsveen  5  and  7  o'clock  P.  M., 
"and  afterwards,"  that  is,  by  the  orders  issued  at  10  o'clock,  "to 
march  to  their  left,  as  soon  as  I  had  intelligence  from  other  quarters 
to  prove  that  the  enemy's  movement  upon  Charleroi  was  the  real 
attack." 

Then,  after  stating  how  the  Prince  of  Orange  rein- 
forced the  brigade  of  Prince  Bernhard  at  Quatre  Bras, 
and  had,  early  in  the  morning  of  the  i6th,  regained  part 
of  the  ground  which  had  been  lost  the  evening  before, 
he  goes  on  to  say : — 

"  In  the  meantime," — that  is  to  say,  before  the  "  early  morn- 
ing,"—  "  I  had  directed  the  whole  army  to  march  uj)on  Les  Qiiatre 
Bras."34 

Mliffling  says"  that,  towards  midnight,^^  the  Duke 
entered  his  room,  and  said : 

"  I  have  got  news  from  Mons,  from  General  Dornberg,  who  re- 
ports  that   Napoleon   has  turned   towards  Charleroi  with  all  his 


^^  Gurwood,  vol.  xii,  pp.  478,  et  seq.    App.  C,  xii ;  post^  p.  372. 

^It  is  remarkable  that  this  distinct  and  unequivocal  statement,  made  in  an 
ofi&cial  report  the  day  after  the  battle,  should  have  received  so  slight  atten- 
tion. It  is  hardly,  if  at  all,  alluded  to  either  by  those  who  believe  that  Wel- 
lington did  order  his  army  to  concentrate  at  Quatre  Bras,  or  by  those  who  do 
not  believe  this.  There  is  no  mention  of  it  in  Siborne,  Chesney,  Hooper, 
Kennedy,  Maurice,  O'Connor  Morris. 

3spassages,  p.  230.     Cf.  Maurice,  p.  261 :  June,  1890. 

^Siborne  (vol.  i,  pp.  79,  80)  says  this  information  arrived  about  10  P.  M. 
Charras  (vol.  i,  p.  134)  says  it  was  "towards  eleven  o'clock." 


[chap.   5.]  BLUCHER   AND   WELLINGTON.  81 

forces,  and  that  there  is  no  longer  any  enemy  in  front  of  him  ;  there- 
fore orders  for  the  concentration  of  my  army  at  Nivelles  and 
Qiiatre  Bras  are  already  despatched.  *  ♦  *  Lg^-  ^g^ 
therefore,  gos?         *         *         *         ^.q  j-he  ball." 

In  spite  of  this  evidence,  there  is  no  little  difficulty  in 
arriving  at  the  conclusion  that  orders  for  a  general  con- 
centration of  the  Anglo-Dutch  army  at  Quatre  Bras 
were  issued  by  the  Duke  of  Wellington  either  during 
the  night  of  the  15th  and  i6th,  or  on  the  morning  of  the 
i6th.  It  is  not  only  that  no  such  orders  as  Mliffling 
says  the  Duke  told  him  he  had  despatched,^^  that  no 
orders  directing  (to  use  the  Duke's  own  words)  "the 
whole  army  to  march  upon  Les  Quatre  Bras," —  have  ever 
been  produced, —  that,  in  fact,  not  a  single  order  of  Wel- 
lington's, directing  any  troops,  except  those  belonging  to 
the  reserves,  upon  Quatre  Bras,  has  ever  been  brought 
to  light.  This,  though  true,  is  not  conclusive.  It  is 
stated  by  Colonel  Gurwood^^  that  the  original  instruc- 
tions issued  to  Colonel  De  Lancey^°  were  lost  with  that 


''C/.  Letters  of  the  First  Earl  of  Malmesbury,  vol.  2,  p.  445  (London, 
Bentley,  1870,),  where  a  similar  statement  is  said  to  have  been  made  by  Wel- 
lington to  the  Duke  of  Richmond  just  before  the  former  left  the  ball- 
room.   See  App.  C,  xiii ;  post,  p.  373. 

^^Miiffling's  letter  to  Gneisenau,  dated  7  P.  M.  but  no  doubt  sent  off  about 
midnight  (Passages,  pp.  229,  230)  says  that  "  as  soon  as  the  moon  rises,  the 
reserves  will  march  ;  and,  in  case  the  enemy  should  not  attack  Nivelles,  the 
Duke  will  be  in  the  region  of  Nivelles  with  his  whole  force  in  the  morning  in 
order  to  support  your  Highness."  Gneisenau,  vol.  4,  p.  365,  note.  The  let- 
ter does  not  mention  Quatre  Bras.  Delbriick,  in  his  Life  of  Gneisenau,  vol. 
4,  p.  367,  says  that  "  Muffling  also  reported  about  midnight  to  the  Prussian 
commander-in-chief  that  the  allied  army  would  be  concentrated  in  twelve 
hours,  and  that  at  ten  o'clock  on  the  following  morning  20,000  men  would  be 
at  Quatre  Bras,  and  the  cavalry  corps  would  be  at  Nivelles."  But  he  cites 
neither  Muffling  nor  any  other  authority  for  this  amazing  statement. 
Miiffling  tells  us  himself  that  in  his  judgment  the  cavalry  could  not  reach 
Quatre  Bras  before  nightfall, —  hence  they  could  reach  Nivelles  only  two  or 
three  hours  before  nightfall.    Muffling,  Passages,  p.  235. 

^'Gurwood,  vol.  xii,  p.  474.  (y.  Maurice,  p.  144:  May,  1890.  Van  Loben 
Sels,  p.  181.    Ellesmere,  pp.  173,  174. 

'*°The  Deputy  Quarter  Master  General,  or  chief-of-staff. 


82  THE    ISth   OF   JUNE:  [CKAP.   5.] 

officer's'*'  papers;  and  it  is  of  course  possible  that  there 
may  have  been  instructions  for  him  to  issue  orders  for 
the  different  corps  or  divisions  to  concentrate  at  Quatre 
Bras  which  were  thus  lost."'  But  the  real  difficulty 
in  holding  the  theory  that,  at  some  time  during  the 
night,  or  in  the  early  morning  of  the  i6th,  the  Duke  issued 
such  instructions,  is,  that  such  a  theory  is  apparently 
inconsistent  with  the  only  orders'*^  given  on  the  early 
morning  of  the  i6th,  of  which  we  have  copies,  and  also, 
with  the  Duke's  actions  during  the  same  period. 

Let  us  consider  these  points  in  their  order.  The 
orders  to  which  we  have  just  referred  are  two  in  num- 
ber; they  are  said  to  have  been  signed  by  Colonel  Sir 
W.  DeLancey,  the  Deputy  Quarter  Master  General  (or 
chief-of-stafi).  They  are  simply  dated  1 6th  June,  1815; 
neither  the  place  nor  the  hour  is  given,  but  they  must 
have  been  written  at  Brussels ;  ^^  and  in  the  early  morn- 
ing. They  are  both  addressed  to  Lord  Hill.  The  first 
directs  him  to  move  the  second  division  of  infantry  upon 
Braine-le-Comte,  and  informs  him  that  the  cavalry  have 
also  been  ordered  to  the  same  place.  Now,  although  to 
move  from  Enghien,  to  which  place  these  divisions  had 
been  directed  in  the  preceding  order,  to  Braine-le-Comte, 
is  to  approach  Quatre  Bras ;  it  certainly  is  not  the  same 
thing  as  to  march  to  Quatre  Bras.  Braine-le-Comte  is 
in  fact  sixteen  miles  west  of  Quatre  Bras.  This  des- 
patch closes  by  saying :  —  "  His  Grace  is  going  to  Water- 
loo." This  would  seem  to  indicate  that  the  Duke  had 
not  made  up  his  mind  at  that  time  whether  he  would 
personally  go  to  Nivelles  or  to  Quatre  Bras,  the  roads  to 


■"He  was  killed  at  Waterloo. 

"^The  orders  themselves,  however,  would  be  received  at  the  headquarters 
of  the  different  corps  or  divisions,  and  might,  possibly,  be  even  now  in  ex- 
istence. 

■♦^Gurwood,  vol.  xii,  p.  474;  App.  C,  xiv;  />ost,  p.  374. 

AS  <i  Previously  to  starting  from  Brussels  for  "  Quatre  Bras,—  says  Siborne, 
vol.  1,  p.  88. 


[chap.    5.]  BLiJCHER   AND   WELLINGTON.  83 

which  points  branch  ofi  at  Waterloo."*^ 

The  next  despatch  orders  the  troops  at  Sotteghem,  — 
Stedmann's  1st  Dutch-Belgian  Division  and  Anthing's 
brigade,  —  to  proceed  to  Enghien,  a  place  some  twenty- 
five  miles  to  the  west  of  Quatre  Bras. 

Here,  then,  are  orders  issued  on  the  i6th,  in  the  early 
morning,  to  be  sure,  as  we  may  suppose,  but  still  some 
hours  after  the  Duke  had  heard  from  General  Dornberg 
at  Mons  that  the  French  had  turned  off  towards  Charleroi, 
and  there  is  no  word  in  them  indicating  any  intention  or 
expectation  of  a  concentration  at  Quatre  Bras.'*^  It  is 
inconceivable  that  these  orders,  or  at  least  the  first  cf 
them,  should  have  been  worded  as  they  were,  if  the 
Duke,  at  the  time  of  giving  them,  had  the  intention  of 
concentrating  his  army  at  Quatre  Bras.  They  are  evi- 
dently based  on  the  leading  idea  of  the  first  two  sets  of 
orders,  namely,  of  a  general  movement  of  the  army 
towards  the  east,  so  that  a  concentration  at  Nivelles 
could  be  easily  made. 

The  facts  in  regard  to  Picton's  division  also  seem  to  show 
that  not  only  at  the  time  when  the  orders  to  that  divis- 
ion were  given,  say  at  2  A.  M.,  but  even  when  the  Duke 
left  Brussels  at  about  7.30  A.  M.,  he  had  not  made  up 
his  mind  to  concentrate  his  army  at  Quatre  Bras. 
Picton  was  ordered  to  halt  at  Waterloo,  where,  as  we 
have  said,  the  roads  to  Nivelles  and  Quatre  Bras  branch 
off.  He  arrived  there  about  ten,  halted  a  couple  of 
hours,' ^^  and,  "about  twelve  o'clock,  an  order  reached 
him  for  the  continuation  of  the  march  of  his  division 


'•^Maurice,  p.  344:  July,  1S90.  This  is  Colonel  Maurice's  conclusion.  So, 
Ollech,  p.  118. 

*^  Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  88,  says:  "  With  the  early  dawn  of  the  i6th  of  June, 
the  whole  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington's  forces  were  in  movement  towards 
Nivelles  and  Quatre  Bras."  And  then  he  gives  the  substance  of  the  orders 
to  Hill.     It  is  not  easy  to  follow  Siborne's  train  of  thought  here. 

*^  Gomm,  p.  352 ;  Waterloo  Letters,  p.  23.  Gomm  says  the  march  v/r.s 
resumed  at  i  P.  M. 


84  THE    15th    OF   JUNE:  [CHAP.    5.] 

upon  Quatre  Bras."  ''^  It  would  certainly  seem  that  when 
the  Duke  was  riding-  to  Quatre  Bras  that  morning,  — 
passing  Picton's  division  on  the  road,  —  he  had  not  de- 
cided whether  to  order  Picton  to  Nivelles  or  to  Quatre 
Bras.  5°  He  knew  that  the  latter  place  was  occupied  by 
a  brigade  or  more  of  Dutch-Belgian  troops,  but  he  had 
not  ordered  them  there  himself,  — he  had  on  the  pre- 
vious evening  ordered  them  to  Nivelles;  they  had,  in 
fact,  come  to  Quatre  Bras  and  stayed  there  contrary  to 
the  orders  which  he  had  given ;  and  apparently  he  had 
not  yet  fully  decided  whether  he  would  withdraw  them 
or  reinforce  them. 

If,  therefore,  we  are  to  make  up  our  minds  solely  from 
Wellington's  acts  in  the  morning  of  the  i6th,  and  from 
the  only  orders  issued  that  morning  of  which  we  have 
copies,  taken  in  connection  with  the  previous  orders  of 
which  we  have  cognizance,  it  would  seem,  that  the  Duke 
from  the  first  intended  to  occupy  Nivelles  strongly,  as  a 
good  thing  to  do  in  any  event ;  and  that  he  finally  de- 
termined on  concentrating  his  army  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  that  town.  It  is  a  fair  inference  from  these  acts 
and  orders  that  he  had  not,  before  he  left  Brussels,  con- 
templated concentrating  his  army  further  to  the  east- 
ward ;  and  that  it  was  not  until  he  had  ridden  to  Quatre 
Bras,  and  seen,  as  he  supposed,  a  very  small  force  ^^  in 
front  of  him,  that  he,  bearing  in  mind,  no  doubt,  that  the 
reserves  on  the  Brussels  road  and  the  troops  at  Nivelles 
were  not  far  off,  decided  to  hold  the  place,  and  take  the 
risk  of  the  enemy's  overwhelming  him  by  a  superior 
force;  and  that  he  then,  — just  as  soon  as  he  had  made 


*'Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  102,  note. 

^°So  Maurice,  p.  344:  July,  1890.  It  is  curious  that  the  contradiction  be- 
tween these  facts  and  the  Duke's  statement  in  his  Report  should  not  have  been 
commented  on. 

5' V^ellington's  letter  to  Bliicher :  OUech,  p.  125;  Maurice,  p.  257:  June 
1890;  post,  p.  106 :  App.  C,  xvi;  i)Ost,  pp.  376,  377. 


[chap.    5.]  BLUCHER   AND   WELLINGTON.  85 

up  his  mind  to  this,  —  sent  his  aides  to  Picton  and  the 
rest  on  the  Brussels  road,  and  to  Nivelles ;  but  that  not 
even  then  was  a  general  concentration  of  the  whole 
army  at  Quatre  Bras  ordered,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the 
word,  though,  no  doubt,  every  effort  was  made  to  collect 
there  all  the  troops  that  could  be  reached. 

But  there  are  two  pieces  of  evidence  which  remain  to 
be  considered,  which  contradict  this  inference,  and  war- 
rant the  conclusion  that  before  he  left  Brussels  Welling- 
ton changed  his  mind,  and  did  order  a  concentration  of 
his  whole  army  at  Quatre  Bras,  as  he  says  in  his  Report 
he  did.  The  first  is  the  letter  ^'^  which  the  Duke  wrote 
to  Marshal  Bliicher  on  the  morning  of  the  i6th,  and  the 
second  is  the  "  Disposition  "  of  the  British  Army  at  7 
o'clock  A.  M.,  i6th  June,"  "written  out  for  the  informa- 
tion of  the  Commander  of  the  Forces  by  Colonel  Sir  W. 
DeLancey." 

The  letter  in  question  never,  we  believe,  saw  the  light 
until  it  was  published  at  Berlin,  in  1876,  in  Von  Ollech's 
History  of  the  Campaign  of  181 5.  We  shall  give  a  full 
translation  of  it  later  on ;  the  original  is  in  French. 
The  "  Disposition,"  of  which  we  give  below  an  exact 
copy,^'*   is   not  signed    by   Sir   W.   DeLancey,   but    by 


^^Von  OUech,  p.  125.      Maurice,  p.  257  :  June,   1S90;  post^  p.  106;  App.  C, 
xvi;  post,  pp.  376,  377. 
^^  Supp.  Desp.,  vol.  X,  p.  496. 

"  Disposition  of  the  British  Army  at  7  o'clock  A.  M.,  i6th  June, 
ist  division  Braine  le  Comte        marching    to    Nivelles 

and  Quatre  Bras. 
2d  "  "  marching  to   Nivelles. 

3d  "  Nivelles  "  to  Quatre  Bras. 

4th         "  Audenarde  "  to  Braine  le 

Comte. 
5  th         "  beyond  Waterloo  "  to  Genappe. 

6th        "  Assche  "  to  Genappe  and 

Quatre  Bras. 
5th  Hanoverian  brigade  Hal  "  to  Genappe  and 

Quatre  Bras. 
4th  "  beyond  Waterloo  "  to  Genappe  and 

Quatre  Bras. 


86  THE    15th    OF   JUNE:  [CHAP.    5.] 

DeLacy  Evans.  Evans,"  who  became  afterwards  a 
distinguished  general  officer,  was  in  1815  a  Major,  and 
was  serving  as  an  extra  aide-de-camp  to  Major  General 
Ponsonby,  who  commanded  the  second  brigade  of  cav- 
alry. His  attestation  to  this  memorandum,  therefore, 
can  hardly  have  been  made  at  the  time ;  but  we  have  a 
right  to  suppose  that  the  paper  was  in  DeLancey's  hand- 
writing, or  that  Evans  had  some  other  sufficient  grounds 
for  thus  attesting  its  authenticity.  It  purports,  in  our 
opinion,^^  to  be  a  statement,  prepared  by  Wellington's 
chief-of-staff,  of  the  probable  positions  at  7  o'clock  A.  M. 
of  the  1 6th  of  June,  of  the  various  divisions  of  the  army, 
and  of  their  respective  destinations. 


2d  division         (  army  of  tlie  ] 

Low 
3d        "               (    Countries   ] 

1 

at  Nivelles  and  Quatre  Bras. 

1 

I  St  division        ) 
Indian  brigade)          " 

Sotteghem           marching 

to  Enghien. 

IMajor-General  Dornberg's  ^ 
brigade  and  Cumberland  > 
Hussars                                ) 

beyond  Waterloo        " 

to  Genappeand 
Quatre  Bras. 

Remainder  of  the  cavalry 

Braine  le  Comte          " 

to  Nivelles  and 
Quatre  Bras. 

Duke  of  Brunswick's  Corps, 

beyond  Waterloo        " 

to  Genappe. 

Nassau 

" 

to  Genappe. 

The  above  disposition  written  out  for  the  information  of  the  Commander  of 
the  Forces  by  Colonel  Sir  W.  De  Lancey.  The  centre  column  of  names 
indicates  the  places  at  which  the  troops  had  arrived  or  were  moving  en. 
The  column  on  the  right  of  the  paper  indicates  the  places  the  troops  were 
ordered  to  proceed  to  at  7  o'clock  A.  M.,  16th  June,  previous  to  any  attack 
on  the  British.  (Signed)  DeLacy  Evans. 

By  the  phrase  —  "the  places  at  which  the  troops  had  arrived  or  were 
moving  on  "  —  the  writer  means,  in  all  probability,  the  places  to  which  the 
troops  were,  in  his  judgment,  nearest,  at  7  A.  M. 

5' Waterloo  Roll  Call,  pp.  4,  19. 

5"^  Maurice  (June,  1890,  p.  261)  adopts  a  different  construction  of  the  state- 
ment ;  he  thinks  it  means  that  the  orders  to  march  to  the  various  points  named 
were  issued  at  seven  o'clock  A.  M.  But  why  should  it  have  been  thought 
necessary  to  give  to  the  Commander  of  the  Forces  information  of  the  hour  of 
i.ssuing  the  orders?  What  he  would  want  to  know  would  be  where  the 
various  divisions  probably  were  at  a  given  hour,  and  to  what  points  they 
W'.'re  marching. 


[chap.    5.]  BLUCHER   AND   WELLINGTON.  B)'] 

That  this  "  Disposition  "  was  reHed  on  by  WelHngton 
when  he  wrote  his  letter  to  Bliicher,  seems,  by  compar- 
ing the  two  papers,  very  clear.  We  find,  for  example, 
that  the  "  Disposition  "  states  that,  of  the  four  divisions 
of  the  ist  Corps,  Cooke's  was  at  7  A.  M.  at  Braine-le- 
Comte,  marching  to  Nivelles  and  Quatre  Bras,  Alten's 
was  at  Nivelles,  and  marching  to  Quatre  Bras,  and  those 
of  Chasse  and  Perponcher  were  at  Nivelles  and  Quatre 
Bras.  We  then  find  the  Duke  writing  to  Bliicher,  that, 
at  10.30  A.  M.,  one  division  of  this  corps  was  at  Quatre 
Bras  and  the  rest  at  Nivelles.  It  cannot  be  denied  that, 
so  far  as  this  corps  is  concerned,  certainly,  the  two  papers 
hang  together  perfectly  well.  Wellington  had  a  perfect 
right  to  suppose  that  Cooke  could  get  from  Braine-le- 
Comte  to  Nivelles,  or  nearly  there,  between  seven 
and  half-past  ten ;  and  as  for  the  positions  of  the  other 
divisions,  he  simply  follows  the  memorandum  which  his 
chief-of-staff  has  prepared  for  his  information,  and  on 
which  he  had  an  undoubted  right  to  rely.  We  shall  give, 
later  on,  other  instances  of  this  agreement  between  these 
two  papers.  They  seem  to  us  to  demonstrate  the 
authenticity  of  the  "  Disposition." 

Assuming  now  the  authenticity  of  this  memorandum, 
we  wish  to  point  out  that  its  statements  necessarily 
imply  that  orders  had  been  issued  to  the  army  other 
than  those  of  which  we  have  copies,  —  that  is,  other  than 
those  of  which  we  have  given  abstracts  above.  Thus,  all 
we  have  hitherto  been  able  to  ascertain  in  regard  to  the 
orders  to  Cooke's  division  is,  that  it  was  by  the  10  P.  M. 
order  of  June  15,  directed  to  march  from  Enghien  on 
Braine-le-Comte.  It  would  appear  from  the  DeLancey 
Memorandum  that  it  had  been  subsequently  ordered  to 
Nivelles  and  Quatre  Bras.  And  the  Duke  does  not 
hesitate  to  tell  Marshal  Bliicher  —  on  the  strength  of 
DeLancey's  statement,  that,  at  7  A.  M.,  Cooke  was  at 
Braine-le-Comte,  —  that  Cooke  must  have  arrived  at 
Nivelles    by    half-past    ten,  —  he    being,    according    to 


88  THE    15th    OF   JUNE:  [CHAP.    5.] 

De  Lancey's  memorandum,  under  orders  to  proceed 
there. 

So  with  the  cavalry.  We  have  seen  above  that  in  an 
early  morning  order  of  the  i6th,  it  is  said  that  the  cav- 
alry had  been  directed  on  Braine-le-Comte.  Yet  there 
must  have  been  some  subsequently  issued  order  to 
Lord  Uxbridge,  for  we  find  the  "Disposition"  stating 
that  the  cavalry  is,  at  7  A.  M.,  at  Braine-le-Comte,  and  is 
marching  to  Nivelles  and  Quatre  Bras ;  and  Wellington, 
relying  on  this  statement  of  his  chief-of-staff,  that  a  sub- 
sequent order  had  been  sent  out  ordering  the  cavalry  to 
continue  their  march  to  Nivelles,  does  not  hesitate  to 
tell  Marshal  BlUcher,  that  his  cavalry  will  be  at  Nivelles 
at  noon. 

We  shall  have  occasion  hereafter  to  examine  both 
papers  in  detail ;  but  what  we  have  just  pointed  out  will 
suflfice  for  the  purpose  now  in  hand. 

That  is  to  say,  the  "  Disposition "  prepared  for  the 
Duke's  information  by  Colonel  DeLancey,  and  the  letter 
of  the  Duke  to  Marshal  Blucher  are  pieces  of  strictly 
contemporaneous  evidence;  and  show  beyond  a  doubt 
that  further  orders,  issued  subsequently  to  those  of  which 
we  know  the  tenor,  and  directing  the  army  on  Quatre 
Bras,  were  really  given  in  the  morning  of  the  i6th,  as 
Wellington,  in  his  Report  of  the  battle,  explicitly  states 
was  the  case. 

Thus,  —  to  recur  for  a  moment  to  the  orders  dated  on 
the  i6th,  and  to  the  inferences  drawn  from  them, — 
although  at  the  time  when  the  despatch  dated  the  i6th 
to  Lord  Hill,  to  move  the  second  division  on  Braine-le- 
Comte,  in  which  it  was  stated  that  the  Duke  was  going 
to  Waterloo,  was  issued,  the  Duke  assuredly  had  not 
made  up  his  mind  to  concentrate  his  army  at  Quatre  Bras, 
nevertheless,  he  did  subsequently,  and  probably  not  long 
afterwards,  make  up  his  mind  so  to  do,  and  thereupon  he 
issued  an  order  for  that  division  to  march  to  Nivelles,  as 
the  "  Disposition  "  states.   As  for  Stedmann's  division  and 


[chap.    5.]  BLUCHER   AND   WELLINGTON.  89 

Anthing's  brigade,  which  were  the  subjects  of  the  other 
order  written  on  the  i6th,  the  "Disposition  "  simply  em- 
bodies the  purport  of  this  order.  And  as  for  the  halt  of 
Picton's  division  at  Waterloo,  to  which  we  have  called 
attention  above,  if  we  suppose  that,  before  he  left  Brus- 
sels for  Quatre  Bras,  the  Duke  had  issued  orders  for  the 
concentration  of  the  whole  army,  or,  at  any  rate,  of  the 
bulk  of  the  army,  at  Quatre  Bras,  he  may  well  have 
passed  Picton's  division  on  its  march  to  Waterloo,  as- 
sured that,  after  a  brief  rest  at  that  place,  which  would 
do  the  men  no  harm,  an  order  would  arrive  from  Brus- 
sels, where  very  possibly  the  staff  ^7  were  writing  out  the 
orders  to  the  army,  for  Picton  to  continue  his  march  to 
Quatre  Bras. 

Wellington's  decision  to  concentrate  at  Quatre  Bras 
the  whole  army,  —  or  the  bulk  of  the  army,  —  for  it 
does  not  appear  even  from  the  DeLancey  Memorandum 
that  he  ever  expected  the  far  distant  divisions  of  Col- 
ville  and  Stedmann  to  arrive  in  season, —  was  reached, 
in  all  probability,  while  he  was  at  the  Duchess  of  Rich- 
mond's ball.  He  went  to  the  ball  at  or  soon  after  lo 
P.  M.,  and  he  stayed  there  until  after  2  A.  M.^'  He  told 
the  Duke  of  Richmond,  just  before  he  left  the  house, 
that  he  had  "  ordered  the  army  to  concentrate  at  Quatre 
Bras."^^  At  some  time,  therefore,  after  the  issuing  of 
the  orders  to  Lord  Hill,  which  are  dated  the  i6th,^°  and 
before  2  or  2.30  A.  M.,  the  Duke  decided  to  concentrate 
the  army  at  Quatre  Bras. 

"  Major  Oldfield  states  that  the  Duke  rode  out  to  Quatre  Bras  unattended 
by  his  Quartermaster-General,  DeLancey,  or  by  the  other  heads  of  depart- 
ments.   Oldfield,  MSS. 

58  Lady  Jane  Dalrymple  Hamilton,  in  her  most  interesting  Journal,  now  in 
the  possession  of  her  granddaughter.  Lady  Manvers,  says :  "  We  found  him 
[the  Duke]  there  [at  the  ball]  on  our  arrival  at  lo  o'clock.  .  .  .  We  re- 
mained till  past  two,  and,  when  I  left,  the  Duke  was  still  there." 

*9  App.  C,  xiii;  ^ost.,  p.  373. 

^Ante,  p.  82. 


NOTES   TO    CHAPTER    V. 

I.  We  may  properly  devote  a  few  words  here  to  the 
Duke  of  Wellington's  "  Memorandum  on  the  Battle  of 
Waterloo,"  written  in  1842,  in  reply  to  Clausewitz's  His- 
tory of  the  Campaign  of  181 5.  There  are  some  state- 
ments contained  in  this  paper  which  fairly  take  one's 
breath  away. 

For  instance,  we  learn  that  the  Duke,  "having  re- 
ceived the  intelligence  of "  the  French  "  attack  only  at 
three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  15th,  was  at  Qiiatre 
Bras  before  the  same  hour  on  the  morning  of  the  16 th,"^ 
with  a  sufficient  force  to  engage  the  left  of  the  French 
army."" 

The  fact  is,  that,  at  3  A.  M.  of  the  i6th  only  the  brigade 
of  Prince  Bernhard  of  Saxe  Weimar  was  at  Quatre  Bras, 
and  he  had  taken  it  there  entirely  on  his  own  responsi- 
bility, and  not,  as  is  implied  in  the  above  statement,  in 
obedience  to  orders  from  the  Duke  of  Wellington. 

But  it  is  unnecessary  to  set  forth  in  detail  any  refuta- 
tion of  such  statements  as  the  above.  The  best  English 
authorities  do  not  rely^  on  this  Memorandum,  alleging 
that  the  Duke's  memory,  when  he  wrote  it,  was  no 
longer  exact.''    We  are  quite  within  bounds  when  we  say 


'The  italics  are  ours.    But  SQt  post,  p.  374 ,  n.  2. 

^Supp.  Desp.,  vol.  X,  p.  523;  App.  C,  xv;  post,  pp.  374,  376,  376, 

^Chesney,  p.  83,  n. ;  p.  loi ;  p,  131. 

*Ib.,  p.  loi ;  p.  131. 


[chap.  5.]     WELLINGTON    AND    BLUCHER. — NOTES.  QI 

that  this  Memorandum  adds  nothing  to  our  knowledge 
of  the  facts.  We  may  add  that  it  is  a  pity  that  this  is  so. 
WeUington  wrote  this  Memorandum  in  1842, —  twenty- 
seven  years  only  after  the  date  of  the  battle  of  Waterloo. 
This  is  not  so  very  long  after  the  occurrence :  we  are 
now  twenty-nine  years  after  Gettysburg.  Very  many 
officers  conversant  with  the  facts  must  have  been  then 
alive ;  and  the  Duke  had  access  to  all  the  official  papers. 
It  is  a  pity,  we  repeat,  that  he  did  not  set  himself  to  the 
task  of  drawing  up  an  exhaustive  and  accurate  narrative 
of  the  facts  of  the  campaign. 

2.  We  desire  to  call  attention  again  to  the  absence  of 
evidence  that  Wellington  and  BlUcher  had  formulated 
any  definite  plan  of  concerted  action  in  the  event  of 
Napoleon's  invading  Belgium. 

One  thing,  at  any  rate,  is  quite  clear,  and  that  is  that 
neither  of  the  allied  commanders  acted,  so  far  as  we  can 
judge,  in  pursuance  of  any  such  agreement.  Blucher, 
when  he  hears  of  Napoleon's  advance  to  Charleroi, 
orders  his  army  to  assemble  at  Sombreffe,  and  then 
sends  word  to  Wellington  of  what  he  has  done ;  the  lat- 
ter, as  we  have  seen,  although  he  learns  that  the  enemy's 
main  attack  is  by  way  of  Charleroi  and  therefore  upon 
the  Prussians,  and  although  he  has  long  known  that  in 
this  event  it  was  Bliicher's  intention  to  concentrate  his 
army  at  Sombreffe,  takes  no  instant  steps  to  bring  his 
army  into  close  union  with  that  of  Bliicher.  His  first 
idea,  certainly,  is  to  assemble  his  army  at  Nivelles.  This 
difficulty,  it  is  true,  does  not  seem  greatly  to  trouble  the 
writers  who  have  adopted  the  theory  of  a  previous  un- 
derstanding or  arrangement ;  it  seems  to  be  possible, 
for  instance,  for  Siborne,  to  believe  that  Wellington  had 
agreed  to  concentrate  at  Quatre  Bras,^  and  yet  actually 
to  call  attention^  to  the  fact  that  he  halted  Picton's  divis- 


^Siborne,  vol.  i.,  p.  40. 
'lb.,  p.  102,  note. 


92  THE    15th   OF   JUNE: — NOTES.  [CHAP.  5.] 

ion  at  Waterloo,  hours  after  he  had  known  that  Blucher 
was  concentrating  at  Sombreffe,  because  he  had  not 
then  made  up  his  mind  whether  to  send  Picton  to 
Nivelles  or  to  Quatre  Bras.  But  he  and  those  other 
historians  who  have  followed  him,  or  have  adopted  the 
same  theory,  have  certainly  a  serious  difficulty  to  con- 
tend with.  The  Duke  had  been  informed  about  mid- 
night^  that  Quatre  Bras  was  occupied  by  a  part  of 
Perponcher's  division,  and  he  had  heard  also  that 
Blucher  was  concentrating  his  army  at  Sombreffe.  If 
he  had  agreed  with  Blucher  to  concentrate  the  Anglo- 
Dutch  army  at  Quatre  Bras,  he  would  assuredly  have 
given  his  orders  accordingly,  and  in  season, —  at  least 
one  would  suppose  so, —  and  he  certainly  could  have  had 
a  large  force  there  by  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning.  But 
he  acted,  on  the  other  hand,  as  if  he  thought  that  he  pos- 
sessed perfect  discretion  as  to  what  he  would  do, —  as  if 
he  was  bound  by  no  agreement  whatsoever.  It  is  evi- 
dent, in  fact,  that  he  did  not  make  up  his  mind  till 
shortly  before  he  left  Brussels  to  go  to  Quatre  Bras  him- 
self, whether  he  would  undertake  to  hold  the  place  or 
not. 

3.  It  is,  however,  to  be  noted  that  the  action  that  was 
fought  at  Quatre  Bras  assumed  at  once  such  importance 
in  the  eyes  of  the  world,  that  those  historians  who  have 
been  great  admirers  of  the  Duke  have  very  generally 
asserted  that  he  had,  almost  from  the  first  news  of  the 
French  attack,  determined  to  concentrate  his  army  there. 
This  assertion  has  been  accompanied  by  many  eulogistic 
remarks,  in  which  Wellington's  prescience  and  power  of 
quick  decision  have  been  held  up  to  an  undeserved 
admiration.  "  At  ten  the  same  night,  however "  [the 
15th],  says  Gleig,^  "the  enemy's  movements  had  suffi- 


^By  a  despatch  sent  to  the  Prince  of  Orange  at  Brussels  from  Braine-le- 
Comte  at  10  P.  M.    Van  Loben  Sels,  p.  176,  note. 

*Gleig's  Life  of  the  Duke  of  WelUngton,  p.  308. 


[chap.  5.]     WELLINGTON   AND    BLUCHER. — NOTES.  93 

ciently  disclosed  his  intentions;  and  the  whole  army, 
with  the  exception  of  the  reserve,  was  put  in  motion. 
It  marched  by  various  roads  upon  Quatre  Bras."  Cap- 
tain Pringle,  of  the  Royal  Engineers,  upon  whom  Sir 
Walter  Scott  largely  relied  for  his  narrative  of  the 
campaign,  says  :^  "  Having  obtained  further  intelligence 
about  II  o'clock  [on  the  evening  of  the  15th],  which 
confirmed  the  real  attack  of  the  enemy  to  be  along  the 
Sambre,  orders  were  immediately  given  for  the  troops  to 
march  upon  Quatre  Bras." 

We  have  just  seen  that  no  such  orders  were  given  un- 
til the  early  morning  hours  of  the  i6th. 

4.  Assuming  now,  as  we  fairly  may,  that  the  Duke 
did  not  direct  a  general  concentration  of  his  army  at 
Quatre  Bras  until  shortly  before  he  left  Brussels,  say,  for 
a  guess,  at  2  A.  M.  of  the  i6th,  let  us  endeavor  to  get  a 
notion,  if  we  may,  of  his  first  intentions  and  expecta- 
tions, as  shown  in  his  previously  issued  orders. 

He  had  directed  three  divisions  on  Nivelles, —  all  his 
reserves  to  a  point  on  the  Charleroi-Brussels  pike  from 
which  they  could  easily  be  moved  to  Nivelles, —  and  his 
more  westerly  divisions  to  Enghien  and  Braine-le-Comte, 
in  the  direction  of  Nivelles.  Among  the  troops  thus 
directed  on  Nivelles  were  some  that  had  been  stationed 
at  Genappe  and  Quatre  Bras.  He  had  in  fact  ordered 
his  army  to  concentrate  at  Nivelles;  notwithstanding 
that  he  had  been  informed  that  the  French  attack  was 
by  way  of  Charleroi,  that  Blucher  was  concentrating  at 
Sombreffe,  that  a  brigade  of  Dutch-Belgians  was  at 
Quatre  Bras,  and  that  it  had  been  skirmishing  with  the 
enemy.  The  question  of  the  appropriateness  of  his 
action  to  these  facts  is  certainly  an  interesting  one. 

Colonel  Maurice,  the  most  recent  military  commen- 
tator on  the  campaign,  discusses  this  question,  and 
arrives    at    the   conclusion    that    Wellington's    original 


'Scott's  Life  of  Napoleon,  p.  833.     Paris;  Galignani;  182S. 


94  THE    I5tll    OF   JUNE: — NOTES.  [CHAP.  5, j 

intention  of  concentrating  his  army  at  Nivelles,  was  in 
accord  with  the  principles  of  war/°  "  If  there  is  one  thing 
which  rests  on  more  certain  experience  than  another," 
says  he,  "it  is  that  an  army  ought  not  to  expose  itself 
piecemeal  to  the  blows  of  a  concentrated  enemy.  Wel- 
lington, therefore,  contemplated  concentrating  his  army 
out  of  reach  of  the  advancing  French.  Napoleon,  from 
his  general  knowledge  of  the  position  of  the  English 
army,  assumed  that  they  would,  of  course,  not  venture  to 
oppose  him  till  they  had  fallen  back  to  concentrate.  As 
the  case  actually  happened,  only  the  wild  wandering  of 
d'Erlon's  Corps  prevented  Ney  from  overwhelming  the 
force  in  his  presence  at  Quatre  Bras." 
To  this  it  may  be  replied:  — 

A.  That  Wellington,  as  we  have  stated  above,"  knew 
at  II  P.  M.  of  the  15th  that  the  main  body  of  the 
French  under  Napoleon  in  person  were  concentrating 
in  front  of  the  Prussians,  who  were  themselves  concen- 
trating at  Sombreffe.  He  might,  therefore,  fairly  reckon 
on  being  able,  if  he  acted  with  promptness,  to  assemble 
at  Quatre  Bras  during  the  next  forenoon  a  force  quite  as 
large  as  any  that  might  reasonably  be  expected 
to  be  spared  from  the  main  body  of  the  French 
to  oppose  him.  He,  therefore,  would  not  have  exposed 
his  troops  "piecemeal  to  the  blows  of  a  concentrated 
enemy,"  if  he  had  ordered  a  general  concentration  at 
Quatre  Bras  after  making  sure  that  the  main  body  of 
the  French  was  at  or  near  Fleurus,  and  that  the  main 
body  of  the  Prussians  was  ready  to  receive  them  there. 

B.  It  is  perfectly  true  that  had  d'Erlon's  Corps  come 
up  in  due  time,  the  forces  which  Wellington  had  at 
Quatre  Bras,  including  the  several  bodies  of  reinforce- 
ments, as  they  successively  arrived,  w^ould  have  been 


'"Maurice,  pp.  344  et  seg.  Quly,  1890.)   Contra,  Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.   132, 
et  seq. 

"AnU,  p.  80,  n.  36. 


[chap.  5.]    WELLINGTON   AND   BLUCHER. — NOTES.  95 

overwhelmed  in  detail.  But  then,  as  we  shall  shortly 
show,  Wellington  did  not  issue  his  orders  for  his  army 
to  concentrate  at  Quatre  Bras  in  season  to  effect  his 
object.  Had  he  done  so,  on  the  night  of  the  15th  and 
1 6th,  he  would  have  had  by  noon,  certainly,  a  very  much 
larger  body  of  men  than  he  actually  did  have,  very 
possibly  enough  to  oppose  successfully  both  d'Erlon  and 
Reille.  It  must  be  remembered  that  it  was  not  until 
(say)  2  o'clock  in  the  morning,  or  thereabouts,  that  he 
gave  any  orders  to  any  troops  to  proceed  to  Quatre 
Bras. 

We  conclude,  therefore,  that  Wellington  would  not 
have  run  any  unwarrantable  risk  by  ordering  his  army 
to  assemble  at  Quatre  Bras  as  soon  as  he  had  learnt  of 
the  French  advance  by  way  of  Charleroi.  And  that  this 
was  the  true  course  for  him  to  take  is  virtually  admitted 
by  his  own  subsequent  accounts  of  his  doings,'''  on  which 
we  have  commented  above  in  our  remarks  on  his  "  Mem- 
orandum on  the  Battle  of  Waterloo."  {Ante,  p.  90.) 
Had  the  instructions  which  he  actually  gave  been  strictly 
carried  out,  had  the  brigade  of  Prince  Bernhard  of  Saxe 
Weimar  been  withdrawn  to  Nivelles  in  obedience  to  the 
orders  of  10  P.  M.,  Ney  might  have  occupied  Quatre 
Bras  without  opposition,  in  the  morning  of  the  i6th. 
And  although  it  is  possible,  and,  in  fact,  probable, 
that  he  would  have  been  attacked  by  the  English  during 
the  afternoon,  and  while  it  would  have  been  obviously  out 
of  the  question  for  him  to  have  advanced  on  Brussels, 
leaving  the  English  army  at  Nivelles,  yet,  supposing  that 
he  had  had  both  his  corps  with  him,  as  he  ought  to  have 
had,  he  assuredly  would  have  been  able  to  spare  a  part 
of  his  forces  to  take  the  Prussians  in  rear  while  they 
were  fighting  at  Ligny,  as  the  Emperor  (as  we  shall 
see)  desired  him  to  do. 

C.    As  for  Napoleon's  expectations  in  regard  to  the 


'Chesney,  p.  loi. 


96  THE    15th    OF   JUNE: — NOTES.  [CHAP.  5.] 

English  occupation  of  Quatre  Bras  as  given  to  us  by 
Colonel  Maurice,  it  must  certainly  be  admitted  by  every- 
body that  Napoleon  considered  the  occupation  of  the 
cross-roads  as  of  very  great  importance  for  himself,  and 
that  the  reason  why  he  gave  Ney  45,000  men  of  all  arms 
was  in  order  to  make  a  sure  thing  of  it.  Very  possibly 
he  did  not  expect  that  the  English  general  would  be  able, 
scattered  as  his  army  was  in  its  cantonments,  to  assem- 
ble a  very  large  force  there  during  the  morning  of  the 
i6th.  But  it  is  evident  that  he  thought  that  his  adver- 
sary's getting  30,000  or  40,000  men  together,  and  either 
assisting  the  Prussians  or  attacking  his  left  flank,  was  a 
thing  so  likely  to  occur,  and  so  dangerous  a  thing,  if  it 
did  occur,  that  he  gave  his  two  largest  corps  to  his  best 
fighting  general  in  order  to  provide  fully  for  this  contin- 
gency by  seizing  and  occupying  the  cross-roads  of  Quatre 
Bras.  If  the  emergency  arose.  Napoleon  was  bound  to 
be  prepared  for  it.  If  he  had  regarded  it  as  extremely 
improbable  that  the  English  would  be  encountered  in 
force  at  or  near  Quatre  Bras,  he  would  probably  have 
strengthened  his  main  army  with  one  of  the  corps  which 
he  gave  to  Ney. 

5.  That  Wellington  and  Bliicher  erred  in  allowing 
their  armies  to  remain  in  their  widely  extended  canton- 
ments until  Napoleon  attacked  them  is  now  generally 
admitted.  Sir  James  Shaw-Kennedy's  remarks  '^  on  this 
point  sum  up  the  question  forcibly :  — 

' '  They  [the  allied  commanders]  determined  to  continue  in  the 
cantonments  which  they  occupied  until  they  knew  positively  the 
line  of  attack.  Now  it  may  safely  "be  predicted  that  this  deter- 
mination will  be  considered  by  future  and  dispassionate  historians 
as  a  great  mistake  ;  for,  in  place  of  waiting  to  see  where  the  blow 
actually  fell,  the  armies  should  have  been  instantly  put  in  motion  to 
assemble.  Nor  was  this  the  only  error :  the  line  of  cantonments 
occupied  by  the  Anglo-Allied  and  Prussian  armies  was  greatly  too 


"Kennedy,  pp.  168-170,     See,  also,  Clausewitz.chaps.  11, 15,  17.  Charras, 
vol.  I,  p.  80,     Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  254. 


[chap.  5.]     WELLINGTON   AND    BLUCHER. — NOTES.  97 

extended.  *  *  *  From  the  time,  therefore,  that  it  be- 
came known  that  Napoleon's  army  was  organized  and  formed  into 
corps  ready  to  take  the  field,  the  armies  of  Wellington  and  Bliicher 
should  have  been  so  placed  in  cantonments  as  to  be  prepared  to 
meet  any  of  the  cases  supposed,"  —  i.  e.,  an  advance  of  the  French 
by  any  one  of  the  great  Flanders  roads,  —  *  *  * 
"  and  from  the  moment  that  it  was  known  that  the  French  army 
was  at  all  in  movement,  the  allied  armies  should  have  been  with- 
drawn from  their  cantonments  and  placed  very  near  to  each  other." 

Wellington  and  Bliicher,  it  will  be  remembered,  had 
known  for  several  days  that  Napoleon  was  massing  his 
forces,  and  yet  they  put  off  till  the  last  moment  even 
the  assembling  their  corps  and  divisions  in  their  respect- 
ive places  of  rendezvous. 

Sir  James  Shaw-Kennedy  then  proceeds  to  discuss 
the  proper  "  line  of  cantonments  "  of  the  allied  armies 
from  the  time  when  "  it  was  known  that  Napoleon  had  a 
large  organized  army  ready  to  take  the  field,"  ''^  and  he 
gives  it  as  his  opinion  that  Bliicher  should  have  "made 
Genappe  his  headquarters,  cantoning  his  army  between 
Louvain  and  Gosselies,  occupying  the  line  of  the  Sambre 
from  Namur  to  the  frontier  by  strong  bodies  of  cavalry, 
&c.,"  and  that  Wellington,  having  his  headquarters  at 
Brussels,  should  have  cantoned  his  army  between  Brus- 
sels and  Soignies,  with  cavalry  outposts. 

Charras  '^  expresses  the  same  opinion  as  to  the  line  of 
cantonments  of  Wellington's  army,  but  he  holds  that  by 
the  end  of  May  the  Duke  should  have  carried  his  head- 
quarters six  or  eight  leagues  [15  or  20  miles]  in  advance 
of  Brussels :  '^  while  Bliicher  ought  at  the  same  time  to 
have  removed  his  headquarters  to  Fleurus,  '^  and  to  have 
concentrated  his  forces  within  a  radius  of  six  or  eight 


'<  Kennedy,  p.  171. 
"  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  80. 

"  This  is  also  the  opinion  of  Clausewitz  ;  ch.  18. 

"Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  83.    Clausewitz,  ch.  18,  says  "nearer  Nivelles,"  /.  ^., 
nearer  than  Namur  is. 


98  THE    15th    OF   JUNE: — NOTES.  [CHAP.  5.] 

leagues  (fifteen  or  twenty  miles)  ;  having  outposts  on  the 
Sambre  and  Meuse. 

In  this  last  opinion,  as  he  says,  he  follows  Napoleon.  '^ 
The  latter,  it  is  to  be  noted,  does  not  criticise  Welling- 
ton, as  do  Charras  and  Clausewitz,  for  retaining  his  head- 
quarters in  Brussels,  but  only,  —  in  this  connection,  that 
is,  —  for  the  excessive  extent  of  his  cantonments.  "^  Na- 
poleon's view  seems  to  be  that  Brussels  was  the  right 
place  for  the  headquarters  of  the  Anglo-Dutch  army  and 
Fleurus  for  those  of  the  Prussian  army ;  and  that  from 
the  15th  of  May  both  generals  should  have  greatly  re- 
duced the  extent  of  their  cantonments,  so  that  no  part 
of  their  troops,  except  the  advance-posts,  should  be  more 
than  twenty  miles  distant  from  the  headquarters  of  the 
army.  Had  this  course  been  adopted,  he  says  the  Prus- 
sians might  have  been  assembled  at  Ligny  at  noon  of 
the  i5th,^°  ready  to  receive  the  attack  of  the  French 
army.  He  does  not,  however,  go  on  and  state  his  view 
of  the  mode  and  time  of  the  cooperation  of  the  English 
army  in  that  event.  We  must  content  ourselves  with 
merely  stating  these  opinions. 

6.  That  Marshal  Bliicher,  who  had  allowed  his  troops 
to  remain  in  their  widely  scattered  cantonments  until 
the  last  moment,  erred  in  giving  Sombreffe  as  the  point 
of  concentration  of  his  army,  seems  on  principle  and  au- 
thority very  clear.  Napoleon's  remarks^'  on  this  are  as 
follows : — 

"  Marshal  Bliicher  ought,  as  soon  as  he  knew  that  the  French 
were  at  Charleroi  [that  is  to  say,  on  the  evening  of  the  15th,]  to 
have  given,  as  the  point  of  assembling  of  his  army,  not  Fleurus,  nor 


"  Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  253. 

"lb,  p.  254. 

^  lb,  p.  253. 

"  lb,  p.  254.  The  words  in  brackets  are  in  the  edition  of  1820,  known  as 
the  "  M^moires,"  but  are  not  in  the  "  Correspondance."  The  "  M^moires  " 
also  substitute  "the  17th"  for  "the  evening  of  the  i6th." 


[chap.  5.]     WELLINGTON   AND   BLUCHER. — NOTES.  99 

Ligny,  which  were  aheady  under  the  cannon  of  the  enemy,  but 
Wavre,  where  the  French  could  not  arrive  until  the  evening  of  the 
i6th.  By  doing  so,  he  would  have  had  all  the  day  of  the  i6th,  and 
the  night  between  the  1 6th  and  17th,  to  effect  the  junction  of  his 
whole  army." 

He  also  for  the  same  reasons  censures  Wellington  " 
for  establishing-  "  Quatre  Bras  as  the  point  of  reunion " 
for  his  army.  Sir  James  Shaw-Kennedy  '^  says  to  the 
same  effect: 

**  The  determination  of  Wellington  and  Bliicher  to  meet  Na- 
poleon's advance  at  Fleurus  and  Qiiatre  Bras  was  totally  incon- 
sistent with  the  widely  scattered  positions  in  which  they  had  placed 
their  armies ;  their  determination  in  this  respect  amounted  in  the 
fullest  extent  to  that  error  which  has  so  often  been  committed  in 
war,  by  even  great  commanders,  of  endeavoring  to  assemble  on  a 
point  which  could  only  be  reached  by  a  portion  of  the  troops 
intended  to  occupy  it,  while  the  enemy  had  the  power  of  concentra- 
ting upon  it  his  whole  force." 

We  do  not  believe,  as  we  have  pointed  out  above,  that 
any  such  determination  had  been  arrived  at  by  Wel- 
lington and  Bliicher  beforehand ;  but,  Bliicher's  taking  the 
decisive  step  of  ordering  a  concentration  of  his  army  at 
Sombreffe,  instead  of  at  Wavre,  for  instance,  placed  Wel- 
lington, as  we  have  just  pointed  out,  under  the  necessity 
of  ordering  a  concentration  of  his  army,  or  a  part  of  it,  at 
Quatre  Bras,  unless  he  was  prepared  to  leave  his  ally  with- 
out support.  The  criticisms  of  Napoleon  and  of  General 
Shaw-Kennedy,  are,  therefore,  we  submit,  really  confined 
to  BliAcher's  action.  Napoleon  is  not  considering  what 
Wellington  ought  to  have  done  hi  view  of  the  step  which 
Bliicher  took  in  concentrating  at  Sombreffe,  but  is  only 
giving  his  opinion,  that,  on  general  principles,  Quatre 
Bras  was  not  the  proper  place  of  concentration  for  the 
English,  just  as  Sombreffe  was  not  the  proper  place  of 
concentration  for  the  Prussians,  after  the  French  were 


"  Corresp.  vol.  31,  p.  255. 
*^  Kennedy,  p.  172. 


100   THE    15th   OF   JUNE: — BLUCHER   AND   WELLINGTON. 

known  to  be  advancing  on  Charleroi.  It  must  be  noted 
that  Napoleon  and  Kennedy  both  assume  that  the  two 
allied  generals  had  agreed  upon  Sombreffe  and  Quatre 
Bras  respectively/'*  If  there  was  no  such  agreement, 
(and  w^e  think  there  was  not  any),  then  we  cannot  prop- 
erly consider  Wellington's  decision  to  concentrate  at 
Quatre  Bras  except  in  connection  with  the  fact  that 
Bliicher  had  committed  himself  to  a  battle  at  Ligny  and 
needed  his  support. 


Corresp.,  pp.  195, 197.     Kennedy,  p.  172. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  FIFTEENTH  OF  JUNE :   THE   DUTCH-BELGIANS. 

Turning  now  from  the  consideration  of  the  arrange- 
ments ordered  by  the  allied  commanders,  our  first  atten- 
tion is  due  to  the  occupation  of  Quatre  Bras  by  the 
brigade  of  Prince  Bernhard  of  Saxe  Weimar,  belonging 
to  the  Dutch-Belgian  division  of  Perponcher  in  the  corps 
commanded  by  the  Prince  of  Orange.  This  brigade, 
which  was  cantonned  along  the  turnpike  from  Genappe 
to  Frasnes  and  in  the  neighboring  villages,'  was,  on  the 
first  news  of  hostilities,  concentrated  by  its  commander 
at  Quatre  Bras,  with  its  outposts  at  Frasnes,  an  act 
which,  done  without  orders,  as  it  was,  did  him  great 
credit.^  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  orders  were  on 
the  way  directing  the  same  thing.  In  the  absence  of 
the  Prince  of  Orange  at  Brussels,  his  chief-of-staff. 
General  Constant  Rebecque,  having  heard  of  the  advance 
of  the  French,  had  already^  sent  to  Perponcher  an  order 
to  assemble  one  brigade  of  his  division  at  Quatre  Bras, 
and  the  other  at  Nivelles.  Between  5  and  6  o'clock  of 
the  afternoon  of  the  15th  Prince  Bernhard 's  brigade  was 
attacked  near  Frasnes  by  the  advance  of  Reille's  Corps.'* 
At  9  he  sent  off  to  Nivelles  a  report  of  the  action ; 
this  was    immediately    forwarded    to    Braine-le-Comte, 


'Van  Loben  Sels,  p.  130. 
^Ib.,  pp.  131,  132.    Chesney,  p.  100. 
^Van  Loben  Sels,  p.  128,  note. 
4lb.,  pp.  133,  134,  note. 


'iO^'  "'  '     '        JUNE  15th:    THE  DUTCH-BELGIANS.  [CHAP.  6.] 

where  the  headquarters  of  the  Prince  of  Orange  were;^ 
but  he  being  at  Brussels  at  the  Duchess  of  Richmond's 
ball,  Rebecque,  his  chief-of-sta£f,  took  it  upon  himself  to 
order  Perponcher  to  support  Prince  Bernhard's  brigade 
at  Quatre  Bras  with  the  other  brigade  of  his  division, 
Bylandt's.^  Rebecque  then,  at  lo  P.  M.,  sent  a  despatch 
to  the  Prince  of  Orange  at  Brussels  informing  him  what 
he  had  done. 

About  II  o'clock,^  an  hour  at  least  after  this  order 
had  been  expedited,  arrived  Wellington's  5  o'clock  order 
to  the  Prince  of  Orange  "  to  collect  at  Nivelles  the  2d 
and  3d  divisions  of  the  army  of  the  Low  Countries." 
In  obedience  to  this,  a  new  order^  was  made  out  and 
sent  to  Perponcher,  but  he  took  it  upon  himself  to 
carry  out  his  earlier  instructions  to  assemble  his 
whole  division  at  Quatre  Bras,  and  in  this  he  was 
supported  by  his  corps-commander,  the  Prince  of 
Orange.  The  greater  part  of  Bylandt's  brigade  arrived 
in  the  early  morning  of  the  i6th.  Perponcher  arrived 
in  person  at  3  A.  M.,^  the  Prince  of  Orange  at  6 
o'clock.'"     (See  Map  3.) 

Thus  was  Quatre  Bras  occupied  on  the  evening  and 
night  of  the  15th,  not  only  without  orders  from  Welling- 
ton, but  contrary  to  his  orders.  Had  his  orders  been 
obeyed,  Ney  would  have  found  on  the  next  morning  no 
one  to  oppose  him. 


^Van  Loben  Sels,  p.  175. 

^Ib.,  p.  176. 

^Ib.,  p.  176,  note. 

*Ib.,  p.  178,  n.    It  would  seem  that  the  sending  to  Perponcher  the  order  to 
return  to  Nivelles  was  a  mere  form. 

nh.,  p.  183. 

'°Ib.,  p.  185. 


NOTE  rO  CHAPTER     VI. 

"Almost  all  historians  "  says  Colonel  Maurice,'  "write 
as  if  the  occupation  of  Quatre  Bras  by  Prince  Bernhard 
was  a  step  for  which  he  not  only  deserves  the  greatest 
credit,  but  one  which  in  itself  was  sure  to  be  of  vast  ad- 
vantage to  the  English  army."  In  this  opinion  Colonel 
Maurice  does  not  share.  We  have  fully  treated  of  this 
subject  before.''  All  we  need  say  here  is  to  repeat,  that 
the  question  of  the  suitableness  of  Quatre  Bras  as  the 
point  of  concentration  for  the  Anglo-Dutch  army  could 
not  have  been  considered  by  the  Duke  of  Wellington  at 
this  moment  apart  from  the  fact  that  Marshal  Blucher 
was  concentrating  his  army  at  Sombreffe;  and  that, 
when  this  fact  was  ascertained,  the  Duke  must  concen- 
trate at  Quatre  Bras  or  abandon  all  hope  of  assisting  his 
ally.  We  have  also  pointed  out  that  the  fact  that  the 
main  French  army  was  opposed  to  the  Prussians  consti- 
tuted this  case  an  exception  to  the  general  rule ;  for,  in 
this  instance,  ex  hypothesis  the  Duke  would  encounter 
only  those  troops  which  Napoleon  would  feel  himself 
strong  enough  to  detach  from  his  main  body. 

If  we  are  right  in  this  contention,  therefore,  then  the 
Dutch-Belgian  generals,  —  Constant  Rebecque,  Per- 
poncher,  and  the  Prince  of  Saxe  Weimar, —  having 
learned  the  situation  of  the  French  and  Prussian  armies 
before  the  Duke  heard  of  it,  did  what  Wellington,  had  he 


^Maurice,  p.  345  :  July,  1890. 
'Ante,  pp.  94  et  seq. 


104  JUNE  15:    THE  DUTCH-BELGIANS.-NOTES.  [CHAP.  6] 

known  what  they  knew,  would  have  ordered  to  be  done.^ 
And  it  may  be  added,  that  we  fully  concur  in  the  com- 
mendation which  has  so  generally  been  awarded  to  them 
for  their  prompt  and  vigorous  action. 


3Chesiiey,  p.  102 ;  Hooper,  p.  84. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  MORNING  OF  THE   SIXTEENTH   OF  JUNE  :      WELLINGTON. 

The  Duke  of  Wellington,  as  we  have  seen,  did  not 
decide  on  ordering  a  general  concentration  of  his  army 
at  Quatre  Bras  until  the  early  morning  hours  of  the 
i6th  of  June. 

We  have  produced  above  two  orders,  both  addressed 
to  Lord  Hill,  written  at  Brussels  on  the  morning  of  the 
i6th  of  June,  and  we  have  shown  that  the  first,  at  any 
rate,  was  written  and  sent  out  before  the  Duke  had 
made  up  his  mind  to  concentrate  his  army  at  Quatre 
Bras.  We  have  also,  however,  shown,  that  before  he  left 
Brussels,  he  did  make  up  his  mind  to  do  this,  and  that 
orders  to  this  effect  were,  no  doubt,  then  issued.  We 
cannot  fix  the  hour  or  hours  at  which  this  was  done,  but 
it  was  undoubtedly  before  the  Duke  left  Brussels.  This 
last  hour  has  been  differently  fixed,'  but  it  was  probably 
about  half-past  seven.  He,  then,  leaving  the  Deputy  Quar- 
ter Master  General  and  the  other  heads  of  departments 
in  Brussels,  —  ^  presumably  to  attend  to  the  issuing  of 
the  orders  for  the  concentration  of  the  army  at  Quatre 


'  Miiffling  (Passages,  p.  230)  says  about  5.  Mudford  puts  it  at  7.  Gardner, 
p.  58,  at  8.  Sir  A.  Frazer  (Letters  of  Colonel  Sir  A.  S.  Frazer,  London,  1859, 
p.  536),  writes  at  6  A.  M.,  that  he  has  "just  learned  that  the  Duke  moves  in 
half  an  hour."  The  Duke  had  22  miles  to  ride  to  arrive  at  Quatre  Bras,  and 
he  got  there  about  10  A.  M.  His  letter  to  Blucher  is  dated  10.30  A.  M.  Old- 
field  (MSS.)  puts  the  time  of  the  Duke's  departure  as  before  that  of  Sir 
George  Wood  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Smyth,  who  "  drove  out  in  a  caleche 
of  the  latter"  "  between  seven  and  eight  o'clock,"  and  soon  after  the  depart- 
ure of  the  Brunswick  troops,  which  was  "  at  an  early  hour." 

^Oldfield,  MSS. 


I06  JUNE  I6.-MORNING:  [chap.  7.] 

Bras,  —  rode  to  the  latter  place,  where  he  arrived  about 
10  o'clock.  Here  he  found  only  Perponcher's  division 
of  Dutch-Belgian  troops,  under  command  of  the  Prince 
of  Orange. 

At  half-past  ten,  he  wrote  to  Marshal  Bliicher  the  let- 
ter before  referred  to,  which,  as  we  have  said  above, 
never,  as  we  believe,  saw  the  light  until  it  was  published 
in  Berlin,^  in  1876,  in  Von  Ollech's  History*  of  the 
Campaign  of  181 5.  We  give  a  translation  of  it  here  in  full. 
On  the  Heights  behind  Frasnes : 
June  16,  1815.  10.30  A.  M. 
My  dear  Prince : 

My  army  is  situated  as  follows : 

The  Corps  d'Armee  of  the  Prince  of  Orange  has  a 
division  here  and  at  Ouatre  Bras,  and  the  rest  at 
Nivelles. 

The  Reserve  is  in  march  from  Waterloo  to  Genappe, 
where  it  will  arrive  at  noon. 

The  English  Cavalry  will  be  at  the  same  hour  at 
Nivelles. 

The  Corps  of  Lord  Hill  is  at  Braine-le-Comte. 

I  do  not  see  any  large  force  of  the  enemy  in  front  of 
us,  and  I  await  news  from  your  Highness  and  the  arrival 
of  troops  in  order  to  determine  my  operations  for  the 
day. 

Nothing  has  been  seen  on  the  side  of  Binche,  nor  on 
our  right. 

Your  very  obedient  servant, 

Wellington. 

Let  us  see  precisely  how  far  this  letter  agrees   with 

Colonel  DeLancey's  Memorandum,  which  he  drew  up  — 

presumably   before   the    Duke    left    Brussels  —  for    the 

Duke's  information,  and  of  which  we  have  before  spoken, 

'Von  Ollech,  p.  125.  Maurice,  June,  1S90,  p.  257.  App.  C,  xw\;post,  pp. 
376,  377- 

■♦Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  192,  note,  refers  to  it  to  show  that  Wellington  was 
opposite  Frasnes  at  10.30  A.  M.,  but  he  make.s  no  other  reference  to  it. 


[chap.  7.]  WELLINGTON.  IO7 

entitled  "  Disposition  of  the  British  army  at  7  o'clock 
A.  M.,  i6th  June."     (See  Map  4.) 

The  ist  Corps,  says  the  Duke  in  his  letter,  has  a 
division  here,  —  that  is,  in  rear  of  Frasnes,  —  and  at 
Quatre  Bras.  This,  as  we  have  seen  above,  was  the 
2d  division  of  Dutch-Belgian  troops, —  Perponcher's. 
The  rest  of  the  ist  Corps,  says  the  Duke,  are  at 
Nivelles.  Now,  of  the  three  divisions,  —  those  of  Chasse 
(Dutch-Belgian),  Alten,  and  Cooke,  which  constituted 
the  rest  of  the  ist  Corps,  —  the  first  two  had  been  or- 
dered to  Nivelles  the  previous  evening,  —  the  last, 
Cooke's,  is  stated  in  the  DeLancey  "  Disposition  "  to  be, 
at  7  A.  M.,  at  Braine-le-Comte.  The  Duke,  therefore, 
might  well  suppose  that  it  would  accomplish  the  greater 
part  of  the  distance  between  Braine-le-Comte  and 
Nivelles,  nine  miles,  in  three  hours  and  a  half. 

The  Duke  next  says  "  The  Reserve  is  in  march  from 
Waterloo  to  Genappe,  where  it  will  arrive  at  noon."  For 
this  statement  the  Duke  did  not  have  to  refer  to  the 
"  Disposition."  He  had  passed  Picton's  division  on  the 
road,  a  mile  or  two  north  of  Waterloo,  probably  a  little 
before  9  A.  M. ;  and,  supposing,  as  he  did,  that  Picton 
either  had  then  received,  or  shortly  would  receive,  orders 
to  push  on  to  Quatre  Bras,  he  was  warranted  in  saying 
that  the  division  would  reach  Genappe  at  noon.  He  did 
not  take  the  trouble  to  except  from  his  general  statement, 
which  he  doubtless  thought  was  sufficiently  accurate  for 
all  practical  purposes,  the  division  of  Sir  Lowry  Cole, 
which  the  "  Disposition  "  placed  at  Assche,  eight  miles 
north-west  of  Brussels,  nor  the  5th  Hanoverian  brigade, 
which  was  at  Hal. 

The  Duke  next  says  that  the  English  Cavalry  will  be 
at  Nivelles  at  noon.  The  "  Disposition  "  puts  them  at 
Braine-le-Comte  at  7  A.  M.  Relying  on  this  statement, 
the  Duke  says  they  will  accomplish  the  nine  miles  be- 
tween that  place  and  Nivelles  by  noon. 


lOS  JUNE  16.-MORNING:  [chap.  7.] 

"  The  Corps  of  Lord  Hill  is  at  Braine-le-Comte,"  is  the 
next  and  last  statement  in  the  letter.  That  corps  con- 
sisted of  the  2d  and  4th  British  divisions,  of  the  ist 
Dutch-Belgian  division,  and  of  Anthing's  brigade.  As 
respects  the  2d  division,  the  "  Disposition  "  states  that  it 
was  at  7  A.M.  at  Braine-le-Comte.  The  4th  division,  the 
"  Disposition  "  states,  was  at  Audenarde  at  7  A.  M.  and 
was  marching  on  Braine-le-Comte ;  but  the  Duke  certainly 
could  not  have  supposed  it  possible  that  that  division 
could  have  marched  from  Audenarde  to  Braine-le-Comte, 
a  distance  of  more  than  thirty  miles,  between  seven  and 
half-past  ten  in  the  morning.  And  as  for  the  ist  Dutch- 
Belgian  division  and  the  Indian  brigade,  the  "Dis- 
position "  puts  them  at  Sotteghem,  a  village  near  Aud- 
enarde, at  7  A.  M.,  and  states  that  they  are  marching  on 
Enghien.  The  Duke,  therefore,  had  not  the  authority 
of  the  "  Disposition  "  for  the  statement  made  in  his  letter 
as  to  these  portions  of  Lord  Hill's  Corps ;  but  then  these 
divisions  had  been  stationed  so  far  away,  that  probably 
he  never  counted  on  them  at  all  in  his  own  mind  in  con- 
nection with  a  concentration  at  Quatre  Bras.  These 
were  the  troops  which  he  left  at  Hal  and  Tubize  on  the 
day  of  Waterloo  to  protect  his  right. 

It  is,  therefore,  we  submit,  easy  to  see  that  the  Duke 
had  the  "  Disposition  "  before  him  when  he  wrote  the 
letter  to  Marshal  BlUcher.  He  seems  to  have  taken  it,  — 
so  to  speak, —  blindfold ;  it  never  seems  to  have  occurred 
to  him  that  it  was  practically  impossible  that  his  various 
divisions  could  have  been  at  seven  o'clock  that  morning 
where  his  chief-of-staff  had  said  that  they  were.  He 
accepted  the  memorandum  as  official,  and  followed  it  sub- 
stantially— with  a  few  deviations,  to  be  sure,  as  we  have 
pointed  out  —  in  his  letter  to  Blucher.  Not  only  this ;  the 
Duke  acted  at  once  on  the  faith  of  the  representations 
contained  in  the  "  Disposition."  He,  about  noon,  rode  over 
to  Brye  to  confer  with  Marshal  Blucher,  and  to  propose 
to  cooperate  with  him.      It  is  evident  from  the  narra- 


^ 


[CIIAP.  7.]  WELLINGTON.  IO9 

tive  5  of  Baron  Mlifflfng,  who  accompanied  the  Duke,  that 
Wellington  was,  in  his  opinion,   laboring   under  grave 
misconceptions   as   to   the  whereabouts   of    his    army. 
The  conversation,  according  to  Miiffling,  was  mainly  con- 
cerned with  the  manner  of  the  promised  cooperation,  — 
Gneisenau  wishing  the  Duke  to  march  from  Quatre  Bras 
to  Brye,  and  Wellington  being  unwilling  thus  to  expose 
his  communications   with  Brussels   and   Nivelles.     To- 
wards the  close  of  the   discussion,   says    Muffling,   the 
Duke  adopted  a  suggestion  of  his,  and  said  "  I  will  over- 
throw what  is  before  me  at  Frasnes  and  will  direct  my- 
self on  Gosselies."    We  cite  this  simply  to  show  how  con- 
fident Wellington  was  that  he  would  find  a  sufficiently 
large  force  at  Quatre  Bras  on  his  return  from  Brye,  at 
about  half-past  two  o'clock.     If  Alten's  division  was  at 
Nivelles  at  7  A.  M.,  en  route  for  Quatre  Bras,  it  should 
have  arrived  there  before  noon.      The  reserves,  which 
marching  from  Brussels  for  Quatre  Bras,  had  by  7  A.  M. 
nearly  reached  Waterloo,  ought  to  be  at  Quatre   Bras, 
which  is  not  over  eleven  miles  further,  by  2  or  3  P.  M. 
If  the  cavalry  was  actually  at  Braine-le-Comte  at  9  A.  M. 
it  might  well  be  at  Nivelles  by  noon,  and  at  Quatre  Bras, 
only  seven  miles  further,  by  3  P.  M.     Cooke  might  be 
expected   about  the   same   time,   with    his   division   of 
Guards.     These  expectations  were  no  doubt  in  the  mind 
of  the  Duke  of  Wellington  as  he  rode  back  to  Quatre 
Bras  from   his  meeting  with    Marshal    Bliicher.      The 
theory  advanced,  or  perhaps  suggested,  by  the  Prussian 
biographer   of   Gneisenau,    Delbrlick,^    that  the    Duke 
misrepresented  the  position  of  his  army  for  the  purpose 
of  inducing    Bliicher  to   give   battle  at   Ligny    on  the 
strength  of  his  promise  to  support  him,  and  of  his  ability 
to  keep  his  promise,  so  that  he,  Wellington,  might  gain 
the  necessary  time  for  the  concentration  of  his  army,  has 


5  Muffling,  Passages,  p.  236.    Ollech,  p.  126. 
'  Gneisenau,  vol.  4,  pp.  369,  370. 


no  JUNE  i6.-morning:-wellington.       [chap.  7.] 

not,  in  our  judgment,  anything  to  support  it/  The 
truth  plainly  is,  that  the  Duke  was  himself  entirely  de- 
ceived by  the  statement  drawn  up  for  his  information  by 
his  chief-of-staff.  He  took  it  for  granted  that  the  troops 
were  where  they  were  stated  to  be,  and  made  his  disposi- 
tions accordingly.  He  was  destined  thereby  not  only  to 
be  greatly  disappointed,  but  to  incur  imminent  danger  of 
defeat.  For,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  many  of  his  divisions 
were  at  seven  that  morning  nowhere  near  the  positions 
assigned  them  in  Colonel  DeLancey's  Memorandum. 
We  shall  refer  to  this  matter  in  another  place ;  suffice  it 
to  say  now  that  the  Duke's  reinforcements  came  on  the 
field  very  much  later  than  he  had  reason  to  expect ;  that 
the  allied  troops  were  for  a  couple  of  hours  or  so  in  a 
very  precarious  situation,  and  would  without  doubt  have 
been  disastrously  defeated  had  Napoleon's  orders  been 
carried  out. 

'  At  the  same  time,  it  must  be  said  that  Delbriick  was  quite  naturally  led  to 
adopt  this  suggestion.  It  is  only  on  the  supposition  that  the  "  Disposition  " 
is  an  authentic  document  and  that  the  Duke  followed  it  blindly,  but  honestly, 
in  his  letter  to  Marshal  Bliicher,  that  we  can  find  a  satisfactory  answer  to 
Delbruck's  suggestion. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER   VII. 

I,.  It  may  be  worth  while  to  state,  as  nearly  as  we 
can,  the  actual  positions  at  7  A.  M.  of  the  i6th  of  the 
various  bodies  of  troops  mentioned  in  the  "Disposi- 
tion."    (See  Map  5.) 

The  ist  division  was  not  at  7  A.  M.  at  Braine-le- 
Comte.  It  did  not  reach  that  place  from  Enghien  until 
9  A.  M.'  Its  commander,  General  Cooke,  having  re- 
ceived no  further  orders,  halted  the  division  till  noon, 
when  he  took  upon  himself  the  responsibility  of  con- 
tinuing the  march  to  Nivelles,  where  he  arrived  at  3 
P.  M.  Here  he  received  orders  to  proceed  at  once  to 
Quatre  Bras. 

The  2d  division,  Clinton's,  which  was  also  stated  in 
the  "  Disposition  "  to  have  been  at  7  A.  M.  at  Braine-le- 
Comte,  and  to  be  marching  on  Nivelles,  did  not,  in  fact,^ 
receive  the  order  to  march  from  the  neighborhood  of 
Ath,  where  it  was  stationed,  to  Enghien  till  twelve  hours 
after  it  was  dated, —  i.  e.,  not  until  10  A.  M.  of  the  i6th  ! 
The  troops  did  not  reach  Enghien  till  2  P.  M.,  and 
missing,  apparently,  the  direct  road,  did  not  arrive  at 
Braine-le-Comte  till  midnight. 

The  3d  division,  Alten's,  is  said  in  the  "  Disposition  " 
to  have  been  at  Nivelles  at  7  A.  M.,  and  marching  to 
Quatre  Bras.     It  did  not  arrive  at  Nivelles  till  noon.^ 

The  4th  division,  Colville's,  was  no  doubt  correctly 


'Grenadier  Guards,  vol.  3,  p.  15. 
^Leeke,  vol.  i,  pp.  10,  11. 
^Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  90. 


112  JUNE  i6.-morning:-notes.  [chap.  7.] 

stated  in  the  "  Disposition  "  to  have  been  at  Audenarde 
at  7  A.  M.  The  10  P.  M.  orders  of  the  15th  of  June 
directed  it  on  Enghien ;  and  we  must  presume,  for  the 
reasons  given  above,  that  further  orders  to  march  on 
Braine-le-Comte  had  been  issued. 

The  5th  division,  Picton's,  was  not "  beyond  Waterloo  " 
at  7  A.  M.,  as  stated  in  the  "  Disposition."  In  point  cf 
fact,  it  must  have  been  some  six  miles  on  the  Brussels 
side  of  Waterloo  at  that  hour.'*  Included  in  this  division 
was  the  4th  Hanoverian  brigade,^  and  the  Duke  of 
Brunswick's  Corps. 

The  6th  division,  Cole's,  is  no  doubt  correctly  stated  in 
the  "  Disposition  "  to  have  been  at  7  A.  M.  at  Assche ;  but 
whether  orders  for  it  to  march  to  Genappe  and  Quatre 
Bras  had  arrived  at  so  early  an  hour,  may  be  doubted. 

Similar  observations  apply  to  the  5th  Hanoverian  bri- 
gade, stated  in  the  "  Disposition  "  to  have  been  at  7  A.  M. 
at  Hal,  and  marching  to  Genappe  and  Quatre  Bras,  and 
to  the  1st  Dutch-Belgian  Division  and  Anthing's  Indian 
brigade,  stated  to  be  at  Sotteghem,  and  marching  to 
Enghien. 

The  "  Disposition  "  states  that  the  2d  and  3d  divisions 
of  the  Army  of  the  Low  Countries  were  at  Nivelles  and 
Quatre  Bras  at  7  A.  M.  This  was  not  true  of  the  3d 
division,  Chasse's,  which  did  not  assemble  at  Nivelles 
till  near  noon.^  The  2d  division,  Perponcher's,  as  we 
have  seen,  was  at  Quatre  Bras  at  7  A.  M. 

As  for  the  statement  in  the  "  Disposition  "  that  Major 


•«Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  102,  note.  Gomm,  pp.  353,  354.  Waterloo  Letters,  pp. 
23,  24.  Gomm  says  Picton's  division  left  Brussels  at  5  A.  M.,  marched  to 
,  Waterloo  (a  distance  of  about  eleven  miles),  and  halted  there  two  hours;  and 
then  at  i  P.  M.  resumed  its  march  for  Quatre  Bras,  where  it  arrived  at  3.30 
P.  M.  Siborne  (vol.  i,  p.  102)  says  that  Picton  arrived  at  a  quarter 
before  3  P.  M.,  having  left  Waterloo  about  noon.  As  the  distance  is  about 
thirteen  miles,  the  later  hour  of  arrival  given  by  Gomm  is  probably  correct. 

^Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  103,  n. 

'Van  Loben  Sels,  p.  232. 


[chap,  7.]  WELLINGTON-NOTES.  II3 

General  Dornberg's  brigade  and  the  Cumberland  Hus- 
sars were  "  beyond  Waterloo"  at  7  A.  M.,  it  certainly  was 
far  from  correct.  Dornberg  had  been  directed  by 
an  order  sent  off  from  Brussels  between  5  and  7  P.  M. 
of  the  15th  to  retire  his  brigade  from  the  neighborhood 
of  Mons  to  Vilvorde,  a  town  seven  miles  north  of 
Brussels.  He  could  not  have  reached  Vilvorde,  which 
is  a  distance  of  forty-five  miles,  until  late  in  the  after- 
noon. 

As  for  the  "  remainder  of  the  cavalry,"  which  was  sta- 
tioned in  and  near  Ninove,  it  not  only  was  not  at  Braine- 
le-Comte  at  7  A.  M.,  as  stated  in  the  "  Disposition,"  but  it 
did  not  receive  the  first  order, —  sent  off  from  Brussels 
about  10  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the  15th, —  until  shortly 
before  six  in  the  morning.^  It  was  therefore  only  an  hour's 
march  from  Ninove  on  its  way  to  Enghien  at  seven 
o'clock.  It  did  not  reach  the  field  till  "  the  evening  was 
far  advanced  and  the  conflict  had  ceased."^ 

Nor  could  Kruse's  Nassau  brigade  have  passed  Water- 
loo at  7  A.  M.,  as  stated  in  the  "  Disposition,"  e7i  route 
for  Genappe,  for  it  did  not  arrive  at  Quatre  Bras  in  sea- 
son to  take  part  in  the  action. 

We  have  been  at  some  pains  to  lay  the  facts  in  regard 
to  this  "  Disposition  "  before  the  reader,  because  it  cer- 
tainly is  the  most  misleading  statement  ever  drawn  up 
"for  the  information"  of  a  commanding  general.  No 
thought  seems  to  have  been  given  either  to  the  time  at 
which  the  orders  could  be  received,  or  to  the  time  re- 
quired to  carry  them  out.  An  officer  of  sufficient  experi- 
ence in  war  to  occupy  the  post  of  chief-of-staff  to  the 
Duke  of  Wellington  ought  certainly  to  have  been  quite 
competent  to  give  to  his  commanding  officer  an  esti- 
mate of  the  probable  positions  at  any  given  time  of  the 


'Historical  Record  of  the  Life  Guards,  p.  193  :  2d  Ed.  London;  Longmans; 
1840.     Bullock's  Journal;  English  Historical  Magazine,  July,  18S8,  p.  549. 

'Life  Guards,  p.  194.    Bullock,  p.  549,  says  eight  o'clock. 


114  JUNE  i6.-morning:-notes.  [chap.  7.] 

various   divisions   of   the   army,  on  which  it  would  be 
safe  to  rely.^ 

2.  Whether,  if  such  an  estimate  had  been  made,  Wel- 
lington would  have  stayed  at  Quatre  Bras,  may  be  a 
question,  but  he  probably  would  have  risked  it,  as  he 
evidently  did  not  suppose  the  French  to  be  in  great 
force  in  his  front,  and  it  was  obviously  of  prime  im- 
portance to  retain  his  communications  with  Bliicher,  if 
possible. 

3.  Finally,  it  must  be  said  that  the  Duke  of  Wellington 
was  not  well  served  by  his  subordinates  on  the  day  of 
the  15th  in  respect  to  the  transmission  to  him  of  infor- 
mation from  the  front.'"  His  first  news  of  the  attack  on 
the  Prussian  lines  near  Thuin  did  not  arrive  till  3  P.  M., 
although  the  French  movement  must  have  been  pro- 
nounced some  ten  or  eleven  hours  before  that  hour. 
Charleroi  was  occupied  by  the  main  French  column  at 
noon,  but  all  the  Duke  had  heard  at  10  P.  M.  simply 
warranted  him  in  writing  that  the  enemy  "  appeared  to 
menace  Charleroi."  Brussels  is  only  35  or  36  miles  from 
Charleroi ;  and  by  a  good  despatch  system  news  of  such 
importance  ought  to  have  been  transmitted  in  four 
hours.  If  that  had  been  done, —  if  Wellington  had 
known  at  four  or  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  positively 
that  the  French  had  occupied  Charleroi  in  force,  and  if 
his  information  from  Mons  had  arrived  at  the  same  time, 
as  certainly  ought  to  have  been  the  case, —  there  is  every 
reason  to  suppose  that  he  would  at  once  have  issued 
orders  for  the  concentration  of  the  army  at  Quatre  Bras. 
The  orders  which  he  did  issue  to  this  effect  were  not 
sent  out,  as  we  have  seen,  till  the  early  morning  hours  of 


'It  ought  to  be  remembered,  however,  that  the  "  Disposition  "  was  in  all 
probability  drawn  up  in  a  great  hurry.  Wellington  had  put  off  the  decision 
to  concentrate  at  Quatre  Bras  so  late  that  both  the  giving  of  the  necessary 
orders  and  the  preparation  of  this  "Disposition  "  must  have  been  done  in  the 
greatest  haste. 

^°Cf.  Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  i66,  note. 


[chap.  7.]  WELLINGTON-NOTES.  1 1 5 

the  1 6th,  some  nine  or  ten  hours  later  than  those  which 
we  may  fairly  suppose  he  would  have  issued,  had  in- 
formation of  the  French  movements  been  promptly 
transmitted  to  him.  But  how  far  the  commander-in- 
chief  is  himself  responsible  for  such  delays  as  this  is,  of 
course,  a  question.  It  is  and  must  be  for  him  to  devise 
efficient  methods,  and  to  put  them  to  the  test  often 
enough  beforehand  to  feel  justified  in  relying  on  them  in 
a  sudden  emergency.  And  the  situation  in  which  the 
Duke  of  Wellington  was  in  the  month  of  June,  1815, 
certainly  would  seem  to  have  called  for  the  utmost 
watchfulness  and  for  the  taking  of  every  precaution.  It 
is  impossible  not  to  conclude  that  he  failed  in  these  re- 
spects. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
THE   MORNING   OF  THE   SIXTEENTH   OF  JUNE:      NEY. 

Marshal  Ney,  as  we  have  seen, '  rode  back  from  the 
front  at  Frasnes  to  report  to  the  Emperor  at  Charleroi, 
where  he  arrived  at  midnight  of  the  15th.  He  informed 
the  Emperor,  so  Colonel  Heymes  says,^ 

"  Of  the  dispositions  he  had  made.  The  Emperor  made  him 
stay  to  supper,  gave  him  his  orders,  and  received  the  Marshal  with 
the  frank  confidence  of  the  camp;  he  unfolded  to  him  his  pro- 
jects and  his  hopes  for  the  day  of  the  i6th,  v^hich  w^as  very  soon 
to  begin.  He  talked  with  him  a  long  time  in  the  night  of  the  15th 
and  i6th.  All  the  officers  of  the  Imperial  headquarters  can  attest 
this." 

Among  these  ofhcers  was,  no  doubt,  Marshal  Grouchy. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  at  this  interview  Ney  told 
the  Emperor  that  he  had  not  occupied  Quatre  Bras,  and 
why  he  had  not  done  so.  With  almost  equal  certainty 
may  it  be  believed  that  Napoleon  told  him  that  he 
must  occupy  the  place  the  next  forenoon. 

Heymes  then  proceeds  as  follows :  ^ 

"The  i6th,  at  two  o'clock  in  the  morning,  the  Marshal  returned 
to  Gosselies  (z.e.,  from  Charleroi),  where  he  stopped  some  minutes 
in  order  to  confer  with  General  Reille ;  he  gave  him  the  order  to 
set  out,  as  soon  as  he  could,  wath  his  two  divisions  and  his  artillery, 
and  to  get  his  troops  together  at  Frasnes,  where  the  Marshal  him- 
self would  arrive  almost  as  soon." 


^  Ante,  p.  54. 

'  Doc.  Inifd.,  Heymfes'  Rel.  p.  6.    See  attte,  p.  65,  n.  28. 

'  lb.,  pp.  6,  7. 


[chap.  8.]  JUNE  16.-MORNING:    NEY.  II7 

And  he  adds  that  at  8  A.  M.  Reille  at  the  head 
of  his  two  divisions  was  en  route  for  Frasnes.  Gen- 
eral Reille,  however,  while  he  says  ^  that  his  troops  were 
ready  to  march  in  the  morning,^  says  also  that  at 
7  A.  M.  he  went  to  see  Marshal  Ney,  to  ask  for 
orders ;  and  that  the  Marshal  said  he  was  expecting 
them  from  the  Emperor.  One  may  infer  from  these 
statements,  which  are  not  perfectly  consistent  with  each 
other,  that  Ney,  on  his  return  to  Gosselies  from  Charleroi, 
told  Reille  that  they  must  be  ready  to  move  at  a  mo- 
ment's notice,  and  that  that  officer  at  once  proceeded  to 
get  his  men  into  marching  order,  and  that  he  had  them  on 
the  Charleroi-Brussels  turnpike,  ready  to  march,  before 
seven  o'clock.  One  may,  perhaps,  infer  more  than  this ; 
namely,  that  Ney,  immediately  on  his  return  from  see- 
ing the  Emperor,  ordered  Reille  to  proceed  with  his  two 
divisions,  as  soon  as  he  could,  from  Gosselies  to  Frasnes, 
so  that,  when  the  order  to  seize  Quatre  Bras  should  ar- 
rive, it  might  be  executed  promptly ;  but  that  he  after- 
wards reconsidered  the  matter,  and  allowed  Reille  to 
remain  in  Gosselies  till  the  written  orders  should  come. 

Whether  this  be  so  or  not,  however,  it  is  plain  that 
when  Ney  had  been,  as  Heymes  says  he  had  been,  in- 
formed by  the  Emperor  himself  of  his  projects  for  the 
ensuing  day,  he  ought  certainly  to  have  ordered  Reille 
up  to  Frasnes  at  once,  with  the  two  divisions  then  at 
Gosselies,  —  thereby  uniting  all  of  the  2d  Corps  that  was 
under  his  control,^  —  and  to  have  seen  to  it  that  the  ist 
Corps  was  ready  to  follow  promptly  in  their  rear.  No 
special  authority  for  this  was  needed.  In  fact  it  was  ob- 
viously necessary  to  get  these  two  divisions  out  of  the  way 
of  the  1st  Corps,  which  ought  to  be  assembling  at  Gosse- 
lies in  the  early  morning,  if  it  was  to  accomplish  anything 

"  Doc.  Indd.,  Reille,  Xot.  Hist,  p.  57. 

5  From  the  context,  he  would  seem  to  mean  before  7  A.  M. 

^Girard's  division  was  with  the  main  army  under  Napoleon. 


Il8  JUNE  16.-MORNING:    NEY.  [chap.  8.] 

of  consequence  during  the  forenoon.  But  Ney,  whatever 
may  have  been  his  first  intentions  on  returning  from  see- 
ing Napoleon,  did  actually  nothing  of  this  kind. ''  One 
cannot  avoid  the  feeling  that  he  was  unwilling  to  take 
the  slightest  responsibility,  even  that  involved  in  uniting 
the  three  divisions  of  the  2d  Corps  at  Frasnes,  and  sup- 
plying their  place  at  Gosselies  with  the  four  divisions 
of  the  1st  Corps, —  a  step  which,  taking  account  of  the 
situation,  and  of  the  written  orders  that  had  been  issued 
to  the  1st  Corps,  it  was  his  manifest  duty  to  take.  The 
consideration,  that,  by  this  course,  the  formal  order  to 
seize  Quatre  Bras,  which  he  undoubtedly  expected,  could 
be  executed  at  once,  while,  by  retaining  Reille  at 
Gosselies  until  the  order  should  be  received,  the  time 
required  to  march  the  five  miles  which  lay  between 
Gosselies  and  Frasnes  would  postpone  the  carrying  out 
of  the  movement  by  some  two  hours  or  more,  does 
not  seem  to  have  had  any  weight  with  him.  In  fact, 
beyond  getting  Reille  in  readiness  to  march,  Ney  really 
seems  to  have  made  no  preparations  to  facilitate  the 
execution  of  the  important  order  which  he  fully  expected 
to  receive. 

That  this  statement  is  not  too  strong,  appears  when 
we  consider  what  Ney  did  to  get  the  ist  Corps  up  and 
well  in  hand,  a  matter  which  assuredly  demanded  his  most 
strenuous  and  active  efforts  at  this  moment.  Ney  arrived 
at  Gosselies  from  Charleroi,  as  we  have  seen,  about  2 
A.  M.  He  stayed  there,  apparently,  till  shortly  after  7 
A.  M.^  We  know^  that,  even  at  3  A.  M.  one  division 
of  the  ist  Corps  had  not  arrived  at  the  river,  and  that  an- 
other was  still  at  Marchienne.  The  other  two  divisions 
had  crossed  the  Sambre,  and  the  leading  one  '°  was  be- 


">  Cf.  La  Tour  D'Auvergne,  p.  189.     Muquardt,  pp.  145,  146. 
^Doc.  Indd.,  Reille,  p.  57. 
^Ante,  p.  51. 
^Ante,  p.  50,  n.  25. 


[chap.  8.]  JUNE  16.-MORNING:    NEY.  II9 

tween  Jumet  and  Gosselies.  Colonel  Heymes,  after 
stating  the  positions  of  the  English  at  Quatre  Bras, " 
says : ''  "  In  default  of  staff-officers,  of  whom  the  Mar- 
shal had  none,  officers  of  the  chasseurs  and  lancers  of  the 
Guard  were  sent  to  meet  the  ist  Corps  in  the  direction 
of  Marchienne-au-Pont ;  they  had  orders  to  press  its 
march  to  Frasnes."  But  we  shall  presently  see,  that  it 
was  not  until  ii  A.  M.,  when  Reille,  with  the  divisions 
of  Foy  and  Jerome,  was  ordered  to  advance  from  Gosse- 
lies to  Quatre  Bras,  that  the  first  three  divisions  of 
d'Erlon's  Corps  were  ordered  to  Frasnes.  It  appears, 
then,  from  Heymes'  statement,  that  the  activity  exhibited 
by  Marshal  Ney,  to  which  he  calls  attention,  was  not 
shown  until  Ney  had  ordered  these  divisions  to  Frasnes, 
that  is,  until  after  eleven  o'clock.  That  this  conjecture 
is  correct,  appears  also  from  the  fact,  stated  by  Colonel 
Heymes, '^  that  the  regiments  of  the  chasseurs  and 
lancers  of  the  Guard,  from  which  officers  were  detailed 
on  staff  duty,  as  above  stated,  were  in  reserve  behind 
the  village  of  Frasnes,  and,  therefore,  not  at  Gosselies. 
There  is,  therefore,  nothing  to  show  that  Marshal  Ney 
did  anything  in  regard  to  getting  up  the  ist  Corps  until 
after  ii  o'clock  A.  M."*  If  he  had.  Colonel  Heymes, 
who  was  on  his  staff,  would  doubtless  have  mentioned  it. 
And  it  seems  to  be  an  unavoidable  inference  from  what 
Colonel  Heymes  says,  that  at  the  time  when  these  extem- 
porized staff -officers  were  sent  to  find  the  ist  Corps  and 
hurry  it  up,  part  of  it,  at  any  rate,  was  supposed  by 
Marshal  Ney  to  be  yet  in  the  neighborhood  of  Mar- 
chienne. 


"  Doc.  Indd.,  Heymes,  pp.  7,  8. 
"  lb.,  p.  8. 

"lb.,  pp.  5,  7.    Anie,p.4g. 
'*  lb.,  Reille,  p.  57. 


120  JUNE  i6.-morning:  ney.  [chap.  8.] 

The  first  written  order  '^  which  Marshal  Ney  received 
on  this  morning  of  the  i6th,  was  from  Marshal  Soult, 
who  informed  him  that  the  Count  of  Valmy  had  been 
ordered  to  Gosselies  with  his  corps  of  cavalry,  and  placed 
under  his,  Ney's,  orders ;  these  troops  were  to  replace  the 
division  of  cavalry  of  the   Guard   under    Lefebvre-Des- 
nouettes.'^     Marshal  Soult  then  inquired  whether  the 
ist  Corps  had  executed  its  movement,  that  is,  had  crossed 
the  river,  and  had  joined  the  2d  Corps  at  Gosselies,  in 
pursuance  of  the  orders'^  to  the  Count  d'Erlon  of  the 
day  before.     He  further  desired  that  Ney  would  inform 
him  as  to  the  exact  positions  of  the   ist  and  2d  Corps, 
and  of  the  two  divisions  of  cavalry,  which  were  attached 
to  them.    We  do  not  know  what  answer  Marshal  Ney 
returned  to  these   interrogatories,  but  he  told  Reille,'^ 
in  the  course  of  the  conversation  to  which  we  have  be- 
fore referred,  shortly  before  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
that  he  had  rendered  to  the  Emperor  an  account  of  his 
situation.     This  first  order,  therefore,  must  have  arrived 
about  6  A.  M. ;  and  from  its  contents,  and  also  from  the 
hour  when  it  was  sent,  as  well  as  from  the  tenor  of  the 
orders  to  d'Erlon  of  the  day  before,  we  can  see  how  care- 
fully the  operations  of  the  left  wing  were  watched  at  the 
headquarters  of  the  army. 

Shortly  after  this  conversation  between  Ney  and 
Reille,  the  Marshal  went  back  to  Frasnes,  "^  leaving  word 
with  Reille  that,  if  any  orders  for  the  movement  of 
troops  should  arrive  in  his  absence,  they  were  to  be  exe- 
cuted at  once,  and  their  contents  communicated  to  the 
Count  d'Erlon,  who  was  at  Jumet,  or  in  rear  of  that 
place. 


"  Doc.  Indd.,  VII,  pp.  26,  27  ;  App.  C,xvii;  posi,  p.  377. 

^^Ante,  p.  49. 

"  Doc.  In^d.,  Heym^s.  V,  VI,  p.  25  ;  App.  C,  v,  vi ;  post,  pp.  367, 

'« lb.,  ReiUe,  p.  57. 

"lb.,  p.  57. 


[chap.  8.]  JUNE  16.-MORNING:    NEY.  121 

About  9  o'clock,  General  Reille  continues,  ^°  a  report 
was  received  from  General  Girard,  who  commanded 
that  division  of  the  2d  Corps  which  had  gone  off  to  the 
right  and  joined  the  main  army,  to  the  effect  that  the 
Prussians  were  forming  beyond  Fleurus.  This  report 
Reille  transmitted  at  once  to  the  headquarters  of  the 
army  at  Charleroi ;  but  he  sent  no  word  of  it  to  Ney,  at 
Frasnes,  at  that  time. 

About  an  hour  afterwards,  that  is,  about  10  A.  M., " 
General  Flahaut  of  the  Emperor  s  staff,  passed  through 
Gosselies,  bringing  with  him  an  imiportant  letter"  for 
Marshal  Ney,  written  by  the  Emperor  himself,  the  con- 
tents of  which  Flahaut  communicated  to  Reille.  Of 
this  letter  we  shall  speak  at  length  in  another  con- 
nection. Suffice  it  to  say  here,  that  it  treated  of  the  oc- 
cupation of  Quatre  Bras,  the  formal  order  for  which, 
emanating  from  the  chief-of-staff,  it  stated  would  arrive 
about  the  same  time.    This  no  doubt  was  the  case.  ^^ 

Reille's  orders  from  Ney,  it  will  be  recollected,  were 
imperative  and  precise,  to  execute  "*  at  once  during  Ney's 
absence,  any  instructions  for  the  movement  of  troops 
that  might  arrive.  Yet  we  find  him  writing '^  from 
Gosselies  at  10.15  A.  M.,  to  Ney  at  Frasnes, —  a  distance 
of  five  miles,  —  to  say  that  he  has  been  informed  by 
General  Flahaut  of  the  contents  of  the  Emperor's  letter, 
but  that,  in  consequence  of  the  information  as  to  the 
Prussians  taking  up  their  positions  near  Fleurus,  which 


*°  Doc.  Indd.,  Reille,  p.  57. 

^'Reille  in  his  "  Notice  Historique  "  says  ii  A.  M.  But  his  despatch  to 
Ney,  in  which  he  says  that  he  read  the  Flahaut  order,  is  dated  10.15  A.M. 
Doc.  Indd.,  XI,  pp.  21^  38;  App.  C,  •xix^post,  p.  379. 

"  lb.,  X,  pp.  32  et  seq.    App.  C,  xviii ;  post,  pp.  377,  378. 

*'  lb.,  p.  30 :    at  least  this  was  the  opinion  of  Marshal  Ney's  son. 

^Vo.,  Reille,  p.  57. 

*5  lb.,  XI,  pp.  37,  38.  App.  C,  xix;  post,  p.  379,  He  does  not  mention  in 
his  "  Notice  Historique  "  that  he  delayed  executing  Ney's  order. 


122  JUNE  i6.-morning:  ney.  [chap.  8.] 

he  had  received  from  Girard  before  9  A.  M.,  he  has 
thought  it  best  to  postpone  the  march  of  his  two  divis- 
ions from  GosseHes  to  Frasnes  until  the  return  of  his 
messenger.  ^^  And  this,  too,  just  after  he  had  read  a  let- 
ter from  the  Emperor  himself,  prescribing  what  disposi- 
tions Ney  should  make  of  his  troops  after  he  had  executed 
the  movement  on  Quatre  Bras.  One  cannot  but  recall 
the  criticisms  on  the  generals  in  this  army  made  by  both 
Napoleon  and  Charras,  which  we  have  given  in  an  ear- 
lier chapter.''^  If  Reille  thought  the  information  sent 
by  Girard  was  so  important,  why  did  he  not  send  it  to 
Ney  at  once,  instead  of  waiting  an  hour  and  a  half  ? 

Marshal  Ney  sent  back  a  peremptory  order  to  Reille  to 
move  up  to  the  front  at  once.  ^^  The  march  began  at 
about  a  quarter  before  twelve  o'clock,  ^^  the  division  of 
Foy  leading. 

Let  us  now  look  at  the  Emperor's  letter  and  at  the 
orders  which  Ney  received  from  Soult  during  the  morn- 
ing of  the  1 6th. 

The  orders  which  were  received  by  Ney  on  the  i6th 
prior  to  the  commencement  of  the  battle  of  Quatre  Bras, 
were  three  in  number.  Of  the  first  ^°  we  have  already 
spoken.^'  The  second,^''  which  was  the  formal  order, 
directed  the  Marshal  to  put  the  2d  and  ist  Corps,  and 
the  3d  Corps"  of  cavalry,  in  march  for  Quatre  Bras, 
where  he  was  to  take  up  a  position,  and  make  reconnois- 


^*The  delay  thus  occasioned  is  estimated  by  Charras  (vol.  2,  p.  238)  at  an 
hour  and  a  quarter.  It  was  really  an  hour  and  three-quarters,  as  Reille  ought 
to  have  started  at  ten. 

'^  Ante,  p.  19. 

»« Doc.  Indd.,  Reille,  XII,  p.  38 ;  App.  C,  xx ;  post,  pp.  379,  380. 

^  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  189.    Cf.  vol.  2,  p.  238. 

»°  Doc.  Indd.,  VII,  pp.  26,  27  ;  App.  C,  xvii ;  post,  p.  377. 

^^  Ante,  p.  120, 

^  Doc.  Indd.,  VIII,  p.  27  ;  App.  C,  xxi;  post,  pp.  380,  381. 

"  That  of  the  Count  of  Valmy,  Kellermann. 


[chap.  8.]  JUNE  16.-MORNING:    NEY.  I23 

sances  in  the  directions  of  Brussels  and  Nivelles.  He 
was  to  station  a  division  with  cavalry  at  Genappe,  and 
another  division  at  or  near  Marbais. 

The  letter^'*  states  that  the  major-general  (Soult)  has 
issued  the  orders,  but  that  Ney  may  perhaps  receive  this 
letter  a  little  sooner,  as  the  Emperor's  aides  are  better 
mounted.  The  Emperor  then  tells  Ney  what  his  own 
plans  are  for  the  day,  —  a  subject  which  will  be  more 
appropriately  treated  in  another  place,  —  and  then 
says:  —  "You  can  then  dispose  of  your  troops  in  the  fol- 
lowing manner :  the  first  division  at  two  leagues  in  front 
of  Quatre  Bras ;  *  *  *  six  divisions  of  in- 
fantry at  and  near  Quatre  Bras  and  another  at  Marbais, 
so  that  I  can  order  it  to  me  at  Sombreffe,  if  I  have  need 
of  it.  *  *  *  The  corps  of  the  Count  of 
Valmy  *  *  *  at  the  intersection  of  the 
Roman  and  Brussels  roads,  so  that  I  may  draw  it  to  me, 
if  I  have  need  of  it.  *  *  *  Your  wing  will 
be  composed  of  the  four  divisions  of  the  ist  Corps,  of  the 
four  divisions  of  the  2d  Corps,  of  the  two  divisions  of 
light  cavalry  [those  of  Jaquinot  and  Pire],  and  of  the 
two  divisions  of  the  corps  of  Valmy." 

It  has  been  asserted"  that  this  letter  restricted  Ney 
in  the  employment  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Count  of  Valmy  ; 
but  it  seems  perfectly  clear  that  all  the  above-mentioned 
bodies  of  troops  are  put  explicitly  at  Ney's  disposal  for 
the  purpose  of  carrying  out  the  orders  which  he  would 
receive  from  the  major-general;  and  that  the  disposi- 
tions of  his  command  which  Ney  is  requested  to  make, 
are  to  be  made  only  after  the  accomplishment  of  the  m,ain 
object  of  the  movemejit, — the  seizure  of  the  cross-roads. 

But  it  is  impossible  that  Ney  could  have  had  any  doubt 
on  the  subject,  inasmuch  as  there  was  a  third  formal 
order  sent  by  Marshal  Soult. 


**Doc.  Indd.,  X,  pp.  32  et  seq.\  App.  C,  xviii;/cj/,  pp.  377,  378. 
"  Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.  204,  205. 


124  JUNE  i6.-morning:  ney.  [chap.  8.] 

This  order  ^^  informs  Ney  that  an  officer  of  lancers  re- 
ports considerable  bodies  of  the  enemy  near  Quatre  Bras. 
It  then  proceeds  thus :  "  Unite  the  corps  of  the  Counts 
Reille  and  d'Erlon  and  that  of  the  Count  of  Valmy, " 
who  has  this  instant  started  to  join  you ;  with  these 
forces  you  ought  to  be  able  to  beat  and  destroy  any  force 
of  the  enemy  which  you  may  meet."  It  then  says  that  it 
is  not  very  likely  that  Bllicher  has  sent  any  troops  to 
Quatre  Bras,  so  that  Ney  will  have  to  do  only  with  the 
troops  coming  from  Brussels.  It  concludes  by  stating 
that  Grouchy  has  made  the  movement  on  Sombreffe  of 
which  Ney  had  been  informed  in  the  former  order. 

Now  these  orders,  and  certainly  the  last  one,  are  as 
plain  as  plain  can  be.  They  do  not  admit  of  two  con- 
structions. Yet  Ney,  still  unwilling  to  surrender  his  own 
judgment,  still  deeming  it  injudicious  to  push  his  com- 
mand so  far  in  advance  of  the  main  army,  orders  ^^  the 
first  three  divisions  of  the  ist  Corps  to  take  up  a  position 
at  Frasnes.  Frasnes,  it  must  be  remembered,  is  two 
miles  and  a  half  from  Quatre  Bras,  —  nearly  two  miles 
from  the  field  of  battle,  —  an  hour's  march.  Not  only 
this,  but  he  orders  the  two  divisions  of  cavalry  of  the 
Count  of  Valmy  to  establish  themselves  at  Frasnes 
and  Liberchies,  —  the  latter  a  village  two  miles  south- 
west of  Frasnes. 

Consider  this  a  moment.  The  principal  formal  order 
directed  Ney,  in  so  many  words,  to  unite  the  two 
corps  d'armee,  and  the  corps  of  cavalry,  and  to  take 
position  at  Quatre  Bras,  —  not  at  Frasnes.  Even  if 
the  Emperor's  letter  admitted  of  a  construction  at 
variance  with  this,  so  far  as  the  cavalry  of  the  Count  of 


*Doc.  Indd.,  IX,  p.  X31 ;  App.  C,  xxii;/^j-/,  p.  381. 

^''Charras  (vol.  i,  p.  190)  says  that  this  order  differed  from  Soult's  previous 
orders  in  authorizing  Ney  to  employ  the  cavalry  of  the  Count  of  Valmy.  But 
both  Soult's  orders  direct  this  in  express  terms. 

38  Doc.  In^d.,  XII,  pp.  38,  39;  App,  C,  xx;  post,  pp.  379,  3S0. 


[chap.  8.]  JUNE  16.-MORNING:    NEY.  I25 

Valmy  was  concerned,  the  last  order  of  Soult's  was 
unmistakable.  It  left  no  room  for  latitude  of  construc- 
tion. All  the  troops  were  to  be  united  in  the  effort  to 
get  possession  of  the  intersection  of  the  roads,  and  the 
cavalry  of  the  Count  of  Valmy  is  explicitly  included. 
Instead  of  carrying  out  this  order,  which  was  both  plain 
and  peremptory,  and  called  for  the  simultaneous  employ- 
ment of  his  entire  command,  or,  at  any  rate,  for  the 
employment  of  as  much  of  his  command  as  he  could 
assemble,  more  than  half  the  force  which  had  been 
placed  at  Ney's  disposal  was  ordered  by  him  to  halt  and 
"take  position,"  "establish  themselves,"  two  miles  and 
more  to  the  south  of  the  cross-roads.  He  himself,  in 
his  letter  to  the  Duke  of  Otranto,  ^^  states  that  the  ist 
Corps  "  had  been  left  by  him  in  reserve  at  Frasnes." 
Although  this  statement  is  incorrect,  inasmuch  as  that 
unlucky  command  never  got  quite  so  far  as  Frasnes, 
yet  it  shows  beyond  controversy  what  Marshal  Ney 
inte^ided  \.o  do  with  the  ist  Corps.  He  furthermore  says 
in  this  letter,  that  it  was  at  the  moment  when  he  was 
about  to  order  it  up  from  Frasnes,  that  he  learned  that 
the  Emperor  had  disposed  of  it.  That  is  to  say,  he 
had  actually  intended  to  keep  a  whole  corps  of  20,000 
men  (or  at  least  three-fourths  of  them)  tvv^o  miles 
from  the  battle-field  till  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon, 
for  (as  we  shall  see  hereafter)  it  was  not  until  five 
o'clock  that  he  learned  that  d'Erlon's  Corps  had  wandered 
off. 


^' Jones,  p.  386.    Charras,  vol.  i,  p,  215. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER   VIII. 

I.  The  conduct  of  Marshal  Ney  on  the  15th  and 
i6th  has  been  the  subject  of  violent  and  bitter  disputes. 
One  principal  cause  of  these  disputes  lies  in  the  sup- 
position that  Napoleon  in  his  accounts  of  the  campaign 
has  misrepresented  the  facts,  so  as  to  throw  a  large 
part  of  the  blame  for  the  final  disaster  undeservedly 
upon  Ney.  Accordingly,  what  Napoleon  has  said  about 
Ney,  and  his  motives  in  saying  it,  have  been  the 
subjects  of  discussion,  rather  than  what  Ney  himself  did. 
We  have  strictly  confined  our  narrative  to  the  considera- 
tion of  Ney's  acts,  orders,  and  statements,  supplemented 
by  those  of  one  of  his  corps-commanders  and  his  chief-of- 
staff.     From  these  it  appears, 

(a)  That  Ney  was  informed  of  the  Emperor's  inten- 
tions during  the  night  of  the  15th  and  i6th: 

(b)  That  he  contented  himself,  on  his  return  to  Gos- 
selies  at  two  o'clock  in  the  morning,  with  ordering  Reille 
to  get  his  two  divisions  ready  to  move:  he  did  not 
order  Reille  up  to  Frasnes  as  he  might  have  done ;  nor 
did  he  see  to  it  that  the  places  of  Reille's  divisions  at 
Gosselies  were  taken  by  the  two  divisions  of  d'Erlon's 
Corps,  which,  as  we  have  seen,'  were,  at  that  hour  well 
across  the  river: 

(c)  That  instead  of  pushing  right  on  to  Quatre  Bras 
with  all  his  disposable  force  when  he  finally  got  his  writ- 


^Ante,  p.  51. 


[chap.  8.]  JUNE  16.-MORNING:    NEY.-NOTES.  1 27 

ten  orders,  as  those  orders  in  express  terms  peremptorily 
directed  him  to  do,  he  ordered  three  divisions  of  the  ist 
Corps  to  take  up  a  position  at  Frasnes,  two  miles  from 
the  field  of  battle,  and  Kellermann's  two  divisions  of 
cavalry  "  to  establish  themselves "  partly  there  and 
partly  at  Liberchies,  a  village  still  further  from  the 
field: 

(d)  That  he  deliberately  intended  those  three  divisions 
of  the  ist  Corps  and  those  two  divisions  of  cavalry  to 
stay  at  Frasnes  and  Liberchies,  as  his  reserve,  instead  of 
having  them  with  him  for  immediate  use  on  the  field  of 
Quatre  Bras : 

(e)  Lastly,  all  these  things  are  admitted  to  be  true ; 
they  are  not  accusations  against  him;  they  are  facts, 
stated  by  himself,  either  in  his  own  orders  or  letters,  or 
by  his  own  chief-of-staff,  or  by  General  Reille. 

2.  There  is  certainly  one  inference  to  be  drawn  from 
these  facts.  It  is  that  Marshal  Ney  was  not,  in  that  night 
and  morning,  preparing  for  a  decisive  blow.  So  much,  we 
presume,  will  be  conceded.  It  is  also  plain  that  he  was 
not  proposing  strictly  to  obey  his  orders.  He  evidently 
had  his  doubts  about  the  wisdom  of  his  orders.  He  was 
not  going  to  embark  too  deep  in  what  he  evidently 
feared  might  prove  a  disastrous  venture.  He  would  pro- 
ceed to  Quatre  Bras  with  the  three  divisions  of  the  2d 
Corps,  but  he  would  leave  three  divisions  of  the  ist 
Corps  and  the  two  divisions  of  Kellermann's  cavalry  to 
protect  his  flank  and  line  of  retreat,  and  also  to  be  at 
hand  in  case  the  Emperor  should  need  them.  He  did 
not  dare  to  trust  the  Emperor  fully.  He  must,  he  felt,  in 
this  emergency,  act  according  to  his  own  judgment. 

3.  If  we  are  right  in  this  conclusion,  we  can  easily 
understand  why  Ney  failed  to  carry  out  the  order  given 
to  him  at  five  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  the  15th,  to 
seize  Quatre  Bras  that  evening.  We  have  left  the  much 
disputed  question  of  the  giving  of  this  order  on  one  side 


128  JUNE  16.-MORNING:    NEY.-NOTES.  [CHAP.  8.] 

in  our  narrative^  for  reasons  already  stated ;  but  we  have, 
nevertheless,  expressed  our  opinion^  that  the  order  was 
given.  Ney's  conduct  on  the  i6th  is  of  a  piece,  we  be- 
lieve, with  his  conduct  on  the  15th. 

4.  No  serious  criticism  can  be  passed,  we  think,  on 
the  tenor  of  the  orders  issued  to  the  corps-commanders 
of  the  left  wing,  or  to  the  commander  of  that  wing,  dur- 
ing the  afternoon  of  the  15th  and  the  morning  of  the 
i6th.  Neither  the  Emperor  nor  Soult  could  well  have 
done  more  than  they  did  to  arouse  the  energy  of  the 
officers  who  had  charge  of  the  operations  there/  The 
orders  were  precise  and  imperative.  The  trouble  was 
that  the  officers  to  whom  they  were  addressed  lacked 
either  the  disposition  or  the  energy  requisite  to  carry 
them  into  effect. 

5.  But  why,  it  may  be  fairly  asked,  did  not  Napoleon, 
as  soon  as  he  had  found  out  that  Ney  had  not  seized 
Quatre  Bras  on  the  evening  of  the  15th,  order  him  forth- 
with to  proceed  to  do  so  in  the  early  morning  of  the 
i6th?  Why  this  delay  in  sending  him  a  formal  written 
order  ? 

This  question  will  be  considered  in  the  next  chapter, 
when  we  come  to  describe  Napoleon's  doings  on  the 
i6th. 


'Ante,  p.  52. 
*Anie,  pp.  67,  68. 

^For  an  explanation  of  Chesney's  (pp.  118,  119)  severe  strictures,  see  ante, 
p.  51,  n.  29. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  MORNING  OF  THE  SIXTEENTH   OF   JUNE  :    NAPOLEON. 

It  is  time  that  we  returned  to  the  headquarters  of  the 
French  army. 

Marshal  Ney,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  last  chapter,  re- 
ported in  person  to  the  Emperor  at  Charleroi  at  mid- 
night of  the  15th.  "  He  rendered  account"  to  him,  says 
Colonel  Heymes,'  "of  the  dispositions  he  had  made." 
Napoleon  was  thus  informed  that  Ney  had  halted  at 
Frasnes  and  had  not  occupied  Quatre  Bras,  the  evening 
before.  Ney  must  have  stopped  at  Charleroi  about  an 
hour  and  a  half,  as  he  reached  Gosselies  on  his  return 
about  two  in  the  morning.  He  must  have  told  the  Em- 
peror where  some,  at  any  rate,  of  his  troops  were, —  that 
Bachelu's  infantry  division  and  Fire's  cavalry  division  of 
the  2d  Corps  were  at  Frasnes ;  that  the  divisions  of  Jerome 
and  Foy  were  at  Gosselies;  that  Durutte's  division  of  the 
1st  Corps  was  between  Jumet  and  Gosselies.  So  much 
as  this  Ney  knew.  But  his  arrival  at  the  army  had  been 
so  recent,  and  his  occupations  since  his  arrival  had 
been  so  engrossing,  that  he  could  not  probably  have 
had  much  more  information  to  give  the  Emperor 
as  to  the  whereabouts  of  the  ist  Corps.  His  almost 
total  deficiency  of  staff  officers  was  a  grievous  drawback, 
and  prevented  him  from  getting  that  hold  on  his  entire 
command  which  otherwise  he  no  doubt  would  have  se- 
cured even  by  this  time.    Very  possibly  he  had  already 


'Doc.  Indd.,  Heym^s,  p.  6. 


130  JUNE  16.-MORNING:  [chap.  9.] 

sent  word  to  d'Erlon  to  hurry  up  to  the  front.  But  he 
must  have  reported  to  the  Emperor  that  a  large  part  of 
the  ist  Corps,  perhaps  half  of  it,  was  still  far  to  the 
rear. 

Napoleon  does  not  mention  this  interview  in  his 
Memoirs,  or  in  the  Gourgaud  Narrative,  nor  does  he 
anywhere  say  that  he,  on  the  morning  of  the  i6th,  gave 
to  Marshal  Ney  any  other  orders  than  the  written  ones 
of  which  we  have  in  the  last  chapter  given  the  sub- 
stance. 

It  would  seem  from  these  orders  that  Napoleon 
thought  it  inexpedient  that  Ney  should  make  any  further 
endeavor  to  carry  Quatre  Bras  by  a  coup-de-main.  The 
situation  was  a  different  one  from  that  which  existed  (as 
Napoleon  correctly  supposed)  the  evening  before.  It 
might  now  be  expected  that  the  cross-roads  would  be  held 
by  a  respectable  force  from  Wellington's  army;  or,  at 
least,  it  was  obviously  unwise  and  hazardous  not  to  make 
adequate  preparations  for  this  very  possible  state  of  things. 
It  was  also  plain,  from  what  Ney  had  stated  at  the  mid- 
night conference,  that  his  command  would  not  be,  in  the 
early  morning  hours,  sufficiently  concentrated  for  any 
decisive  stroke.^  Hence,  somewhere  about  five  o'clock, 
the  first  of  the  three  orders  of  which  we  have  spoken  in 
the  last  chapter  was  sent  off  from  Charleroi ;  the  one  in 
which  Ney  was  informed  that  Kellermann's  cavalry  had 
been  ordered  to  him  to  take  the  place  of  that  of  Lefebvre- 
Desnouettes,  and  in  which  he  was  directed  to  report  to 
the  Emperor  whether  the  ist  Corps  had  "executed  its 
movement,"  and  to  inform  him  of  the  exact  positions  of 
the  ist  and  2d  Corps.  This  order,  as  we  have  seen,  Ney 
replied  to  before  7  A.  M.  His  reply,  which,  we  may  as- 
sume, contained  some  news  of  the  advance  of  the  ist 
Corps,  and  also  stated  that  the  divisions  of  Jerome  and 
Foy  of  the  2d  Corps  were  at  Gosselies  ready  to  march, 


^Cf.  La  Tour  D'Auvergne,  pp.  91,  92. 


[chap.  9.]  NAPOLEON.  I3I 

must  have  reached  headquarters  shortly  before  8  A.  M. 
As  soon  as  this  reply  was  received,  Napoleon  and  Soult 
prepared  the  formal  order  for  the  conduct  of  the  left 
wing  during  the  forenoon. 

That  order,  as  we  have  seen,  directed  Ney  to  unite  the 
I  St  and  2d  Corps  and  the  cavalry  of  the  Count  of  Valmy, 
and  to  proceed  at  once  to  take  possession  of  Quatre 
Bras.  It  was  issued  as  soon  as  the  Emperor  had  become 
satisfied,  from  Ney's  report,  that  such  a  movement  had 
become  practicable, —  that  is,  that  it  could  be  made  in 
sufficient  force  to  overcome  any  opposition  it  would  be 
likely  to  encounter.  Until  he  had  become  satisfied  of 
this,  it  was  deemed  unadvisable  to  issue  the  order  to  ad- 
vance beyond  Frasnes. 

We  are  able  to  fix  the  hour  at  which  this  formal  order 
to  seize  Quatre  Bras  was  prepared  by  Soult  with  quite 
an  approach  to  accuracy.  We  know  that  Napoleon  dic- 
tated a  letter  to  Ney,  which  he  sent  by  Count  Flahaut,' 
and  which  arrived  at  Gosselies  about  the  same  time* 
with  the  formal  order, — that  is, — about  lO  A.  M.^  Flahaut 
wrote^  to  Marshal  Ney's  son,  then  Duke  of  Elchingen, 
that,  to  the  best  of  his  recollection,  the  Emperor  dictated 
the  letter  to  him  between  8  and  9  o'clock  in  the  morning. 
Such  a  letter,  dictated  between  8  and  9,  and  afterwards 
reduced  to  proper  form,  would  have  reached  Gosselies,  a 
distance  of  about  four  miles  and  a  half  from  Charleroi, 
about  10  A.  M.,  as  Reille^  says  it  did.  This  accords  per- 
fectly with  the  statement  made  above  that  Napoleon 
waited  to  hear  more  definitely  from  Ney  before  framing 
his  order  for  the  morning's  operations. 

But  the  backwardness  of  d'Erlon's  Corps  not  only  de- 


^Doc.  Indd.,  X,  p.  32  ;  App.  C,  xviii;  post,  pp.  377,  378. 

'^Ante,  p.  121,  note  23. 

^Ante,  p.  121,  note  21. 

*Doc.  Indd.,  XXI,  p.  62, ;  App.  C,  xxiii;  post,  p.  382. 

'lb.,  XI,  pp.  37,  38;  App.  C,  xix;  post,  p.  379. 


132  JUNE  i6.-morning:  [chap.  9.] 

ferred  the  forward  moment  of  the  left  wing;  it  seems  to 
have  delayed  the  advance  of  the  main  body.  Until  Napo- 
leon could  be  sure  that  Ney  with  the  large  force  that 
had  been  assigned  to  him  was  in  march  on  his  left,  able 
to  give  a  good  account  of  any  Anglo-Dutch  forces  which 
might  attempt  to  unite  with  the  Prussians  or  to  molest 
the  left  flank  of  the  main  French  army,  he  seems  to 
have  been  unwilling  to  move  upon  Blucher.  It  was 
part  of  his  plan  that  Ney  with  the  left  wing  should 
at  least  "  contain  "  that  part  of  Wellington's  army  which 
that  general  might  reasonably  be  expected  to  get  to- 
gether at  Quatre  Bras.  Hence,  when  Ney  reported  to 
the  Emperor  at  midnight  the  very  backward  state  of 
the  1st  Corps,  the  latter  not  only  decided  to  wait  before 
giving  him  further  orders  until  something  more  definite 
and  satisfactory  should  be  learned  respecting  that  corps, 
and  until  Ney  could  fairly  be  supposed  to  have  had  time 
enough  to  get  his  entire  command  well  in  hand,  but  he 
also  postponed  his  own  forward  movement  upon  Fleurus 
and  Sombreffe  until  Ney  could  move  simultaneously 
upon  Quatre  Bras.  These  considerations  certainly  go 
far  to  account  for  and  justify  the  delay  in  the  early  morn- 
ing hours  of  the  i6th,  which  has  drawn  down  upon  the 
Emperor  so  much  severe  and  almost  contemptuous  criti- 
cism. Napoleon,  in  truth,  could  have  done  nothing  else, 
unless  he  had  risked  a  battle  with  the  Prussians  on  the 
chance  that  Ney,  with  the  2d  Corps  alone,  could  prevent 
their  being  assisted  by  the  English.  It  is  true,  this  is 
what  actually  happened ;  but  it  was  Napoleon's  intention 
that  Ney  should  operate  against  the  English  with  his 
entire  command,  and  in  deferring  the  giving  of  orders 
for  the  advance  of  the  army  until  he  had  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  Ney  could  do  this,  he  was  simply  carrying  out 
his  original  scheme. 

To  finish  now  with  Napoleon's  intentions  and  expec- 
tations in  regard  to  his  left  wing.  He  may  well 
have  expected  that  Ney  had,  in  advance  of  receiving  the 


[chap.  9.]  NAPOLEON.  1 33 

formal  order,  sent  Reille  to  Frasnes  with  his  two  divis- 
ions, which  Ney's  reply  to  his  early  morning  inquiry  had 
informed  him  were  then  all  ready  to  march,  thus  uniting 
the  entire  2d  Corps,  mimis  Girard's  division ;  also,  that 
the  leading  divisions  of  the  ist  Corps  would  be  gotten 
under  arms  without  delay  in  Gosselies,  so  as  to  be  ready 
to  march  at  once.  He  must  have  expected  his  order  to 
reach  Gosselies  by  10  A.  M.,  and  Frasnes  by  11  A.  M., 
and  he  may  well  have  thought  it  quite  possible, —  as 
indeed  it  would  have  been, —  that  Ney,  at  the  head  of 
three  divisions  of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry,  might 
be  able  to  drive  out  of  Quatre  Bras  the  Dutch- 
Belgians  who  had  been  encountered  the  evening  before, 
unless,  indeed,  they  had  been  largely  reinforced.  At  or 
about  I  P.  M.,  however,  the  ist  Corps  ought  to  be  arriv- 
ing at  Quatre  Bras,  as  its  leading  divisions  would  leave 
Gosselies  —  as  Napoleon  would  have  a  right  to  suppose 

—  between  10  and  11  A.  M.;  so  that,  by  2,  or,  at  any 
rate,  by  3  P.  M.,  Marshal  Ney  would  have  his  entire  com- 
mand at  Quatre  Bras,  well  in  hand,  and,  pretty  certain, 

—  at  least  so  Napoleon  would  be  likely  to  think, —  to  be 
successful  over  any  troops  they  mJght  encounter.  On 
these  expectations,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  were  quite 
warranted  by  the  information  he  had  received,  he  based 
his  calculations  for  the  day's  doings. 

While  Napoleon  was  thus  awaiting  at  Charleroi  defi- 
nite news  of  the  progress  and  condition  of  the  left 
wing  of  his  army,  he  employed  his  time, —  or  a 
part  of  it,  at  least, —  in  determining  on  the  lines  of  action 
he  would  pursue  in  view  of  possible  emergencies.  As 
we  have  already  seen,  he  desired  nothing  so  much  as  to 
join  battle  with  Marshal  Bliicher  on  the  i6th  of  June. 
It  had  been  his  expectation^  that  the  Prussian  general 
would  assemble  his  army  near  Sombreffe,  and  fight  a 
battle,  somewhere  to  the  south  of  that  village,  for  the 

^^«/t',  pp.  5,  13,  14- 


134  JUNE  1 6 -morning:  [chap.  9.] 

preservation  of  his  line  of  communications  with  the 
Duke  of  WelHngton,— the  Namur-Nivelles  turnpike. 
At  the  same  time,  it  was,  of  course,  perfectly  possible 
that  the  allied  commanders  had  made  other  arrange- 
ments.5  It  was  not  impossible,  for  instance,  that  Napo- 
leon's concentration  had  been  such  a  surprise  to  them 
that  they  were  purposing  to  fall  back,  for  the  present  at 
least,  either  divergently  towards  their  respective  bases, 
or  in  a  northerly  direction  by  parallel  lines.  In  any 
event  it  would  be  manifestly  desirable  to  inform  the 
commanders  of  the  right  and  left  wings  of  the  army  of 
the  Emperor's  probable  course  in  any  such  event,  so 
that  every  advantage  might  be  promptly  taken  of  the 
situation.  It  was  certainly  true,  that  instructions  of  this 
nature  might  not  be  required ;  they  would  assuredly  not 
be  required  if  Bliicher  should  do  what  Napoleon  had 
thought  it  likely  he  would  do.  In  that  case  there  would 
be  no  need  of  elaborate  instructions  being  given  to  either 
Ney  or  Grouchy;  the  issue  of  the  battle  would  settle 
everything.  But  in  order  to  be  prepared  for  the  other 
state  of  affairs,  Napoleon  employed  himself  with  pre- 
paring letters  to  the  commanders  of  the  wings  of  the 
army. 

The  letter'"  to  Ney,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  was  dic- 
tated by  the  Emperor  to  General  Flahaut  between  8  and 
9  A.  M.,  and  was  carried  by  that  officer  to  Ney,  whom  it 
must  have  reached  at  Frasnes  shortly  before  eleven 
o'clock,"  informs  him  that  Marshal  Grouchy  is  marching 
on  Sombreffe  with  the  3d  and  4th  Corps;  that  the 
Emperor  is  taking  the  Guard  to  Fleurus,  where  he  will 
be  before  midday ;  that  he  will  attack  the  enemy  if  he 
meets  him,  and  will  clear  the  road  as  far  to  the  east- 


'Ollech,  p.  123. 

»°Corresp.,  vol.  28,  p.  334-     Doc.  Indd.,  X,  p.  32 ;  App.  C,  xviii ;  post.  pp. 

377,  378- 

"Flahaut,  says  Reille,  passed  through  Gosselies  about  10  A.  M.     Doc. 
Indd.,  XI,  pp.  37,  38;  App.  C,  xix;  post,  p.  379- 


[chap.  9.]  NAPOLEON.  1 35 

ward  as  Gembloux.  There,  at  Gembloux,  the  Emperor 
will  make  up  his  mind  what  to  do  next,  — perhaps  at 
three  in  the  afternoon,  perhaps  not  till  evening.  But  he 
tells  Marshal  Ney  that,  just  as  soon  as  he  has  made  up 
his  mind,  he  wants  him  to  be  ready  to  march  on  Brus- 
sels;  that  he  will  support  him  with  the  Guard,  which 
will  be  at  Fleurus  or  Sombreffe,"  and  that  he  would  like 
to  get  to  Brussels  the  next  morning.  He  then  tells  him 
where  he  would  like  him  to  station  his  various  divis- 
ions.'^ He  informs  him  that  he  has  divided  his  army 
into  two  wings  and  a  reserve ;  that  Ney's  wing  will  con- 
sist of  the  1st  and  2d  Corps,  comprising  eight  divisions 
of  infantry  and  two  of  light  cavalry,  and  of  the  cavalry 
of  the  Count  of  Valmy;  that  Marshal  Grouchy  com- 
mands the  right  wing;  that  the  Guard  will  constitute 
the  reserve.  He  closes  by  reiterating  the  importance 
of  Ney's  dispositions  being  so  well  made  that  he  can 
march  on  Brussels,  —  2.  ^.,  from  Quatre  Bras,  —  as  soon 
as  ordered  to  do  so. 

To  Grouchy  the  Emperor  sent  a  similar"*  letter,  giving 
him  the  command  of  the  3d  and  4th  Corps,  —  those  of 
Vandamme  and  Gerard,  —  and  of  the  three  cavalry-corps 
of  Pajol,  Milhaud  and  Exelmans.  He  orders  him  to 
Sombreffe  with  his  entire  command ;  the  cavalry  are  to 
be  sent  off  at  once,  the  infantry  to  follow  without  halting 
anywhere.  The  Emperor  states  that  he  is  removing  his 
headquarters  from  Charleroi  to  Fleurus,  where  he  will 
arrive  between  10  and  11  A.  M.,  and  that  he  is  going  to 
Sombreffe,  leaving  the  Guard,  unless  it  should  be  neces- 
sary to  employ  it,  at  Fleurus.  "If  the  enemy  is  at 
Sombreffe,"  he  goes  on  to  say,  "  I  propose  to  attack  him ; 
I  propose  to  attack  him  even  at  Gembloux,  and  to  pos- 


"This  seems  to  imply  that  the  Emperor  did  not  propose  to  carry  the  Guard 
to  Gembloux. 

"See  ante,-^.  123. 

'■•Corresp.,  vol.  28,  p.  336;  App.  C,  xxiv;  post,  pp.  382,  383. 


136  JUNE  i6.-morning:  [chap.  9.] 

sess  myself  of  that  position ;  my  intention  being,  after 
having  explored  {connu^  these  two  positions,  to  set  out 
this  night,  and  operate  with  my  left  wing,  which  Marshal 
Ney  commands,  against  the  English."  He  then  desires 
Grouchy  to  send  him  reports  of  everything  he  may 
learn,  and  finishes  by  saying:  — "All  my  information 
is  to  the  effect  that  the  Prussians  cannot  oppose  to  us 
more  than  forty  thousand  men." 

It  is  quite  true,  that  this  last  remark  shows,  as  several 
writers'5  have  pointed  out,  that  the  Emperor  was  to  a 
considerable  extent  mistaken  on  this  morning  of  the 
1 6th  in  his  apprehension  of  the  situation.  But  it  is  an 
error  to  take  these  letters  as  if  they  were  written  for  the 
purpose  of  giving  Napoleon's  estimates  of  the  probabili- 
ties; they  are  rather  instructions  in  the  event  of  the 
occurrence  of  not  impossible  contingencies.  The  fact 
in  the  case  was  just  this, —  the  main  army  was  about  to 
make  a  forward  movement  against  the  Prussians  ;  if  they 
were  found  to  be  in  force  and  offered  battle,  the  result  of 
this  battle  would  of  course  settle  everything ;  but  if  they 
should  retire,  instead  of  offering  battle,  they  must  be 
followed,  and  that  involved  the  separation  of  the  French 
army  into  two  unequal  portions.  Hence  it  was  very 
desirable  to  inform  Ney,  from  whom  in  this  event  the 
right  wing  and  reserves  would  march  away,  about  how 
far  the  Prussians  would  be  followed,  and,  especially  to 
enjoin  upon  him,  in  case  the  Emperor  should  deem  it 
safe  to  leave  the  care  of  the  Prussians  to  Grouchy,  and 
should  himself  retrace  his  steps,  and,  with  his  Guard, 
join  the  left  wing,  to  be  ready  to  march  on  Brussels  at  an 
instant's  notice. 

It  must  be  noted,  too,  that  these  letters,  especially  when 
taken  in  connection  with  tne  formal  orders  of  Soult  to 
the    two    Marshals,    show    how    absolutely    Napoleon 


''Ollech,  pp.  112,  113:  D'Auvergne,  pp.  103,  104:  Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.  143. 
144- 


[chap.  9.]  NAPOLEON.  I37 

adhered  to  his  original  conception  of  the  campaign,  as 
we  have  before  described  it.  To  attack  the  Prussians 
first,— to  follow  them  up  for  a  considerable  distance,  so 
as  to  be  assured  of  the  direction  which  their  retreat  was 
taking, —  and  then,  and  only  then,  to  return  to  the  Brus- 
sels road  and  advance  on  the  English, —  such  was  the 
programme  marked  out  in  the  two  letters  to  Ney  and 
Grouchy.  We  shall  have  occasion  to  refer  to  this  in 
another  place. 

Lastly,  while  the  Emperor  expressly  states  in  his  letter 
to  Grouchy  that  he  estimates  that  the  Prussians  can  not 
oppose  to  him  a  force  of  over  forty  thousand  men,  and 
while  it  may  perhaps  be  inferred  from  his  letter  to  Ney 
that  he  thought  that  that  officer  would  meet  with  little  or 
no  opposition,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  Napoleon  acted 
in  all  respects  as  if  he  expected  that  the  enemy  would  be 
found  in  force.  Both  Ney  and  Grouchy  were  explicit- 
ly directed  to  employ  the  whole  of  their  respective 
forces.  We  have  spoken  of  this  before  as  it  affected 
Ney.  It  was  the  same  with  the  movement  prescribed  to 
Grouchy, — "Take  your  right  wing  to  Sombreffe,"  —  '^ 
i.  e.,  the  two  corps-d'armee,  and  the  three  cavalry  corps. 
Whatever  Napoleon  may  have  conjectured  as  to  the 
force  or  intentions  of  the  enemy,  both  of  his  movements 
this  forenoon,  —  that  of  the  main  army  on  Sombreffe, 
and  that  of  the  left  wing  on  Quatre  Bras,  —  were  to  be 
made  in  force,  —  with  all  the  force  he  could  muster.  If 
he  did  expect,  as  some  writers  think,  that  his  enemies 
would  retire  before  him,  he  at  any  rate  made  every 
preparation  to  fight  and  overcome  them,  should  they 
give  him  battle.  It  was  in  order,  as  we  have  pointed 
out,  that  these  movements  might  be  made  simultane- 
ously, and  in  sufficient  force,  that  they  were  deferred  to 
such  a  late  period  in  the  day,  —  the  backwardness  of  the 


'^ "  Rendez-vous  avec  ceite  aile  droite  a  Sombreffe^ 


138  JUNE  16.-MORNING:    NAPOLEON.  [CHAP.  9.] 

I  St  Corps  having  postponed  for  several  hours  the  con- 
centration of  the  left  wing. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  in  none  of  these  letters  or 
formal  orders  is  the  6th  Corps  under  the  Count  of  Lobau 
mentioned.  The  inference  is,  that,  at  that  time,  the 
Emperor  desired  to  retain  this  body  of  troops  as  a 
reserve  for  the  whole  army.  He  wanted  to  get  along,  if 
he  could,  without  employing  it  at  all  in  the  present  stage 
of  the  campaign. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  IX. 

I.  The  very  simple  explanation  suggested  in  this 
chapter  of  the  cause  of  the  delay  on  the  morning  of  the 
i6th  in  the  movement  of  the  main  body  of  the  French 
army  under  the  Emperor  in  person,  namely,  that  that 
movement  was  deferred  because  of  the  inability  of  the  left 
wing  of  the  army  to  make  a  simultaneous  movement  on 
Quatre  Bras,  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred  to  most  of 
the  historians  of  this  campaign/  But  surely,  when  allow- 
ance is  made  for  this  fact,  the  severe  criticisms  of 
Jomini,''  Charras,  ^  SibornC*  and  others,  must  be  held  to 
be  quite  beside  the  mark.  Had  Ney  occupied  Quatre 
Bras  on  the  evening  of  the  15th,  the  forward  movement 
of  the  main  French  army  would  certainly  not  have  been 
thus  delayed.  It  would  doubtless  have  been  made  in 
the  early  morning  of  the  i6th,  even  though  it  might 
have  been  necessary  to  give  Ney  the  6th  Corps  in  place 
of  the  backward  ist.  But  as  Quatre  Bras  had  not  been 
occupied  the  evening  before,  and  as  the  backward  state 
of  d'Erlon's  Corps  rendered  it  impossible  for  Ney  to 
make  a  forward  movement  with  the  entire  force  which 
had  been  assigned  to  him  until  the  forenoon  was  well 
advanced,  the  operations  of  the  main  body  were  post, 
poned,  and  the  troops  were  allowed  what  would  other- 
wise have  been  an  unnecessary  ^  time  to  rest  and  recruit. 

'It  is,  however,  given  in  Du  Casse's  Vandamme,  vol.  2,  p.  562. 

•  Jomini,  pp.  129,  130. 
'Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.  138,  145,  182. 

*  Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  85. 

5  The  Duke  of  Wellington,  however,  thought  the  inactivity  of  Napoleon  on 
the  morning  of  the  16th  was  necessitated  by  the  long  marches  of  the  past  few 
days.    Ellesmere,  pp.  296,  297.    So,  Clausewitz,  ch.  25,  p.  53. 


140  JUNE  i6-mornixg:-notes.  [chap.  9.] 

2.  It  is  to  be  observed  here,  that  for  the  backwardness 
of  the  ist  Corps  at  midnight  of  the  15th,  Marshal  Ney 
was  in  no  wise  responsible.  His  recent  arrival  at  the 
army  and  his  lack  of  a  proper  staff  exonerate  him  com- 
pletely from  any  blame  for  this  unfortunate  delay.  For 
this  d'Erlon  alone  must  be  held  responsible. 

3.  It  is  unnecessary  to  repeat  here  what  we  have  said 
above  as  to  Ney's  conduct  on  his  return  to  Gosselies 
from  his  interview  wath  Napoleon  at  Charleroi.  It 
seems  to  us  that  any  competent  and  energetic  officer, 
bent  upon  getting  ready  to  execute  his  orders  as  soon 
as  they  should  be  received,  and  to  execute  them  to  the 
letter  when  he  should  receive  them,  would  have  accom- 
plished far  more  than  Marshal  Ney  accomplished  that 
morning. 

4.  We  desire  to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  up  to 
this  time  there  is  no  evidence  whatever  of  indolence,  or 
irresolution,  on  the  part  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon. 
From  the  time  when  he  left  Paris  at  half-past  three  in 
the  morning  of  the  12th  to  the  time  of  which  we  are  now 
writing,  he  seems  to  have  been  fully  up  even  to  his  own 
high  standard  of  military  activity  and  capacity.  His 
general  order  for  the  movement  of  the  army  on  the  15th 
was  as  clear  and  full  as  it  was  possible  for  an  order  to  be. 
His  energy  and  dash  on  the  15th  were  noticeable.  His 
vigor  and  endurance  also  seem  to  have  been  equal  to  the 
demands  put  upon  them.  From  three  in  the  morning  to 
eight  in  the  evening  of  the  15th  he  was  on  horseback,  and 
in  personal  command  of  the  troops.  At  midnight  he  had 
a  long  conference  with  Marshal  Ney.  Since  the  result 
of  that  conference  was,  as  we  have  seen,  to  induce  the 
postponement  of  the  advance  of  the  army,  the  Emperor 
may,  very  possibly,  have  taken  some  rest  in  the  early 
morning  hours  of  the  i6th.  But  the  despatch  to  Ney 
requesting  from  him  an  exact  account  of  his  position 
must  have  been  sent  off  about  five,  and  at  or  soon  after 
eight  we  find  him  dictating  to  Count  Flahaut  the  letters 


[chap.  9.]  NAPOLEON.-NOTES.  I4I 

to  Ney  and  Grouchy.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add,  that 
if  the  explanation  given  above  of  the  causes  of  the  delay 
in  the  advance-movement  of  the  army  on  the  morning  of 
the  1 6th  be  correct,  there  is  not  the  slightest  foundation 
for  the  charges  of  hesitation  or  irresolution,  which  have 
been  so  often  made.  ^ 

5.  It  seems  to  be  difficult  for  some  writers  to  keep 
steadily  in  mind  the  absolute  necessity  of  Napoleon's 
either  defeating  the  Prussians  or  compelling  them 
definitely  to  retreat,  before  he  undertook  any  movement 
in  the  direction  of  Brussels,  either  with  the  view  of 
attacking  the  English  or  of  occupying  that  city.  Thus 
Chesney,7  speaking  of  Napoleon's  intentions  on  the 
morning  of  the  i6th,  says : — 

"  His  morning  orders  clearly  prove  that  he  expected  no  serious 
opposition  from  them  (the  Prussians)  or  the  English  at  present, 
and  was  divided  only  in  his  mind  between  the  thought  of  pressing  on 
direct  to  Brussels  between  the  two  allied  armies,  or  striking  at  the 
supposed  Prussian  right,  driven  back  on  Fleurus  the  day  before." 

But  Napoleon's  letters  to  Ney  and  Grouchy,  to  which 
Chesney  here  refers,  explicitly  contradict  this  supposition. 
Napoleon  says  in  his  letter  to  Ney :  —  ^ 

"I  am  sending  Marshal  Grouchy  with  the  3d  and  4th  Corps  of 
infantry  to  Sombreffe.  I  am  taking  my  Guard  to  Fleurus,  and  I 
shall  be  there  myself  before  noon.  I  shall  there  attack  the  enemy 
if  I  meet  him,  and  I  shall  clear  the  road  as  far  as  Gembloux.  There, 
after  what  shall  have  passed,  I  shall  make  up  my  mind." 

And  he  directs  Ney  to  be  all  ready  to  march  to  Brussels, 
as  soon  as  he  (Napoleon)  shall  have  arrived  at  a  decision. 
But  this  decision,  it  is  to  be  observed,  was  not  to  be  taken 
until  the  Prussians  should  either  have  been  attacked  and 


^Anfe,pp.  132,  139. 

'Chesney,  pp.  138,  139  :  See  also,  Clinton,  p.  380. 

•Corresp.,  vol.  28,  p.  334:  Doc.  In^d.,  X,  p.  32;  App.  C,  xviii;  posf,  pp. 
377,  378. 


142  JUNE  i6.-morning:  napoleon.-notes.  [chap.  9.] 

defeated,  or  should  have  fallen  back  at  least  as  far  as 
Gembloux. 

To  the  same  effect  is  the  letter  to  Grouchy :  ^ 

"  If  the  enemy  is  at  Sombreffe  I  am  going  to  attack  him  ;  I  am 
going  to  attack  him  even  at  Gembloux,  and  to  carry  even  that 
position ;  my  intention  being,  after  having  explored  {connu) 
these  two  positions,  to  set  out  this  night  and  to  operate  with  my 
left  wing,  which  is  under  the  command  of  Marshal  Ney,  against 
the  English." 

It  is  plain  from  both  these  letters  that  to  say  that 
Napoleon  was  "  divided  in  his  mind  "  between  "  pressing 
on  direct  to  Brussels  betvv^een  the  two  allied  armies" 
and  attacking  the  Prussians  in  front  of  him, —  in  other 
words,  that  he  was  hesitating  which  of  these  two  courses 
he  would  take,  is  a  statement  utterly  without  foundation. 
In  both  despatches  he  states  unequivocally  his  immediate 
intention,  —  namely,  to  attack  the  Prussians  ;  and  it  was 
only  after  he  should  have  attacked  and  driven  the 
Prussians  and  forced  them  as  far  to  the  eastward  as 
Gembloux,  that  he  proposed  to  retrace  his  steps,  to  rein- 
force Ney,  and  march  against  the  English.  Brussels, 
indeed,  was  regarded  by  Napoleon  as  perhaps  the  most 
important  result  of  the  campaign,  next  to  the  enormous 
military  advantage  which  would  be  secured  by  the  defeat 
or  dispersion  of  the  armies  of  Wellington  and  Blucher. 
But  this  was  all.  For  the  Emperor  to  gain  Brussels, 
these  hostile  armies  must  either  be  attacked  and  beaten, 
or  else  they  must  definitely  separate,  each  retiring 
towards  its  own  base.  The  idea  of  passing  between  the 
two  armies  at  this  stage  of  the  campaign,  and  so  arriving 
at  Brussels,  it  is  safe  to  say,  never  entered  Napoleon's 
mind.  His  object,  as  Jomini '°  correctly  states,  was  "not 
to  occupy  Brussels,  but  to  destroy  the  opposing  masses 
in  succession." 


9Corresp.,  vol.  28,  p.  336;  App.  C,  xxiv ;  post,  pp.  382,  383. 
*°  Jomini,  p.  112. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  LIGNY.  BLUCHER's  DECISION  TO  ACCEPT 
BATTLE  NOT  DEPENDENT  ON  WELLINGTON'S  ASSURANCE  OF 
SUPPORT. 

Marshal  Blucher,  as  we  have  seen,'  had.  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  14th,  ordered  a  concentration  of  his  entire 
army  in  the  neighborhood  of  Sombreffe.  This,  as  has 
been  pointed  out  above,  was  done  without  consultation, 
at  the  moment  certainly,  with  the  Duke  of  Wellington ; 
and  we  have  before  stated  that  we  do  not  find  that  it  was 
done  in  pursuance  of  any  previous  arrangement  between 
the  two  commanders.  At  any  rate  it  is  not  disputed 
that  Marshal  BlUcher  took  up  a  position  in  order  of 
battle  to  the  south  of  the  Namur-Nivelles  turnpike  without 
having  received  either  by  letter  or  word  of  mouth  any 
assurance  whatsoever  that  his  English  ally  was  prepared 
to  support  him,  other  than  that  contained  in  MUffling's 
despatch,  sent  off  from  Brussels  about  midnight,  and 
informing  him  that  Wellington  expected  to  be  at 
Nivelles  at  10  A.  M.  in  strong  force.  Zieten's  (1st) 
Corps,  about  five  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  i6th, 
withdrew'  from  the  neighborhood  of  FleUrus,  where  it 
had  passed  the  night  of  the  15th,  to  the  north  side  of  the 
brook  of  Ligny,  and  took  up  position  in  the  villages  of 
St.  Amand,  Brye  and  Ligny.  Between  9  and  10  A.  M. 
the  lid  Corps,  commanded  by  Pirch  I.,^  arrived,  and  took 


^Ante,  p.  70. 

"Ollech,  p.  120. 

•Pirch  II.  commanded  a  brigade  in  the  1st  Corps. 


144  THE    BATTLE    OF   LIGNY.  [CHAP.  10.] 

up  a  position  behind  that  occupied  by  the  1st  Corps."* 
Between  ii  A.  M.and  12  M.the  1 1  Id  Corps,  Thielemann's, 
came  up,  and  occupied  the  hne  between  Sombreffe  and 
Tongrinelle.  These  were  the  positions  which  were  held 
during  the  battle  by  the  three  corps  which  had  been  gotten 
together;  the  IVth  Corps,  Billow's,  it  was  then  known 
could  not  come  up  during  the  day.  Not  until  noon^  did 
Wellington's  letter,  dated  "On  the  heights  behind 
Frasnes,  10.30  A.  M.,"  arrive.  Not  until  i  P.  M.^  did  the 
Duke  himself  meet  Marshal  Bliicher.  Then  a  conversa- 
tion took  place  between  them.  There  is  no  doubt  that 
Wellington  expressed''  himself  as  practically  certain  that 
the  bulk  of  his  army  would  be  assembled  at  Quatre  Bras 
early  in  the  afternoon.  His  verbal  statements  to  Marshal 
Bliicher  were  to  the  same  effect  as  the  statements  con- 
tained in  his  letter.  We  have  seen  how  mistaken  he  was 
in  these,  and  how  he  came  to  be  mistaken.  What  he 
wrote  and  said,  however,  he  honestly  believed ;  and  he 
certainly  did  give  to  Marshal  Bliicher  some  assurance 
that  hQ  should  be  supported  by  the  Anglo-Dutch  forces 
in  his  impending  struggle  with  the  bulk  of  the  French 
army.  According  to  some  authorities,  his  assurance 
took  the  form  of  a  positive  promise  of  support ;  and  these 
writers  do  not  hesitate  to  assert  that  Bliicher's  decision 
to  accept  battle  at  Ligny  was  based  upon  this  definite 
promise.^     "  Upon  this  assurance,"  says  Charras,  "  the 


■♦OUech,  p.  123. 

^Gneisenau,  vol.  4,  p.  373. 

^Ollech,  p.  125. 

^Miiffling:  Passages,  230,231,237. 

^Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.  150,  151,  and  note.  Damitz,  p,  92.  Gneisenau,  vol.  4, 
p.  375.  Charras  states  in  the  note  cited  above  that  Clausewitz  "  says  that  it 
was  the  promise  of  help  from  Wellington  that  decided  Bliicher  to  receive 
battle," — but  we  have  not  been  able  to  find  the  passage.  He  also  says  that 
Siborne  substantially  follows  Damitz  in  this  matter;  but  we  can  not  find  that 
Siborne  represents  Wellington  as  making  any  such  promise.  In  his  official 
report  of  the  battle  Bliicher  does  not  claim  that  such  a  promise  was  given. 
Jones,  pp.  320,  321. 


BLUCHERS   DECISION.  I45 

Prussian  general  decided  to  receive  the  battle  which  he 
could  have  avoided." 

The  principal  knowledge  we  have  of  the  conversation 
between  Wellington  and  Bllicher  comes  from  what 
Muffling  has  told  us  about  it.^  According  to  him  the 
last  words  the  Duke  spoke  were :  —  "  Well !  I  will  come, 
provided  I  am  not  attacked  myself."  General  Dorn- 
berg's  evidence'"  is  to  the  same  effect.  The  latest  Prus- 
sian historian  of  the  campaign"  does  not  claim  that  the 
Duke  gave  Bliicher  any  unconditional  promise  of  sup- 
port. That  a  different  impression  should  have  obtained 
currency  with  the  Prussians  is  very  natural.  The  Duke's 
statements  of  the  proximity  of  his  army,  made  vjiih  per- 
fect honesty,  but  based,  as  we  have  seen,  on  very  errone- 
ous da/a,  no  doubt  raised  false  hopes  in  the  minds  of 
the  Prussian  generals.  That  these  statements  after- 
wards assumed  in  the  mind  of  General  Gneisenau,  the 
Prussian  chief-of-staff,  the  aspect  and  dimensions  of  a 
positive  pledge  of  support,  seems  from  Delbriick's  life  of 
Gneisenau  quite  probable."  But  the  evidence,  what 
there  is  of  it,  and  tlie  probabilities  of  the  case,  are  all  the 
other  way.  That  is  to  say,  Bllicher  decided  to  fight  at 
Ligny,  without  having  any  such  definite  promise  of  sup- 
port from  Wellington,  as  the  latter  relied  upon  when  he 
decided  to  await  the  attack  of  the  French  at  Waterloo, 
two  days  later. 

This  will  appear  more  clearly  when  we  consider  the 
other  assertion  made  on  behalf  of  the  Prussian  com- 
mander, of  which  we  have  made  mention  above, —  namely, 
that  Bluchers  decision  to  accept  battle  at  Ligny  was 


'Miiffling :  Passages,  pp.  233-237, 

'°011ech,  p.  127,  note. 

"lb.,  p.  127. 

"011ech(p.  142;  quotes  Gneisenau  as  writing  on  the  17th:  "We  received  from 
the  Duke  of  Wellington  the  written  promise  that  if  the  enemy  should  attack 
us,  he  would  attack  them  in  the  rear."  There  is  no  such  promise  in  Welling- 
ton's letter  to  Bllicher. 


146  THE    BATTLE   OF   LIGNY.  [CHAP.  10.] 

based  upon  this  promise  of  support  from  Wellington.'^ 
Delbriick,  in  his  Life  of  Gneisenau/'*  says :  "  Although 
this  position  [z.  e.,  at  and  near  Ligny]  had  been  carefully 
considered  and  taken  up  with  all  caution,  it  was  yet  not 
fully  decided  to  receive  battle."  This  decision  was  not 
arrived  at,  we  are  given  to  understand,  until  Bliicher  had 
received  from  Wellington  a  promise  of  support.  That 
could  not  have  been  until  between  i  and  2  o'clock  P.  M., 
for  the  Duke  did  not  arrive  at  Brye  till  one  o'clock. 
Miiffling  says'^  that  it  was  "when  the  heads  of  Napoleon's 
attacking  columns  showed  themselves  moving  upon  St. 
Amand"  that  "the  Duke  asked  the  Field  Marshal 
[Bliicher]  and  General  von  Gneisenau :  'Qzie  voulez-vous 
que  je  fasse? '" 

That  is,  we  are  asked  to  believe  that  Bliicher  had 
not  fully  decided  to  await  the  attack  of  these  French 
columns,  now  seen  to  be  advancing,  in  the  positions 
which  had  been  deliberately  selected,  and  on  which  the 
troops  had  been  carefully  stationed,  until  the  Duke  of 
Wellington  had  stated  himself  able  to  do  what  Bliicher 
and  Gneisenau  wished  him  to  do.  We  are  asked  to 
believe  that  Bliicher  would  have  retreated  if  Wellington 
had  told  him  that  his  situation  was  such  that  he  could 
not  bring  him  any  aid. 

We  must  say  that  such  a  contention  seems  to  us 
hardly  to  deserve  serious  consideration.  It  is  surely 
plain  enough  that  Bliicher  had  chosen  a  battle-field, — 
had  posted  his  army  there, —  had  encouraged  his  troops 
to  expect  a  conflict  with  the  French, —  without  taking 
counsel  with  the  English  general.'^  Had  he  determined 
to  fight  only  if  he  should  receive  assurance  of  support 
from -Wellington,  would  he  not  have  taken  some  pains  to 


"La  Tour  D'Auvergne,  p.  109,  entirely  disbelieves  this  assertion. 

'^Gneisenau,  p.  372. 

"Muffling :  Passages,  p.  234. 

'*  Bliicher's  Report  leaves  the  question  open.    Jones,  pp.  320,  321. 


[chap.  10.]  blucher's  decision.  147 

obtain  such  assurance  ?  Would  he  have  left  it  entirely  to 
the  chance  of  Wellington's  writing  him  a  letter,  or  riding 
over  to  his  headquarters  ?  These  questions  answer  them- 
selves. 

We  conclude,  then,  that  it  is  a  fact  beyond  contro- 
versy that  Marshal  Blucher  decided  to  accept  battle  at 
Ligny  altogether  independently  of  any  support  or  assist- 
ance that  might  be  afforded  him  by  the  Anglo-Dutch 
army.  He  deliberately  ran  the  risk  of  encountering, 
unsupported  by  his  allies,  and  with  such  only  of  his 
troops  as  he  could  on  short  notice  collect  close  to  the 
frontier,  the  bulk  of  the  French  army  under  Napoleon 
himself.  How  far  he  was  wise  in  this  we  will  consider 
in  another  place ;  what  we  have  sought  to  make  plain 
now  is  that  such  was  the  fact. 


NOTE  TO   CHAPTER  X. 

What  were  the  reasons  which  induced  Marshal 
Bllicher  to  take  up  a  defensive  position  at  Ligny,  and 
there  await  the  attack  of  Napoleon  ?  The  question  is 
certainly  an  important  one.  We  have  considered  above 
and  rejected  the  answer  to  this  question  offered  by  some 
Prussian  writers,  that  Bllicher  accepted  battle  only  on 
the  definite  promise  of  support  from  Wellington.  It 
remains  to  see  what  other  reasons  have  been  adduced 
for  his  taking  a  step  so  perilous  to  the  fortunes  of 
the  allies. 

Neither  Clausewitz  nor  Jomini  pay  any  attention  to 
the  question. 

Damitz"  explanation  is  as  follows  : — 

"Marshal  Bliicher  was  free  to  refuse  the  combat;  he  could  very 
well  have  avoided  it,  and  have  waited  until  the  IVth  Corps  should 
have  joined  him.  But,  seeing  himself  at  the  head  of  80,000  men, 
it  was  not  in  his  firm  and  decided  character  to  turn  his  back  on  an 
adversary.  He  knew  that  he  could  not  vanquish  Napoleon  by  skil- 
ful manoeuvres,  but  only  by  repeated  blows.  The  General  and  his 
army  felt  themselves  strong  enough ;  that  was  of  itself  a  reason  for 
not  avoiding  a  battle." 

He  then  goes  on  to  show  that  a  march  to  join  the 
English  army  would  involve  a  temporary  renunciation  of 
the  Prussian  base  of  operations. 

These  are  the  reasons  he  gives.      He  adds  most  unex- 


'Damitz,  p.  85. 


[chap.  10.]  BLUCHERS  DECISION. — NOTES.  I49 

pectedly:  — ""  "It  is  then  evident  that  the  Prussians 
decided  on  accepting  battle  because  the  Duke  of  Wel- 
lington had  given  them  his  word."  But  of  any  such  fact 
as  this  no  mention  whatever  is  made  until  the  writer  has 
occasion  to  speak^  of  the  conversation  between  Welling- 
ton and  Bliicher  between  i  and  2  P.  M.,  when  the  French 
were  deploying  their  columns  for  the  attack.  It  is 
impossible  to  believe  that  Bliicher  had  not  before  this 
made  up  his  mind  to  fight,  altogether  independently  of 
anything  Wellington  might  say  to  him. 

Ollech'^  suggests,  as  an  answer  to  the  question,  "  Why 
did  Bliicher  give  battle  on  the  i6th  although  a  whole 
army  corps  had  not  arrived  ? "  that  he  did  it  in  order  to 
give  the  English  army  time  to  concentrate.  This  writer 
does  not  pretend  that  Wellington  gave  the  Field 
Marshal  any  definite  promise  of  support.^ 

Delbriack,  in  his  Life  of  Gneisenau,  says^  that  Bliicher, 
relying  on  Wellington's  promise,  and  still  hoping  that  at 
least  late  in  the  evening  a  portion  of  the  IVth  Corps  would 
arrive,  concluded  to  give  battle. 

There  is  really  not  much  to  be  said  on  this  subject. 
The  truth  is  plain  enough.  Bliicher  had,  as  we  have 
said  above,^  long  ago  fixed  upon  Sombreffe  as  the  point 
of  concentration  for  his  army  in  case  the  French  should 
cross  the  Sambre  at  or  near  Charleroi ;  and  he  had,  most 
likely,  communicated  this  determination  to  the  Duke  of 
Wellington.  In  arriving  at  this  determination  he 
undoubtedly  assumed  that  he  would  be  able  to  collect 
his  whole  army  together,— say,  120,000  men.  He 
thought,  and  he  had  a  right  to  think,  that  if  Napoleon 


"Damitz,  p.  87. 

'lb.,  p.  92. 

^Ollecli,  pp.  123,  124. 

*Ib.,  p.  127. 

'Gneisenau,  vol.  4,  P-  375- 

'Ante,  p.  70. 


150  THE   BATTLE   OF   LIGNY. — NOTES.        [CHAP.  10.] 

should  advance  by  way  of  Charleroi,  he  would  be  sure  to 
attack  the  Prussian  army  if  it  should  be  found  posted  at 
or  south   of  Sombreffe;  and  that  Napoleon  would  be 
obliged  to    employ  against  it  the  bulk  of  his   army. 
Hence  Bliicher  calculated  that  the  Anglo-Dutch  concen- 
tration could  be  effected  without  serious  molestation, 
and  that  some  assistance  at  any  rate  from  that  quarter 
might  safely  be  counted  on.     But  when  the  day  arrived, 
he  found  that  he  could  not  reckon  on  the  arrival  of  one 
of  his  corps  in  time  for  the  battle.    Yet  he  still  adhered 
to  his  determination  to  accept  the  contest,  partly  from 
unwillingness  to  retreat  at  the  outset  of  the  campaign, 
and  partly  in  the  hope  that  important  aid  would  be 
received    from   Wellington.    This  determination,  how- 
ever, was  arrived  at  without  consultation  with  Welling- 
ton and  before  his  letter  was  received,—  in  which,  it  is 
to  be   noted,  there   is   no  promise  whatever,— and,   of 
course,  before  the   Duke  himself  rode  over  to   Brye. 
What  Wellington  said  no  doubt  strengthened  the  Field 
Marshal  in  his  belief  in  the  soundness  of  his  decision ;  it 
reinforced  his  judgment ;  it  gave  him  hopes  of  victory. 
But  to  say  that  his  decision  to  receive  the  attack  of  the 
French  at  Ligny  was  based  upon  any  promise  of  sup- 
port made  by   Wellington,  is  entirely  contrary  to  the 
evidence. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE    BATTLE    OF   LIGNY. 

Marshal  Blucher  had  taken  up  a  position,  which 
although  in  some  respects  determined  by  the  nature  of 
the  ground,  was  nevertheless  intended  to  secure  two 
objects,  —  first,  his  line  of  communications  with  Namur, 
and  an  unobstructed  march  for  his  expected  I  Vth  Corps, 
Billow's,  and,  secondly,  his  avenue  of  communication 
with  the  Anglo-Dutch  army,  from  which  he  expected  to 
receive  at  least  some  assistance  in  the  course  of  the 
afternoon.  It  thus  came  about  that  the  centre  of  the 
Prussian  army  was  at  Sombreffe,  —  that  the  line  of  the 
right  wing  ran  through  the  villages  of  Ligny  and  St. 
Amand  in  a  south-westerly  direction,  and  that  that  of 
the  left  wing  ran  from  Sombreffe  through  the  hamlet  of 
Mont  Potriaux  to  Tongrinelle  and  Balatre  in  a  south- 
easterly direction.  This  left  wing  consisted  entirely  of 
the  II Id  Corps,  Thielemann's.  It  contained  22,051 
infantry,  2,405  cavalry,  and  48  guns. '  The  1st  Corps, 
Zieten's  held  the  front  of  the  centre  and  right  wing,  and 
was  supported  by  the  lid  Corps,  that  of  Pirch  I., 
throughout  its  whole  extent.  These  two  corps  contained 
56,803  infantry,  6,093  cavalry,  and  176  guns.'  The 
right  wing  was  "  in  the  air " ;  it  was  possible  to  turn  it 
completely,  by  way  of  St.  Amand  and  Wagnelee. 
Behind  Ligny   and   St.   Amand,   and   on  commanding 


Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  155,  n. 
lb.,  p.  155,  n. 


152  THE   BATTLE   OF   LIGNY.  [CHAP.  II.] 

ground,  was  the  village  of  Brye.  Bluchers  whole  force 
thus  consisted  of  87,352  men,  of  whom  8,498  were  cavalry, 
—  with  224  guns. 

Napoleon,  having  finished  giving  his  orders  shortly 
after  nine,  arrived  at  Fleurus  about  11  A.  M.  ^  He 
busied  himself,  while  the  troops  were  arriving,  with 
examining  the  enemy's  position.  From  the  tower  of  an 
old  and  disused  windmill  in  the  outskirts  of  the  town  he 
made,  it  is  said,  his  first  observations.  Then  he  went,  — 
wdthout  his  staff,  as  his  custom  was  before  a  battle,  — 
partly  on  horseback  and  partly  on  foot,  along  the  front  of 
the  enemy's  position,  seeing  for  himself  everything  that 
could  be  seen.  By  the  time  the  troops  had  arrived  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Fleurus,  he  had  formed  his  plan. 
He  had  not,  however,  correctly  estimated  the  numbers 
of  the  force  opposed  to  him ;  the  nature  of  the  ground 
prevented  his  being  able  to  see  all  the  enemy's  troops.  ^ 

The  more  natural  and  obvious  plan  for  Napoleon 
would  have  been  to  direct  his  attack  upon  the  exposed 
Prussian  right  wing,  and  to  operate  in  conjunction  with 
the  column  under  Marshal  Ney,  so  far  as  that  might  seem 
expedient.  By  moving  upon  Wagnelee  and  Brye,  he 
would  turn  the  position  of  St.  Amand,  and  almost  cer- 
tainly secure  a  victory.  But  Napoleon  did  not  see  in 
this  operation  any  chance  of  inflicting  a  decisive  blow.  ^ 
At  most,  he  would  only  have  defeated  an  exposed  wing 
of  the  enemy's  army.  There  w^ould  have  been  nothing 
to  prevent  its  falling  back  upon  the  centre  and  left  wing. 
The  Prussians  would  no  doubt  be  worsted,  but  their 
defeat  could  hardly  be  of  a  character  to  cripple  them. 
Nor  would  their  communications  be  in  the  slightest 
degree  imperilled. 

What  Napoleon  determined  on  was  an  operation  far 


^  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  145. 

*  lb.,  p.  150. 

5  For  a  further  discussion  of  this  subject  see  the  Notes  to  this  chapter. 


[chap.  II.]  THE    BATTLE    OF   LIGNY.  153 

more  decisive.  He  saw  that  that  part  of  the  Prussian 
army  which  lay  in  the  neighborhood  of  Sombreffe, 
Tongrinelle  and  Balatre,  placed  there,  as  it  had  been,  for 
the  purpose  of  protecting  the  communications  with 
Namur,  would  in  all  probability  not  dare  to  move  from 
its  position,  and  would  accordingly  not  be  able  to  take 
any  active  part  in  the  battle.  He  would  therefore  have  to 
deal  only  with  that  portion  of  the  enemy's  army  which 
lay  between  Sombreffe  and  St.  Amand,  — say,  two-thirds 
of  their  entire  force.  He  also  saw  that  if  the  enemy's 
centre,  between  Ligny  and  Sombreffe,  could  be  broken, 
the  Prussian  right  wing  would  be  separated  from  the 
rest  of  the  army,  and  that  he  might  hope  to  overwhelm 
it.  He  saw  also  one  other  thing.  If,  at  or  about  the 
time  when  this  success  should  be  obtained,  a  strong 
column  from  Marshal  Ney's  command  could  march 
down  the  Quatre  Bras-Namur  turnpike  and  move  upon 
Brye,  that  success  would  almost  certainly  be  of  the  most 
decisive  character.  ^  Attacked  in  front  and  rear  at  the 
same  time,  its  connection  with  the  rest  of  the  army 
severed,  surrounded  by  superior  numbers,  the  utter  rout 
of  that  part  of  the  Prussian  army  was  inevitable.  (See 
Map  6.) 

At  one  o'clock  the  French  army  had  arrived,  and  was 
in  and  about  Fleurus.  The  Emperor  threw  the  4th 
Corps,  Gerard's,  about  16,000  strong,  ^  with  38  guns,  far 
to  the  right,  opposite  the  whole  front  of  the  village  of 
Ligny;  the  3d  Corps,  Vandamme's,  about  19,000 
strong,  ^  with  38  guns,  connected  with  the  left  of  the  4th 
Corps,  and,  assisted  by  Girard's  division  of  the  2d  Corps, 


*  "  A  movement  that  would  certainly  have  obtained  an  immense  victory." 
Jomini,  p.  223. 

">  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  155,  n.  The  division  of  Hulot  and  the  cavalry  of  Maurin 
were  stationed  opposite  the  bend  in  the  enemy's  line,  beyond  Ligny.  lb.,  p. 
161. 

*Ib.,  p.  155,  n. 


154  THE   BATTLE    OF   LIGNY.  [CHAP.   II.] 

about  4,300  Strong,  ^  with  8  guns,  menaced  the  Prussians 
in  the  village  of  St.  Amand ;  while  the  cavalry  of  Pajol 
and  Exelmans,  to  the  number  of  about  6,500  men, '°  with 
24  guns,  supported  by  Hulot's  division  of  the  4th  Corps, 
observed  the  Prussian  left  wing,  —  stationed  from 
Sombreffe  to  Balatre.  The  Guard,  with  Milhaud's 
Cuirassiers,  in  all  about  22,000  men,  with  102  guns,"  was 
kept  in  reserve,  near  Fleurus,  ready  to  strike  the  final 
blow  when  the  enemy  in  Ligny  and  St.  Amand  should 
have  been  sufificiently  weakened  by  a  continuous  struggle 
of  three  or  four  hours.  The  whole  force  consisted  of 
67,787  men,  of  whom  13,394  were  cavalry,  with  210 
guns.  "  These  dispositions  consumed  perhaps  an  hour 
or  more.  At  2  o'clock  the  chief-of-sta£f,  Soult,  wrote  '^ 
to  Marshal  Ney,  informing  him  that,  at  half-past  two 
Marshal  Grouchy,  with  the  3d  and  4th  Corps,  would 
commence  an  attack  on  a  Prussian  corps  stationed 
between  Sombreffe  and  Brye ;  that  it  was  the  Emperor's 
intention  that  Ney  should  also  attack  the  enemy  before 
him ;  and,  after  having  vigorously  driven  them,  should 
fall  back  upon  the  main  army  to  join  in  enveloping  this 
Prussian  corps,  of  which  mention  had  just  been  made. 

Then,  at  half-past  two  precisely,  the  battle  began ;  '^ 
Gerard  vigorously  attacked  Ligny,  — Vandamme  and 
Girard,  St.  Amand.  With  equal  vigor  did  the  Prussians 
defend  their  positions.    The  engagement  immediately 


9  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  155,  n. 

'°Ib.,  p.  155,  n. 

"lb.,  p.  15s,  n. 

"lb.,  p.  155,  n.  This  is  exclusive  of  the  6th  Corps,  which  was  in  reserve. 
It  numbered  10,465  men,  with  32  guns. 

"Doc.  Indd.,  XIII,  p.  40;  App.  C,  xxv;  post,  pp.  383,  384. 

•■•The  battle  of  Ligny  has  often  been  described.  Charras,  La  Tour 
d'Auvergne,  Thiers,  on  the  French  side,  Clausewitz  and  OUech  on  the  Ger- 
man side,  give  excellent  descriptions.  Siborne's  account  is  also  very  clear  and 
good.     It  is  unnecessary  to  repeat  the  details  here. 


[chap.  II.]  THE    BATTLE    OF   LIGNY.  155 

became  very  hot,  and  very  sanguinary.  Both  sides 
fought  with  singular  determination.  In  less  than  an 
hour  Napoleon  was  convinced  that  he  had  more  than  a 
single  corps  to  deal  with,  —  as  he  had  written  to  Ney, — 
it  was  an  army.  The  success,  therefore,  could  be  made 
more  decisive  than  he  had  at  first  thought  possible,  if 
only  at  the  proper  time  Ney's  cooperation  could  be 
secured.  Without  that  cooperation,  indeed,  he  was 
practically  sure  of  victory;  it  was  plain  to  him  that 
the  Prussians  in  the  villages  of  Ligny  and  St.  Amand 
and  its  neighboring  hamlets,  and  on  the  heights  in  the 
rear  of  these  villages,  were  becoming  exhausted,  and 
were  suffering  terribly  from  the  fire  of  his  guns,  to  which 
their  position  on  the  heights  exposed  them;'^  he  knew 
that  when  the  proper  moment  arrived  he  could  defeat 
them  ;  but  he  wanted  something  more  than  a  defeat ;  he 
saw  that  the  rout  or  capture  of  this  part  of  the  Prussian 
army  was  a  certain  thing  if  Ney  could  only  make  that 
movement  from  Quatre  Bras  upon  their  right  and  rear, 
of  which  he  had  spoken  in  his  2  o'clock  order.  Hence 
at  a  quarter-past  three  Soult  wrote  to  Ney  again,'^ 
urging  him  to  manoeuvre  at  once,  so  as  to  envelop  the 
enemy's  right,  and  to  fall  on  his  rear.  He  told  him  that 
the  Prussian  army  was  lost  if  he  acted  vigorously ;  that 
"the  fate  of  France  was  in  his  hands."  "Thus,"  the 
order  proceeds,  "  do  not  hesitate  an  instant  to  make  the 
movement  which  the  Emperor  orders,  and  direct  yourself 
on  the  heights  of  Brye  and  St.  Amand  to  assist  in  a 
victory  perhaps  decisive." 

The  officers  who    carried    these    orders    had    some 


»  Sir  Henry  Hardinge,  speaking  to  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  said:  "  When 
you  had  examined  the  Prussian  position,  I  remember  you  much  disapproved 
of  it,  and  said  to  me,  'if  they  fight  here  they  will  be   damnably  mauled.' " 

*  *  *  The  Duke  added :  "  They  were  dotted  in  this  way  —  all  their 
bodies  along  the  slope  of  a  hill,  so  that  no  cannon-ball  missed  its  effect  upon 
them."     Stanhope,  p.  109.     Cf.  Hooper,  p.  96. 

'6  Doc.  Indd.,  XIV,  p.  42  ;  App.  C,  xxvi;  post,  p.  384. 


156  THE    BATTLE   OF   LIGNY.  [CHAP.  II.] 

thirteen  miles  to  ride,  about  six  miles  on  cross-roads,  as 
far  as  Gosselies,  and  the  remainder  on  the  great  Brussels 
turnpike,  on  which  d'Erlon's  troops  were  marching 
towards  Frasnes.  Their  errands  could  not  have  been 
performed  in  less  than  two  hours, '''  and  as  a  matter  of  fact 
they  required  three  hours.  Napoleon  could  hardly  have 
expected  the  first  order  to  reach  Ney  much  before  5  P.  M., 
and  the  second  hardly  before  6  P.  M.  The  distance  from 
Quatre  Bras  to  Marbais,  where  the  road  branches  off 
from  the  Namur  turnpike  in  the  direction  of  Wagnelee, 
is  nearly  four  miles.  If  then  at  5  o'clock  it  should  be  in 
Marshal  Ney's  power  to  execute  the  2  P.  M.  order,  his 
troops  might  be  looked  for  or  heard  from  in  the  direction 
of  Marbais  about  7  o'clock.  If  he  should  be  unable  to 
obey  the  2  o'clock  order,  but  should  be  able  to  execute 
the  3.15  order,  his  movement  down  the  Namur  road 
might  be  looked  for  about  8  o'clock. 

The  battle  then  went  on  with  unabated  determination 
and  with  heavy  loss  on  both  sides.  Bliacher  reinforced 
his  troops  from  time  to  time ;  in  this  way  he  exhausted 
his  reserves ;  nearly  all  his  divisions  were  brought  under 
fire.  Napoleon  on  the  other  hand  was  exceedingly  chary 
of  giving  aid  to  the  two  corps  engaged ;  he  wished  to 
keep  his  reserves  as  large  as  possible ;  at  half-past  five 
he  had  employed  ten  thousand  fewer  men  than  his 
adversary.  '^  At  this  time,  also,  the  6th  Corps  was  well 
on  its  way  from  Charleroi.  The  hour  was  approaching, 
too,  when  Ney's  cooperation  might  be  expected. 

Up  to  this  time  Napoleon  had  remained  in  his  position 
in  front  of  Fleurus ;  '^  it  was  a  central  position,  and  noth- 
ing had  called  for  his  personal  superintendence  elsewhere. 


"The  Duke  of  Elchingen  — Doc.  Indd.,  p.  41  —  estimates  the  distance  at 
nearly  five  leagues,  that  is,  i2h  miles,  and  allows  two  hours  for  the  time 
occupied,  Charras,  vol.  i,  page  204,  n.,  makes  the  distance  six  leagues  (15 
miles)  and  estimates  the  time  at  three  hours. 

'8  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  166. 

«9Ib.,  p.  164. 


[chap.  II.]  THE    BATTLE    OF   LIGNY.  1 57 

But  now  he  prepared  to  strike  the  decisive  blow.  He 
determined  to  put  in  the  Guard.  He  proposed  to  send 
to  Vandamme  the  infantry  division  known  as  the  Young 
Guard,  and  one  of  the  two  brigades  of  the  division 
known  as  the  chasseurs  of  the  Guard ; ''°  the  other  bri- 
gade of  this  division  he  would  place  at  the  disposal  of 
Gerard.  He  himself,  at  the  head  of  the  infantry 
division  of  grenadiers  of  the  Guard,  known  as  the  Old 
Guard,  with  all  the  artillery  of  the  Guard,  with  Guyot's 
division  of  the  heavy  cavalry  of  the  Guard,  and  Milhaud's 
division  of  cuirassiers  of  the  line, —  to  take  the  place  of 
Lefebvre-Desnouettes'  division  of  light  cavalry  of  the 
Guard  which  was  with  the  left  wing  under  Marshal  Ney, 
— prepared  to  carry  the  village  of  Ligny,  and  the  com- 
manding heights  above  and  to  the  right  of  the  village, 
thereby  breaking  the  centre  of  the  enemy's  line. 

At  this  moment,  however,  word  came  from  Van- 
damme that  a  column  of  the  enemy  was  seen  de- 
bouching from  a  wood  some  two  miles  away,  and 
apparently  marching  on  Fleurus.  This  was  not  the 
quarter  in  which  the  expected  reinforcement  from  Ney 
was  looked  for.  Curiously  enough,  Vandamme  did  not 
ascertain  what  this  column  was.  Why  he  should  not 
have  done  this  it  is  not  easy  to  see.  Had  he  sent  a 
patrol  to  find  out  who  these  troops  were,  time  would 
have  been  saved,  and  time,  at  that  hour  in  the  day,  was 
most  important.  The  Emperor  sent  one  of  his  own 
aides  to  ascertain  the  facts;  and,  pending  his  report, 
suspended  the  projected  attack.  The  battle  went  on  as 
before,  but  BlUcher  drew  more  and  more  from  his  centre 
and  left  wing  to  support  his  right  at  St.  Amand  and  the 
neighboring  villages. 

In  something  less  than  two  hours  the  aide  returned. 


''"Sometimes  classed  as  part  of  the  Old  Guard,  as  in  Charras,  vol.  i,  p,  67 
and  La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  p.  48,  and  sometimes  as  "  the  Middle  Guard"  {la 
Garde  moyetine).     See  "  Napoleon  \  Waterloo,"  p,  315,  n.  i  ;  p.  325. 


158  THE    BATTLE   OF   LIGNY.  [CHAP.   II.] 

The  troops  which  Vandamme  had  reported  advancing 
were  those  of  d'Erlon's  Corps/'  All  anxiety  was  relieved. 
Napoleon  naturally  concluded"  that  d'Erlon  had  been 
sent  by  Ney,  and  would  immediately  move  on  Brye.  He 
instantly  resumed  the  suspended  movement.^^  Before 
half-past  seven,  Vandamme  had  received  his  reinforce- 
ments, and  had  renewed  the  fight  with  energy.  At  the 
same  time  the  Emperor,  at  the  head  of  the  grenadiers 
and  cavalry  of  the  Guard  and  of  Milhaud's  cuirassiers, 
marched  for  the  village  of  Ligny,  of  which  the  eastern 
portion  was  already  in  the  possession  of  Gerard's  Corps. 
The  Prussians,  though  fighting  desperately,  were  speed- 
ily overcome;  the  village  was  carried;  the  brook  of 
Ligny,  a  serious  obstacle  for  both  cavalry  and  artillery, 
was  crossed  on  the  bridges  in  the  town ;  and  at  half-past 
eight  o'clock"^  the  French  troops,  passing  out  of  the 
northern  end  of  the  village,  deployed  on  the  heights 
lying  between  that  village  and  Sombreffe,  and  ascended 
the  plateau,  the  key  to  the  field  of  battle,  on  which  stood 
the  windmill  of  Bussy.  The  Prussian  troops  which 
BlUcher  had  allowed  to  remain  on  this  part  of  the  line 
offered  a  stout  but  ineffectual  resistance.  The  old 
Marshal  himself  came  up  from  St.  Amand,  where  he  had 
wrongly  supposed  that  the  crisis  of  the  battle  was  being 
decided,  and  at  the  head  of  a  body  of  cavalry  fiercely 
charged  the  victorious  French.  In  one  of  the  encounters 
his  horse  was  killed,  he  himself  was  badly  bruised,  and 
came  very  near  being  taken  prisoner. 


^'We  shall  consider  in  another  place  how  d'Erlon's  Corps  came  to  be  there. 
Shortly  after  it  was  seen  by  Vandamme  it  retired  to  Frasnes. 

"La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  p.  135  :  Jomini,  pp.  13S,  139. 

"There  was  no  delay,  as  suggested  by  Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  218.  From  where 
the  Guard  had  been  stationed  to  the  northerly  end  of  the  village  of  Ligny, 
where  it  was  put  in,  was  at  least  two  miles  and  a  half.  Only  a  small  part  of 
this  distance  had  been  traversed  before  the  news  from  Vandamme  caused  a 
halt. 

''''Charras,  vol.  i,p.  175,  n.  2  :  letter  from  Soult  to  Joseph  Bonaparte. 


[chap.  II.]  THE    BATTLE    OF   LIGNY.  159 

Meantime,  the  Prussians  fell  back  from  St.  Amand 
and  the  neighboring  villages,  which  were  at  once  occu- 
pied by  Vandamme.  Brye,  however,  was  held  until  mid- 
night by  Pirch  I.  with  a  strong  rear  guard,  and  Thiele- 
mann occupied  Sombreffe  and  Point  du  Jour.  The  corps 
of  Zieten,  followed  finally  by  that  of  Pirch  I.,  retreated 
on  Tilly,  a  town  just  north  of  Sombreffe,  and  in  the 
direction  of  Wavre. 

The  Prussians  lost'^  in  this  battle  about  18,000 
men  killed  and  wounded ;  and,  a  day  or  two  afterwards, 
about  10,000  or  12,000  more,  who  would  seem  to  have 
done  their  duty  in  the  fight,  abandoned  their  colors,  and 
retired  towards  Liege.  These  men  belonged  to  prov- 
inces which  had  formerly  been  part  of  the  French 
Empire,  and  their  sympathies  were  with  Napoleon.^^ 
The  French  captured  some  thousands  of  the  Prussian 
wounded,  and  25  or  30  guns.  The  French  loss  was 
between  11,000  and  12,000  men.'^ 

The  battle  was  over  at  about  half-past  nine.  The  3d 
Corps  established  itself  in  bivouac  beyond  St.  Amand 
and  Wagnelee ;  the  6th  Corps  occupied  the  plateau  of 
Bussy;  the  4th  Corps  was  on  the  right  of  the  6th,  with 
one  division  at  and  near  Potriaux.  The  Guard  and 
Milhaud's  cuirassiers  occupied  a  line  behind  these 
troops.""^  At  1 1  P.  M.  the  Emperor  returned  to  Fleurus,''^ 
where  he  established  his  headquarters. 

All  parts  of  the  French  army  on  the  field  had  taken  part 
in  this  action  except  the  ist  and  6th  Corps.  The  ist  Corps 
retired  towards  Frasnes  soon  after  it  had  been  seen.    As 

"^Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  179,  where  he  discusses  the  Prussian  authorities.  Cf. 
Muquardt,  p.  139,  n. 

^Cf.  Gneisenau,  vol.  4,  pp.  381,  382.  Muffling:  Passages,  pp.  204,  205,  223. 
Siborne,  vol.  i,  pp.  302,  303. 

"Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  180. 

"lb.,  pp.  177,  178. 

■»Ib.,  p.  179. 


l60  THE   BATTLE   OF   LIGNY.  [CHAP.  II.] 

for  the  6th  Corps,  the  order  to  Lobau,  which  was  not 
sent  until  2.30  P.  M.,  could  not  have  reached  him  in 
his  bivouac  near  Charleroi  till  3.30  P.  M.  He  had  eight 
miles  to  march  before  reaching  Fleurus;  he  was  then 
directed  on  Ligny,  and  he  passed  through  Ligny,  just 
after  the  successful  attack  of  that  place  by  the  Imperial 
Guard,  to  his  final  position  on  the  plateau  of  Bussy, 
between  Brye  and  Sombreffe,  where  he  arrived  about 
9.30  P.  M.  ^°  It  has  been  considered  singular,  that  when 
Lobau  arrived  at  Fleurus,  say,  about  7.30  P.  M.,^'  he 
should  have  been  directed  on  Ligny,  apparently  to 
support  the  movement  of  the  Guard ;  whereas  if  he  had 
been  instructed  to  move  on  Brye  by  passing  around  St. 
Amand  and  Wagnelee  it  would  seem  that  he  might  have 
struck  the  defeated  Prussians  in  flank  and  rear,  and 
accomplished  substantially  what  Napoleon  expected  from 
Ney.  But  the  withdrawal  of  the  ist  Corps  could  only  be 
explained  by  the  supposition  that  Ney  had  encountered 
the  English  in  considerable  force;  and  under  these 
circumstances  Napoleon  may  have  deemed  it  wiser  to 
retain  the  6th  Corps  as  a  reserve  for  the  whole  army.^^ 

The  battle  of  Ligny  was  a  great  victory,  although  it 
was  not  a  decisive  victory.  Napoleon  had  diminished  by 
one-third  the  strength  of  his  opponent's  army,  and  had 
also  driven  him  from  the  field.  He  had  certainly  achieved 
a  great  success.  But  the  advantage  obtained  was  not  all 
that  he  had  a  right  to  expect.  Had  it  not  been  for  the 
appearance  of  d'Erlon's  Corps  in  the  neighborhood  of  St. 
Amand,  the  attack  by  the  Guard  would  have  been  made 
at  half-past  five  o'clock,  when  there  would  have  been 
sufficient  daylight  left  to  have  made  it  possible  to  follow 
up  the  victory.     On  such  a  result  as  would  have  been 


^'Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  178. 

3'Charras  (vol.  i,  p.  184)  thinks  it  was  not  later  than  6.30  P.  M.  when  the 
6th  Corps  reached  Fleurus. 

^-Charras  (vol.  i,  pp.  184,  185)  severely  criticises  this  decision. 


[chap.  II.]  THE    BATTLE    OF   LIGNY.  l6l 

obtained  in  this  event  Napoleon  had  a  right  to  calculate, 
and  that  he  did  not  obtain  such  a  result  was  in  no  way 
his  fault."  For  the  purpose  therefore,  of  estimating  the 
adequacy  of  the  Emperor's  measures  to  the  task  before 
him,  and  the  danger  which  Marshal  Blucher  ran  when 
he  accepted  battle,  we  should  consider  what  would  have 
been  the  result,  if  the  attack  of  the  Guard  had  been  made 
two  hours  earlier  than  it  was  made,  and  there  had  been 
two  hours  of  daylight  in  which  to  complete  the  defeat 
and  to  pursue  the  enemy. 

As  for  the  cooperation  of  Ney,  that  is  a  different 
matter.  Napoleon  could  not  know  what  resistance  Ney 
might  encounter;  hence  he  could  not  calculate  on  his 
overcoming  that  resistance  and  sending  a  reinforcement 
to  the  main  army,  —  he  could  only  hope  that  Ney  would 
be  able  to  do  this.  If  Ney  should  be  able  to  keep  off  the 
English,  all  that  Napoleon  had  a  right  to  calculate  on 
would  be  effected.  Whether  Ney  could  have  accom- 
plished more  than  he  did  accomplish  will  be  considered 
in  another  place. 

Owing,  then,  to  the  postponement  of  the  attack  on  the 
Prussian  centre  caused  by  the  unexpected  apparition  of 
a  large  body  of  troops  (the  ist  Corps),  in  a  quarter  where 
it  threatened  the  French  left,  the  victory  of  Ligny  was 
by  no  means  so  complete  as  it  otherwise  would  have  been. 
Darkness  came  on  before  the  Prussians,  retiring  from 
St.  Amand  and  the  neighboring  hamlets,  could  be  vig- 
orously pressed.  Nevertheless,  the  victory  of  Ligny  had 
disposed  of  Bllicher  for  thirty-six  hours,  at  the  very  least. 
It  gave  Napoleon  an  opportunity  of  attacking  Wellington 
the  next  day  without  danger  of  interference  from  the 
Prussians.  And  as  this  success  had  been  achieved  with 
no  loss  at  all  on  the  part  of  the  ist  and  6th  Corps  and 
with  a  trifling  loss  on  the  part  of  the  Guard,   Napoleon 


^^Unless  he  erred  in  arresting  the  attack  of  the  Guard  on  the  appearance 
of  the  strange  corps.     SQ&post,  p.  174,  notj  8. 


l62  THE    BATTLE    OF   LIGNY.  [CHAP.   II.] 

was  in  excellent  condition  to  take  advantage  of  the 
opportunity  thus  presented.  That  is  to  say,  the  decision 
of  Marshal  Blucher  to  accept  battle  when  he  had  collected 
only  three-fourths  of  his  army,  and  the  inability  of 
the  Duke  of  Wellington  to  render  him  any  assistance, 
had  produced  this  result  at  the  close  of  the  second  day 
of  the  campaign,  —  that  one  of  the  allied  armies  had  been 
badly  beaten,  and  that  Napoleon  was  perfectly  free  to 
attack  the  other  the  next  day  with  superior  forces,  most 
of  which  consisted  of  fresh  troops. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  XI. 

I.  Napoleon  has  been  often  blamed  because  he  did 
not  begin  the  battle  of  Ligny  till  between  two  and  three 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  We  have  spoken  of  this  criticism 
before,  and  recur  to  it  now  merely  to  repeat  that  the 
greater  part  of  this  delay  may  (in  all  probability)  be 
accounted  for  by  his  wish  that  his  own  advance-move- 
ment should  be  contemporaneous  with  that  of  the  left 
wing,  one-half  of  which  was  far  in  the  rear.  There  was 
probably  also  an  unusual  amount  of  time  spent  in 
examining  the  position  of  the  enemy. 

Clausewitz'  is  undoubtedly  right  in  saying  that 
"  If  the  actual  tactical  shock  of  battle  could  have  been  arranged  to 
take  place  in  the  morning  of  the  i6th,  it  would  have  been  an  enor- 
mous mistake  in  Napoleon  to  have  delayed  it,  for  Blticher  was  col- 
lecting his  troops  at  that  time,  and,  as  the  whole  force  of  the  Prus- 
sians [including  Billow's  Corps,  which  for  anything  Napoleon  knew 
to  the  contrary,  might  arrive  during  the  day]  was  far  superior  to 
the  75,000  men  which  he  could  use  against  it,  nothing  was  so  im- 
portant as  to  offer  battle  before  it  was  all  got  together." 
It  is  also  true, '  that,  had  Napoleon  advanced  early  in  the 
morning  with  the  main  body  of  his  army,  leaving  Ney  to 
push  forward  with  the  left  wing  as  soon  as  he  could,  he 
would  have  been  able  to  interrupt  the  formation  of  the 
Prussian  line  of  battle,  and  would  not  have  been  in  the 


'Clausewitz,  ch.  25,  p.  53. 

^Cf.  Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.  182,  183, 


163 


l64  THE    BATTLE   OF   LIGNY.-NOTES.         [CHAP.   II.] 

least  interfered  with  by  the  Anglo-Dutch  army.  But 
Napoleon,  although  it  is  plain  from  his  letters  to  Grouchy 
and  Ney  that  he  did  not  expect  to  find  either  the  Prus- 
sians or  the  English  in  great  force,  preferred  on  the  whole 
to  make  his  own  advance  coincide  in  point  of  time  with 
that  of  Marshal  Ney.  He  could  not  estimate  with  any 
certainty  the  number  of  troops  which  Bllicher  might  have 
on  the  heights  of  Ligny  or  within  call ;  he  could  not  know 
how  large  a  part  of  his  army  Wellington  had  been  able  to 
collect.  Hence  he  decided  to  defer  his  own  movement 
until  Ney  was  ready,  or,  at  least,  ought  to  have  been 
ready,  with  all  the  troops  which  had  been  assigned  to 
him,  to  protect  the  left  flank  of  the  main  army  from  all 
danger  of  an  attack  by  the  Anglo-Dutch  forces. 

The  question  is  one  on  which  different  opinions  will 
always  exist.  The  course  adopted  by  Napoleon  was 
unquestionably  the  one  most  in  accordance  with 
the  principles  of  war.  Whether  a  chance  of  success 
justifies  a  departure  from  the  practice  of  those  principles, 
or  whether  such  a  departure  is  warranted  only  in  cases  of 
emergency,  is  the  real  question.  We  have  no  room  to 
discuss  it  further  here. 

2.  Napoleon's  plan  of  battle  at  Ligny  has  been 
severely  criticised.  Clausewitz,  ^  Rogniat,  ^  Marshal 
Davout,  5  are  especially  pronounced  in  their  opinion  that 
Napoleon  should  have  manoeuvred  so  as  to  turn  the 
Prussian  right,  and  not  to  pierce  their  centre.  The 
question  is  thus  stated  by  Rogniat : 

"We  arrived  upon  their  right  flank;  reason  counselled  us  to 
attack  this  wing ;  in  this  way  we  should  have  avoided  in  part  the 
defiles  of  the  brook ;  we  should  have  approached  our  own  left  wing, 
which  was  fighting  at  Quatre  Bras,  so  that  both  armies  could  have 
helped  each  other,  and  finally  we  should  have  thrown  the  Prussians 
far  from  the  English,  in  forcing  them  to  retire  on  Namur." 

^Clausewitz,  ch.  34. 

*Cons.  sur  I'Art  de  la  Guerre,  p.  339,  cited  in  Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  472. 

'Davout,  p.  545. 


[chap.  II.]         THE    BATTLE    OF   LIGNY.-NOTES.  165 

To  this  Napoleon^  replied  from  St.  Helena: 
"  The  question  in  this  battle  was  not  that  of  separating  the  English 
from  the  Prussians ;  we  knew  that  the  English  could  not  be  ready 
to  act  till  the  next  day ;  but  here  the  point  was  to  hinder  that  part 
of  the  Illd  Corps  of  Bliicher  which  had  not  joined  him  by  1 1  A.  M., 
and  which  came  by  way  of  Namur,  and  also  the  IVth  Corps, 
which  came  from  Liege  by  way  of  Gembloux,  from  uniting  [with 
the  1st  and  lid  Corps]  on  the  field  of  battle.  In  cutting  the 
enemy's  line  at  Ligny,  his  whole  right  wing  at  St.  Amand  was 
turned  and  compromised ;  while  by  simply  becoming  masters  of 
St.  Amand,  we  should  have  accomplished  nothing." 

In  other  words,  Napoleon  defends  his  plan  of  battle  by 
showing  that  it  aimed  at  a  decisive  tactical  success ;  that 
its  accomplishment  would  practically  have  destroyed  half 
of  the  Prussian  army ;  which  an  attack  upon  the  exposed 
right  wing  would  not  have  effected.  He  contends  that 
the  Prussians  being,  as  they  certainly  were,  on  this  day, 
completely  separated  from  the  English,  the  best  thing  he 
could  possibly  do  was  to  take  advantage  of  their  faulty 
formation,  and  cut  off  and  destroy  the  two  exposed 
corps.  This  he  calculated  he  could  effect  with  the  troops 
he  had  in  hand.  Then  he  undoubtedly  hoped  that  he 
would  get  assistance  from  Ney  in  this  operation. '  The 
order  to  Ney  at  2  P.  M.  shows  this  beyond  a  question ; 
and  this  order  was  reiterated  at  a  quarter-past  three. 
Napoleon  said  to  Gerard  during  the  battle,'  "It  is 
possible  that  in  three  hours  the  issue  of  the  war  may  be 
decided.  If  Ney  executes  his  orders  well,  not  a  cannon 
in  the  Prussian  army  can  escape  capture.  That  army  is 
taken  enjiagrant  deliC  This  last  expression  occurs  also 
in  the  3.15  P.  M.  order.  The  possibility  of  Ney's  sending 
a  force  down  the  Ouatre-Bras-Namur   turnpike  to  take 


^Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  472- 

^Clausewitz  (ch.  34,  pp.  81  et  seq.)  points  out  that  Ney's  cooperation 
could  not  have  formed  an  essential  part  of  Napoleon's  plan  of  battle,  for 
Napoleon  "  could  not  know  whether  Ney  would  be  able  to  spare  him  a 
single  man." 

^Corrcsp.,  vcl.  31,  p.  2c6. 


l66  THE   BATTLE   OF   LIGNY.-NOTES.         [CHAP.  II.] 

the  exposed  Prussian  right  wing  in  rear,  was  therefore 
an  additional  reason  for  inclining  him  to  make  his  main 
attack  at  Ligny,  and  thereby  isolate  this  wing,  with  the 
hope  of  surrounding  and  destroying  it.  That  he  had  no 
right  to  count  on  Ney's  cooperation  is  certainly  true,  as 
has  been  stated  above ;  but  then  Napoleon  believed  that 
he  could  carry  out  his  plan  without  Ney's  cooperation, 
and  that  if  Ney  should  assist  him,  his  success  would  be 
overwhelming. 

To  the  reasons  advanced  by  Rogniat  for  making  the 
main  attack  upon  the  right  flank  of  the  Prussians, 
Marshal  Davout  adds  another :  —  ^ 

"  He  ought  not  to  have  left  the  Prussian  army  between  himself 
and  Marshal  Ney ;  because,  in  that  case,  if  he  should  beat  the 
Prussians,  he  would  force  them  to  retire  in  the  direction  of  the 
English." 

To  the  same  effect  Clausewitz  '°  asks,  "  whether  Bona- 
parte ought  to  have  arranged  his  attack  so  as  to  drive 
Bllicher  towards  Wellington,  or  so  as  to  push  him  away 
from  him," — implying  that  the  result  of  the  battle  as 
fought  by  Napoleon  had  the  former  effect, 

"If,"  says  Clausewitz,  "Bonaparte  had  attacked  St.  Amand 
with  his  right  wing,  Wagnelee  with  his  left,  and  had  advanced  with 
a  third  column  against  the  road  fi'om  Brussels,"  the  Prussians,  if 
they  lost  the  battle,  would  have  been  forced  to  retreat  along  the 
Roman  road,  that  is,  towards  the  Meuse,  and  a  union  with 
Wellington  in  the  days  immediately  following  the  battle  would 
have  been  very  uncertain,  perhaps  impossible." 

We  can  have  no  hesitation  in  admitting  that  if  the 
Prussians  had  been  driven  in  the  direction  of  the  Meuse 
as  the  result  of  the  battle,  they  could  not  have  afforded 
aid  to  the  English  on  the  i8th  of  June.  But  we  can 
hardly  believe  that  if  Napoleon  had  destroyed  their  1st 


'Davout,^  p.  545- 

'"Clausewitz,  ch.  34,  p.  83. 

"It  is  not  quite  clear  in  which  direction  this  column  was  to  advance. 


[chap.  II.]         THE    BATTLE   OF   LIGNY.-NOTES.  167 

and  lid  Corps,  which  he  expected  would  be  the  result 
of  his  plan  of  battle,  the  Prussians  could  possibly  have 
afforded  any  further  assistance  to  the  English.  Still, 
while  the  decision  of  the  Prussian  generals  after  the  battle 
to  maintain  their  communication  with  the  Duke  of 
Wellington,  and  to  come  to  his  assistance  at  Waterloo 
with  their  whole  army,  was  not  arrived  at  merely  or 
chiefly  because  the  two  corps  which  had  been  beaten  at 
Ligny  were  able  to  fall  back  in  a  northerly  direction 
instead  of  in  an  easterly  direction,  in  retiring  from  the 
field  of  battle,"  it  is  certainly  true  that  this  fact  did 
make  the  task  easier  of  accomplishment ;  it  saved  time, 
also.  At  the  same  time,  it  did  not  affect  in  any  way  the 
risk  involved  in  the  operation,  —  that  of  renouncing  for 
the  time  being  their  line  of  supplies. 

3.  We  have  seen  that  Napoleon  believed  that  Ney  s 
intervention,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  might  have  occurred 
at  the  moment  when  the  Prussian  centre  was  being 
pierced,  would  have  gained  him  a  great  victory.  But 
Clause  witz'^  asks:  "Why  was  it  inevitable  that  10,000 
men  in  the  rear  of  the  strong  Prussian  army  of  80,000 
men,  in  an  open  country,  where  one  can  see  on  all  sides, 
should  bring  about  its  complete  overthrow  ?  "  In  other 
words.  Napoleon  was  not  warranted  (so  Clausewitz 
contends)  in  expecting  such  a  decisive  success,  even  if 
Ney  should  send  10,000  men  down  the  Namur  road. 

But  Clausewitz  has  not  in  his  question,  above  quoted, 
put  the  case  quite  fairly.  The  question  which  Napoleon 
considered  was  this :  —  What  would  in  all  probability  be 
the  effect  upon  two  Prussian  corps,  numbering  at  the 
commencement  of  the  action  not  over  63,000  men, 
attacked  vigorously  for  three  or  four  hours,  subjected 


•^Maurice,  pp.  350,  351:  July,  1890.  Maurice  thinks  that  the  beaten  troops 
must  have  crossed  the  turnpike,  even  if  they  w^ere  intending  to  retreat  towards 
the  Rhine. 

"^Clausewitz,  ch.  31,  p.  66. 


l68  THE    BATTLE   OF   LIGNY -NOTES.         [CHAP.  II.] 

during  that  time  to  a  most  destructive  fire  of  artillery, 
reduced  by  casualties  to  a  force  not  greatly  exceeding 
50,000  men,  assailed  in  front  by  over  20,000  fresh  troops 
in  addition  to  their  opponents  of  the  last  few  hours, 
forced  to  make  a  precipitate  retreat  by  having  their 
connection  with  the  rest  of  their  army  broken,  —  what 
would  be  the  effect  upon  them  at  this  moment  of  an 
unexpected  and  vigorous  attack  in  rear  of  10,000  fresh 
troops  ?  Napoleon  thought  and  said,  that,  in  his  judg- 
ment, the  result  would  be  the  total  rout  of  the  two  corps, 
the  capture  of  all  their  guns  and  perhaps  half  of  their 
men.     It  is  probable  that  he  was  right  in  his  opinion. 

4.  But  how  far  was  Napoleon  warranted  in  expecting 
aid  from  Ney  ? 

As  to  Ney's  whereabouts  at  the  time  when  the  2  P.  M. 
order  should  reach  him,  say,  at  5  P.  M.,  we  have  spoken 
before,''*  and  have  shown  that,  long  before  that  hour, 
certainly  as  early  as  4  P.  M,,  the  whole  of  the  2d  Corps 
and  the  greater  part  of  the  ist  Corps  ought  to  have 
arrived  at  Quatre  Bras.  In  fact,  it  will  be  remembered 
that  had  Reille  obeyed  at  once  Ney's  order  to  him 
he  would  have  arrived  at  Quatre  Bras  at  noon;  and 
there  was  nothing  to  prevent  d'Erlon  following  promptly 
on  his  traces.  Napoleon,  it  is  true,  as  we  learn  from 
his  own  narrative,  had  heard  of  this  vexatious  delay, 
caused  by  Reille,  —  which  he  naturally  but  erroneously 
attributed  to  Reille's  superior,  Ney, — but  he  still  seemed 
to  think  it  possible  that  Ney  could  be  at  Quatre 
Pras  at  noon,  notwithstanding.  This,  to  be  sure,  was 
absolutely  out  of  Ney's  power,  as  we  have  seen ;  but 
there  was  no  reason  whatever  why  Ney  should  not  have 
had  long  before  5  P.  M.  his  whole  command  well  in  hand, 
at  or  in  front  of  Quatre  Bras.  Napoleon  was  perfectly 
justified  in  assuming  this  to  be  the  case. 

But  though  Ney  might  well  be  at  Quatre  Bras  with 


u  A  lite,  p.  133. 


[chap.   II.]       THE    BATTLE    OF    LIGNY.-NOTES.  1 69 

his  whole  force,  he  might  yer  be  entirely  unable  to 
comply  with  the  Emperor's  order  to  detach  a  force  to 
attack  the  Prussians  in  rear. 

Clausewitz  's  points  out  that  Ney  with  his  40,000  men 
could  easily  encounter  50,000  to  60,000  English  and 
Dutch.  This  is  certainly  true.  It  may  be  added  that 
the  last  despatch  '^  sent  to  Ney  informed  him  that  an 
ofhcer  of  lancers  had  just  informed  the  Emperor  that 
large  masses  of  the  enemy  were  to  be  seen  near  Ouatre 
Bras.  This  information  was  incorrect,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  yet  it  was  believed  to  be  true  at  the  time  the 
despatch  was  written.  Of  course  the  truth  may  have 
been  ascertained  before  the  2  P.  M.  order  was  sent  to 
Ney;  but  we  do  not  know  this  for  a  fact.  There  was 
certainly  no  reason  why  Napoleon  should  have  felt 
certain  that  Ney  would  find  it  possible  to  send  troops  to 
his  assistance ;  it  all  depended  upon  the  forwardness  of 
the  concentration  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington's  army; 
and  as  to  this  Napoleon  could  but  guess,  —  he  had  no 
information  at  all. 

5.  If  Napoleon,  then,  could  not  rely  with  any  certainty 
on  Ney's  assistance,  was  he  justified  in  adopting  a  plan 
of  battle,  to  the  full  success  of  which  Ney's  cooperation 
v/as  essential  ?  Would  it  not  have  been  wiser  for  him 
to  have  adopted  the  plan  recommended  by  Rogniat, 
Davout  and  Clausewitz,  and  to  have  thrown  his  whole 
force  on  the  exposed  right  wing  of  the  Prussians  ? 

This  question  cannot  be  properly  answered  without  a 
careful  examination  of  the  tactical  conditions,  and  this  no 
one  of  Napoleon's  critics  has  attempted  with  any  detail. 
We  will  leave  the  matter,  therefore,  with  this  single 
observation.  Napoleon,  when  he  had  completed  his 
examination  of  the  Prussian  position,  saw  that  there  were 
open  to  him  two  plans  of  attack,  each  giving  excellent 

"Clausewitz,  ch.  31,  p.  65. 

'^Doc.  Indd.,  IX,  p.  31 ;  App.  C,  xxii;  pos^,  p.  381. 


170  THE   BATTLE   OF   LIGNY.-NOTES.         [CHAP.  II.] 

promise  of  success.  He  chose  the  one  which  in  his 
judgment  offered  the  greater  chance  of  success,  inde- 
pendent of  Ney's  cooperation,  and  promised  a  decisive 
success  if  Ney's  cooperation  could  be  secured.  As  it 
was,  without  Ney's  assistance,  and  in  spite  of  an 
unfortunate  accident  which  caused  an  injurious  delay  in 
the  final  attack,  he  gained  a  great  victory.  It  hardly 
seems  worth  our  while  to  speculate  on  what  the  results 
would  have  been  if  he  had  adopted  the  other  plan. 

6.  Why  did  not  Napoleon  order  d'Erlon's  Corps  to 
remain  and  take  part  in  the  action  ?  For  not  doing  this 
he  has  been  most  severely  criticised  by  Charras  '^  and 
others.  But  Napoleon  must  have  supposed  that  d'Erlon 
had  come  upon  the  field  under  orders  from  Marshal  Ney 
expressly  to  remain  and  take  part  in  the  action.  Why, 
then,  should  he  send  him  any  orders  ?  Jomini,  indeed, 
says  '7  that  Napoleon  should  have  sent  d'Erlon  an  order 
directing  him  on  Brye.  We  can  see  now  that  this  would 
have  been  wise;  but  it  might  well  have  appeared 
unnecessary  at  the  time,  inasmuch  as  the  order  of  2  P.M. 
by  implication  directs  Ney's  troops  on  Brye.  It  must 
also  be  remembered  that  at  this  moment  Napoleon  had 
all  he  could  attend  to  in  organizing  the  decisive  move- 
ment on  Ligny. 

If  any  other  explanation  than  the  above  be  needed,  it 
has  been  furnished  by  Clausewitz.'^  He  says  that  the 
lateness  of  the  hour  probably  prevented  Napoleon  from 
directing  personally  the  employment  of  the  ist  Corps. 

"  Napoleon  seems  to  have  received  information  of  the  approach  of 
this  corps  somewhere  in  the  neighborhood  of  half-past  five  ;  it  took  till 
seven  before  the  nevv^s  that  it  was  d'Erlon  was  brought  him  ;  it 
would  have  taken  an  hour  before  d'Erlon  could  have  received  the 
order,  and  another  hour  would  have  passed  before  he   could  have 


'^Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.  170,  171,  183,  184. 
"Jomini,  p.  138. 
'^Clausewitz,  ch.  34,  p.  84. 


[chap,  II.]         THE    BATTLE    OF   LIGNY.-NOTES.  I7I 

appeared  In  the  neighborhood  of  Brye,"  i.  <?.,  in  obedience  to  such 
an  order. 

The  inference  is  that  Napoleon  may  well  have  thought 
it  better  to  let  d'Erlon  proceed  in  obedience  to  the 
orders  under  which  he  was  acting  when  he  came  upon 
the  field. 

7.  We  may  fairly  say  that  Napoleon  fought  few 
battles  in  his  whole  career  more  carefully  and  more  skil- 
fully than  the  battle  of  Ligny.  The  difference  between 
a  brave  and  zealous  general  of  ordinary  capacity  and  a 
master  in  the  art  was  well  illustrated  on  this  field. 
Clausewitz's  remarks  on  this  battle  are  very  clear  and 
instructive.  We  give  them  in  full,  —  premising  that  the 
figures  vary  more  or  less  from  those  which  we  have 
adopted. 

J9  "  If  we  get  a  picture  of  the  whole  battle,  it  is  like  all  modern 
battles,  a  slow  destruction  of  the  opposing  forces  in  the  first  line, 
where  they  touch  each  other,  in  a  fire  lasting  many  hours,  subjected  to 
only  slight  oscillations,  till,  at  last,  one  part  obtains  a  clear  superi- 
ority in  reserves,  i.  e.,  in  fresh  bodies,  and  then  with  these  gives 
the  deciding  blow  to  the  already  wavering  forces  of  the  enemy. 

"Bonaparte  advances  with  about  75,000  men 2°  against  Bliicher, 
whose  three  united  corps  form  a  force  of  78,000  men,^'  that  is  of 
equal  strength. 

"With  about  30,000  men  he  combats,  from  3  o'clock  till  8,  the 
two  chief  points  of  Bliicher's  position,  St.  Amand  and  Ligny.  He 
employs  some  6,000  men  to  occupy  the  Hid  Prussian  army  corps, 
and  with  33,000  he  remains  far  behind  the  fighting  line,  quietly  in 
i^eserve.  Of  these  he  employs  6,000  men  finally  to  sustain  the  battle 
at  St.  Amand. 

"As  early  as  6  o'clock  he  determines  to  give  the  deciding  blow  at 
Ligny  with  the  Guard  :  at  that  moment  he  i^eceives  the  information 
that  a  considerable  corps  has  appeared  on  his  left  flank,  about  one 
hour's  march  distant.  Bonaparte  stops  his  movement,  for  it  might 
be  a  corps  coming  from  the  enemy  at  Brussels.     The  fact  is,  it  was 


'^Clausewitz,  ch.  32,  pp.  73  etseq. 

*°This  includes  the  6th  Corps. 

"Charras  makes  the  Prussian  army  about  87,000  strong. 


172  THE    BATTLE   OF    LIGNY.-NOTES.         [CHAP.  II.] 

d'Erlon  who  was  marching,  It  is  not  yet  known  for  what  cause,  from 
Frasnes  against  St.  Amand.  A  troop  of  cavahy  is  sent  in  haste  to 
reconnoitre  this  corps,  but  nearly  two  hours  go  by  before  the  news 
comes  back  that  it  is  the  ist  French  army  corps.  On  this  account 
the  attack  on  Ligny  does  not  take  place  till  8  o'clock. 

"  Even  this  blow  Bonaparte  does  not  give  with  the  whole  mass  of 
his  reserves,  but  only  with  about  half  of  them,  that  is,  with  the 
Guard  ;  the  6th  Corps  remains  behind  as  a  reserve. 

"  Bliicher  has  in  the  beginning  of  the  battle  employed  the  Ist 
army  corps  of  27,000  men  in  the  positions  of  Ligny  and  St.  Amand, 
and  the  Hid,  of  22,000  men,  in  that  extending  from  Sombreffe  to 
Balatre,  and  has  kept  back  only  the  lid,  with  29,000  men,  as  a 
resei-ve.  It  is  true  that  the  Hid  army  corps  could  have  been  con- 
centrated, since  the  enemy  did  not  attack  it  in  earnest,  and  it  may 
have  been  looked  upon  as  a  reserve.  Bliicher,  it  is  true,  counted 
still  on  Billow's  arrival ;  but  it  did  not  take  place,  and  so  the  situation 
of  the  Prussian  reserves  remained  always  unfavorable.  The  lid 
army  corps,  that  is,  the  reserves,  were  graduall}',  as  we  have  seen, 
employed  to  sustain  the  battle.  Nothing  therefore  remained  to 
decide  the  battle  even  if  the  state  of  the  battle  had  remained  perfectly 
balanced,  or  even  had  turned  out  favorably  for  us. 

"As  the  day  ended,  the  situation  of  the  opposing  forces  was 
somewhat  as  follows :  Bliicher  had  used  up  in  the  villages  38,000 
infantry,  who  had  suffered  considerably,  had  in  great  part  expended 
their  ammunition,  and  must  be  looked  upon  as  useless,  in  which  there 
was  not  mvich  more  force.  6,000  infantry  wei^e  stationed  behind  the 
villages,  scattered  in  single  battalions  which  had  however  not  yet 
fought.  The  rest  of  the  56,000  men  of  the  Ist  and  lid  army  corps 
were  cavalry  and  artillery,  of  which  only  a  small  part  was  fresh. 

"  If  the  Illd  army  corps  had  been  collected,  or  if  it  had  been 
sufficiently  provided  for,  it  would  have  been  a  reserve  of  about  18,000 
men ;  it  could  therefore  have  been  said  that  Bliicher  had  still  24,000 
men  in  reserve. 

"  Bonaparte,  although  originally  some  few  thousand  men  weaker 
than  Bliicher,  had  now,  however,  several  thousand  more  fresh 
troops  than  that  general :  the  cause  of  this  was  his  keeping  back 
more  men,  a  greater  economy  of  forces  in  the  firing. 

"  This  small  -^  superiority  of  reserves  would  naturally  not  have 


"Unless  we  include  the  1 1  Id  Corps  among  the  Prussian  reserves,  the 
French  superiority  in  reserves  was  very  large ;  and  Bliicher,  as  Clausewitz 
goes  on  to  state,  did  not  have  the  1 1  Id  Corps  at  his  disposal. 


[chap.  II.]         THE    BATTLE    OF    LIGNY.-NOTES.  IJS 

decided  much,  but  it  must  nevertheless  be  looked  on  as  the  first 
cause  of  the  victory. 

"  The  second  reason  was  the  unequal  result  which  the  firing  had 
up  to  that  time  produced. 

"It  is  true  that  when  Bonaparte  advanced  against  Ligny  we  still 
occupied  part  of  this  village,  but  we  had  then  lost  the  rest ;  it  is  true 
that  we  still  occupied  a  position  between  Wagnelee  and  St.  Amand, 
but  here,  too,  we  had  lost  villages  and  ground ;  the  engagement  had 
therefore  turned  out  everywhere  a  little  to  our  disadvantage,  and  in 
such  a  case  the  preparations  for  the  deciding  blow  are  already 
made. 

"  The  third  and  most  important  reason  was,  however,  without 
doubt,  the  fact  that  Bliicher  did  not  have  at  his  disposal  the  troops 
which  had  not  yet  fought,  namely,  the  Hid  Corps.  It  is  true  that  the 
Xllth  brigade  was  very  near  him,  but  that  was  too  little  :  the  IXth  was 
also  notfaraway ;  but  of  this,  as  well  as  of  the  whole  of  Thielemann's 
Corps,  there  had  been  no  thought ;  and  the  Hid  Corps,  therefore,  as 
regards  a  decisive  blow  to  be  given  by  it,  was  as  good  as  out  of  reach 
and  could  be  used  only  for  the  retreat.  Perhaps  and  very  probably, 
this  scattered  disposition  of  Thielemann  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  on 
the  whole  an  actual  advantage.  If  the  Hid  Corps  had  been  at  hand, 
it  would  have  been  employed  also,  without  increasing  the  chances 
for  a  successful  result,  which,  considering  the  turn  which  the  whole 
affair  had  taken,  could  have  been  secured  only  by  a  decided 
superiority,  such,  in  fact,  as  the  arrival  of  Billow's  Corps  would  have 
procured.  And  if  the  Hid  Corps  had  been  used,  the  loss  in  battle 
would  probably  have  been  greater  by  10,000  men." 

We  cannot  leave  this  subject  without  calling  attention 
to  a  remark'^  of  Marshal  Davout's  in  his  criticism  of  the 
Emperor's  conduct  of  this  campaign.  He  speaks  of  him 
-in  connection  with  this  battle  as 

"The  Napoleon  of  the  Moskowa,  who,  to  make  use  of  a  vulgar 
expression,  takes  the  bull  by  the  horns ;  this  was  the  reason  why 
this  battle  was  so  bloody  and  so  hotly  fought,  etc." 

How  much  justification  there  is  for  this  remark 
appears  from  Clausewitz's  review  of  Napoleon's  tactics, 
which  we  have  cited  above.    But  Davout  had  a  case  to 


"Davout,  p.  547- 


174  THE    BATTLE    OF   LIGNY.-NOTES.         [CHAP.  II.] 

make  out,  apparently,  and  he  desired  to  score  a  point  at 
every  stage  of  his  criticism;  an  extremely  common 
temptation,  by  the  way,  to  which  very  many  critics  yield. 
As  for  the  losses  suffered  by  the  French  to  which  Davout 
refers,  it  must  be  remembered  that  Napoleon  would  have 
brought  the  action  to  a  close  two  hours  sooner,  had  it  not 
been  for  the  unexpected  apparition  of  d'Erlon's  Corps ; 
and  that  a  good  part  of  the  French  loss  was  suffered  in 
those  two  hours.  The  same  cause  also  operated  to  render 
the  victory  much  less  decisive  than  it  otherwise  would 
have  been,  as  darkness  came  on  before  anything  like 
pursuit  could  be  attempted.  Any  fair  criticism,  therefore, 
of  Napoleon's  conduct  of  the  battle  of  Ligny  ought  to 
proceed  on  the  supposition  that  this  unlucky  incident, 
for  which  a  superserviceable  staff-ofHcer  was  solely 
responsible,  had  not  occurred.  On  this  supposition,  then, 
the  Prussian  centre  at  Ligny  would  have  been  broken 
between  6  and  7  P.  M.,  the  losses  of  the  French  would 
have  been  much  less,  and  their  victory  would  necessarily 
have  been  much  more  complete. 

8.  The  wisdom  of  Napoleon's  course  in  arresting  the 
attack  on  the  Prussian  centre  when  the  news  of  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  strange  corps  which  might  possibly  consist 
of  hostile  troops  was  brought  to  him,  has  perhaps  not  re- 
ceived the  attention  it  deserves.  When  Napoleon  de- 
cided to  wait  till  he  should  learn  what  this  body  of  troops 
might  be,  he  was  all  ready  to  give  the  finishing  blow  to 
the  Prussian  army.  He  was  pretty  certain  to  break  up 
a  large  part  of  that  army.  If  the  unknown  corps  should 
turn  out  to  have  come  from  Ney,  it  was  certainly  in  a 
position  where  it  could  play  a  most  important  part  in  the 
attack.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  should  turn  out  to  have 
come  from  WelHngton,  Napoleon,  provided  only  that  he 
should  have  time  enough  to  complete  his  contemplated 
stroke  against  Bliicher,  would  probably  be  in  a  much 
better  situation  to  deal  with  his  antagonists  than  he 
could  otherwise  hope  to  occupy.     It  would  seem,  there- 


[chap.  II.]         THE    BATTLE   OF   LIGNY.-NOTES.  I75 

fore,  as  if  it  was  by  no  means  clear  that  Napoleon  took 
the  wisest  course  when  he  deferred  the  main  attack  on 
the  Prussians  on  the  appearance  of  d'Erlon's  Corps. 

9.  It  is  not  easy  to  see  why  Napoleon,  certainly  when 
he  found  that  he  would  have  to  fight  a  battle  at  Ligny, 
should  not  have  ordered  the  6th  Corps  up  to  Fleurus  at 
once,  so  that  he  might  have  it  close  at  hand  in  case  he 
needed  it.  The  extreme  importance  of  inflicting,  if  pos- 
sible, a  crushing  defeat  on  the  Prussians  was  so  clearly 
seen  by  him,  as  his  orders  to  Ney  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
i6th  and  morning  of  the  17th  abundantly  show,  that  we 
cannot  understand  why  he  should  not  have  availed  him- 
self of  the  aid  of  Lobau's  command.  Lobau,  even  if  he 
were  not  sent  for  until  1 1  A.  M.,  could  have  been  at 
Fleurus  at  or  before  4  P.  M. ;  and  had  he  then  been 
directed  to  march  in  rear  of  the  troops  of  Vandamme  and 
Girard  which  were  fighting  at  and  near  St.  Amand,  he 
could  have  fallen  upon  the  Prussian  right  and  rear  near 
Brye  at  or  about  half-past  five  o'clock,  which  was  the 
moment  when  Napoleon  was  preparing  for  the  decisive 
stroke  at  Ligny.  Lobau  could  undoubtedly  have  accom- 
plished all  that  Napoleon  expected  from  Ney.  And  the 
cooperation  of  Lobau  could  have  been  arranged  for  with- 
out any  chance  of  failure,  while  that  of  Ney  was  neces- 
sarily dependent  on  the  situation  in  which  he  might  find 
himself  at  Quatre  Bras. 


CHAPTER  XII. 
THE    BATTLE    OF   QUATRE    BRAS. 

Marshal  Ney,  as  we  have  seen,  took  no  steps  what 
ever,  on  his  return  to  Gosselies  from  his  midnight  inter- 
view with  the  Emperor,  to  get  his  command  in 
readiness  for  the  work  of  the  coming  day.  Frasnes,  in 
any  event,  he  must  have  known,  would  have  to  be 
occupied  in  force,  whether  an  advance  from  that 
place  to  Quatre  Bras  should  be  decided  on  or  not.'  Yet, 
instead  of  getting  the  divisions  of  Foy  and  Jerome  up  to 
Frasnes  at  once,  where  Bachelu  and  Pire  already  were, 
and  supplying  their  place  at  Gosselies  by  the  divisions 
of  the  1st  Corps,  one  of  which,  we  know  (Durutte's),  had 
bivouacked  between  Jumet  and  Gosselies,  he  suffered 
them  to  remain  at  Gosselies ;  and,  so  far  as  appears,  sent 
officers  to  hurry  up  d'Erlon  only  after  he  had  ordered 
him  to  Frasnes  {ante,  p.  119),  that  is,  after  11  A.  M. 
Then  there  was  a  delay  of  an  hour  and  three-quarters,  for 
which  Ney  was  not  directly  responsible,  which  was 
caused  by  Reille,''  who,  instead  of  obeying  Ney's  order 
to  march  promptly  from  Gosselies  to  the  front  on 
receipt  of  any  orders  of  movement  from  the  headquarters 
of  the  army,  delayed  doing  so  until  he  had  informed 
Ney,  who  was  at  Frasnes,  that  he  had  heard  from  Girard 
that  the  Prussians  were  concentrating  near  St.  Amand, 
and  had  thereupon  received  fresh  orders.  But  this 
delay  could   never  have  occurred  had   Reille  been  at 


^Cf.  Jomini,  p.  221. 

"Jomini,  p.  226,  defends  Reille's  course.    We  shall  discuss  this  question  in 
the  Notes  to  this  chapter. 

176 


[chap.  12.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.  1 77 

Frasnes  himself,  to  which  place  he  ought  to  have  been 
ordered  by  Ney  hours  before. 

It  is,  therefore,  perfectly  correct  to  say,  that  if  Reille's 
two  divisions  at  Gosselies  had  been,  early  in  the  morning, 
ordered  to  Frasnes,  where  Bachelu  and  Pire  had  been 
since  the  previous  evening.  Marshal  Ney  could  have 
commenced  the  battle  of  Quatre  Bras  with  all  the  2d 
Corps,  except  Girard's  division,  which  was  with  the  main 
army,  at  eleven  o'clock,  the  hour  when  he  received  his 
orders  from  Soult  and  his  letter  from  the  Emperor.  Or, 
if  he  had  thought  best  to  defer  the  attack  until  he  should 
have  communicated  to  the  Emperor  the  information  as 
to  the  concentration  of  the  Prussian  army  near  St.  Amand 
conveyed  by  Girard,  ^  he  would  have  been  able  to  obey 
his  orders,  whatever  they  were,  the  moment  his  messenger 
returned.  There  was  also  no  reason  why  d'Erlon  should 
not  have  been  likewise  ordered  up  from  Gosselies  to 
Frasnes  to  support  Reille,  certainly  with  Durutte's 
division,  leaving  the  other  divisions  to  come  along  as 
fast  as  they  could.  And  it  is  not  going  too  far  to  say  that 
the  measures  above  suggested  were  simply  those  which 
common  sense  would  dictate,  to  an  officer  in  Ney's 
position.'^ 

However,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  Ney  did  not  take  these 
measures,  nor  did  he,  even  on  the  receipt  of  his  orders, 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  peremptorily  directed  him  to 
assemble  the  ist  and  2d  Corps  and  Kellermann's  two 
divisions  of  cavalry,  and  with  this  force  to  carry  Quatre 
Bras,  proceed  to  comply  with  them.  He  ordered  d'Erlon 
to  halt  at  Frasnes ;  he  ordered  Kellermann  ^  to  station 


^Cf.  Jomini,  pp.  221,  226. 

*La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  pp.  91,  92,  145  ;  Muquardt,  pp.  145,  146,  149,  n- 
Charras,  though  discussing  Ney's  conduct  at  considerable  length  (vol.  2,  pp. 
236  et  seq),  does  not  touch  upon  this  part  of  it. 

s  Kellermann,  Charras  says,  vol.  i,  p.  iSS,  had  at  10.30  A.  M.  passed 
Gosselies.  His  two  divisions  were,  therefore,  long  before  2  P.  M.,  at  Frasnes. 
and  Liberchies. 


178  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.  [CHAP.   12.] 

one  division  at  Frasnes  and  one  at  Liberchies ;  and  he 
assailed   the   enemy's   position    at.   Quatre    Bras    about 

2  P.  M.  with  the  infantry  divisions  of  Bachelu  and  Foy, 
and  the  cavah-y  division  of  Pire.     It  was  not  until  nearly 

3  o'clock^  that  the  division  of  Jerome  ^  arrived,  and  took 
its  place  in  the  line  of  battle.  With  the  2d  Corps  alone, 
then,  did  Marshal  Ney  attempt  the  task  which  he  had 
been  directed  to  undertake  wdth  all  the  troops  which  had 
been  assigned  to  him.  The  ist  Corps  and  the  cavalry 
he  ordered  to  stay  behind  to  protect  his  flanks  and  line 
of  retreat. 

When  such  are  the  preparations,  nothing  but  extraor- 
dinary luck  can  give  success  in  battle;  and  at  first  it 
seemed  as  if  this  luck  was  in  store  for  Marshal  Ney. 
When  he  began  the  action,  Perponcher's  Dutch-Belgian 
division  constituted  the  sole  force  of  the  enemy  at  Quatre 
Bras;  and  Wellington  not  having  yet  returned  from 
Brye,  where  he  had  been  to  see  Blucher,  the  Prince  of 
Orange,  a  gallant  young  officer,  but  possessing  no 
remarkable  abilities,  was  in  command.  Ney's  two 
divisions  gave  him  a  slight  superiority  in  infantry, 
which  was  augmented  by  the  arrival  of  the  third,  and  his 
soldiers  were  much  the  better  fighters.  He  easily  gained 
ground,  and  success  seemed  assured. 

The  Duke  of  Wellington  reached  the  field  about  half- 
past  two;  and  of  course  assumed  control.  He  now  had 
occasion  to  see  how  far  the  statements  of  the  "  Disposi- 
tion" were  from  the  actual  facts;  he  found  himself 
obliged  to  sustain  a  vigorous  and  well-conducted  attack 
by  superior  forces,  as  best  he  might.  Fortunately,  about 
3.30  P.  M.,^  Picton's  British  division  arrived,  followed 
immediately  by  the  Duke  of  Brunswick's  Corps,  and  Ney 


^•'Vcrs  J  heurcs.'"     Reille's  statement,  Doc.  Indd,  p.  59. 
'  Or  that  of  Guilleminot,  as  Charras  prefers  to  call  it.     Charras,  vol.  i,  pp. 
195,  196,  n. 
8  Gomm,  p.  353  ;  Waterloo  Letters,  p..  21. 


[chap.  12.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.  1 79 

found  himself  slightly  outnumbered.''  Nevertheless,  the 
quality  of  his  troops,  both  officers  and  men,  was  so  good, 
and  his  superiority  to  his  antagonists  in  cavalry  and 
artillery  was  so  great,  that  he  continued  the  fight  with  the 
expectation  of  success  and  with  the  chances  in  his  favor.'° 
But  no  efforts  of  his  could  overcome  the  steadiness  and 
courage  of  the  British  infantry.  The  Dutch-Belgians 
retired  after  a  couple  of  hours'  fighting;  the  Brunswickers 
were  broken,  and  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  was  killed ;  but 
the  British  and  Hanoverian  troops,  though  outmatched 
at  this  stage  of  the  action,  stubbornly  maintained  the 
fight. 

At  five  or  soon  after,  two  brigades  of  Alten's  3d 
British  division  arrived,  and  gave  Wellington  an  equality, 
perhaps  even  a  slight  superiority  in  force.  Ney,  on  the 
other  hand,  had  not  been  reinforced  either  by  d'Erlon  or 
by  Kellermann's  two  divisions  of  cavalry,  all  which  troops 
had  been  placed  at  his  disposal  by  the  Emperor,  and  all 
which  he  had  been,  by  the  last  order  which  he  had 
received  from  Marshal  Soult,  expressly  directed  to  employ 
in  the  movement  upon  Quatre  Bras.  That  is  to  say,  as 
late  as  five  o'clock,  w^hen  the  battle  had  been  in  progress 
for  three  hours,  Ney  had  not  got  his  command  together, 
had  not,  in  fact,  assembled  one-half  of  it  on  the  field. 
Where  were  these  missing  troops?    (See  Map  7.) 

Take,  first,  the  case  of  the  ist  Corps.  We  have  seen 
that  the  division  of  the  2d  Corps,  which  was  the  last  to 
arrive,  arrived  on  the  field  of  battle  at  or  shortly  before 
3  P.  M.  Quatre  Bras  is  distant  from  Frasnes  about  two 
miles  and  a  half,  and  the  field  of  battle,  therefore,  was 
about  two  miles  beyond  Frasnes.  Since  Jerome  arrived 
on  the  field  at  3  o'clock,  he  must  have  left  Frasnes  about 
or  soon  after  2  o'clock.     If  Durutte,  who  commanded  the 


9  Siborne,  vol.  i,  p  io8. 

'°  We  shall  not  attempt  a  tactical  account  of  the  battle.  It  is  well  described 
by  Siborne  and  Charras,  and  there  is  much  of  value  in  other  writers.  But  it 
is  not  worth  while  at  this  late  day  to  go  into  detail. 


l80  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.  [CHAP.  12.] 

leading  division  of  the  ist  Corps,  had  followed  Jerome 
promptly  from  Jumet,  which  is  not  over  a  mile  and  a  half 
to  the  south  of  Gosselies,  he  would  have  reached  Frasnes 
before  3  o'clock.  The  other  two  divisions,  which  were 
ordered  to  Frasnes,  should  have  arrived  certainly  in  the 
course  of  the  next  hour  and  a  half ;  so  that  by  4  or  4.30 
P.  M.  Ney  should  have  had  the  three  divisions  of  the  ist 
Corps  which  he  had  ordered  to  Frasnes,  ready  for  use 
there. 

What  actually  happened  was  this.  Durutte,  who 
commanded  the  leading  division  of  the  ist  Corps,  when 
in  march  from  Jumet  for  Frasnes, "  received  orders  from 
Ney  to  continue  his  march  to  Quatre  Bras.  But,  as  he 
was  reaching  Frasnes,"  he  was  ordered  by  one  of  the 
Emperor's  aides,  on  his  own  responsibility,  '^  to  direct  his 
march  towards  Brye.  This  order  Durutte  obeyed,  and, 
on  arriving  at  Frasnes,  turned  the  head  of  the  column  to 
the  right.  D'Erlon,  who,  had  he  been  present,  might 
have  stopped  this  unauthorized  proceeding,  had  unfortu- 
nately ridden  in  advance  of  his  corps.  The  aide,  who, 
according  to  d'Erlon's  statement,  was  carrying  a  pencil 
note  to  Marshal  Ney,  came  up  with  d'Erlon  just  beyond 
Frasnes,  and,told  him  what  he  had  done.  D'Erlon  then 
rode  back  to  join  his  command,  sending  his  chief-of-staff 
to  Marshal  Ney  to  inform  him  what  had  happened.  The 
ist  Corps  then  proceeded  by  way  of  Villers-Peruin 
towards  St.  Amand  for  possibly  a  couple  of  miles,  '-*  when 
it  was  seen  by  Vandamme,  who  between  5.30  and  6 
o'clock  reported  to  the  Emperor  the  appearance  of  this 
unexpected    body    of  troops. '^     The  corps  must  have 


"  Doc.  ln.6d.y  p.  71,  Durutte's  statement. 
"Drouet,  p.  95. 

"  lb.,  p.  95  ;  Doc.  Indd,  p.  65  ;  d'Erlon's  statement. 

"As  it  would  seem  from  the  map.    But  the  distance    is    a    matter    of 
conjecture  only. 
"  Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  207. 


[chap.  12.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.  l8l 

been  seen,  therefore,  shortly  after  5  o'clock.  It  must,  there- 
fore, have  left  the  Charleroi  road  at  Frasnes  somewhere 
about  4.30  P.  M.  That  is,  the  head  of  d'Erlon's  column  did 
not  reach  Frasnes  till  two  hours  and  a  half  after  the  rear 
of  the  2d  Corps  had  left  it.  For,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
last  division  of  the  2d  Corps,  Jerome's,  had  passed 
through  Frasnes  by  2  o'clock. 

This  fact,  that  there  was  a  march  of  two  hours  and  a 
half  between  the  two  corps  which  constituted  the 
principal  part  of  Marshal  Ney's  command,  has  not 
received  due  attention.  '^  It  is  impossible  to  account  for 
it  without  laying  a  grave  responsibility  on  the  shoulders 
of  both  Marshal  Ney  and  the  Comte  d'Erlon.  There  is 
no  need  of  dwelling  on  the  importance  of  the  matter. 
That  there  was  no  sufficient  effort  to  obey  the  orders  of 
the  Emperor, — vigorously  and  energetically  to  carry  out 
the  duty  assigned  to  this  wing  of  the  army,  —  is  too  plain 
for  argument.  It  needs  hardly  to  be  remarked,  that  if 
Durutte  had  followed  closely  on  the  traces  of  Jerome, — 
even  if  he  had  started  from  Jumet  at  the  moment  when 
Jerome  started  from  Gosselies,  and  had  not  (as  would 
have  been  natural  and  proper)  moved  up  nearer  to 
Gosselies  before  the  order  to  march  to  Quatre  Bras 
arrived,  —  he  could  not  have  been  turned  off  the  main 
road  by  the  Emperor's  staff-officer,  for,  long  before  half- 
past  four  o'clock,  which  was  the  hour  when  the  staff- 
officer  reached  Frasnes,  Durutte  would  have  been 
fighting  the  English  at  Quatre  Bras.  One  cannot  avoid 
the  conclusion  that  Marshal  Ney's  measures  for  getting 
his  command  together  on  the  field  of  battle  this  day  were 
singularly  ineffective. 

For  d'Erlon's  marching  off  towards  St.  Amand,  Ney, 
of  course,  was  in  no  wise  responsible.  When  he  heard 
of  it,  he  sent  him  a  peremptory  order  to  return  at  once. 
For  this   he   has   been    severely,   and,   in   our   opinion. 


"  But  see  "  Napoldon  a  Waterloo,"  pp.  132  et  seq. 


l82  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.  [CHAP.   12.] 

unjustly  blamed  by  many  critics  who  have  approached 
the  question  in  the  belief  that  d'Erlon  was  ordered  to 
leave  Ney's  immediate  command  by  the  Emperor  himself. 
But  this  was  not  so.  Napoleon  addressed  no  order  to 
d'Erlon.  The  only  orders  which  the  Emperor  sent  on 
this  afternoon  of  the  i6th  of  June  of  which  we  have  any 
knowledge  were  sent  to  Marshal  Ney.  Napoleon  cannot 
be  imagined  to  have  sent  a  direct  order  to  one  of  Ney's 
corps-commanders,  for  they,  the  Emperor  must  have 
supposed,  were  acting  under  the  Marshal's  immediate 
supervision.  Napoleon  himself  always  denied  having 
sent  any  order  to  d'Erlon,  and  even  Charras  believes  him 
to  be  correct  in  this  statement.  We  shall  recur  to  this 
subject  later;  suffice  it  to  say  here  that  we  are  inclined 
to  think  that  it  was  the  2  P.  M.  order  that  was  shown,  or, 
of  which  more  likely,  the  supposed  purport  or  intent 
was  stated,  to  Durutte.''  The  time  at  which  Durutte's 
column  was  perceived  heading  for  St.  Amand  indicates 
approximately  when  he  must  have  left  the  turnpike  at 
Frasnes ;  and  this,  as  we  shall  hereafter  see,  was  about  the 
hour  when  the  officer  who  carried  the  2  P.  M.  order 
must  have  reached  Frasnes. 

D'Erlon,  on  receiving  Ney's  order  to  return,  retraced 
his  steps,  leaving  Durutte's  division  on  his  right  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Marbais,  but  he  did  not  reach  Frasnes 
till  after  9  P.  M.  Thus  the  ist  Corps  was  of  no  use 
either  to  Ney  or  Napoleon  that  afternoon. 

Take  next  the  case  of  Kellermann's  cavalry.  The  last 
order  which  Ney  received  was,  as  we  have  seen,  perfectly 
explicit  in  terms.  '^  It  directed  him  to  "  unite  the  corps 
of  Counts  Reille  and  d'Erlon,  and  that  of  the  Count  of 
Valmy  [Kellermann],"  and  stated  that "  with  these  forces  he 
ought  to  be  able  to  beat  and  destroy  any  force  of  the  enemy 
which  might  present  itself."    Yet  Ney  ordered  one  of 


"So,  Hooper,  pp.  136, 137. 

'^Doc.  Indd.,  IX,  p.  31 ;  App.  C,  xxii;  post,  p.  3S1. 


[chap.   12.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.  183 

Kellermann's  divisions  to  halt  at  Frasnes  and  the  other 
at  Liberchies,  —  two  miles,  and  two  miles  and  a  half, 
respectively,  from  the  field  of  battle.  It  is  not  going 
too  far  to  say  that  there  is  no  excuse  for  such  flat 
disobedience  of  orders.  Cavalry,  as  respects  the  use  to 
which  they  were  put  in  those  days,  must  be  on  the  spot, 
ready  to  take  advantage  in  an  instant  of  a  weak  place  in 
the  enemy's  line  of  battle.  No  one  knew  this  better  than 
Marshal  Ney.  The  disposition  he  made  of  his  cavalry 
was  deliberately  made,  from  the  same  reason  which  in- 
duced him  to  order  the  ist  Corps  to  take  up  position  at 
Frasnes, —  probably  because  he  deemed  it  unwise  and 
even  dangerous  that  the  left  wing  should  be  advanced  so 
far  in  front  of  the  main  army ;  and  he  did  not  send  for 
Kellermann  till  six  o'clock,  and  then  he  only  employed 
one  brigade.  '^ 

To  return  now  to  the  battle.  The  arrival  of  Alten's  divis- 
ion gave  Wellington  the  advantage,  certainly  in  point  of 
numerical  force  ;  still,  the  three  infantry-divisions  of  the 
2d  Corps  were  superior  in  numbers  to  the  two  divisions 
of  Picton  and  Alten ;  and  the  Dutch-Belgian  and  Bruns- 
wick troops  had  suffered  so  much  that  there  was  very 
little  fight  left  in  them.  The  cavalry  of  Pire  was  easily 
superior  to  that  of  the  Brunswickers  and  Dutch- 
Belgians  ;  none  of  the  English  cavalry  had  arrived ;  and 
the  French  were  decidedly  superior  in  artillery. 

About  5  P.  M.^°  the  2  o'clock  order  from  Napoleon  was 
received,  but  it  was  impossible  for  Ney,  situated  as  he  was, 
to  execute  it.  At  6  P.  M.^'  the  3.15  P.  M.  order  arrived. 
Then,  according  to  Charras,"  Ney  for  the  first  time  sent  to 
Kellermann   to   bring   up    L'Heritier's    division.      The 


"Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  206. 

^Ib.,  p.  204,  n. 

^'Ib.,  p.  206. 

'^  lb.,  p.  206.     Charras  says  that  Roussel's  division  remained  where  it  was. 
He  is  probably  correct.      But  see  Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  136,  and  Hooper,  p.  127. 


184  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.  [CHAP.   12.] 

veteran  of  Marengo  made  a  gallant  and  at  first  a  success- 
ful charge''^  at  the  head  of  the  cuirassier  brigade  of  this 
division,  but,  finally,  the  galling  fire  from  the  British 
in  the  farm-enclosures  near  the  intersection  of  the  roads, 
received  when  the  horses  were  blown  and  the  impetus  of 
the  charge  was  exhausted,  brought  about  a  panic,  and  the 
troops  retired  in  great  disorder.  Soon  after  this,  which 
was  the  last  offensive  move  made  by  the  French,  Cooke's 
division  of  the  English  Guards  came  up  from  Nivelles, 
and  the  French  were  forced  to  retire  to  Frasnes,  which 
they  did  in  good  order. 

At  the  close  of  the  action,  the  Duke  of  Wellington 
had  employed  his  ist,  3d  and  5th  British  divisions,  the 
2d  Dutch-Belgian  division,  and  the  Brunswick  contin- 
gent, numbering  in  all  over  31,000^'*  men;  Marshal  Ney, 
of  the  43,000  men  which  had  been  entrusted  to  him  and 
with  which  he  was  to  "  beat  and  destroy  any  enemy's 
force"  in  his  front,  had  brought  to  the  encounter  less 
than  22,000  men.  The  casualties  of  the  Anglo-Dutch 
army  were  nearly  or  quite  4,500, —  those  of  the  French 
over  4,000. 

It  cannot  be  seriously  questioned  that  the  result  of  the 
action  would  have  been  a  victory  for  the  French  if  the 
ist  Corps,  d'Erlon's,  had  not  been  diverted  from  the 
turnpike."^  The  head  of  his  column  reached  Frasnes,  as 
we  have  seen,  about  half-past  four  o'clock,  and  the  leading 
division  could  have  been  put  in  line  before  half-past  five, 
that  is,  shortly  after  the  arrival  of  Alten's  division. 
Wellington  at  this  moment  was  deeply  involved  in  the 


^^Siborne  is  in  error  in  supposing  that  there  were  two  charges.  Only  one 
brigade  was  put  in,  the  cuirassiers,  and  this  was  towards  the  end  of  tlie 
action. 

^''Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  153.  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  210,  rates  Wellington's  force  as 
high  as  37,000  men. 

^'Even  Hooper  admits  (p.  137)  that  the  "  timely  presence  "  of  these  troops 
v/ould  have  "placed  Wellington  in  an  extremity  of  peril."  Cf.  Siborne,  vol. 
I,  pp.  162,  163. 


[chap.  12.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.  185 

battle.  He  was  expecting  reinforcements  hourly.  He 
probably  would  not  have  thought  of  retiring.  In  fact  his 
deficiency  in  cavalry  and  artillery  would  have  made  it  a 
difficult  matter  to  bring  off  his  command  in  good  order, 
and  it  is  not  likely  that  any  of  his  troops  save  his  (so 
called)  British  divisions  could  have  sustained  with  firm- 
ness the  strain  of  a  retreat  before  an  enemy  fired  with 
the  success  of  the  first  battle  of  the  campaign.  The 
chances  are  that  if  d'Erlon's  Corps  had  marched  straight 
on  to  Ouatre  Bras,  the  result  would  have  been  a  severe 
defeat  for  the  Duke  of  Wellington.  Distrust  and  even 
demoralization  would  almost  certainly  have  appeared  in 
most  of  his  foreign  contingents;  and  with  only  his 
English  regiments  and  those  of  the  King's  German 
Legion  he  could  not  have  mustered  a  sufficient  force  to 
justify  him  in  accepting  battle  at  Waterloo,  even  if  he 
had  been  otherwise  disposed  to  do  so.  In  fact,  one  may 
safely  conclude,  that  the  battle  of  Waterloo  would  not 
have  been  fought  had  not  d'Erlon's  Corps  been  turned 
aside  by  the  unauthorized  act  of  the  staff-officer.  We 
may,  and  in  fact  we  must,  even  go  further.  It  is  alto- 
gether improbable  that  if  Bliicher  had  found  that  Wel- 
lington was  in  no  condition  to  receive  battle  on  the  i8th, 
he  would  have  deviated  from  his  natural  course  of  action 
after  losing  the  battle  of  Ligny ;  he  would  without  doubt, 
in  such  case,  have  retired  on  either  Liege  or  Namur. 
These  consequences  are  assuredly  not  too  remote.  The 
immediate  and  palpable  results  of  an  action,  or  of  a 
failure  to  act,  are  within  the  legitimate  field  of  inquiry; 
in  fact,  unless  this  be  permitted,  history  can  yield  no  les- 
sons at  all ;  it  is  only  when  we  carry  our  speculation  into 
the  region  of  remote  results,  or  vary  too  much  from  the 
conditions  which  actually  existed,  that  we  are  going  be- 
yond the  line  of  legitimate  inference  and  useful  deduction. 
It  may  be  added  that  it  is,  and  in  the  nature  of  things 
must  be,  for  each  person  to  draw  the  line  in  each  case. 
If,  now,  we  ask  what  would  probably  have  happened  if 


1 86  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.  [CHAP.   12.] 

Ney  had  collected  his  troops  at  Frasnes  during  the  fore- 
noon, in  order  that  he  might  be  able  promptly  to  obey 
his  orders  as  soon  as  they  should  be  received,  as  we  have 
above  maintained  he  ought  to  have  done,  v^^e  are  inclined 
to  think  that  the  simultaneous  .  movement  upon  Quatre 
Bras  between  twelve  and  two  o'clock  of  40,000  men 
would  have  brought  about  the  prompt  retirement  by  the 
Prince  of  Orange^^  of  Perponcher's  division.  It  would 
probably  have  fallen  back  on  Nivelles,  where  Chasse  was 
assembling  the  other  Dutch-Belgian  division.  Whether 
the  Duke  on  his  return  from  Brye  could  have  effected  a 
concerted  attack  on  the  French  by  combining  a  move- 
ment on  the  Brussels  road  by  Picton  and  the  Bruns- 
wickers  with  one  on  the  Nivelles  road  by  Perponcher 
and  Alten,  it  is  not  easy  to  say.  The  advantage  of  posi- 
tion would  have  clearly  been  with  the  French,  and  in  fact 
they  would  have  been  considerably  superior  in  numbers. 
There  would  certainly  have  existed  no  reason  why  in 
this  case  Ney  could  not  have  sent  10,000  or  even  20,000 
men  down  the  Namur  road  in  compliance  with  the 
orders  of  2  and  3.15  P.  M.'^ 

Neither  of  the  above-described  advantages  was  gained 
by  Marshal  Ney.  By  leaving  the  divisions  of  Jerome 
and  Foy  at  Gosselies  instead  of  bringing  them  up  to 
Frasnes  early  in  the  morning, —  by  leaving  that  of 
Durutte  at  Jumet,  and  the  other  three  of  d'Erlon's  divis- 
ions still  further  in  rear  until  long  after  the  last  regi- 
ments of  the  2d  Corps  had  left  Gosselies, —  he  rendered  a 
prompt  and  bloodless  occupation  of  Quatre  Bras  almost 


*''The  Duke  of  Wellington  did  not  get  back  from  B^e,  where  he  had 
gone  to  confer  with  Marshal  Bliicher,  until  half-past  two  o'clock. 

"Jomini,  however,  says  (p.  227)  that  all  that  could  have  been  expected 
of  Ney  even  in  this  case  would  have  been  to  maintain  his  position.  But 
he  says  this  in  a  letter  to  Marshal  Ney's  son,  and  his  statement  cannot  be 
taken  seriously.  The  events  of  the  day  demonstrated  that  one  corps  would 
have  been  amply  sufficient  to  hold  the  place,  had  it  been  once  occupied  by 
the  French. 


[chap.  12.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.  187 

impossible.  Exactly  how  far  he  was  responsible  for  the 
gap  between  his  two  corps,  we  do  not  know.  But  we  can 
certainly  say  that  a  diligent  and  experienced  officer  in 
Ney's  place  would  have  known  to  a  half  an  hour  just  how 
long  after  the  arrival  of  the  last  division  of  the  2d  Corps, 
the  van  of  the  ist  Corps  might  be  expected.  The  whole 
management  of  Marshal  Ney  on  this  day  shows  distrust 
of  the  Emperor's  judgment,  unwillingness  to  take  the 
most  obvious  steps,  finally,  disobedience  of  orders.  As 
the  natural  consequence  of  his  wilfulness  and  perverse- 
ness  he  failed  to  reap  the  enormous  successes  which  the 
Emperor's  sagacity  had  placed  within  his  power.  All  he 
did  was  to  prevent  Wellington  from  giving  any  aid  to 
BlUcher.  This  he  certainly  accomplished;  and  an 
important  service  it  was.  He  also  showed  himself  as  he 
always  did,  a  brave,  resolute,  capable  officer  on  the  field 
of  battle.  Probably  he  did  as  much  as  any  one  could 
have  done  with  the  force  actually  under  his  hand.  But 
had  he  taken  the  necessary  steps  to  get  the  large  and 
powerful  body  of  troops  which  Napoleon  had  entrusted 
to  his  care  well  in  hand  in  due  season,  he  could  not  have 
failed,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  to  achieve  a  striking  suc- 
cess, which  might  very  possibly  have  had  a  decisive 
effect  on  the  fortunes  of  the  war.  If  each  of  the  two 
allied  generals  had  been  defeated  at  the  outset  of  the 
campaign,  the  chances  of  Napoleon  for  final  victory  would 
have  been  greatly  in  his  favor. 

In  regard  to  the  conduct  of  this  battle  by  the  Duke  of 
Wellington  nothing  new  can  be  said.  He  has  always 
received  the  credit  which  he  certainly  fully  merited,  of 
maintaining  most  skilfully  and  with  great  spirit  and 
tenacity  a  fight  in  which  he  was  outmatched  until  nearly 
the  close  of  the  day.  He  had  been  gravely  misled  by  his 
chief-of-staff  as  to  the  situation  of  the  various  bodies 
which  composed  his  army ;  and  in  fact  it  must  be  admitted 
that  his  own  calculations  were  very  far  from  being  worthy 
of  his  reputation.     Hence  he  ran  the  risk  of  encountering 


1 88  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.  [CHAP.  12.] 

a  largely  superior  force ;  and  that  he  had  actually  to  deal 
with  only  half  of  this  force  was  due  to  no  strategy  of  his. 
He  found  himself  in  a  most  perplexing  and  dangerous 
situation,  in  which  he  displayed  undoubtedly  great  skill 
and  courage,  but  for  the  successful  result  of  the  day  he 
was  largely  indebted  to  the  "  fortune  of  war."-*^ 


^^Cf.  Chesney,  p.  137. 


NOTES   TO  CHAPTER  XII. 

I.  Ch arras'  references  to  the  orders  to  Marshal  Ney 
as  respects  Kellermann's  cavalry,  are  disingenuous  and 
very  misleading.  They  are  evidently  intended  to  throw 
the  blame  for  the  non-employment  of  this  body  of  troops 
upon  the  shoulders  of  Napoleon. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  his  letter '  to  Ney,  which 
the  Emperor  said  might  arrive  a  little  before  the  formal 
order  signed  by  Marshal  Soult,  the  Emperor  told  Ney 
what  his  wishes  were  as  to  the  disposition  of  his  troops 
after  he  should  have  occupied  Quatre  Bras.  One  division 
was  to  be  stationed  two  leagues  in  front  of  Quatre  Bras,  — 
six  divisions  around  Quatre  Bras,  —  and  Kellermann's 
cavalry  at  the  intersection  of  the  Roman  road  with  the 
Charleroi  turnpike,  so  that  the  Emperor  might  recall  it, 
if  he  desired  so  to  do.  In  the  same  letter  he  tells  Ney 
to  be  careful  of  Lefebvre-Desnouettes'  division,  which 
belonged  to  the  Guard. 

It  seems  plain  enough  that  this  letter  must  be  taken  in 
connection  with  Soult's  definite  order,  ^  to  which  the  letter 
refers,  which  ordered  Ney  to  direct  the  ist  and  2d  corps 
cTarmee  and  the  3d  corps  of  cavalry,  —  Kellermann's,  — 
upon  Quatre  Bras,  and  there  take  up  his  position. 

But  the  latest  order  ^  of  Soult  positively  instructs  Ney 
to  unite  the  two  corps  of  Counts  Reille  and  d'Erlon  and 


'Doc.  In€d.,  X,  p.  32  ;  App.  C,  xviii;  i>ost,  pp.  377.  378- 

»Ib.,  VIII,  p.  27  ;  App.  C,  xxi;  post,  pp.  380,  381. 

'lb.,  IX,  p.  31 ;  App.  xxii;  i^^j/,  p.  381.    This  refers  to  the  prior  order  in 

distinct  terms. 

189 


IQO  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS -NOTES.  [CHAP.  12.] 

also  that  of  the  Count  of  Valmy,  and  says  in  so  many 
words  that  with  these  forces  he  ought  to  be  able  "  to  beat 
and  destroy  "  the  enemy. 

There  is  not  either  in  the  letter  or  in  these  orders  a 
single  word  limiting  the  employment  of  Kellermann's 
cavalry  to  "  a  case  of  necessity."  Yet  this  is  what  Charras 
states'*  was  contained  in  Soult's  order.  He  even  says 
that  Ney  did  not  dare  ^  to  employ  but  one  out  of  the  four 
brigades  of  which  Kellermann's  Corps  consisted, — 
meaning  that  he  was  so  hampered  by  his  orders. 

Hooper^  also  says  that  Ney  used  Kellermann's  cavalry 
"  sparingly,  in  obedience  to  the  instructions  of  Napoleon." 
The  orders  speak  for  themselves.  Ney  was  not  only 
permitted  to  use  Kellermann's  Corps,  but  was  positively 
directed  to  do  so.  It  was  only  in  his  use  of  the  cavalry 
of  the  Guard  —  the  division  of  Lefebvre-Desnouettes^— 
that  he  was  restricted. 

2.  Napoleon  in  his  account  of  the  campaign  labored 
under  a  mistake  as  to  the  time  when  he  gave  Ney  his 
orders  on  the  i6th.  He  says  it  was  in  the  night.  This 
involved  him  in  another  mistake,  namely,  that  the  orders 
directed  Ney  "to  push  on  at  daybreak  beyond  Quatre 
Bras."  It  is  true  that  he  rendered  it  possible  for  the 
readers  of  his  book  to  rectify  these  errors,  for  he  says 
that  Flahaut  was  the  bearer  of  these  orders,  and  he 
survived  the  campaign.  Doubtless  if  the  Emperor  could 
have  had  access  to  him,  these  mistakes  would  have  been 
rectified ;  as  it  is,  they  render  much  of  what  Napoleon 
says  of  no  value.  Then,  Napoleon  never  learned  the 
truth  about  the  wanderings  of  d'Erlon's  Corps ;  and  this 
of  course,  invalidates  his  criticisms  as  to  that  matter. 


'•Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  205. 
^Ib.,  p.  206. 
'Hooper,  p.  127. 

'Even  in  regard  to  this  division,  Soult's  order  plainly  implies  that  Ney 
light  make  use  of  it.    Doc.  In^d.,  VIII,  p.  28 ;  App.  C,  xxi. ;  post,  pp.  3S0, 381. 


[chap.  12.]    THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.-NOTES.  IQI 

But  in  regard  to  the  main  point  made  in  this  chapter,  the 
Emperor's  opinion  is  given  explicitly.  He  blames  Ney^ 
for  not  having  "executed  his  orders  and  marched  on 
Quatre  Bras  with  his  43,000  menr  That  Ney  should 
concentrate  his  entire  command  was  in  reality,  the  burden 
of  his  orders. 

That  this  neglect  to  keep  his  command  together  was 
in  Napoleon's  eyes  Ney's  principal  fault  in  his  conduct 
on  the  1 6th,  appears  unmistakably  from  the  following 
passages  in  Soult's  despatch^  to  Ney  of  the  next  day:  — 

"  The  Emperor  has  seen  with  pain  that  you  did  not  yesterday 
unite  your  divisions ;  they  acted  independently  of  each  other ;  hence 
they  experienced  losses. 

"  If  the  corps  of  the  Counts  d'Erlon  and  Reille  had  been  together, 
not  an  Englishman  of  the  troops  which  attacked  you  would  have 
escaped.  If  the  Count  d'Erlon  had  executed  the  movement  upon 
St.  Amand  which  the  Emperor  had  ordered,  the  Prussian  ai'my 
would  have  been  totally  destroyed,  and  we  should  have  taken  perhaps 
30,000  prisoners. 

"The  corps  of  Generals  Gerard  and  Vandamme  and  the  Imperial 
Guard  have  always  been  united :  one  exposes  one's  self  to  reverses 
when  detachments  are  put  in  peril. 

"  The  Emperor  hopes  and  desires  that  your  seven  divisions  of 
infantry  and  your  cavaliy  shall  be  well  united  and  organized,  and 
that  together  they  shall  not  occupy  more  than  one  league  of  ground, 
so  that  you  may  have  them  under  your  hand  and  may  be  able  to 
employ  them  at  need." 

What  Soult  told  Sir  William  Napier, '°  years  after- 
wards, is  without  question  the  truth :  —  "  Ney  neglected 
his  orders  at  Quatre  Bras." 

3.  It  may  be  worth  while  to  correct  a  curious  error 
into  which  Siborne  has  fallen  in  his  anxiety  to  show  that 
Ney  was  not  ordered  to  seize  Quatre  Bras  early  in  the 
morning.     He  "  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  2  P.  M. 


^Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  209. 

9Doc.  Indd.,  XVII,  p.  46;  App.  C,  xxvii;  :post,  pp.  384,  385, 

'°Lifeof  General  Sir  W.  Napier,  vol.  i,  p.  505. 

"Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  146,  n. 


192  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.-NOTES.  [CHAP.   12.] 

order  to  Ney  was  addressed  on  the  back  of  the  letter  to 
the  Marshal  at  Gosselies.  "  This  circumstance,"  he  says, 
"  proves  that  Napoleon  was  under  the  impression  that 
Ney  had  not  at  that  time  (two  o'clock)  commenced  his 
attack,  but  was  still  at  Gosselies."  But  this  argument,  if 
it  is  good  for  anything,  shows  that  Napoleon  supposed 
that  Ney  and,  of  course,  the  bulk  of  his  command  also, 
would  be  at  Gosselies  when  the  bearer  of  the  letter 
arrived  there,  say  at  3  o'clock,  which  is  simply  absurd. 
The  fact  is  that,  Ney  having  the  previous  night  had  his 
headquarters  at  Gosselies,  all  orders  to  him  were  naturally 
and  properly  sent  there  first. 

4.  Jomini,"  in  a  letter  to  the  Duke  of  Elchingen, 
suggests  that  Napoleon  might  well  have  left  Reille's 
corps  and  Lefebvre-Desnouettes'  cavalry  at  Frasnes  to 
watch  the  enemy  at  Quatre  Bras,  and  thrown  d'Erlon's 
Corps  and  Kellermann's  cavalry  on  the  rear  of  the 
Prussians  at  Brye,  a  manoeuvre  which,  he  says,  "  could  be 
executed  from  Frasnes  as  well  as  from  Quatre  Bras." 
Into  the  merits  of  this  suggestion  we  do  not  propose  to 
enter;  there  is  certainly  much  to  recommend  it.  But  in 
a  postscript  General  Jomini  takes  special  pains  to  express 
his  opinion  that  General  Reille  is  not  "  deserving  of  the 
least  censure  "  for  having  deferred  putting  his  corps  in 
motion  from  Gosselies  for  Frasnes,  on  the  morning  of  the 
1 6th,  until  he  had  communicated  Girard's  information  to 
Marshal  Ney. 

"  We  must  not  forget  that  General  Reille  had  just  sent — nine 
o'clock  —  positive  information  of  the  presence  of  the  entire  Pmssian 
army  towards  Ligny :  he  must  have  concluded  from  this  that  the 
left  would  be  called  upon  to  take  part  in  the  attack  of  this  army, 
and  that  it  would  be  unfortunate  if,  after  such  information,  he  took 
the  Genappe  [Quatre  Bras]  route  when  it  would  be  necessary  to 
turn  to  the  right  towards  Brye.  This  reasoning  was  more  than 
logical,  it  was  based  on  the  laws  oi  la  grafide  tactique"'^ 


»^Joniini,  pp.  219,  221. 
"lb.,  p.  226. 


[chap.  12.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.-NOTES.  I93 

In  this  passage  Jomini  seems  to  overlook  what  he  has 
just  before  said  about  Frasnes.  Even  if  the  left  should 
be  called  upon  to  take  part  in  the  attack  of  the  Prus- 
sians instead  of  being  concentrated  for  the  attack  of 
Quatre  Bras,  it  would  still  be  necessary  for  a  large  force 
to  establish  itself  at  Frasnes,  in  order  to  observe  the 
enemy  at  Quatre  Bras ;  to  proceed  then  to  Frasnes,  with 
the  two  divisions  of  Foy  and  Jerome,  from  Gosselies, 
where  he  was  when  the  Emperor's  order  reached  him, 
was  the  right  thing  for  Reille  to  do  in  any  event.  Jomini 
in  fact  suggests  this  very  thing  as  in  his  judgment  the 
correct  course,  viz.:  to  leave  the  2d  Corps  at  Frasnes 
and  to  throw  the  ist  Corps  on  Brye.  This  attempt, 
therefore,  to  justify  Reille's  delay  in  marching  to 
Frasnes,  fails. 

5.  Other  theories  than  the  one  we  have  adopted  as  to 
the  cause  of  the  wanderings  of  d'Erlon's  Corps  have 
been  broached.  Thiers  thinks  that  Napoleon  sent 
d'Erlon  a  direct  order ;  Charras''*  has  combated  this  view 
in  a  careful  examination  of  the  evidence,  and  we  agree 
with  him.  There  is,  however,  considerable  conflict  of  tes- 
timony. Lieutenant-Colonel  de  Baudus,  who  was  on 
the  staff  of  Marshal  Soult  in  this  campaign,  in  his 
"  Etudes  sur  Napoleon,"  '^  tells  this  story :  — 

"  At  the  moment  when  the  affair  [the  battle  of  Ligny]  was  at  its 
height,  Napoleon  called  me  and  said  to  me  :  'I  have  sent  an  order  to 
the  Comte  d'Erlon  to  direct  his  whole  corps  in  the  rear  of  the  right 
of  the  Prussian  army ;  go  and  carry  to  Marshal  Ney  a  duplicate  of  this 
order,  which  ought  to  be  communicated  to  him.  You  will  tell  him 
that,  whatever  may  be  the  situation  in  which  he  finds  himself,  it  is 
absolutely  necessary  that  this  disposition  should  be  executed;  that  I 
do  not  attach  any  great  importance  to  what  is  passing  to-day  on  his 
wing;  that  the  important  affair  is  here,  where  I  am,  because  I  want 
to  finish  with  the  Prussian  army.  As  for  him,  he  must,  if  he  can- 
not do    better,   confine  himself  to   keeping  the  English   army  in 


■''Charras,  vol.  2,  pp.  242  et  seq. 
"Vol.  I,  pp.  210  et  seq.     Paris:  1841. 


194  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.-NOTES.  [CHAP.   12.] 

check.*  '^  When  the  Emperor  had  finished  giving  me  his  instruc- 
tions, the  major-general  [Soult]  recommended  me  in  the  most  ener- 
getic terms  to  insist  most  forcibly  on  the  Duke  of  Elchingen  that, 
on  his  part,  nothing  should  hinder  the  execution  of  the  movement 
prescribed  to  the  Comte  d'Erlon." 

Notwithstanding  this  circumstantial  narrative,  we  do 
not  beheve  that  Napoleon  sent  d'Erlon  a  direct  order. 
Napoleon  had  in  all  his  communications  with  Ney  placed 
d'Erlon  under  him;  the  letter  written  to  Ney  that  morn- 
ing by  the  Emperor  said :  — "  The  major-general  has  given 
the  most  precise  instructions,  so  that  there  shall  be  no 
difficulty  about  obedience  to  your  orders  when  you  are 
detached  from  the  main  army;  when  I  am  present,  the 
corps-commanders  will  take  their  orders  from  me." 
Now  Napoleon  must  have  supposed  that  d'Erlon  would 
be  with  Ney  at  5  P.  M. 

Baudus'  book  was  published  twenty-six  years  after  the 
battle.  His  recollection  of  the  fact  that  he  was  sent  on 
such  a  mission  was  no  doubt  clear;  very  likely  he 
remembered  with  approximate  accuracy  what  Napoleon 
and  Soult  said  to  him;  but  he  may  easily  have  been 
mistaken  as  to  the  order  itself.  It  would  be  very  natural 
that  an  order  to  Ney  directing  him  to  send  the  i  st  Corps  to 
attack  the  Prussian  right  might  be  mistaken  for  an  order 
to  d'Erlon,  who  commanded  the  ist  Corps,  to  do  this. 
And  what  to  our  mind  settles  the  matter  is,  that  if  the 
order  had  really  been  one  directed  to  d'Erlon,  neither 
the  Emperor  nor  Soult  would  have  wasted  their  time  in 
asking  Baudus  to  ask  Ney  not  to  interfere  with  its  exe- 
cution.    If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  an  order  to   Ney, 


'^  This  is  exactly  what  was  enjoined  on  Ney  by  the  3.15  P.  M.  order.  It  is 
to  be  noted  that,  while  the  2  P.  M.  order  expressly  directed  Ney  to  attack 
the  EngHsh,  and  only  after  having  vigorously  pushed  them,  to  turn  back  and 
operate  against  the  Prussians,  the  3.15  P.  M.  order  directed  him  to  manoeuvre 
at  <?«^^,— that  is,  without  waiting  until  he  should  have  driven  the  English,— 
so  as  to  surround  the  Prussian  right  wing.  This  is  precisely  what  Baudus  says 
the  Emperor  and  Souk  desired  him  so  strongly  to  urge  upon  Marshal  Ney. 


[chap.  12.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.-NOTES.  I95 

urging  on  him  to  detach  a  part  of  his  command  to  take 
the  Prussians  in  rear,  such  remarks  as  Napoleon  and 
Soult  made  to  Baudus  were  directly  apposite,  and 
were  made,  no  doubt,  in  order  that  they  might  be 
repeated  to  Ney,  so  that  he  might  enter  more  fully 
into  the  Emperor's  view  of  the  situation.  Lastly, 
although  no  specific  mention  might  be  made  in  the  writ- 
ten order  of  the  troops  which  Ney  was  to  detach,  it  is 
extremely  probable  that  both  Napoleon  and  Soult  spoke 
of  the  ist  Corps  in  this  connection,  as  it  was  of  course 
known  that  d'Erlon  was  to  come  up  in  rear  of  Reille, 
who  might  very  probably  be  actively  engaged,  and  that 
d'Erlon's  Corps,  therefore,  would  probably  be  sent,  if  any 
was  sent. 

We  have  little  doubt  that  Baudus  carried  the  duplicate 
of  the  3.15  P.  M.  order  to  Marshal  Ney.  Everything  that 
he  says  about  it  points  to  this ;  the  statement  that  the 
battle  was  at  its  height  when  the  order  was  given  to  him 
would  be  true  at  a  quarter-past  three;  the  strong  lan- 
guage of  the  Emperor  and  Soult  as  to  the  importance  of 
persuading  Ney  to  comply  with  their  request  has  the 
same  ring  as  the  language  of  the  order.'^  Baudus  tells  us 
that  when  he  was  nearing  Quatre  Bras  he  was  nearly 
run  down  by  Kellermann's  cuirassiers,  who  were,  as  we 
have  seen,'^  routed  between  6  and  7  P.  M.'^  Charras  says 
that  the  3.15  P.  M.  order""  arrived  at  6  o'clock."'      This 


'^  See  note  16,  on  page  194. 

'^Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.  206-208. 

'^Heymes,  Ney's  aide-de-camp,  says  (Doc.  Indd.,  pp.  9,  10)  that  it  was  just 
when  Kellermann's  cuirassiers  had  been  routed  that  Colonel  Laurent  arrived 
and  told  Marshal  Ney  that  he  had  ordered  d'Erlon  to  turn  off  the  main  road 
in  the  direction  of  St.  Amand.  Baudus  came  up  a  Uttle  later,  evidently,  as 
he  met  the  cuirassiers  some  distance  from  the  field  of  battle.  But  as  Baudus 
saw  nothing  of  the  troops  of  the  ist  Corps,  we  think  Heym^s  must  be  mis- 
taken, as  to  Laurent's  having  just  turned  off  the  head  of  the  column  to  the 
right.     If  so,  Baudus  must  have  passed  at  least  half  the  corps  on  the  road. 

^"According  to  Gourgaud,  p.  57,  Colonel  Forbin-Janson  carried  this  order. 

""Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  206. 


196  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUATRE  BRAS.-NOTES.  [CHAP.  12.] 

duplicate  of  it,  dated  3.30  P.  M."  the  transmission  of 
which  was  delayed,  as  we  have  seen,  by  the  verbal  mes- 
sages to  Ney,  may  very  possibly  not  have  reached  the 
Marshal  till  half-past  six.  Baudus  found  Ney  in  a  state 
of  great  exasperation  against  the  Emperor,  who  had,  as 
he  had  been  told,  ordered  the  ist  Corps  to  march  upon 
St.  Amand  without  informing  him  of  this  change  of 
plan.  The  fact  that  Baudus  saw  nothing  of  the  ist 
Corps  on  the  road  confirms  our  hypothesis  that  that 
corps  had  been  turned  off  by  the  bearer  of  the  2  P.  M. 
despatch. 

In  conclusion,  vv^e  may  say  that  the  evidence  as  to 
this  matter  is  not  entirely  satisfactory.  D'Erlon  says 
the  order  he  saw  was  addressed  to  Marshal  Ney.  Reille 
says  the  same.  D'Erlon  says  the  order  was  brought 
by  General  Labedoyere ;  Heymes,  by  Colonel  Laurent. 
Heymes  says  that  Colonel  Laurent,  after  turning  the  ist 
Corps  off  the  turnpike,  informed  Ney  what  he  had 
done  ;^^  Baudus  says  that  Ney  told  him^'*  that  he  never 
received  any  advice  of  the  sort  at  all,  and  that  he  only 
learned  that  the  corps  had  gone  off  by  sending  to 
Frasnes  for  it,  and  there  being  no  troops  there.  It  is  idle 
to  seek  to  reconcile  these  minor  contradictions.  They 
are  not  important. 


^==Doc.  Indd.,  p.  42. 
"lb.,  pp.  9,  10. 
''^Baudus,  vol.  i,  p.  212. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE  SEVENTEENTH  OF  JUNE:    NAPOLEON. 

Napoleon  had,  thus  far,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  main, 
accomplished  his  programme.  Things  had  turned  out, 
so  far  as  the  enemy  were  concerned,  very  much  as  he  had 
originally  expected.  He  had  found  Bllicher  determined 
to  fight ;  he  had  found  Wellington  wholly  unprepared  to 
assist  his  ally.  He  had  encountered  the  Prussians,  there- 
fore, alone ;  and  he  had  beaten  them.  He  had,  in  the 
main,  as  we  have  said,  done  what  he  expected  to  do.  It 
now  only  remained  to  complete  the  original  plan  marked 
out  in  the  letters  to  Ney  and  Grouchy  of  the  morning 
before ;  and,  leaving  the  latter  with  the  3d  and  4th  Corps 
and  plenty  of  cavalry  to  ascertain  the  direction  in  which 
the  Prussians  had  retreated,  to  march  himself  at  the  head 
of  the  6th  Corps  and  the  Guard  to  join  Ney,  and  move 
promptly  against  the  English.     (See  Map  8.) 

There  was  no  reason  in  the  world  for  delay.  As  has 
been  pointed  out  above.  Napoleon  had  not  been  obliged 
to  employ  all  his  troops  in  obtaining  the  victory  of 
Ligny.  The  troops  which  he  intended  to  take  with  him 
were  fresh,  or  substantially  so.  The  6th  Corps  had  not 
fired  a  shot;  the  Guard,  though  it  had  lost  perhaps  a 
thousand  men,  had  certainly  done  no  very  hard  fighting, 
and  it  had  been  brilliantly  successful.  The  cavalry,  also, 
had  suffered  but  little.  Ney,  too,  had  plenty  of  fresh 
troops.  The  ist  Corps,  d'Erlon's,  had  not  been  engaged; 
nor  had  the  light  cavalry  division  of  Lefebvre-Des- 
nouettes ;  only  one  of  the  four  brigades  of  Kellermann's 


igS  THE  17th  OF  JUNE:  [chap.  13.] 

heavy  cavalry  had  been  in  action  at  Quatre  Bras.  Thus 
a  formidable  army,  almost  entirely  composed  of  fresh 
troops,  could  be  led  at  once  against  the  Duke  of  Wel- 
lington's heterogeneous  forces.  The  weather,  in  the 
morning  of  the  17th,  was  fine;  the  Prussians,  wherever 
they  had  gone,  were,  at  any  rate,  for  the  time  being, 
out  of  the  way;  there  was  no  reason,  we  repeat,  why 
advantage  should  not  have  been  promptly  taken  of  the 
fortunate  situation  in  which  the  victory  of  Ligny  had 
temporarily  placed  the  French, —  why  there  should  have 
been  any  hesitation  whatever  in  dealing  with  the  Anglo- 
Dutch  army,  separated,  as  it  now  was,  from  its  ally. 

But  we  may  go  farther  than  this.  Fortunate  as  the 
situation  of  the  French  was  on  the  morning  after  the 
battle  of  Ligny,  there  w^ere  grave  reasons  for  deeming 
this  advantage  to  be  very  brief  in  its  duration.  Napoleon 
had,  indeed,  won  a  victory  over  Bllicher.  But  the  tardi- 
ness of  d'Erlon  and  the  disobedience  of  Ney  had  pre- 
vented Napoleon  from  getting  from  his  left  wing  the 
assistance  on  which  he  had  counted ;  and  he  himself  had 
not  seen  fit  to  modify  his  operations  so  as  to  conform 
to  this  different  state  of  facts.  He  had  not  attacked 
the  Prussians  while  they  were  taking  position  on  the 
heights  of  Ligny,  because  at  that  early  hour  the  forward 
movement  of  the  main  army  could  not  have  been  covered 
by  the  advance  of  the  whole  of  the  left  wing.  He  had  not 
been  able  to  win  the  crushing  victory  over  the  Prussians 
when  concentrated  which  he  would  undoubtedly  have 
won  if  Ney  had  obeyed  his  orders  intelligently  and  boldly, 
and  had  been  able,  as  he  then  would  have  been  able,  to 
send  a  large  force  down  the  Namur  road  to  take  the 
Prussians  in  rear.  Lastly,  Napoleon  had  not  achieved 
the  success  on  which  he  had  a  right  to  count  without  the 
aid  of  Ney,  for,  on  the  unexpected  appearance  of  the  ist 
Corps,  he  had  delayed  the  final  stroke  until  it  was  too 
dark  to  take  full  advantage  of  it.  Napoleon  had  not  in 
the  battle  of  Ligny,  as  he  very  well  knew,  destroyed  the 


[chap.  13.]  NAPOLEON.  1 99 

Prussian  army.  He  understood  perfectly  the  difference 
between  the  victory  he  had  actually  won  and  the  victory 
which  he  would  have  won  had  he  received  from  Ney 
the  assistance  of  d'Erlon's  Corps,  or  even  of  10,000 
men.'  Hence  it  is  remarkable  that  he  should  not  have 
exerted  himself  to  use  his  incomplete  success  to  the 
best  advantage,  and  this  required,  of  course,  the  utmost 
energy  and  activity  on  his  part. 

There  was  also,  had  he  only  known  it,  a  magnificent 
opportunity  before  him  on  this  morning  of  the  17th.  For, 
owing  to  the  carelessness  of  the  Prussian  staff,  Welling- 
ton had  not  been  promptly  informed  of  the  result  of  the 
battle  of  Ligny,  and  he  was  still  at  Quatre  Bras,  only  six 
miles  from  Brye,  where  he  could  be  assailed  in  front  and 
flank.  He  had  not  yet  succeeded  in  collecting  his  entire 
army.  It  was  perfectly  practicable  to  attack  him  in  this 
condition  before  the  Prussians  could  possibly  reorgan- 
ize their  beaten  forces,  and  come  to  his  assistance.  For 
such  an  attack  Napoleon  had  ample  means,  and  of  the 
best  quality,  as  we  have  just  seen.  Ney's  movements 
could  easily  be  coordinated  with  his  own;  Ney  could 
attack  the  English  in  front,  while  the  Emperor  brought 
up  the  6th  Corps  and  the  Guard  over  the  Namur-Quatre- 
Bras  turnpike  directly  upon  their  flank.  The  march 
from  Brye  could  be  begun  at  sunrise, —  at  4  A.  M. ; 
Quatre  Bras  could  be  reached  before  7  o'clock.  Had 
Napoleon,  then,  acted  with  energy  in  accordance  with  his 
own  plan,  he  would  have  stood  a  very  good  chance  of 
crushing  this  portion  of  Wellington's  army,  —  so  far 
from  its  ally,  so  open  to  attack.""  But,  apart  from 
this,  this  was  not  one  of  those  cases  where  time 
is  required  to  come  to  a  decision ;  nothing  was  risked  by 
marching  against  the  English  at  once.     And,  as  it  hap- 


'See  his  despatch  to  Ney,  of  the  17th,  cited  above  ;  p.  191. 
^Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  255. 


200  THE  17th  OF  JUNE:  [CHAP.  I3.] 

pened,  fortune  had  put  in  Napoleon's  way  the  oppor- 
tunity of  striking  a  decisive  blow. 

Napoleon  allowed  this  opportunity  to  escape  him.  Up 
to  this  moment  we  have  seen  him  as  active,  as  sagacious, 
as  energetic  as  ever.  But  it  would  certainly  seem  that 
on  this  morning  of  the  17th  he  was  not  up  to  the  mark. 
He  probably  was  greatly  fatigued,  and  we  need  not 
wonder  at  it.  From  half-past  three  on  the  morning  of 
the  1 2th,  when  he  left  Paris,  to  eleven  o'clock  at  night  of 
the  1 6th,  when,  having  fought  and  won  the  battle  of  Ligny, 
he  sought  rest  at  Fleurus,  he  had  been  subjected  to  a 
tremendous  strain.  Neither  Wellington  nor  Blucher  had 
had  anything  like  it.  He  had  been  on  the  move  and  at 
work,  night  and  day.  He  had  had  to  decide  at  the 
moment  the  most  important  questions,  he  had  had  to 
take  the  gravest  responsibilities.  There  was  a  natural 
reaction.  The  Emperor  yielded  to  the  sense  of  fatigue. 
He  put  off  the  execution  of  the  next  part  of  his  plan. 
He  moreover  neglected  to  ascertain  the  facts  of  the  situa- 
tion, and  hence  was  unaware,  until  too  late,  of  the  great 
opportunity  then  presented  to  him.  General  Jomini 
considerately  remarks:  —  ^"Undoubtedly  the  Emperor 
had  powerful  motives  for  resigning  himself  to  such  inac- 
tivity ;  but  these  motives  have  never  reached  us." 

Napoleon  wasted  most  of  the  morning.  He  expected, 
he  says,  to  hear  from  Ney  what  the  result  of  his  opera- 
tions had  been;  but  that  officer,  furious  with  the 
Emperor  for  having,  as  he  supposed,  withdrawn  the  ist 
Corps  without  notice  from  his  command,'*  vouchsafed  no 
report  to  headquarters.  Finally,  about  8  A.  M.,  General 
Flahaut,  the  Emperor's  aide,  who  had  carried  the  letter 
to  Ney  the  previous  morning  and  had  remained  with 
him  during  the  day,  returned  to  Napoleon  and  brought 
him  the  first  information  of  the  battle  of  Quatre  Bras. 


^Jomini,  p.  148. 

*See  Ney's  letter  to  the  Duke  of  Otranto  ;  Jones,  386. 


[chap.  13.]  NAPOLEON.  201 

He  also  brought  word  that  Ney  had  received  no  news  of 
the  result  of  the  battle  of  Ligny.^  Thereupon  Soult 
wrote  a  despatch*^  to  Ney  informing  him  that  the  Prus- 
sians had  been  "  put  to  rout,"  and  that  Pajol  was  pursu- 
ing them  on  the  roads  to  Namur  and  Liege.  Ney  was  then 
told  that  the  Emperor  was  going  to  Brye ;  that  it  did  not 
seem  possible  for  the  English  to  do  anything  against 
him,  Ney,  but  that  if  they  should  undertake  anything, 
the  Emperor  would  march  directly  upon  them.  Then 
the  Emperor  comments  on  the  fact  that  Ney  did  not  act 
on  the  preceding  day  with  his  entire  force.''  Lastly,  Ney 
is  ordered  to  take  up  position  at  Quatre  Bras ;  but  if  that 
should  not  be  possible,  then  he  was  at  once  to  state  the 
facts  in  detail,  and  the  Emperor  would  immediately 
march  on  Quatre  Bras  himself,  while  Ney  should  assail 
the  enemy  in  front.  If,  on  the  contrary,  there  should  be 
only  a  rear-guard  there,  Ney  was  to  attack  it  and  take  up 
position  there.  Ney  was  also  directed  to  inform  the 
Emperor  of  the  exact  situation  of  his  divisions,  and  of  all 
that  v/as  going  on  in  his  front. 

That  no  move  of  importance  was  then  under  contem- 
plation at  headquarters  appears  from  this  sentence :  — 

"  To-day  will  be  needed  to  terminate  this  operation,  to  supply 
ammunition,  bring  in  stragglers,  and  call  in  detachments.  Give 
your  orders  accordingly ;  and  see  to  it  that  all  the  wounded  are 
cared  for  and  transported  to  the  rear ;  we  hear  complaints  that  the 
ambulances  have  not  done  their  duty." 

This  despatch  was  probably  written  about  8  A.  M.^  It 
is  clear  from  reading  it  that  Napoleon  presumed,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  that  Wellington  had  long  before  heard 
of  the  defeat  of  Bllicher,  and  had  fallen  back  towards 
Brussels,  leaving  only  a  rear-guard  at  Quatre  Bras.  Had 


'See  Charras'  very  apposite  remarks  on  this:  vol.  i,  p.  234. 
'Doc.  Indd.,  XVII,  pp.  45,  47  ;  App.  C,  xxvii.;  i)ost  pp.  3S4,  385. 
'See  atite^  p.  191. 
'Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  235,  n. 


202  THE  17th  OF  JUNE  I  [CHAP.  I3.] 

he  known  the  truth, —  which  was,  as  we  shall  soon  see, 
that  the  Duke  did  not  move  a  man  till  lo  A.  M., —  he 
would  no  doubt  have  attacked  him  at  once.  It  is  true 
that  Napoleon's  conjecture  as  to  Wellington's  move- 
ments was  a  very  natural  one.  It  is  true,  also,  that  he 
had  a  perfect  right  to  expect  to  receive  from  the  com- 
mander of  his  left  wing  an  accurate  and  full  account  of 
the  situation  there;  Ney  ought,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
say,  to  have  prepared  a  report  of  the  battle  of  Quatre 
Bras  on  the  evening  of  the  i6th,  and  sent  it  off  to  head- 
quarters at  once.  Furthermore,  he  ought  to  have 
informed  the  Emperor  on  the  morning  of  the  17th  that 
the  English  were  still  at  Quatre  Bras  in  force.  Napoleon's 
inactivity  does  not  in  the  least  excuse  him.  But  Ney's 
neglect  to  make  proper  reports  of  the  situation  at  Quatre 
Bras  does  not  in  any  way  justify  Napoleon's  delay  in 
marching  upon  the  English.  The  propriety  of  this  step 
was  not  dependent  on  the  accounts  to  be  received  from 
Marshal  Ney.  To  unite  the  reserves  to  the  left  wing  and 
move  upon  Wellington  at  the  earliest  possible  moment 
was  the  thing  to  do,  whatever  might  be  the  reports  from 
Ney. 

Marshal  Soult  seems  to  have  been  of  no  assistance  to 
the  Emperor  on  this  morning.  If  he  had  been  a  compe- 
tent and  efficient  chief-of-sta£f  he  would  assuredly  have 
had  all  needed  information  ready  for  the  Emperor  when 
the  latter  made  his  appearance  in  the  morning.  As  it 
w^as,  knowing  nothing  of  what  had  happened  at  Quatre 
Bras  till  nearly  eight  o'clock,  waiting  till  it  should  suit 
Ney  to  furnish  him  with  the  information  requested  in  the 
8  A.  M.  despatch,  assuming  that  Wellington  must  have 
heard  of  the  defeat  of  Bliicher  and  fallen  back  in  conse- 
quence, the  Emperor  amused  himself  with  going  over  the 
field  of  battle,  and  talking  politics  to  the  generals.^  He 
did  not  exert  himself  in  the  least  to  stimulate  the  energy 


^La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  p.  214.    See  also,  pp.  20S  and  233. 


[CHAP.  13.]  NAPOLEON.  2O3 

and  activity  of  his  subordinates ;  in  fact,  he  yielded  to 
that  lassitude  which  is  so  apt  to  succeed  unusual  exer- 
tion. He  deliberately  postponed  the  execution  of  the 
next  step  in  his  campaign,  notwithstanding  that  the  in- 
Complete  result  of  his  encounter  with  the  Prussians 
rendered  it  ail  the  more  imperative  that  no  time  should  be 
lost  and  no  opportunity  neglected. 

During  the  forenoon,  however,  the  troops  intended  to 
join  Ney  were  ordered  to  Marbais  on  the  turnpike, — 
Lobau'°  at  ten  o'clock, —  the  Guard  and  Milhaud's  cuiras- 
siers at  eleven.  At  noon,  it  having  been  reported  that 
the  English  were  still  at  Quatre  Bras,  another  order" 
was  sent  to  Ney,  directing  him  to  attack  the  enemy 
there,  and  informing  him  that  the  Emperor  was  leading 
the  troops  now  at  Marbais  to  support  his  operations. 
Thus  the  execution  of  the  plan  of  campaign  marked  out 
in  the  letters  to  Ney  and  Grouchy  was  at  last  resumed ; 
the  reserves  under  Napoleon  marched  to  join  the  left 
wing  under  Ney;  the  right  wing  under  Grouchy  was 
assigned  to  take  care  of  the  defeated  Prussians.  Girard's 
division  of  the  2d  Corps,  which  had  suffered  severely 
in  the  battle, —  Girard  himself  having  been  mortally 
hurt, —  was  left  on  the  field  to  take  care  of  the  wounded. 

Napoleon  had  undoubtedly  assumed  that  the  Prussian 
army,  if  beaten,  would  retire  on  its  base  of  operations, 
towards  Namur  and  Liege.  This  assumption  was 
strengthened  by  the  circumstances  of  the  battle  of  Ligny. 
He  had  not  failed  to  note  the  strong  force  retained  by 
Marshal  Bliicher  to  protect  his  communications  with 
Namur  as  well  as  the  road  to  Gembloux,  by  which  the 
IVth  Corps  was  expected  to  arrive.  He  was  perfectly 
justified  in  inferring  that  if  Bliicher  had  established  a 
new    or    secondary    base    at    Wavre,  for    instance,  or 


"One  division  of  the  6th  Corps,  that  of  Teste,  was  detached,  and  added  to 
Grouchy's  command. 
"Doc.  In6d.,  XVI,  p.  44;  App.  C,  xxvm;:pos/,  pp.  385,  386. 


204  THE  17th  OF  JUNE:  [CHAP.   I3.] 

Louvain,  or  if  he  had  had  any  idea  whatever  of  renounc- 
ing his  line  of  communications,  so  as  to  be  able  to  cooper- 
ate with  the  English  in  subsequent  operations,  he  would 
without  doubt  have  placed  his  left  wing  in  a  wholly 
different  position,  where  he  could  have  made  some  use 
of  it  in  the  battle."  The  fact  that  Thielemann's  Corps 
was  placed  where  it  could  not  be  of  any  assistance  to 
those  of  Zieten  and  Pirch  I.,  seemed  to  indicate  that 
reliance  was  placed  upon  the  English  for  any  help  these 
corps  might  need,  and  corroborated  the  presumption  that 
Blucher  and  Gneisenau  v/ere  willing  to  take  the  risk  of 
the  defeat  of  a  part  of  the  Prussian  army  by  accepting 
battle  where  support  could  only  be  furnished  by  their 
allies,  and  had  no  intention  whatever  of  renouncing  their 
base  of  operations,  via  Namur  and  Liege.  Added  to 
these  considerations  was  the  general  presumption  against 
such  a  dangerous  and  inconvenient  course  as  a  change  of 
base  must  always  be.'^ 

It  must  also  be  remembered  that  the  Prussians  held 
the  villages  of  Brye  and  Sombreffe  till  after  midnight,  so 
that  there  was  no  obstacle  whatever  to  the  troops  of  the 
two  beaten  corps  retiring  after  the  battle  by  the  Quatre- 
Bras-Namur  turnpike  towards  Namur.  It  may  well  be 
questioned  whether  there  was  any  need  for  these  troops 
to  cross  the  pike  at  all ;  or  whether  any  of  them  would 
have  crossed  it,  had  BlUcher  given  orders  for  the  whole 
army  to  retire  on  Namur.''^ 

Hence  it  was  assumed  at  the  headquarters  of  the 
French  army  that  it  was  in  the  direction  of  Namur  that 


"Maurice,  p.  350;  July,  1S90:  citing  Clausewitz,  ch.  33,  p.  76.  Gneisenau, 
vol.  4,  p.  386. 

"Maurice,  pp.  350,354:  July,  1890. 

'"But  see  Maurice,  pp.  350, 351 :  July,  1890.  He  thinks  that  the  troops  of  the 
two  beaten  corps  must  at  first  have  retreated  northward,—  that  is,  across  the 
turnpike,  in  the  direction  of  Wavre. 


[chap.  13.]  NAPOLEON.  2O5 

the  Prussians  had  retreated.'^  Soult,  early  in  the  morn- 
ing, sent  out  Pajol  on  the  Namur  road  with  a  division  of 
his  own  corps,  supported  by  a  brigade  from  Exelmans' 
Corps,  to  ascertain  the  facts ;  and  before  8  A.  M.  Pajol 
reported  the  capture  of  a  battery  and  prisoners  at  Le 
Mazy  on  that  road.'^  It  was  on  this  information  that 
Soult  informed  Ney  that  Pajol  was  pursuing  the  Prus- 
sians on  the  road  to  Namur. 

It  is  nevertheless  very  strange  that  no  reconnoissance 
should  have  been  ordered  in  the  direction  of  Tilly  and 
Wavre.'^  This  may  perhaps  be  partly  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  cavalry  divisions  belonging  to  the  3d  and  4th 
Corps,  upon  which  such  duties  would  most  naturally  fall, 
were  exhausted  by  their  efforts  of  the  day  before,  that 
the  6th  Corps,  which  bivouacked  nearest  to  Brye,  had  no 
cavalry  division  attached  to  it,  and  that  the  rest  of  the 
cavalry  was  on  the  right  of  the  position.  These  facts 
may  perhaps  serve  to  account  in  a  way  for  what  cannot 
but  be  considered  as  an  inexcusable  neglect.  There  was 
plenty  of  cavalry  with  the  army.  Exelmans  could  have 
been  sent  out  towards  Wavre,  as  easily  as  Pajol  towards 
Namur.  Both  routes  were  equally  open  to  the  enemy. 
It  was  certainly  by  no  means  impossible  that  Bliicher 
should,  in  spite  of  his  defeat,  endeavor  to  keep  up  his 
communication  with  Wellington,  especially  considering 


'^This  mistake  could  not  have  been  made,  as  Ollech  points  out  (p.  172) 
if  the  battle  had  been  decided  before  nightfall. 

"As  a  matter  of  fact,  these  troops  were  not  a  part  of  a  column  in  retreat 
for  Namur;  but,  of  course,  this  could  not  be  known  at  once.  See  Siborne, 
vol.  I,  pp.  286,  287.    Clausewitz,  ch.  37,  p.  92. 

"Jomini  states  (p.  150,  n.)  that  General  Monthion  reconnoitred  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Tilly  and  Mont  St.  Guibert  in  pursuance  of  orders  given  him  by  the 
Emperor  on  the  morning  of  the  17th.  Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  317,  states  that 
Domon's  cavalry  division  of  the  3d  Corps,  which  had  been  temporarily 
attached  to  the  main  column,  reconnoitred  the  country  between  the  Brussels 
road  and  the  Dyle.  This  must  have  been,  however,  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
17th. 


206  THE  17th  OF  JUNE:  [CHAP.  I3.] 

that  half  his  army, —  the  1 1  Id  and  IVth  Corps, —  was 
untouched,  as  Napoleon  very  well  knew.  The  neglect, 
therefore,  to  explore  the  country  to  the  north  of  the  turn- 
pike cannot  be  excused.  The  blame  for  this  neglect 
must  fall  primarily  upon  Napoleon,  for  he  ought  to  have 
ordered  Soult  to  attend  to  this  matter  in  the  early  morn- 
ing. This  he  certainly  failed  to  do.  Soult  ought,  to  be 
sure,  to  have  had  the  reconnoissance  made,  on  his  own 
motion ;  and  in  neglecting  this,  he  shows  that  he  was  not 
a  good  chief-of-staff.  But  the  Emperor  seems  to  have 
been  satisfied  with  what  Soult  had  done;  hence,  the 
blame  of  not  ascertaining  that  the  two  beaten  Prussian 
Corps  had  retreated  in  the  direction  of  Wavre,  falls 
finally  on  his  shoulders.  Nor  can  Napoleon's  fault  in 
this  matter  be  explained  or  excused  on  the  ground  of  his 
fatigue ;  it  costs  no  exertion  to  order  a  cavalry  officer  to 
make  an  exploration  in  a  certain  direction ;  the  reason 
the  order  was  not  given  was  because  the  Emperor  was  so 
sure  that  such  an  exploration  would  result  in  nothing, — 
because  in  fact  he  was  so  confident  that  the  Prussians 
had  retired  to  the  east^vard,  towards  their  base  of  opera- 
tions. There  was,  it  is  true,  as  we  have  pointed  out 
above,  strong  reason  to  believe  this  to  be  the  fact ;  but 
there  was  also  a  possibility  that  it  might  not  be  the  fact ; 
and  if  it  should  turn  out  not  to  be  the  fact,  the  plan  of 
Napoleon  would  have  to  be  essentially  modified,  for  a 
retreat  of  the  two  beaten  corps  in  the  direction  of  Wavre, 
where  they  could  easily  be  united  with  the  two  unbroken 
corps,  could  hardly  have  any  other  object  than  a  junction 
with  the  English  army,  retiring,  as  that  army  was  sure 
to  do,  from  Quatre  Bras  towards  Brussels. 

Before  Napoleon  left  the  field  of  battle  for  Marbais, 
shortly  before  twelve  o'clock,  he  called  Grouchy  to  him 
and  gave  him  instructions  by  word  of  mouth.  Up  to  this 
time  no  further  information  had  been  received  since 
Pajol  had  reported  the  capture  of  guns  and  prisoners  on 
the  Namur  road.     The  Emperor  at  first  simply  told  him 


[chap.  13.]  NAPOLEON.  2O7 

to  take  the  3d  and  4th  Corps  and  the  cavalry  of  Pajol 
and  Exehiians  and  to  pursue  the  enemy. 
,  "I  replied  to  him,"  says  Marshal  Grouchy,  whose  account  '^  we 
are  now  giving,  "  that  the  Prussians  had  commenced  their  retreat 
at  ten  o'clock  the  evening  before ;  that  much  time  must  elapse 
before  my  troops,  who  were  scattered  over  the  plain,  were  cleaning 
their  guns  and  making  their  soup,  and  were  not  expecting  to  be 
called  upon  to  march  that  day,  could  be  put  in  movement ;  that  the 
enemy  had  seventeen  or  eighteen  hours  the  start  of  the  troops  sent 
in  pursuit ;  that  although  the  reports  of  the  cavalry  gave  no  definite 
information  as  to  the  direction  of  the  retreat  of  the  mass  of  the 
Prussian  army,  it  was  apparently  on  Namur  that  they  were  retiring ; 
and  that  thus,  in  following  them,  I  should  find  myself  isolated, 
separated  from  him,  and  out  of  the  range  of  his  movements.  These 
observations,"  Marshal  Grouchy  goes  on  to  say,  "were  not  well 
received ;  the  Emperor  repeated  his  orders,  adding  that  it  was  for 
me  to  discover  the  route  taken  by  Marshal  Bliicher;  that  he  him- 
self was  going  to  fight  the  English,  '  if  they  will  stand  on  this  side 
of  the  Forest  of  Soignes'  '9  that  it  was  for  me  to  complete  the 
defeat  of  the  Prussians  in  attacking  them  as  soon  as  I  should  have 
caught  up  with  them,  and  that  I  must  communicate  with  him  by 
the  paved  road,"^° — the  Namur-Qiiatre-Bras  turnpike. 

These  objections  raised  by  Marshal  Grouchy  were 
clearly  not  well  taken.  His  two  corps  had  done  the 
principal  part  of  the  fighting  the  day  before ;  they  were 
unquestionably  in  need  of  repose  the  forenoon  after  the 
battle.  The  fresh  troops  in  the  army  were  required  for 
the  operations  which  were  to  be  immediately  undertaken 
against  the  English.  Hence  the  delay  in  beginning  the 
pursuit  of  the  Prussians,  of  which  Grouchy  complained, 
was  unavoidable,  unless  the  whole  plan  of  campaign  was 
to  be  changed.  It  would  have  been  very  desirable,  no 
doubt,  had  it  been  possible,  to  follow  up  the  defeated 
Prussians  with  the  greatest  promptness  and  vigor.    But 


'^Grouchy,  Obs.,  p.  12  et  seq. 

'^Fragments  Hist,  Lettre  k  MM.  Mdry  et  Barthdiemy;  pp.  4,  5.    Grouchy 
Mem.,  vol.  4,  p.  44. 

*°Grouchy,  Obs.  p.  13. 


208  THE  17th  OF  JUNE:  [CHAP.   I3.] 

under  the  circumstances  this  was  not  practicable,  unless, 
as  we  have  said,  Napoleon  should  change  his  plan,  and 
should  march  against  BlUcher  with  the  bulk  of  his  army, 
consisting  almost  entirely  of  fresh  troops,  and  should 
leave  Grouchy  with  the  corps  of  Vandamme  and  Gerard 
to  watch  the  English.  This  the  Emperor  was  not 
proposing  to  do.  Moreover,  if  the  Prussians  were  really 
retiring  on  their  base,  as  both  Napoleon  and  Grouchy  at 
this  time  supposed  was  the  case,  delay  in  following  them 
up  could  not  be  a  very  material  matter."" 

Then,  as  for  the  objection  that,  if  he  followed  the 
Prussians  towards  Namur,  he  would  "find  himself 
isolated,  separated  from  the  Emperor,  and  out  of  the  range 
of  his  movements,"  this  was  to  a  certain  extent  unavoid- 
able. The  fact  that  such  an  objection  should  be  raised 
shows  how  unfit  Grouchy  was  for  an  independent 
command.  The  slightest  reflection  should  have 
convinced  him  that  the  task  assigned  to  him  could  not 
well  be  assigned  to  any  one  else  ;  and  that  it  was  a  task 
which  some  one  must  perform.  It  was,  therefore,  his 
manifest  duty  to  undertake  it  with  cheerful  alacrity,  and 
not  in  the  fault-finding  spirit  which  he  does  not  even 
attempt  to  conceal. 

These  were  the  only  orders  which  Marshal  Grouchy 
ever  admitted  having  received  on  the  17th ;  he  denied, 
over  and  over  again,  in  his  pamphlets  written  about  the 
battle,  ever  having  received  any  written  order,  whether 
from  Napoleon  or  Soult,  until  the  next  day."  In  conse- 
quence of  these  formal  and  explicit  denials,  which  were 
very  generally  credited,  the  statements  made  by  Napoleon 
in  his  St.  Helena  narratives,  which,  though  anything  but 
exact,  nevertheless  conveyed  the  truth  substantially, 
were  generally  disbelieved.  For  nearly  thirty  years 
after  the  battle  of  Waterloo  a  wholly  false  notion  was 


'Ollech,  p.  171.     Cf.  Claus2witz,  ch.  51. 

-This  subject  will  be  treated  of  in  Appendix  B ;  ^ost,  p.  355. 


[chap.  13.]  NAPOLEON.  2O9 

prevalent  as  to  the  task  assigned  by  Napoleon  to  Marshal 
Grouchy.  Neither  Siborne,  who  wrote  in  1844,  nor  Van 
Loben  Sels,  who  wrote  in  1849,  was  aware  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  written  order  which  we  are  now  about  to  give. 
The  mischievous  influence  which  this  deliberate  conceal- 
ment of  his  orders  by  Marshal  Grouchy  has  exerted  upon 
the  general  opinion  of  Napoleon's  conduct  of  this  cam- 
paign can  hardly  be  exaggerated. 

Shortly  after  giving  these  verbal  orders  to  Grouchy, 
which  were  plainly  based  on  the  theory  that  Bliicher  had 
fallen  back  on  Namur,  Napoleon  received  ^^  a  report  from 
Berton,  who  commanded  the  brigade  which  was  sent  out 
in  support  of  Pajol,  to  the  effect  that  he  had  been  led  by 
the  statements  of  the  inhabitants  to  proceed  to  Gembloux, 
where  he  had  seen,  at  9  A.  M.,  a  Prussian  corps  of  some 
20,000  men.  '^  This  certainly  looked  as  if  the  Prussians 
were  not  retiring  on  Namur.  The  first  thing  to  be  done, 
therefore,  was  to  find  out  where  they  were  going,  and  what 
they  were  proposing  to  do.  At  Gembloux,  so  it  now 
appeared,  one  would  be  sure  to  get  on  the  track  of  the 
Prussians,  and  obtain  news  of  their  movements  and 
designs.  Accordingly  the  Emperor,  in  the  temporary 
absence  of  Marshal  Soult,  dictated  to  General  Bertrand 
the  following  order  ^^  to  Grouchy :  — 

"Proceed  to  Gembloux  with  the  cavalry  corps  of  General  Pajol, 
the  light  cavalry  of  the  4th  Corps,  the  cavalry  corps  of  General 
Exelmans,  the  division  of  General  Teste,  of  which  you  will  take 
particular  care,  it  being  detached  from  its  own  corps,  ^^  and  the  3d 
and  4th  corps  of  infantry. 

"  You  will  explore  in  the  directions  of  Namur  and  of  Maestricht,^? 


"Charras,  vol,  i,  p.  240. 

''''Berton,  pp.  47,  48.     Berton  supposed  it  to  be  the  corps  of  Biilow,  but  it 
was  really  that  of  Thielemann.     Ollech,  p.  157. 

*^Pascallet,  p.  79.     Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  241.     Appendix  B  ;  post,  p.  358. 

**This  division  belonged  to  the  6th  Corps. 

"Namur  lay   nearly   south-east    and    Maestricht  nearly  north-east  from 
Sombreffe. 


2IO  THE  lyth  OF  JUNE:  [chap.  13.] 

and  you  will  pursue  the  enemy.  Explore  his  march,  and  instruct 
me  respecting  his  manccuvres,  so  that  I  may  be  able  to  penetrate 
what  he  is  inte7idlng  to  do.  ^^ 

"I  am  carrying  my  headquarters  to  Quatre  Bras,  where  the 
English  still  were  this  morning.  Our  communication  will  then  be 
direct  by  the  paved  road  of  Namur.  If  the  enemy  has  evacuated 
Namur,  write  to  the  general  commanding  the  second  military 
division  at  Charlemont  to  cause  Namur  to  be  occupied  by  some 
battalions  of  the  national  guard  and  some  batteries  which  he  will 
organize  at  Charlemont.  He  will  give  the  command  to  a  brigadier- 
general. 

' '  //  is  important  to  penetrate  ivhat  the  enemy  is  intetiding  to 
do;  whether  they  are  separating  the7nselves  from  the  £^tiglish^  or 
whether  they  are  inte7iding  still  to  unite,  to  cover  Brussels  or  ^9 
Liege,  in  trying  the  fate  of  another  battle.  ^°  In  all  cases,  keep 
constantly  your  two  corps  of  infantry  united  in  a  league  of  ground, 
and  occupy  every  evening  a  good  military  position,  having  several 
avenues  of  retreat.  Post  intermediate  detachments  of  cavalry,  so  as 
to  communicate  with  headquarters. 

Dictated  by  the  Emperor, 
in  the  absence  of  the  major-general,  to  the 
Ligny,  17  June,  1815.  Grand-marshal  Bertrand."  ^i 

Not  only  is  the  tone  of  this  letter  altogether  different 
from  that  of  the  verbal  orders  previously  given,  but  the 
duty  assigned  to  Grouchy  is  a  wholly  different  one. 

There  is  in  the  letter  no  trace  of  that  certainty  as  to 
the  position  of  affairs  so  plainly  exhibited  in  the  verbal 
orders.  The  news  that  a  Prussian  corps  has  been  seen 
at  Gembloux  has  evidently  made  a  strong  impression  on 
the  Emperor.  It  may  very  possibly  indicate  that  Bliicher 
is  not  falling  back  to  Namur.  The  statement  is  twice 
made  in  the  letter  that  the  Emperor  is  in  doubt  as  to  the 


^^The  italics  are  ours. 

'^'The  original  is  "^/,"  but  this  is  plainly  an  error,  very  possibly  caused  by 
the  fact  that  the  letter  was  dictated. 
3°The  italics  are  ours. 
"There  are  other  readings  varying  in  unimnortant  points  from  the  above 


[chap.   13.]  NAPOLEON.  211 

intentions  of  the  Prussians,  and  the  chief  task  now 
imposed  upon  Grouchy  is  to  ascertain  those  intentions. 
The  precise  danger  to  be  anticipated  is  stated  explicitly. 
Grouchy  is  warned  in  so  many  words  that  the  Prussians 
may  be  intending  to  unite  with  the  English  to  try  the 
fate  of  another  battle  for  the  defence  of  Brussels,  —  which 
was  exactly  what  they  were  intending  to  do,  and  what 
they  succeeded  in  doing.  Whether  they  are  or  are  not 
intending  to  do  this,  is  the  principal  thing  for  Grouchy 
to  find  out.  As  the  Emperor  had  previously  informed 
Grouchy  of  his  determination  to  fight  the  English  "  if  they 
will  stand  on  this  side  of  the  Forest  of  Soignes," — which 
meant  of  course  that  he  looked  upon  a  battle  with  them 
the  next  day  as  very  possible,  —  this  question,  of  the 
Prussians  uniting  with  the  English  in  fighting  this  battle 
was  of  vital  importance  to  him.^"*  What  Grouchy  was  to 
do  if  he  fou7id  the  Prussia^is  directing  their  movements 
so  as  to  compass  this  end,  it  was  left  to  him  to  determine 
for  Imjzsclf  It  might  be  that  he  could  hinder  the 
accomplishment  of  their  design  most  effectually  by 
attacking  them ;  it  might  be  that  his  best  course  would 
be  to  rejoin  the  main  army  as  soon  as  he  could,  or  to 
manoeuvre  so  as  to  act  in  conjunction  with  it.  It  was 
impossible  for  Napoleon  to  tell  beforehand  how  things 
would  turn  out.  Full  discretion  was  therefore  left  to 
Grouchy  to  take  whatever  course  might  seem  best  to 
him. 

Marshal  Grouchy  was  making  his  arrangements  to  get 
his  command  under  way  when  he  received  this  letter. 
He  experienced  great  delay  in  beginning  his  march  to 
Gembloux.  Vandamme  did  not  get  started  till  two 
o'clock.  Gerard  left  Ligny  an  hour  later.  It  came  on  to 
rain  hard  about  two  o'clock,  and  the  roads  soon  became 


^^Whether  it  was  wise  under  these  circumstances  for  Napoleon  to  detach 
such  a  large  force  as  that  which  he  intrusted  to  Grouchy,  is  a  question  which 
will  be  discussed  in  the  notes  to  Chapter  XV, 


212  THE  17th  OF  JUNE:  [CHAP.  1 3.] 

very  bad.  Grouchy  did  not  succeed  in  getting  farther 
with  his  two  infantry  corps  that  night  than  Gembloux, 
which  is  rather  less  than  eight  miles  from  St.  Amand. " 
The  cavalry  of  Exelmans  was,  however,  stationed  at 
Sauvenieres,  to  gather  information.  Grouchy  had  with 
him  a  force  of  33,319  men  of  all  arms,  of  whom  4,446  were 
the  cavalry  belonging  to  the  two  corps  of  Pajol  and 
Exelmans.  ^^  Napoleon  took  with  himself  Domons 
light  cavalry  division  of  the  3d  Corps,  but  Grouchy 
retained  that  of  Maurin,  belonging  to  the  4th  Corps,  — 
say,  1,500  men.     That  is,  he  had  6,000  cavalry  in  all. 

At  ten  o'clock  that  evening  Grouchy  wrote  to  the 
Emperor  from  Gembloux  a  letter  ^^  which  seemed  to 
indicate  that  he  comprehended,  at  least  to  a  certain 
extent,  the  nature  of  his  task.  He  says  that  it  appeared 
to  him  that  the  Prussians  had  passed  through 
Sauvenieres,  where  his  (Grouchy 's)  cavalry  now  have 
arrived,  and  that,  at  Sauvenieres,  they  had  divided  into 
two  columns,  one  taking  the  road  to  Wavre,  by  Sart-a- 
Walhain,  and  the  other  that  to  Perwez,  a  town  on  the  way 
to  Maestricht.     Grouchy  then  goes  on  to  say :  — 

"  One  may  perhaps  infer  that  a  part  is  going  to  join  Wellington, 
and  that  the  centre,  which  is  the  army  of  Bliicher,  is  retiring  on 
Liege;  another  column  with  artillery  has  effected  its  retreat  on 
Namur.  Exelmans  has  been  ordered  to  send  this  evening  six 
squadrons  to  Sart-a-Walhain  and  three  to  Perwez. 

"  According  to  their  reports,  if  the  mass  of  the  Prtissians  is 
retiring  on  Wavre,  I  shall  folloiv  them  in  that  direction,  in  order 
that  they  may  not  be  able  to  gain  Brussels,  and  to  separate  them 
from   Wellington.  3^ 


"Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  242. 

^Ib.,  vol.  I,  p.  238. 

^^G^rard:  Dernieres  Obs.,  p.  15  ;  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  244;  Siborne,  vol.  i, 
p.  297.  Of  the  mutilations  in  the  text  affecting  the  significance  of  this  letter, 
contained  in  the  Grouchy  Memoirs,  notice  will  be  taken  in  Appendix  B,  post, 
p.  359,  where  a  full  copy  of  it  will  be  given. 

'^The  italics  are  ours. 


[chap.  13.]  NAPOLEON.  2I3 

"If,  on  the  contrary,  my  information  proves  that  the  principal 
Prussian  force  has  marched  on  Perwez,  I  shall  direct  myself  on  that 
city  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy." 

That  Marshal  Grouchy  understood  something  of  the 
nature  of  the  task  before  him  is  apparent  from  this 
despatch.  But  when  he  says  that  his  object  in  following 
the  mass  of  the  Prussians  in  the  direction  of  Wavre  is  to 
prevent  their  gaining  Brussels,  he  is  plainly  beside  the 
mark.  No  movement  of  his  from  Gembloux  to  Wavre 
or  in  the  direction  of  Wavre  could  possibly  hinder  a 
force  at  Wavre  from  marching  on  Brussels.  When  he 
declares  that  his  object  in  proceeding  in  the  direction  of 
Wavre  would  be  to  separate  the  Prussians  from 
Wellington,  he  must  be  understood  to  mean  the  direction 
of  Wavre,  as  contradistinguished  from  the  direction  of 
Perwez,  —  that  is,  in  other  words,  if  the  Prussians  go 
north  instead  of  east  he  will  also  go  north  instead  of  east. 
And  as  he  had  abundance  of  cavalry,  there  was  certainly 
no  reason,  now  that  he  had  cause,  as  he  says  he  had,  to 
suspect  that  a  part  of  the  Prussians  had  gone  to  Wavre, 
with  the  intention  of  uniting  with  Wellington,  why  he 
should  not  have  reconnoitred  to  his  left  the  next  morning 
and  ascertained  the  facts. 

Leaving  Marshal  Grouchy  at  Gembloux  with  the  right 
wing,  we  now  return  to  Napoleon,  who,  when  we  left 
him,  was  about  to  lead  the  reserves,  consisting  of  the  6th 
Corps  and  the  Guard,  and  some  cavalry,  to  Quatre  Bras. 
Orders,  repeated  orders,  had  been  sent,  as  we  have  seen, 
to  Marshal  Ney,  to  get  him  to  move  upon  Quatre  Bras. 
But  Ney  had  not  moved  a  man."  Charras  thinks 
he  must  have  informed  the  Emperor,  in  obedience  to  the 
8  A.  M.  order,  that  the  English  were  still  in  force  in  his 
front.  But  there  is  no  evidence  whatever  of  this.  Charras 
himself,  ^^  after  censuring  the  Emperor  for  his  delays  on 


^^Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  249. 
^^Ib.,  pp.  236,  237. 


214  THE  17th  OF  JUNE:  [CHAP.  I4.] 

this  morning,  does  not  assign  as  the  cause  of  the  second 
and  more  peremptory  despatch  to  Ney,  dated  at  noon,  any 
reply  of  Ney's  to  the  8  A.  M.  despatch,  but  the  return  of 
a  reconnoitring  party  sent  out  by  Napoleon  himself, 
which  reported  the  English  at  Quatre  Bras.  If  anything 
further  were  needed  to  show  that  Ney  vouchsafed  no 
reply  to  the  8  A.  M.  despatch,  it  is  found  in  the  fact  that 
this  noon  order  refers  to  no  such  reply.  In  fact  it  was 
not  until  Ney  saw  the  column  under  the  Emperor  in 
person  advancing  on  the  Namur  road  that  he  put  his 
cavalry  in  motion,  and  it  was  the  Emperor's  own  staff 
officers^^  that  ordered  d'Erlon  forward  in  pursuit  of  the 
English.     This  was  about  i  P.  M. 

Wellington  had  collected  at  Quatre  Bras  about  45,000 
men.  The  rest  of  his  army  was  at  Nivelles  and  Braine- 
le-Comte.  Since  10  A.  M.  he  had  been  quietly  with- 
drawing his  forces,  and  Ney  had  not  offered  an 
interruption.'*"  Probably  he  did  not  know  what 
Wellington  was  doing.  Yet  Ney  must  have  had  at  his 
disposal  about  40,000  men,  25,000  of  whom  had  not  fired 
a  shot  or  drawn  a  sword.  There  is  no  saying  what  loss 
the  English  might  not  have  been  obliged  to  suffer,  if  he 
had  vigorously  pressed  them.  His  conduct  on  this  day 
is  even  more  culpable  than  on  the  day  before.  There 
was  not  only  not  any  of  that  intelligent  cooperation  which, 
as  has  been  remarked,  Napoleon  always  counted  upon 
in  his  lieutenants,  —  there  was  positive  disobedience  of 
orders. 

At  Quatre  Bras,  the  Emperor,  who  had  ridden  from 
Ligny  in  his  carriage,  mounted  his  horse,"*'  and  led  the 
pursuit  in  person.  He  now  saw,  and  no  doubt  with 
mortification,  what  an  opportunity  he  had  missed.     He 


^'Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  250. 

<°C/'.  Napoleon  h  Waterloo,  p.  181. 

**Charras,  vol.  1,  p.  250. 


[chap.  13.]  NAPOLEON.  215 

was  also,  and  with  reason,  indignanf*^  with  Ney  for  not 
having  obeyed  his  orders,  ascertained  that  WelKngton 
was  withdrawing  his  forces,  sent  him  word  at  once,  and 
energetically  pressed  the  enemy.  His  fatigue  seems  to 
have  wholly  disappeared,  and  he  showed,  this  afternoon 
of  the  17th  as  he  had  on  the  afternoon  of  the  15th,  ^^  how 
he  could  infuse  his  own  activity  and  energy  into  his 
troops.  We  have  two  pictures  of  Napoleon  on  this 
afternoon,  by  eye  witnesses.  The  Count  d'Erlon,  in  his 
autobiography,'*'*  says :  — 

"  The  Emperor  found  me  in  advance  of  this  position  (Qiiatre 
Bras),  and  said  to  me  in  a  tone  of  profound  chagrin  these  words, 
which  have  been  always  graven  on  my  memory :  — 

"  '  They  have  ruined  France  ;  come,  my  dear  general,  put  yourself 
at  the  head  of  this  cavalry,  and  vigorously  push  the  English 
rearguard.' 

"  The  Emperor  never  quitted  the  head  of  column  of  the  advance- 
guard,  and  was  even  engaged  in  a  charge  of  cavahy  in  debouching 
from  Genappe." 

Says  the  author  of  "  Napoleon  aWaterloo,"  —  an  officer 
of  artillery  of  the  Guard,  who  was  near  the  Emperor 
throughout  the  campaign :  —  '•^ 

"  One  must  needs  have  been  a  witness  of  the  rapid  march  of  this 
army  on  the  day  of  the  17th,  —  a  march  which  resembled  a  steeple- 
chase rather  than  the  pursuit  of  an  enemy  in  retreat,  —  to  get  an 
idea  of  the  activity  which  Napoleon  knew  how  to  impress  upon  his 
troops  when  placed  under  his  immediate  command.  Six  pieces  of 
the  horse-artillery  of  the  Guard,  supported  by  the  headquarters 
squadrons,  marched  in  the  first  line,  and  vomited  forth  grape  upon 
the  masses  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  as  often  as,  profiting  by  some 
accident  of  ground,  they  endeavored  to  halt,  to  take  position,  and 
retard  our  pursuit.     The  Emperor,  mounted  on  a  small  and   very 

•*^Gourgaud,  pp.  77,  7S ;     Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  214. 

*^Ante,  p.  47. 

^'Le  Marechal  Drouet,  p.  96. 

-•sNapoldon  h.  Waterloo,  pp.  1S5,  186. 


2l6  THE  17th  OF  JUNE:    NAPOLEON.  [CHAP.   I3.] 

active  Arab  horse,  galloped  at  the  head  of  the  column ;  46  he  was 
constantly  near  the  pieces,  exciting  the  gunners  by  his  presence  and 
by  his  words,  and  more  than  once  in  the  midst  of  the  shells  and 
bullets  which  the  enemy's  artillery  showered  upon  us." 

There  was  a  smart  skirmish  at  Genappe.  The  7th 
English  regiment  of  hussars  was  injudiciously  ordered  to 
charge  the  French  lancers,  and  was  beaten  back.  Then 
the  pursuing  French,  in  mounting  the  hill  behind  the 
town  of  Genappe,  were  ridden  down  by  the  ist  Life 
Guards. 

During  the  whole  afternoon  the  rain  fell  in  torrents, 
and  there  was  a  severe  storm  of  thunder  and  lightning. 
Very  possibly  the  bad  weather  may  have  favored  the 
retiring  army.  The  retreat  of  the  English  was  continued 
to  the  position  to  the  south  of  the  hamlet  of  Mont  St. 
Jean,  where  the  battle  of  the  next  day  was  fought. 


*^Cf.  Gourgaud,  pp.  78,  79.     Cf.  Mercer's  Diary,  vol.  i,  p.  269. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  XIII. 

I.  In  regard  to  Napoleon's  action  with  reference  to 
the  defeated  Prussians,  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish 
between  instituting  a  prompt  and  vigorous  pursuit  of 
them,  and  taking  immediate  measures  for  ascertaining  in 
which  direction  they  had  retreated.  The  first  was  under 
the  circumstances  impossible,  that  is,  without  an  entire 
change  of  plan,  but  the  second  was  not  only  possible, 
but  of  prime  necessity. 

Charras,'  however,  complains  bitterly  of  Napoleon  for 
not  following  up  the  Prussians.  "  Not  to  pursue  the 
vanquished,  sword  in  hand,  to  leave  him  time  to  collect 
himself,  to  reform  his  forces,  to  gather  in  his  reinforce- 
ments, was  so  strange  a  thing  for  troops  accustomed  to 
the  tactics  of  Napoleon." 

But  Clausewitz  ^  with  better  judgment  says :  — 

' '  If  we  seem  here  to  find  so  great  a  difference  from  the  earlier 
methods  of  procedure  adopted  by  the  French,  we  must  get  a  true 
picture  of  the  changed  conditions.  The  extraordinary  energy  in 
pursuitto  which  the  brilliant  results  of  Bonaparte's  former  campaigns 
were  due,  was  simply  pushing  very  supei'ior  forces  after  an  enemy 
who  had  been  completely  vanquished.  Now,  however,  Napoleon 
had  to  turn  with  his  main  force,  and  above  all  with  his  freshest 
troops,  against  a  new  enemy,  over  whom  victory  had  yet  to  be  gained. 
The  pursuit  [of  the  Prussians]  had  to  be  carried  out  by  the  3d  and 
4th  Corps,  the  veiy  two  who  had  been  engaged  in  the  bloodiest  fight 
till  ten  in  the  evening,  and  now  necessarily  needed  time  to  get  into 
order  again,  to  recover  themselves,  and  to  provide  themselves  with 
ammunition." 


'Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  233. 
"Clausewitz,  ch.  37,  p.  95. 


2l8  THE  17th  OF  JUNE  :-NOTES.  [CHAP.  I3.] 

Napoleon,  therefore,  while  censurable  for  not  having 
ascertained  as  early  as  possible  the  direction  of  the  retreat 
of  the  Prussians,  and  for  not  having  moved  promptly 
with  his  main  body  against  the  English,  can  not  be 
blamed  for  having  allowed  Grouchy 's  troops  to  remain  on 
the  field  till  noon,  to  recover  from  their  fatigues. 

2.  It  hardly  needs  to  be  said  that  if  Napoleon  had 
known  that  the  1st  and  lid  Prussian  Corps  were  retiring 
on  Wavre,  he  would  not  have  ordered  Grouchy  on 
Gembloux.  Exactly  what  he  would  have  done,  it  is 
needless  to  conjecture,  but  in  all  probability  he  would  have 
kept  the  whole  army  together,  or  within  easy  reach,  so  as 
to  have  concentrated  an  overwhelming  force  against 
Wellington  the  next  morning,  if  not  on  that  afternoon. 

3.  To  illustrate  the  effect  which  the  concealment  of 
the  Bertrand  order  by  Marshal  Grouchy  has  produced  on 
the  mind  of  an  able  critic,  take  the  following  passages 
from  Clausew^itz,  ^  who  wrote  his  narrative  before  the 
order  came  to  light :  — 

"  Bonaparte,  it  is  claimed,  ordered  Grouchy  to  keep  between 
Bliicher  and  the  road  from  Namur  (Charleroi)  to  Brussels,  for  the 
second  battle  would  have  to  be  fought  on  this  road,  and  only  thus 
was  there  a  possibility  of  Grouchy's  cooperating  in  it.  But  of  such 
an  order  nothing  can  be  found  except  in  the  untrustworthy  account* 
of  Bonaparte  and  of  the  men  who  have  copied  him.  The  account 
which  Grouchy  gives  of  the  movements  of  the  17th  bears  too  much 
the  character  of  the  simple  truth  s  not  to  gain  credence  ;  and,  accord- 
ing to  this,  Bonaparte's  instruction  was  directed  in  very  general 
terms  towards  pursuing  Bliicher,  and  was  drawn  up  in  very 
uncertain  expressions." 


^Clausewitz,  ch.  37,  p.  93. 

*The  Memoirs  are  exceedingly  unsatisfactory  in  regard  to  this  part  of  the 
campaign.  Napoleon  evidently  had  no  exact  recollection  of  the  order  which 
he  dictated  to  Bertrand.  He  was  only  sure  that  he  gave  Grouchy  an  intima- 
tion that  he  might  need  him.    See  App.  A ;  post^  p.  351. 

'  Very  possibly  Grouchy  did  tell  "  the  simple  truth"  in  his  account  of  the 
interview  between  himself  and  the  Emperor.  The  trouble  with  Grouchy 
was,  that  he  did  not  tell  "  the  whole  truth."  He  denied  having  received  any 
written  order. 


[chap.  13.]  NAPOLEON.-NOTES.  219 

^  "  As  we  read  Marshal  Grouchy's  account  of  the  events  which 
took  place  with  Bonaparte  on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  we  see  :  — 

(i)  That  this  Marshal  in  all  probability  actually  received  no  other 
direction  for  his  action  on  the  17th  besides  a  very  general  instruction 
to  pursue  the  Prussians : 

(2)  That  Bonaparte  had  no  idea  of  the  retreat  of  the  Prussians 
towards  the  Dyle,  and  considered  the  opinion  that  they  had  gone 
towards  Namur  not  unreasonable,  and  therefore  did  not  give  the 
Marshal  the  direction  of  Wavre." 

Clausewitz  concludes  by  surmising  that  Napoleon  was 
"  affected  by  a  sort  of  lethargy  and  carelessness."  Had 
Clausewitz  known  the  truth,  namely,  that  Grouchy  was 
sent  off  with  a  letter  of  instructions,  telling  him  in  so 
many  words  that  the  Prussians  might  be  intending  to 
unite  with  the  English  to  fight  a  battle  for  the  defence  of 
Brussels  on  the  turnpike  on  which  Napoleon  was  now 
marching  with  the  intention  of  encountering  the  English, 
we  should  have  had  a  very  different  criticism  from  this, 
we  may  be  sure. 

4.  But  it  is  a  curious  thing,  that,  even  with  those 
historians  who  wrote  after  the  Bertrand  letter  came  to 
light,  the  influence  of  Grouchy's  misrepresentations  has 
induced  a  sort  of  ignoring  of  the  letter,  and  an 
acquiescence  in  the  erroneous  judgment  of  Napoleon's 
conduct  formed  when  the  existence  of  the  letter  was 
unknown,  and  when  the  verbal  instructions,  as  given  by 
Grouchy,  were  all  the  orders  which  it  was  believed  that 
Napoleon  ever  gave  to  Grouchy.  Thus  Chesney, ''  after 
giving  the  substance  of  the  document,  says :  — 

"  Such  was  the  whole  tenor  of  this  important  letter,  which  serves 
to  show  two  things  only  :  that  Napoleon  was  uncertain  of  the  line  of 
Bliicher's  retreat,  and  that  he  judged  Gembloux  a  good  point  to  move 
Grouchy  on  in  any  case." 

The  injunction  to  Grouchy,  though  given  by  Chesney 
almost  textually,  to  ascertain  whether  or  not  the  Prussians 


^Clausewitz,  ch.  48,  p.  130. 
'Chesney,  p.  152. 


220  THE  17th  OF  JUNE  :-NOTES.  [CHAP.  I3.] 

were  intending  to  unite  with  the  English  and  fight  a 
battle  for  the  defence  of  Brussels,  —  the  very  thing  which 
they  actually  were  intending  to  do,  —  has  evidently  made 
no  impression  whatever  on  his  mind. 

The  same  determination,  —  for  we  know  not  what  other 
word  indicates  more  correctly  the  temper  of  mind  which 
must  possess  a  historian  of  this  campaign  who  shuts  his 
eyes  to  the  contents  of  the  Bertrand  letter,  —  the  same 
determination,  we  say,  not  to  recognize  the  fact  that  the 
Bertrand  letter  shows  beyond  a  question  that  Napoleon 
was  alive  to  the  danger  that  the  Prussians  might  be 
intending  to  do  exactly  what  they  were  intending  to  do, 
that  is,  unite  with  the  English  and  fight  another  battle,  — 
this  time  on  the  Brussels  road,  —  is  shown  also  by  the 
latest  English  critic.  Colonel  Maurice.     He  says :  — ^ 

"  He  (Napoleon)  gave  orders  to  Grouchy,  with  a  force  of  33,000 
men  and  96  guns,  to  pursue  the  Prussians,  complete  their  defeat, 
and  communicate  with  him  by  the  Namur  road.  9  Written  orders 
were  subsequently  given  to  Grouchy  directing  hi?n  to  ?nove  on 
Gembloux"  '° 

Here,  the  warning  contained  in  the  written  order,  the 
injunction  to  ascertain  whether  the  Prussians  were 
intending  to  join  Wellington,  is  absolutely  and  quietly 
ignored.  One  would  suppose  that  all  that  the  Bertrand 
letter  contained  was  an  order  to  move  on  Gembloux. 
Colonel  Maurice  proceeds :  — 

"  He  (Grouchy)  promised,  that  if,  from  the  reports  he  received, 
he  gathei-ed  that  the  Prussians  had  for  the  most  part  retired  on 
Wavre,  he  would  follow  them  there,  in  order  to  prevent  them  gain- 
ing Brussels,  and  in  order  to  separate  them  from  Wellington. 
TJiis  is  the  first  indication  we  receive^  on  any  authentic  evidejzce^ 
that  any  one  in  the  French  ar7i2y  supposed  that  the  duty  of 
separating-  the  Prussians  from  Welliitgton  would  become  the  task 
of  Grouchy s  force.      Up  till  then,  all  the  French  supposed  that 


*Maurice,  pp.  73,  74 :    April,  1890. 
'These  are  the  verbal  orders. 


[chap.   13.]  NAPOLEON.-NOTES.  221 

there  ivas    120    prospect  of  Bliic/ier's    attempting  to  2i?tite  with 
V/ellino-toji."  '° 

Yet  in  the  body  of  the  Bertrand  letter,  of  which  Colonel 
Maurice  quotes  the  first  line,  are  these  words :  — 

"It  is  important  to  penetrate  what  the  enemy  is  intending  to  do; 
whether  they  are  separating  themselves  fro7n  the  English,,  or 
whether  they  are  intendi^ig  still  to  unite,,  to  cover  Brussels,,  or 
Liege,,  in  trying  the  fate  of  another  battle." 

We  confess  our  inability  to  explain  or  account  for 
criticism  of  this  nature,  unless  by  the  hypothesis  that  to  a 
mind  preoccupied  with  a  certain  view,  firmly  held,  it  is 
often  possible  that  the  plainest  evidence  should  be,  so  to 
speak,  invisible.  It  is  as  plain  as  anything  can  be  that 
Grouchy's  letter,  from  w^iich  Maurice  makes  his  quota- 
tion, is  a  reply  to  that  part  of  the  Bertrand  letter  which 
we  have  given  above ;  but  Maurice,  his  mind  full  of  the 
verbal  orders  only,  wholly  overlooks  this. 

But  Colonel  Maurice  and  Colonel  Chesney  are  not 
alone  in  their  views. 

General  Hamley,"  in  his  account  of  the  camiDaign, 
says  of  Grouchy :  "  His  orders  were  to  follow  them  [the 
Prussians],  complete  their  rout,  and  never  lose  sight  of 
them."  Hamley  does  not  seem  even  to  have  heard  of  the 
Bertrand  order.  Hence  his  elaborate  criticism  on 
Grouchy's  conduct,''' —  leaving  out,  as  it  does,  the  two 
most  important  data,  viz.:  —  Napoleon's  explicit  warning 
to  Grouchy  of  the  possibility  of  the  Prussians  uniting 
with  the  English  to  fight  a  battle  for  the  defence  of 
Brussels,  and  his  equally  explicit  statement  to  Grouchy 
(as  reported  by  the  latter),  that  he  was  going  that  very 
afternoon  to  attack  the  English  "  if  they  will  stand  on 
this  side  of  the  Forest  of  Soignes," —  is  entirely  beside 
the  mark,  and  cannot  be  considered  as  possessing  any 


'°The  italics  are  our  own. 

"Hamley,  Op.  of  War,  p.  190.     He  also  cites  the  verbal  orders. 

»Ib.,  pp.  196-19S. 


222  THE  lyth  OF  june:-notes.         [chap.  13.] 

practical  value  whatever.  He  has  addressed  himself  to  a 
case  which  never  really  existed.'^ 

Hooper,  also,  omits  entirely  the  information  which  the 
Emperor  gave  of  his  own  intention,  and  of  his  conjecture 
that  the  English  might  fight  "  on  this  side  of  the  forest  of 
Soignes," —  where  they  actually  did  fight, —  and  dismisses 
the  explicit  injunction  for  Grouchy  to.  ascertain  the  facts 
in  these  words :  —  '"^ 

"Yet  some  doubts  of  the  correctness  of  his  views  had  entered  the 
mind  of  the  Emperor  before  he  quitted  Ligny,  and  he  remarked 
(sic)  to  Grouchy  that  it  was  important  to  learn  whether  the  Prus- 
sians were  separating  themselves  from  the  English,  etc." 

These  instances  suffice  to  show  how  seriously  the  con- 
cealment of  the  Bertrand  letter  by  Marshal  Grouchy  has 
affected  the  historians  of  the  campaign.  The  prominence 
assigned  to  the  verbal  orders  to  Grouchy,  so  common  in 
most  of  the  narratives,  is  not  only  utterly  useless, —  but 
most  misleading. 

5.     But  was  the  Bertrand  letter  sufficiently  explicit  ? 

Charras,'^  who,  unlike  the  English  historians  cited 
above,  fully  admits  that  the  letter  shows  that  Napoleon 
saw  "the  possibility  of  the  union  of  the  allied  armies 
to  cover  Brussels,"  observes  that  this  involved  the  neces- 
sity of  reconnoitring  in  the  directions  of  Mont  St.  Gui- 
bert  and  Wavre.      "  Nevertheless,"  he  goes  on  to  say, 


"Hamley  contends  that  the  injunction  to  Grouchy — which,  by  the  way,  is 
contained  in  both  the  written  and  the  verbal  orders, —  to  communicate  with 
Napoleon  by  the  Namur-Quatre  Bras  turnpike,  is  not  consistent  with  a  move- 
ment towards  Wavre.  But  why  should  not  this  arrangement  have  been  pre- 
scribed for  the  sake  of  greater  safety?  If  the  Prussians  were  moving  towards 
Wavre  and  the  Dyle,  their  cavalry  might  be  expected  tomake  all  communica- 
tion across  the  country  very  hazardous  for  couriers  or  staff-officers.  And, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  by  the  Brussels  turnpike  to  Quatre  Bras,  thence  by 
the  Namur  turnpike  to  Sombreffe,  and  thence  via  Gembloux  to  Grouchy's 
position  in  front  of  Wavre,  that  Napoleon  sent  Grouchy  the  two  orders  on 
the  day  of  the  battle.    Napoldon  h  Waterloo,  pp.  277,  278. 

'"Hooper,  p.  153. 

"Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.  241,  242. 


[chap.  13.]  NAPOLEON.-NOTES.  223 

"Napoleon  did  not  make  this  the  subject  of  a  special 
recommendation  to  Grouchy;  *  *  *  ^^^^  ^j^g 
latter,  given  over  to  his  own  inspirations,  did  not  repair 
the  inconceivable  fault  of  the  commander-in-chief.  He 
had  an  order  to  proceed  to  Gembloux  ;  he  did  not  trouble 
his  head  about  anything  else." 

If  Napoleon  had  entertained  as  low  an  opinion  of 
Marshal  Grouchy's  capacity  as  Charras  evidently  did,  it 
certainly  would  have  been  a  terrible  mistake  to  have 
omitted  to  tell  him  to  explore  the  region  between 
Gembloux  and  Wavre.  But  questions  of  this  kind  hardly 
bear  discussing;  every  one  has  his  own  opinions  on  such 
matters,  based  on  his  own  estimate  of  other  men's  ability, 
his  own  experience,  his  own  notions  of  what  is  fitting. 
The  suggestion  of  danger  to  the  main  army,  if  it  should 
find  the  Prussians  as  well  as  the  English  opposed  to  it 
on  the  Brussels  turnpike,  would  have  amply  sufficed  for 
many  generals.  It  was  not,  however,  sufficient,  as  we 
shall  soon  see,  for  Marshal  Grouchy. 

6.  We  cannot  agree  with  those  who  contend  that  it 
was  an  error  to  direct  Grouchy  on  Gembloux  in  the  first 
instance.'^  Up  to  the  moment  when  the  order  was 
dictated  to  Bertrand  no  other  considerable  force  of  the 
enemy  had  been  discovered ;  at  Gembloux,  Berton  had 
found  a  whole  corps.  Here,  therefore,  one  could  not  help 
getting  at  the  direction  of  the  Prussian  retreat.  And, 
owing  to  the  lack  of  an  early  morning  reconnoissance 
in  all  directions,  this  was,  at  noon,  obviously  the  most 
promising  direction  for  the  pursuing  force  to  take. 

7.  We  owe  to  Colonel  Maurice  some  valuable  sugges- 
tions which  serve  to  explain  Napoleon's  neglect  to  take 
adequate   measures   to   ascertain   the   direction   of   the 


'^Assuming,  that  is,  that  it  was  wise  in  Napoleon  to  detach  Grouchy  with 
his  two  corps  from  the  main  army  after  he  had  reason  to  apprehend  that  the 
Prussians  might  be  intending  to  unite  with  the  English.  See  the  Notes  to 
Chapter  XV  -jpost,  pp.  273  e(  seq. 


224  THE  lyth  OF  june:-notes.         [chap.  13.] 

Prussian  retreat.  He  points  out  in  the  first  place'^  the 
folly  of  such  writers  as  Quinet,  who  w^ould  have  Napo- 
leon sleep  in  the  midst  of  his  Guard, —  who  expect  the 
commander  of  an  army  to  do  the  w^ork  of  a  sentry  on  the 
outer  picket-line.  It  may  be  remarked  in  this  connec- 
tion, by  the  way,  that  as  the  French  were  not  able  to  push 
up  to  the  Namur  turnpike  on  the  evening  of  the  i6th, 
their  advanced  posts  could  not  possibly  have  heard 
anything  more  than  the  withdrawal  of  the  enemy  towards 
the  pike,  down  w^hich  they  might  have  marched  without 
let  or  hindrance  towards  Namur.  Colonel  Maurice  in 
the  next  place  quotes  an  able  criticism'^  by  an  officer  whom 
he  does  not  name,  to  the  effect  that  Napoleon's  vast 
experience  enabled  him  in  his  later  years  to  dispense 
with  much  of  that  personal  attention  to  the  facts  which 
in  his  earlier  campaigns  it  had  been  absolutely  necessary 
for  him  to  give. 

Colonel  Maurice  also  calls  attention  to  the  circum- 
stances which  we  have  detailed  above,  which  very  naturally 
induced  Napoleon  to  adopt  the  opinion  that  the  Prus- 
sians had  fallen  back  towards  the  Rhine.'^ 

8.  In  conclusion,  we  may  admit,  fully,  with  Colonel 
Maurice,  to  whom  we  owe  a  great  deal  for  setting  this 
matter  of  the  probabilities  of  the  case  in  its  true  light, 
that  Napoleon's  estimate  of  the  probabilities  was  a 
correct  one.  He  was  quite  warranted  under  all  the 
circumstances  in  believing  that  the  Prussians  had 
retired  towards  their  base.  Nevertheless,  this  belief  does 
not  justify  him  for  having  neglected  to  ascertain  the 
facts  by  a  prompt  exploration  of  the  whole  region 
through  which  the  Prussians  could  have  retreated. 

The  lesson  which  this  neglect  teaches,  is  a  plain  one. 
It  is,  that  where  there  is  any  chance  at  all  of  the  occur- 

"Maurice,  p.  348:  July,  1890. 
"lb.,  p.  353- 
"lb.,  pp.  350-355. 


[chap.  13.]  NAPOLEON.-NOTES.  225 

rence  of  an  event,  which,  if  it  does  happen,  will  be  fatal, 
it  is  folly  to  trust  to  the  probabilities  of  the  case ;  every  pre- 
caution should  be  taken ;  nothing  that  can  avert  a  fatal 
calamity  should  be  neglected,  no  matter  how  small  may 
appear  to  be  the  chance  of  its  happening.  In  this  case, 
we  find  Napoleon,  at  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
day  after  the  battle  of  Ligny,  entirely  ignorant  of  the 
whereabouts  and  intentions  of  the  Prussians,  and,  in  fact, 
alarmed  lest  they  should  be  intending  to  unite  with  the 
English,  whom  he  is  expecting  to  fight  the  next  day; 
obliged  to  go  off  himself  to  join  his  left  wing,  and  to 
leave  the  all-important  task  of  preventing  the  union  of 
his  adversaries  to  a  newly-made  Marshal,  in  whose  abili- 
ties he  cannot  place  very  great  confidence.  And  all  this, 
because  he  did  not  have  the  facts  as  to  the  Prussian 
retreat  ascertained  at  day-break. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

THE  SEVENTEENTH  OF  JUNE  I  BLUCHER  AND  WELLINGTON. 

ZiETEN  and  Pirch  I.  fell  back  after  the  battle  of 
Ligny,  as  has  been  above  stated/  in  the  direction  of 
Wavre.  Gneisenau,  the  chief-of-staff  of  the  Prussian 
army,  on  whom,  in  the  absence  of  Marshal  Blucher, 
who  was  unhorsed  and  quite  seriously  bruised  in  a 
cavalry  encounter  at  the  end  of  the  day,  and  was  sup- 
posed to  have  been  taken  prisoner,^  the  command 
devolved,  gave  the  order  at  first  for  the  two  beaten  corps^ 
to  retire  on  Tilly,  and  then,  as  one  of  his  staff-officers 
called  his  attention  to  the  fact  that  Tilly  was  not  on  all 
the  maps,  he  substituted  Wavre  for  Tilly  as  the  point  to 
be  reached.'* 

This  step  involved  obviously  the  renunciation  of  the 
line  of  Namur.  It  implied  also  that  the  Illd  and  IVth 
Corps,  those  of  Thielemann  and  Blilow,  would  be  ordered 
to  retire  in  the  general  direction  of  Wavre,  so  that  a 
union  of  the  whole  army  might  be  effected  somewhere  to 
the  northward.  But  it  did  not  necessarily  imply  that 
this  union  of  the  army  would  be  effected  at  Wavre ;  or 
even  that,  if  effected  at  Wavre,  it  would  be  followed  by 
an  attempt  to  unite  with  the  Anglo-Dutch  army.  It  was 
quite   possible   that  the  two  beaten  corps  might,  after 


^ A  lite,  p.  159. 

^OUech,  p.  157. 

^He  could  not  at  this  time  communicate  with  Thielemann  and  Billow. 

*Gneisenau,  vol.  4,  p.  385  ;  Ollech,  p.  156. 


[chap.  14.]  BLiJCHER  AND  WELLINGTON.  227 

reforming  at  Wavre,  be  ordered  in  the  direction  of 
Maestricht,  towards  which  place  the  1 1  Id  and  IVth 
Corps  might  also  be  ordered  to  retire.  In  fact,  this  was 
the  interpretation  put  by  General  Thielemann  on  the 
facts  as  he  first  learned  them.  He  wrote  to  Biilow,^  that 
he  had  heard  nothing  from  the  Marshal,  but  supposed 
that  the  intention  was  that  the  1st  and  lid  Corps  were 
to  fall  back  from  Wavre  towards  St.  Trond,  which  is  a 
town  in  the  direction  of  Maestricht,  some  35  miles  from 
Wavre. 

At  the  same  time  it  is  clear  that  Gneisenau,  in  ordering 
Zieten  and  Pirch  I.  to  Wavre,  had  taken  the  necessary 
preliminary  steps  to  effect  a  concentration  of  the  whole 
army  at  that  place,  from  which  a  movement  for  the  assist- 
ance of  Wellington,  if  he  should  be  willing  to  accept 
battle  at  Waterloo,  could  be  made.  This  union  with  the 
Anglo-Dutch  army  was,  therefore,  naturally  regarded  by 
the  Prussian  officers  and  soldiers  as  the  real  object  of  the 
movement  to  Wavre.^  It  may  be  that  Gneisenau  himself 
gave  his  orders  with  the  sole  intention  of  bringing  about 
a  union  of  the  two  allied  armies.^  But  this  is  doubtful. 
It  is  more  likely  that  he  ordered  a  retreat  on  Wavre, 
knowing  that  this  alone  could  render  such  a  union 
possible,  and  leaving  its  practicability  and  advisability 
to  be  determined  afterwards. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  step  which  Gneisenau 
had  taken  involved  a  temporary  change  of  base,  with  all 


sQllech,  p.  157.  Maurice  (pp.  354,  355  :  July,  1890)  points  out  that  this 
serves,  as  far  as  it  goes,  to  show  that  Napoleon  might  have  known  of  the 
retreat  of  Zieten  and  Pirch  I,  to  Wavre  without  changing  his  opinion  that 
the  whole  Prussian  army  was  intending  to  fall  back  to  the  eastward. 

^Damitz,  p.  143. 

'This  is  Ollech's  opinion  (p.  156):  "Thus  had  Gneisenau  broken  all 
bridges  behind  him,  given  up  all  communication  with  the  Rhine,  that  he 
might  once  again  offer  the  hand  to  the  English  for  a  common  blow  which 
should  forever  overthrow  the  French  forces."  But  this  is  surely  going  too 
far.  Communication  with  the  Rhine  could  be  maintained  as  well  by  way  of 
Maestricht  as  by  way  of  Liege. 


228  JUNE  17 :  [chap.  14.] 

the  many  inconveniences  and  risks  therefrom  resulting. 
The  communications  with  Namur  must  be  abandoned. 
No  such  course  as  this  had  been  thought  of  when  Marshal 
Bllicher  decided  on  accepting  battle  at  Ligny ;  if  it  had 
been,  he  would  have  posted  his  troops  very  differently,  as 
we  have  had  occasion  to  observe.^  Gneisenau,  however, 
though  disappointed  at  not  receiving  help  from  the 
English  during  the  battle,  yet  influenced,  very  possibly, 
by  the  fact  that  Wellington  had  successfully  held  his 
ground  against  the  attack  of  the  French  left  wing,^  was 
extremely  unwilling  to  renounce,  by  retiring  on  Namur, 
all  hopes  of  another  battle  to  be  fought  in  cooperation 
with  the  English.  Hence  he  determined  to  take  at  any 
rate  the  first  steps  to  make  it  possible  to  fight  such  a 
battle ;  and  in  the  absence  of  his  chief,  and  in  the  confu- 
sion and  turmoil  which  followed  the  successful  charge  of 
the  Imperial  Guard,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  take  the 
responsibility  of  ordering  the  beaten  corps  to  retire  on 
Wavre.'° 

But  whether  it  would  be  wise  to  concentrate  the 
whole  army  on  Wavre  was  a  question  that  could  not  be 
settled  in  an  instant.  It  was  in  truth  dependent  on  many 
things.  The  question  of  supplies  of  ammunition  was  per- 
haps the  most  serious  problem ;  but  there  were  others, 
each  presenting  more  or  less  difficulty.  Then,  besides 
these,  there  was  the  question  of  the  amount  of  confidence 
to  be  placed  in  the  Duke  of  Wellington.  The  whole 
object,  the  sole  justification,  of  the  manoeuvre  now  in 
contemplation  was  the  fighting  another  battle  in  co- 
operation with  the  English.  Here,  of  course,  it  had  to  be 
assumed  that  the  Duke  would  be  desirous  of  fighting 
such  a  battle.  But  could  Wellington  be  relied  upon  to 
fulfil    the    expectations    which    would    be    entertained 


^Anie,  pp.  151,  204.     Cf.  Gneisenau,  vol.  4,  p.  3f 

'Gneisenau,  vol.  4,  p.  3S6. 

'°011ech,  p.  156;  Gneisenau,  vol.  4,  p.  3S5. 


[chap.  14.]  BLUCHER  AND  WELLINGTON.  229 

in  regard  to  his  willingness  and  ability  to  fight  such  a 
battle?  Gneisenau  had  been  gravely  disappointed  by 
the  non-arrival  of  support  from  the  English  army  during 
the  battle  of  Ligny.  He  never  had  had, —  so  we  learn 
from  Miiffling," — entire  confidence  in  the  Duke's  trust- 
worthiness. The  letter"  received  on  the  morning  of  the 
battle, —  so  far  from  accurate, —  the  confident  statements'^ 
made  by  the  Duke  at  Brye  early  in  the  afternoon,  on 
which  such  expectations  had  been  formed,  and  which 
had  proved  so  utterly  unreliable, —  must  have  seriously 
shaken  Gneisenau's  belief  in  Wellington.  He  feared  lest 
the  danger  to  the  Prussian  army  involved  in  its  con- 
centration at  Wavre  might  be  incurred  only  to  see  the 
Anglo-Dutch  army  marching  off  to  Antwerp  or  Ostend. 
During  the  night  Marshal  Bliicher  had  been  carried, 
badly  bruised  and  suffering  a  good  deal, —  a  man,  too,  it 
must  be  remembered,  seventy-two  years  of  age,'"* — to 
the  little  village  of  Mellery, —  or  Melioreux,  as  the  older 
maps  have  it, —  a  mile  or  two  north  of  Tilly.'^  Here,  in 
a  little  house,  filled  with  wounded  men,  he  passed  the 
night.  Here  Gneisenau,  his  chief-of-staff,  and  Grolmann, 
his  quartermaster-general,  joined  him.  Here  also  was 
brought  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hardinge,  the  English  mil- 
itary attache  at  BliAcher's  headquarters,  who  had  lost  his 
left  hand  in  the  battle.''  He  gave  to  the  Duke  of  Wel- 
lington, twenty-two  years  after,  an  account  of  his  experi- 
ence during  that  night,  making  the  mistake, — natural 
enough  under  the  circumstances,  and  considering  how 


"Muffling  :  Passages,  p.  212. 

^^Ante,  p.  106. 

"Anie,  p.  144. 

'■♦He  was  exactly  seventy-two  years  and  six  months  old  on  the  day  of  the 
battle  of  Ligny. 

«011ech,  p.  157- 

"Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  241,  n. 


230  JUNE  17:  [chap.   14.] 

long  a  time  had  elapsed, — of  locating  the  scene  at  Wavre, 
and  not  at  Mellery.  The  story  is  thus  reported  by  Earl 
Stanhope : — '^ 

"  Yes,"  said  Hardinge,  "  Bliicher  himself  had  gone  back  as  far  as 
Wavre.  I  passed  that  night,  with  my  amputated  arm,  lying  with  some 
straw  in  his  ante-room,  Gneisenau  and  other  generals  constantly  pass- 
ing to  and  fro.  Next  morning  Bliicher  sent  for  me.  *  *  * 
He  said  to  me  that  he  should  be  quite  satisfied  if,  in  conjunction 
with  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  he  was  able  now  to  defeat  his  old 
enemy.  I  was  told  that  there  had  been  a  great  discussion  that  night 
in  his  rooms,  and  that  Bliicher  and  Grolmann  had  carried  the  day 
for  remaining  in  communication  with  the  English  army,  but  that 
Gneisenau  had  great  doubts  as  to  whether  they  ought  not  to  fall 
back  to  Liege  and  secure  their  own  communication  with  Luxem- 
bourg. They  thought  that  if  the  English  should  be  defeated,  they 
themselves  would  be  utterly  destroyed." 

Colonel  Maurice  tells  us  in  confirmation  of  this  story 
that  General  Hardinge  "  records  that,  as  he  was,  on  the 
17th,  lying  on  his  bed,  Bliicher  burst  into  his  room,  tri- 
umphantly announcing :  '  Gneisenau  has  given  way. 
We  are  to  march  to  join  Wellington.'  "'^ 

If  these  statements  are  to  be  accepted  literally,  and 
there  is,  perhaps,  no  sufficient  reason  why  they  should 
not  be,  the  credit  of  the  decision  remains  wholly  with 
Marshal  Bliicher.  Still,  it  may,  not  impossibly,  be  that 
Gneisenau,  to  whose  action  alone  it  was  due  that  the 
original  intention  of  retreating  on  Namur,  in  case  it 
should  be  found  necessary  to  retreat  at  all,  had  been 
departed    from,    felt    himself    morally    bound    to  pre- 


''Stanhope,  p.  no. 

"Maurice,  p.  355  :  July,  1890.  Colonel  Maurice  is  inclined  to  believe  that 
the  above  incident  "must  have  taken  place  in  Wavre,  after  the  receipt  of 
Wellington's  offer  to  remain  and  fight  at  Waterloo,  if  Bliicher  would  join 
him  with  one  or  two  corps."  This  is  certainly  very  possible.  The  incident 
reported  in  Stanhope's  work,  however,  is  stated  to  have  occurred  the  night 
after  the  battle,  which,  as  we  know  from  the  Prussian  historians,  Bliicher 
spent  at  Mellery.  Ollech,  p.  157.  Very  possibly  there  may  have  been  a 
second  discussion  at  Wavre  on  the  17th. 


[chap.  14.]  BLUCHER  AND  WELLINGTON.  23I 

sent  to  his  impetuous  and  unthinking  chief  the  more 
cautious  and  conservative  course ;  and  that  in  reality 
he  was  not  averse  to  find  that  the  movement  which 
he  had  ordered  in  Bliicher's  absence  should  receive 
from  his  chief  and  his  advisers  such  hearty  approval 
and  be  prosecuted  to  its  natural  result. 

While  the  1st  and  lid  Corps  were  making  their  way 
towards  Tilly  and  Mont  St.  Guibert,  Thielemann,  in 
ignorance  of  the  dispositions  of  the  commander-in-chief, 
retired  from  Tongrinelle  and  Balatre  to  Sombreffe,  and 
thence  continued  his  retreat  to  Gembloux,  so  as  to 
approach  the  IVth  Corps,  which  had  arrived  late  in  the 
evening  in  the  neighborhood  of  Baudeset  and  Sauven- 
ieres.  Thielemann  reached  Gembloux  at  6  A.  M.  of  the 
17th.  Here  he  wrote  a  letter  to  Biilow,  to  which  reference 
has  been  already  made.  Biilow  in  reply  requested  him 
to  retire  to  the  neighborhood  of  Corbaix,  half  way  between 
Gembloux  and  Wavre,  and  informed  him  that  he  himself 
was  directing  his  corps  on  Wavre.  In  these  movements, 
which  were  to  be  nearly  parallel,  the  corps  of  Biilow  was 
to  keep  to  the  eastward  of  that  of  Thielemann. 

Thus  the  temporary  separation  of  the  four  corps 
composing  the  Prussian  army  worked  no  harm.  The 
corps-commanders  acted  with  cheerful  and  zealous 
cooperation  in  the  absence  of  orders  from  the  com- 
mander-in-chief. In  fact  nothing  can  be  finer  than  the 
spirit  displayed  by  the  Prussians  after  the  loss  of  the 
battle  of  Ligny,  —  whether  we  look  at  their  willingness  to 
take  risks  and  make  sacrifices  to  ensure  the  success  of 
the  combined  movement  now  in  process  of  execution,  or 
at  the  harmony  which  prevailed  among  the  chief  officers, 
which  it  is  evident  neither  the  loss  of  the  battle  nor  the 
non-arrival  of  Blilow's  Corps  had  disturbed  in  the  least. 

Orders  were  now  issued  for  the  retreat  of  the  whole 
army  on  Wavre.     It  was  conducted  as  follows  : —  '^ 


''Ollech,  pp.  166  et  seq. 


232  JUNE  17:  [chap.    14.] 

The  1st  Corps  marched  from  its  position  between 
Tilly  and  Mellery  early  in  the  morning  of  the  17th,  and 
proceeded  through  Gentinnes  and  Mont  St.  Guibert 
towards  Wavre,  where  it  crossed  the  Dyle,  and  took  up 
position  at  Bierges. 

The  lid  Corps  followed  by  the  same  route  somewhat 
later,  and  halted  at  Aisemont,  a  village  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Dyle,  opposite  Wavre. 

The  Hid  Corps  rested  at  Gembloux  till  i  or  2  o'clock 
P.  M.,  and  then  marched  by  way  of  Corbaix  to  Wavre, 
the  head  of  the  column  passing  through  the  town  in  the 
evening,  but  the  rear  guard  not  arriving  till  the  morning 
of  the  1 8th. 

The  IVth  Corps  marched  in  two  columns,  by  way  of 
Walhain  and  Tourinnes  to  Dion-le-Mont,  a  village  about 
two  miles  east  of  Wavre.  where  it  arrived  about  10  P.  M 
of  the  17  th. 

One  brigade  of  infantry  belonging  to  the  lid  Corps 
and  some  cavalry  were  stationed  for  a  time  at  Mont 
St.  Guibert  for  purposes  of  observation,""  and  General 
Groeben,  of  Bliicher's  staff,  who  accompanied  these 
troops,  witnessed  from  a  high  hill  near  Tilly"  the 
march  of  the  troops  which  Napoleon  carried  with  him  to 
Quatre  Bras,  and  the  movement  of  a  smaller  body, 
estimated  by  him  at  about  12,000  or  15,000  men,  in  the 
direction  of  Gembloux.  He  supposed,  naturally,  that 
this  was  all  the  force  which  had  been  detached  for  the 
pursuit  of  the  Prussians."  The  march  of  the  rest  of 
Grouchy's  command  was  concealed  by  the  inequalities  of 
the  ground. 

The  artillery  trains,  containing  the  needful  ammunition 
for  the  coming  battle,  for  the  arrival  of  which  Gneisenau 


^°011ech,  p.  166.  These  troops  were  afterwards  replaced  by  two  battalions 
of  infantry,  a  regiment  of  cavalry,  and  two  batteries,  under  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Ledebur.    Seeposf,  p.  260;  Ollech,  p.  168;  Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  285. 

"OUech,  p.  168. 
*^Ib.,  p.  169. 


[chap.   14.]  BLiJCHER  AND  WELLINGTON.  233 

had  felt  great  anxiety,  arrived  safely  at  Wavre  about 
5  P.  M.  of  the  17th. 

Thus  the  retreat  of  the  Prussians  on  Wavre  had 
been  successfully  and  quickly  accomplished,  and,  what  is 
almost  as  important,  it  had  escaped  the  observation  of 
the  French.  Marshal  Bliicher  had  collected  at  Wavre 
somewhere  about  90,000  men,  and  both  the  army  and  its 
leaders  were  animated  by  the  best  spirit,  impatient  to 
encounter  the  enemy  again,  and  confident  of  success  in 
another  battle. 

The  Duke  of  Wellington  spent  the  night  after  the 
battle  of  Quatre  Bras  at  Genappe,  but  returned  to  the 
front  "  at  daybreak,  or  soon  after."  ^^  A  detachment  of 
cavalry  was  soon  afterwards  sent  out,  which  ascertained 
that  the  Prussians  had  been  beaten  the  day  before,  and 
were  now  retreating  on  Wavre.  This  information  reached 
Wellington  about  7.30  A.  M.^^ 

Bliicher  had  sent  an  officer.  Major  Winterfeldt,  from 
the  field  of  battle  the  evening  before  to  inform  General 
Muffling  of  his  intended  retreat,  but  he  had  been 
wounded, '5  and  the  information  had  not  reached  the 
Duke. 

At  9  o'clock  another  officer  arrived  from  Bliicher,'^ 
Lieutenant  Massow.'^  The  Duke  told  him  that  he 
would  fall  back  to  the  position  of  Mont  St.  Jean  where 
he  would  give  battle,  if  he  were  supported  by  one 
Prussian  corps.  This  answer  Massow  carried  to  Bliicher. 
He  arrived  at  Wavre  at  noon.  At  this  hour,  as  we  are 
told  by  the  latest  Prussian  historian,  '^  it  was  not  known 


^^Waterloo  Letters:    Vivian,  p.  153. 

^Ollech,  p.  179. 

"^Miiffling:    Passages,  pp.  238,  239. 

^*For  a  capital  story  connected  with  this  incident,  see  the  "  Letters  of  the 
First  Earl  of  Malmesbury,"  vol.  2,  p.  447.  London,  1S70.  App.  C,  xxix; 
post,  p.  386.    See  also  Waterloo  Letters,  pp.  154,  167. 

''^Miiffling    Passages,  p.  241 ;  Ollech,  p.  iSo. 

«011ech,  p.  187. 


234  JUNE  17:  [chap.  14.] 

where  the  1 1  Id  or  IVth  Corps  was,  and  the  reserve 
ammunition  had  not  arrived.  ^^  No  decided  assurance 
could,  therefore,  be  given  during  the  day.  Finally,  about 
11.30  P.  M.,  news  arrived  from  Biilow  of  the  arrival  of  his 
corps  at  Dion-le-Mont,  and  about  the  same  time  a 
despatch  from  Muffling  arrived,  stating  that  the  Anglo- 
Dutch  army  had  taken  position  for  battle  at  Mont  St. 
Jean.  Then  Grolmann  wrote  to  Muffling  Bliicher's 
answer.     It  was  sent  off  about  midnight  of  the  17th. 

This  despatch  stated  that  Biilow  would  move  at  break 
of  day  by  way  of  St.  Lambert  to  attack  the  right  flank  of 
the  enemy,  and  that  the  lid  Corps  would  support  the 
IVth  Corps  in  this  operation.  The  1st  and  Hid  Corps 
were  to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  do  the  like. 

This  despatch,  which  could  not  have  reached 
Wellington  until  the  morning  of  the  battle  of  Waterloo, 
seems  actually  to  have  contained  the  first  definite  promise 
of  support  from  Blucher.  ^°  Long  before  its  arrival  the 
Duke  had  taken  up  his  position  at  Waterloo  in  the  hope 
—  in  fact,  in  the  expectation,  —  of  receiving  some  such 
promise  of  assistance  and  support.  Messages  were 
doubtless  exchanged,  as  we  are  told,^'  between  the  English 
and  Prussian  headquarters  during  the  whole  day.  But 
the  Duke  received  no  positive  assurance  until  the  early 
morning  of  the  i8th  that  the  Prussian  army,  or  any  part 
of  it,  would  come  to  his  assistance.  It  is  true  that  he 
was  aware  that  the  Prussians  w^ere  concentrating  at 
Wavre  ;  and  he  knew  that  their  object  in  so  doing  could 
be  nothing  else  than  to  tender  him  their  support  in  the 
battle  that  was  sure  to  occur  the  next  day.  But  it  must 
have  required  all  the  resolution  and  courage  which  he 
possessed  to  have  decided  him  to  take  up  position  for 


*'It  arrived  about  5  P.  M.    See  an/e,  p.  232. 

^Contra:    Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  279.   This  subject  will  be  considered  in  the 
Notes  to  this  chapter. 

"Gneisenau,  vol.  4,  p.  393. 


[chap,  14.]  BLUCHER  AND  WELLINGTON.  235 

battle  without  having  received  any  definite  assurance 
that  the  necessary  support  would  be  furnished. 

For  it  was  a  perfectly  possible  thing  that  he  might  the 
next  morning  be  assailed  by  a  hundred  thousand  men. 
Bliicher  had,  no  doubt,  sent  him  the  information  obtained 
by  Groeben,  that  Napoleon  had  detached  only  12,000  or 
15,000  men  to  follow  the  Prussians,  and  was  bringing 
against  the  Anglo-Dutch  army  all  his  remaining  troops.^^ 
As  we  see  it  now,  that  would  have  been  Napoleon's  best 
course.  If  he  had  known  the  facts  at  the  time,  as  he  might 
easily  have  done  had  he  not  neglected  to  take  the  proper 
measures  to  ascertain  them,  that  is  what  he  probably 
would  have  done.  At  any  rate,  Wellington  had  no 
assurance  from  any  quarter  whatever  that  Napoleon 
would  not  do  exactly  that  thing.  If  Napoleon  had  done 
it,  and  if  the  weather  had  been  fine  and  the  ground  hard, 
what  chance  would  Wellington  have  stood?  The 
question  is  asked  simply  to  define  the  situation  in  which 
the  Duke  placed  himself  on  the  night  of  the  17th  and 
1 8th.  That  is,  we  desire  to  bring  out  the  fact  that 
Wellington  in  taking  up  position  at  Waterloo,  instead  of 
continuing  his  retreat  to  Brussels  and  arranging  with 
Bliicher  to  do  the  like  from  Wavre,  ran  a  very  great 
risk  of  being  beaten  before  he  could  get  help  from  the 
Prussians,  whereas  if  both  commanders  had  proceeded 
to  Brussels,  where  the  roads  from  Waterloo  and  Wavre 
converge,  they  would  have  greatly  outnumbered  the 
French.  This  course  was  the  one  which  Napoleon 
maintained  would  have  been  the  safer  and  wiser.^^ 

Still,  it  must  be  remembered  that  both  Wellington  and 
Bliicher  were  anxious  to  close  the  campaign  with  a  great 
battle,  which  was  certain  to  take  place  if  Wellington 
stood  at  Waterloo,  and  that  it  was  by  no  means  certain 


*In  point  of  fact  Wellington  supposed  that  only  the  3d  Corps  had  been 
detached  for  the  pursuit  of  the  Prussians.  See  his  Official  Report,  Jones, 
p.  307- 

"See^^^j^",  p.  243. 


236  JUNE  17  :— BLiJCHER  AND  WELLINGTON.  [CHAP.  I4.] 

that  Napoleon  would  push  through  the  forest  of  Soignes 
only  to  find  the  combined  armies  confronting  him.  They 
also  thought  that  there  was  a  very  fair  chance  that  they 
would  succeed  in  effecting  the  union  of  their  armies  at 
Waterloo. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  XIV. 

I.  Colonel  Maurice  has  recently  examined  the  evi- 
dence in  reference  to  the  communications  which  passed 
between  the  Duke  of  Wellington  and  Marshal  Blucher 
on  the  subject  of  the  support  to  be  given  to  the  English 
army  by  the  Prussians.'  We  think  he  has  shown  that 
the  account  given  in  Siborne  is  not  altogether  correct, 
and  we  have  followed  Colonel  Maurice  in  preferring  the 
statements  of  Miiffling  and  Ollech. 

Siborne  says^  that  the  Duke,  on  the  morning  of  the 
17th,  sent  back  the  Prussian  officer^  who  first  brought 
him  the  news  of  BlUcher's  defeat,  with  a  letter  to  the 
Field  Marshal,  "  proposing  to  accept  a  battle  on  the  fol- 
lowing day  in  the  position  in  front  of  Waterloo,  provided 
the  Prince  would  detach  two  corps  to  his  assistance"; 
and  that,  in  the  course  of  the  evening*  he  received  from 
Bliicher  a  reply  in  these  terms :  — 

"  I  shall  not  come  with  two  corps  only,  but  with  my  whole  army ; 
upon  this  understanding,  however,  that,  should  the  French  not 
attack  us  on  the  iSth,  we  shall  attack  them  on  the  19th." 

Colonel  Maurice  is  inclined  to  the  opinion  that  the 
letter  which  is  quoted  by  Siborne  is  really  one  written  to 


'Maurice,  pp.  534  et  seq. :  Sept.,  1890. 

^  Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  251,  following  Damitz,  p.  212. 

^Lieutenant  Massow. 

*  Siborne,  vol.  i,  pp.  27S,  279,  following  Damitz,  p.  213. 

»37 


238  JUNE  17  :-NOTES.  [chap.  14.] 

Muffling  at  Bllicher's  dictation  on  the  following  morning, 
after  nine  o'clock,  in  which  MUffling  is  desired  to  inform 
the  Duke  of  Bliicher's  intentions,  and  in  which  some  of 
the  words  given  above  are  employed.  If  this  be  so,  and 
it  seems  very  likely,  the  Duke  not  only  took  up  his  posi- 
tion for  battle  before  he  had  received  any  definite  assur- 
ance of  support  from  his  ally,  but  he  did  not  get  any  until 
the  arrival  at  the  Duke's  headquarters  at  Waterloo  of  the 
letter  sent  off  from  Wavre  between  11  and  12  P.  M.,^ 
which  could  hardly  be  before  2  A.  M.  of  the  i8th.  How 
much  longer  the  Duke  would  have  remained  in  his  posi- 
tion waiting  for  the  promise  of  Prussian  support,  no  one, 
of  course,  can  say.  He  certainly  did  not  propose  to  stay 
and  fight  single-handed.  He  had  sent  word  to  Bllicher 
by  Massow  that  without  Prussian  support  he  would  be 
obliged  to  fall  back  to  Brussels.^  Yet  according  to 
Siborne,  he  waited  till  evening,^  according  to  Ollech,  he 
must  have  waited  till  two  o'clock  in  the  morning,  before 
receiving  any  definite  assurance  of  assistance. 

2.  But  there  is  a  story,  which  rests  on  testimony 
which  it  is  impossible  to  disregard,  to  the  effect  that  the 
Duke,  after  having  caused  his  army  to  take  up  its  posi- 
tion on  the  field  of  battle,  rode  over  to  Wavre  in  the 
evening  to  ascertain  for  himself  whether  or  not  he  was  to 
be  supported  by  Marshal  Bllicher  in  the  battle  of  the 
ensuing  day.  This  story  has  been  carefully  investigated 
by  Colonel  Maurice,^  and  w^e  shall  state,  as  briefly  as  we 
can,  the  evidence  collected  by  him. 

We  first  find  the  story  in  print  in  the  year  1835,  in 
Lockhart's  Life  of  Napoleon.^     It  reads  as  follows :  — 


5  Ollech,  p.  1 87  ;  Gneisenau,  vol.  4,  pp.  393,  394- 

4  b.,  p.  180. 

'Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  278. 

^Maurice,  pp.  533-538:  Sept.,  1890;  and  pp.  330  ^/ j'^^.,  January,  1891. 

'V^ol.  2,  p.  313.  The  History  of  Napoleon  Buonaparte.  By  J.  G.  Lock. 
hart.  3d  ed.,  2  vols.  John  Murray:  1835.  See  also  the  same  work,  p.  594; 
London:  William  Tegg  :  1867. 


[chap.   14.]    BLUCHER  AND  WELLINGTON.-NOTES.  239 

"  All  his  arrangements  having  been  effected  early  in  the  evening  of 
the  17th,  the  Duke  of  Wellington  rode  across  the  country  to 
Bliicher,  to  inform  him  personally  that  he  had  thus  far  effected  the 
plan  agreed  on  at  Brye,  and  express  his  hope  to  be  supported  on 
the  morrow  by  two  Prussian  divisions.  The  veteran  replied  that  he 
would  leave  a  single  corps  to  hold  Grouchy  at  bay  as  well  as  they 
could,  and  march  himself  with  the  rest  of  his  army  upon  Waterloo ; 
and  Wellington  immediately  returned  to  his  post." 

To  this  the  following  note  is  appended :  — 

"  The  fact  of  Wellington  and  Bliicher  having  met  between  the 
battles  of  Ligny  and  Waterloo  is  well  known  to  many  of  the  supe- 
rior officers  in  the  Netherlands ;  but  the  writer  of  this  compendium 
has  never  happened  to  see  it  mentioned  in  print.  The  horse  that 
carried  the  Duke  of  Wellington  through  this  long  night  journey,  so 
important  to  the  decisive  battle  of  the  iSth,  remained  till  lately,  it 
is  understood,  if  he  does  not  still  remain,  a  free  pensioner  in  the 
best  paddock  at  Strathfieldsaye." 

Lord  Ellesmere,  however,  writing-,  as  we  have  before 
had  occasion  to  remark,  under  the  inspiration  of  the 
Duke  of  Wellington,  states  in  a  review  of  a  biography 
of  Bliicher  that  Lockhart  is  mistaken.'"  But  it  is  curious 
that  no  statement  whatever  is  given  by  him  of  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  Duke  passed  the  evening  of  the  17th. 
His  actions  are  accounted  for  only  till  dark. 

The  story  is  most  circumstantially  told  in  the  journal 
of  the  Rev.  Julian  Charles  Young: — " 

"In  the  year  1833,  while  living  in  Hampshire,  no  one  showed 
my  wife  and  myself  more  constant  hospitality  than  the  late  Right 
Honorable  Henry  Pierrepont,  the  father  of  the  present  Lady  Charles 
Wellesley.  *         *         *         Qj-^  q^q  ^f  q^j.  niany  delightful  visits 

to  Conholt,  Mr.  Pierrepont  had  but  just  returned  from  Strathfield- 
saye as  we  arrived.  He  had  been  there  to  meet  the  judges,  whom  the 
Duke  was  accustomed  to  receive  annually,  previously  to  the  opening 


'°Ellesmere,  p.  157  ;  Quarterly  Review,  vol.  70,  p.  464. 

"A  Memoir  of  Charles  Mayne  Young,  Tragedian :  With  extracts  from  his 
son's  journal.  By  Julian  Charles  Young,  M.  A.,  Rector  of  Ilmington.  London 
and  New  York:  Macmillan  &  Co.:  1S71 ;  pp.  158  et  seq. 


240  JUNE  I7:-N0TES.  [chap.   14.] 

of  the  assizes.  After  dinner,  Mr.  Pierrepont  was  asked  by  the 
Duke  of  Beaufort,  who,  with  the  Duchess,  was  in  the  house,  if  he  had 
had  an  agreeable  visit.  '  Particularly  so,'  was  the  answer.  'The 
Duke  was  in  great  force  and,  for  him,  unusually  communicative. 
The  two  judges  and  myself  having  arrived  before  the  rest  of  the 
guests,  who  lived  nearer  Strathfieldsaye  than  we  did,  the  Duke 
asked  us  if  we  were  disposed  to  take  a  walk,  see  the  paddocks,  and 
get  an  appetite  for  dinner.  We  all  three  gladly  assented  to  the 
proposition.  As  we  were  stumping  along,  talking  of  Assheton 
Smith's  stud  and  hounds,  one  of  the  judges  asked  the  Duke  if  we 
might  see  Copenhagen,  his  celebrated  charger.  '  God  bless  you,' 
replied  the  Duke,  '  he  has  been  long  dead ;  and  half  the  fine  ladies 
of  my  acquaintance  have  got  bracelets  or  lockets  made  from  his 
mane  or  tail.'  '  Pray,  Duke,  apart  from  his  being  so  closely  asso- 
ciated with  your  Grace  in  the  glories  of  Waterloo,  was  he  a  very 
remarkable  —  I  mean  a  particularly  clever  horse  ?  ' 

"  Duke  —  'Many  faster  horses,  no  doubt,  many  handsomer;  but 
for  bottom  and  endurance,  never  saw  his  fellow.  I'll  give  you  a 
proof  of  it.  On  the  17th,  early  in  the  day,  I  had  a  horse  shot  under 
me.  Few  know  it,  but  it  was  so.  Before  ten  o'clock  I  got  on 
Copenhagen's  back.  There  was  so  much  to  do  and  to  see  to,  that 
neither  he  nor  I  were  still  for  many  minutes  together.  I  never 
drew  bit,  and  he  never  had  a  morsel  in  his  mouth  till  eight  P.  M., 
when  Fitzroy  Somerset  came  to  tell  me  dinner  was  ready  in  the 
little  neighbouring  village,  Waterloo.  The  poor  beast  I  saw  myself 
stabled  and  fed.  I  told  my  groom  to  give  him  no  hay,  but,  after  a 
few  go-downs  of  chilled  water,  as  much  corn  and  beans  as  he  had  a 
mind  for,  impressing  on  him  the  necessity  of  his  strewing  them 
well  over  the  manger  first.  Somerset  and  I  despatched  a  hasty 
meal,  and  as  soon  as  we  had  done  so,  I  sent  off  Somerset  on  an 
errand.  This  I  did,  I  confess,  on  purpose  that  I  might  get  him  out 
of  the  way ;  for  I  knew  that  if  he  had  had  the  slightest  inkling  of 
what  I  was  up  to,  he  would  have  done  his  best  to  dissuade  me  from 
my  purpose,  and  want  to  accompany  me. 

"  '  The  fact  was,  I  wanted  to  see  Bliicher,  that  I  might  learn  from 
his  own  lips  at  what  hour  it  was  probable  he  would  be  able  to  join 
forces  with  us  the  next  day.  Therefore,  the  moment  Fitzroy's  back 
was  turned,  I  ordered  Copenhagen  to  be  resaddled,  and  told  my 
man  to  get  his  own  horse  and  accompany  me  to  Wavre,  where  I  had 
reason  to  believe  old  '  Forwards '  was  encamped.  Now,  Wavre 
being  some  twelve  miles  from  Waterloo,  I  was  not  a  little  disgusted, 


[chap.  14.]    BLUCHER  AND  WELLINGTON.-NOTES.  24I 

on  getting  there,  to  find  that  the  old  fellow's  tent  was  two  miles  still 
farther  off. 

"'However,  I  saw  him,  got  the  information  I  wanted  from 
him,  and  made  the  best  of  my  way  homewards.  Bad, 
however,  was  the  best,  for,  by  Jove,  it  was  so  dark  that  I  fell 
into  a  deepish  dyke  by  the  roadside ;  and  if  it  had  not  been 
for  my  orderly's  assistance,  I  doubt  if  I  should  ever  have  got  out. 
Thank  God,  there  was  no  harm  done,  either  to  horse  or  man ! 

"  '  Well,  on  reaching  headquarters,  and  thinking  how  bravely  my 
old  horse  had  carried  me  all  day,  I  could  not  help  going  up  to  his 
head  to  tell  him  so  by  a  few  caresses.  But  hang  me,  if,  when  I 
was  giving  him  a  slap  of  approbation  on  his  hind-quarters,  he  did 
not  fling  out  one  of  his  hind  legs  with  as  much  vigour  as  if  he  had 
been  in  stable  for  a  couple  of  days.  Remember,  gentlemen,  he  had 
been  out  with  me  on  his  back  for  upwards  often  hours,  and  had 
carried  me  eight  and  twenty  miles  besides.  I  call  that  bottom  ! 
ey  ? ' " 

Then  there  is  another  piece  of  evidence.  Colonel 
Maurice  says :  —  " 

"  Mr.  Coltman  —  a  well-known  barrister  now  alive  —  remembers 
to  have  distinctly  heard  his  father,  then  Mr.  Justice  Coltman  of  the 
Common  Pleas,  tell  the  story,  and  say  that  he  had  heard  it  from  the 
Duke's  own  mouth  during  a  particular  visit  to  the  Duke  at  Strath- 
fieldsaye  in  a  named  year,  1838.  He  wrote  to  me,  giving  the  story 
substantially,  though  not  with  quite  as  much  detail,  and  making  the 
horse's  kicking  out  in  reply  to  the  caress  take  place  on  the  iSth 
instead  of  on  the  17th,  as  it  appears  in  Young's  narrative.  He 
had  at  the  time  never  seen  Young's  book.  Obviously,  the 
difference  as  to  the  day  of  the  kick  is  just  such  a  lapse  as  would 
naturally  occur  in  a  narrative  not  written  down  at  the  time.  Either 
may  be  right." 

Notwithstanding  the  improbable  features  in  these 
accounts, —  and  there  are  many,'^ —  it  is   at  first  sight 


^-Maurice,  p.  337  :  January,  1891. 

"Mere  improbability,  however,  is  not  a  sufficient  reason  for  rejecting  a  story 
supported  by  credible  evidence.  It  is  always  impossible  to  place  one's  s  If 
precisely  in  the  position  of  those  of  whom  the  story  is  told.  And  some,  at 
any  rate,  of  the  improbable  features  may  be  mere  accretions  on  the  original 
story. 


242  JUNE  17  :-NOTES.  [CHAP.   I4.] 

difficult  to  account  for  the  existence  of  this  evidence, 
except  on  the  supposition  that  the  story  is  true. 
But  a  close  examination  of  the  so-called  Diary  of  the 
Rev.  Mr.  Young  shows  that  it  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  a 
diary  at  all,  for  the  stories  and  remarks  contained  in  it 
were  not  set  down  at  the  time,  as  in  an  ordinary  journal. 
Thus,  this  very  story,  the  date  of  which  is  given  as  1833, 
is  entered  under  the  date  of  October  7,  1832.  (Diary,  p. 
153.)  Take  another  instance.  The  writer  is  speaking 
of  Mr.  John  Wilson  Croker,  and  he  says,  under  date  of 
March,  1832  (pp.  144,  145),  that  "for  forty  years  he 
[Croker]  filled  a  prominent  position  in  the  world  of  let- 
ters." Now  forty  years  before  1832,  Croker  was  only 
twelve  years  old.  Again,  in  this  very  story  of  the  ride 
to  Wavre,  which  is  said  to  have  been  told  in  1833,  the 
Duke  is  made  to  say  of  his  horse  Copenhagen  that  he 
had  then  "  been  long  dead."  But,  in  fact,  Copenhagen 
did  not  die  till  1836;  the  date  of  his  death  is  given  on 
the  grave-stone  erected  over  his  remains  at  Strathfield- 
saye. 

As  for  the  letter  of  Mr.  Coltman  to  Colonel  Maurice, 
which  is  a  statement  recently  made  of  the  former's  recol- 
lection of  what  he  had  heard  his  father  say  that  the 
Duke  of  Wellington  told  him  in  1838,  it  clearly  cannot 
have  much  weight,  unless  corroborated. 

There  is,  moreover,  some  newly-discovered  evidence. 
It  consists  of  notes  taken  by  the  late  Baron  Gurney,  of 
the  Court  of  the  Exchequer,  of  conversations  with  the 
Duke  of  Wellington.  In  one  of  these,  the  Duke  was 
asked  "  whether  a  story  was  true  of  his  having  ridden 
over  to  Bliicher  the  night  before  the  battle  of  Waterloo 
and  returned  on  the  same  horse.  He  said  :  '  No  ;  that 
was  not  so.  I  did  not  see  Bliicher  the  day  before  Wat- 
erloo.' "    This  seems  to  settle  the  question. 


[chap.  14.]    BLUCHER  AND  WELLINGTON.-NOTES.  243 

3.  We  have  spoken  briefly  of  Napoleon's  opinion, 
that  the  Duke  of  Wellington  and  Marshal  Blucher  ought 
to  have  retired  on  Brussels.  The  passage  to  which  we 
referred  reads  as  follows :  —  '* 

"  One  may  ask, —  What  ought  the  English  general  to  have  done 
after  the  battle  of  Ligny  and  the  combat  of  Qiiatre  Bras  ?  There 
cannot  be  two  opinions  on  this  subject.  He  ought  on  the  night  of 
the  17th  and  iSth  to  have  traversed  the  Forest  of  Soignes  by  the 
Charleroi  pike,  while  the  Prussian  army  was  traversing  it  by  the 
Wavre  pike ;  the  two  armies  could  then  unite  at  daybreak  before 
Brussels,  leaving  rearguards  to  defend  the  forest, —  gain  some  days 
to  give  those  of  the  Prussians  who  had  been  dispersed  by  the  battle 
of  Ligny  time  to  rejoin  the  army, —  obtain  reinforcements  from  the 
fourteen  English  regiments  which  were  either  in  garrison  in  Bel- 
gium or  had  just  landed  at  Ostend  on  their  return  from  America, — 
and  leave  the  Emperor  of  the  French  to  manoGuvre  as  he  liked. 
Would  he,  with  an  army  of  100,000  men,  have  traversed  the  forest 
of  Soignes  to  attack  on  the  other  side  of  it  the  two  hostile  armies 
united,  more  than  200,000  strong,  and  in  position?  That  would  cer- 
tainly have  been  the  most  advantageous  thing  that  could  happen  to 
the  allies.  Would  he  have  been  contented  to  take  up  a  position 
himself?  He  certainly  could  not  have  kept  it  long,  for  300,000 
Russians,  Austrians,  and  Bavarians,  already  arrived  at  the  Rhine, 
would  in  a  few  weeks  have  been  on  the  Marne,  which  would  have 
obliged  him  to  fly  to  the  defence  of  the  capital.  Then,  the  Anglo- 
Prussian  army  could  have  marched  forward,  and  joined  their  allies 
under  the  walls  of  Paris." 

It  is  plain  that  the  course  pointed  out  by  the  Emperor 
would  have  avoided  all  the  risks  incurred  by  Wellington 
in  giving  battle  at  Waterloo,  with  the  needed  support 
not  available  until  afternoon.  But  Clausewitz'^  denies 
that  Wellington  incurred  any  risk. 

"  Wavre  is  distant  from  Wellington's  field  of  battle  about  two 
[German,  or  about  ten  English]  miles.  From  the  moment  when 
the  Duke  of  Wellington  saw  the  enemy  appear  in  his  front  up  to 


**Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  258. 
'SClausewitz,  ch.  39,  pp.  99,  100. 


244  JUNE  17  :  BLiJCHER  AXDWELLIXGTON.-XOTES.  [CHAP.  I4.] 

Bliicher's  arrival,  six  or  eight  hours  would  therefore  have  to  elapse, 
unless  Bliicher  had  started  still  earlier;  but  in  that  time  a  battle 
against  70,000  men  cannot  be  begun,  fought  and  decided ;  it  v^^as 
therefore  not  to  be  feared  that  Wellington  would  be  defeated  before 
Bliicher  arrived." 

It  is,  perhaps,  a  sufficient  reply  to  this  remark  to  recall 
the  fact  that  the  battle  of  Ligny  was  begun  at  half-past 
two  and  was  completely  finished  at  half-past  nine,  and 
that  this  period  of  seven  hours  includes  the  delay  of 
nearly  two  hours  caused  by  the  unexpected  appearance 
of  d'Erlon's  Corps.  It  seems  to  us  foolish  to  contend  that 
Wellington  did  not  run  a  great  risk  of  being  defeated 
before  the  arrival  of  the  Prussians.  Had  the  battle  been 
begun  five  or  six  hours  earlier,  all  the  troops  in  Napo- 
leon's army  could  have  been  employed  against  the  Anglo- 
Dutch  forces,  and  the  battle  could  have  been  fought  as 
the  Emperor  intended  to  fight  it.  The  risk  of  being 
beaten,  we  repeat,  was  a  great  risk ;  and  we  believe  the 
Duke  was  quite  aware  that  it  was  such  when  he  assumed 
it.  The  question  then  is, —  recurring  to  Napoleon's  cen- 
sure on  Bliicher  and  Wellington  for  not  having  avoided 
this  risk  by  continuing  their  retreat  to  the  immediate 
neighborhood  of  Brussels, —  whether  the  possibility  of 
overthrowing  Napoleon  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign 
by  effecting  a  union  of  the  allied  armies  at  Waterloo 
warranted  the  t\vo  allied  commanders  in  taking  the  risk 
of  the  defeat  of  the  Anglo-Dutch  army  before  this  union 
could  be  effected.  As  this  question  is  evidently  one 
capable  of  indefinite  discussion,  we  content  ourselves  with 
stating  it. 


CHAPTER  XV. 
THE   EIGHTEENTH    OF   JUNE:    GROUCHY   AND    BLUCHER. 

Napoleon  received  Marshal  Grouchy 's  letter,  dated 
Gembloux,  lo  P.  M.  of  June  17th,  about  2  A.  M.  of  the 
1 8th,  at  the  Caillou  House,  on  the  Brussels  turnpike, 
where  he  passed  the  night  of  the  17th.  A  close 
examination  of  it  might  have  raised  a  suspicion  in  his 
mind  that  Grouchy  did  not  thoroughly  comprehend  his 
task,  and  that  he  might  possibly  fail  to  take  the  right 
course,  if  the  emergency,  which  he  had  in  his  letter 
represented  as  not  unlikely  to  occur,  should  actually  con- 
front him.  He  had  said,  that,  if  he  found  that  the  mass 
of  the  Prussians  were  retiring  on  Wavre,  he  "  would  fol- 
low them  in  that  direction,  in  order  that  they  might  not  be 
able  to  gain  Brussels,  and  to  separate  them  from  Wel- 
lington," but  if  they  were  retiring  on  Perwez,  that  he 
would  direct  himself  on  that  city.  We  have  pointed  out 
above  that  it  was  clearly  impossible  for  him  to  prevent 
the  Prussians  from  getting  to  Brussels.  He  was  thirty 
miles  from  Brussels, —  the  Prussians  less  than  twenty, — 
and  they  were  directly  between  him  and  Brussels.  And 
as  for  separating  the  Prussians  at  Wavre  from  Welling- 
ton, while  Grouchy  must  of  course  follow  them  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Wavre  as  distinguished  from  that  of  Perwez,  yet 
the  only  thing  really  open  to  him  was  to  cross  the  Dyle 
at  once  by  the  bridges  of  Moustier  and  Ottignies  and  then 
to  act  in  close  connection  with  the  main  French  army, — 
to  stand  between  it  and  the  Prussians,  and  ward  off  the 


246  JUNE  18:  [chap.  15.] 

danger  as  best  he  might.  This  could  be  done;  but 
this  was  all  that  could  be  done.  It  was  not  to 
be  expected  that  an  attack  upon  the  Prussian  rear- 
guard at  Wavre, —  which  was  the  only  other  thing  that 
Grouchy  could  do, —  however  vigorously  made,  could 
have  the  result  of  detaining  their  whole  army.  But,  in 
Grouchy's  letter,  a  movement  on  his  part  to  rejoin  or  to 
approach  the  main  army  by  crossing  the  Dyle,  in  case  he 
found  that  the  Prussians  were  massing  at  Wavre,  was  not 
even  mentioned. 

Napoleon  and  Soult,  therefore,  one  would  suppose, 
might  have  seen  by  the  programme  which  Grouchy  had 
marked  out  for  himself  in  his  despatch  that  in  all  prob- 
ability he  was  not  clearly  apprehending  the  situation, 
and  that  it  was  therefore  possible  that  he  might 
make  a  serious,  perhaps  a  very  serious,  mistake  the 
next  day.  They  ought,  therefore,  if  they  suspected 
this  to  be  the  state  of  the  case,  to  have  replied  at 
once,  giving  him  precise  instructions  as  to  his  course  in 
the  event  of  the  retreat  of  the  Prussians  on  Wavre. 
They  should  have  told  him,  that,  if  he  should  find  this  to 
be  the  fact,  he  must  at  once  march  to  cross  the  Dyle 
above  Wavre,  at  Moustier  and  Ottignies,  approach  the 
main  army,  and  act  in  conjunction  with  it.  Yet  although 
Grouchy  told  the  officer  who  carried  the  10  P.  M. 
despatch  to  wait  for  an  answer,  none  was  returned.' 
Grouchy  was  not  even  informed  where  the  army  was, 
and  that  it  was  confronted  by  the  English  army  in  posi- 
tion. Nor  was  he  advised,  as  he  surely  should  have  been, 
that  Demon's  reconnoissance  had  proved  that  a  strong 
Prussian  column, —  consisting,  as  we  have  seen,  of  the 
two  beaten  corps,  those  of  Zieten  and  Pirch  I., — had 
retired  on  Wavre  by  way  of  Gery  and  Gentinnes.^  It  is 
impossible  to  account  for  these  omissions.^ 


'Mem.  du  Due  de  Raguse,vol.  7,  pp.  124,  125. 

^Soult's  despatch  to  Grouchy  :  June  i8th,  10  A.  M. 

^Even  if  the  Emperor  had  been  asleep  when  Grouchy's  aide  arrived,  or 


[chap.  15.]  GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.  247 

Now  this  last-mentioned  fact,  that  "a  pretty  strong 
(Prussian)  column"  had  "passed  by  Gery  and  Gen- 
tinnes,  directed  on  Wavre,"  was  the  most  important  fact 
that  could  be  ascertained,  both  for  Napoleon  and 
Grouchy.  Napoleon  had  in  fact,  at  2  A.  M.  of  the 
i8th,  when  Grouchy's  letter  arrived,  strong  reason  to 
apprehend  that  Grouchy  might,  during  the  night,  ascer- 
tain that  the  whole  of  Bluchers  army  had  retired  on 
Wavre.  It  certainly  would  seem  that  this  was  one  of 
those  cases  where  nothing  should  be  omitted  that  could 
assist  the  mind  of  a  subordinate  in  arriving  at  a  correct 
conclusion."* 

Napoleon,  however,  seems  to  have  thought  it  unnec- 
essary to  send  Grouchy  any  precise  directions.  We 
know  that  he  expected  Grouchy  to  arrive  the  next  after- 
noon by  the  bridge  of  Moustier.  Marbot,  whose  Memoirs 
have  just  been  published,  states,^  that,  towards  11  A.  M. 
of  the  day  of  the  battle,  he  was  sent  with  his  own  regi- 
ment of  hussars  and  a  battalion  of  infantry  to  and  beyond 
the  extreme  right  of  the  army,  with  instructions,  brought 
to  him  by  one  of  the  Emperor's  aides,  to  push  reconnois- 
sances  to  the  bridges  of  Moustier  and  Ottignies.  He 
says  that  these  detachments  were  connected  by  cavalry- 
posts,  "  so  that  they  could  quickly  inform  him  of  their  junc- 
tion with  the  advance  guard  of  the  troops  of  Marshal 
Grouchy,  which  were  to  arrive  on  the  Dyle." 

It  may  perhaps  be,  that  Grouchy's  expressed  intention 
that  he  would  try  to  prevent  Blucher  from  joining  Wel- 
lington was  held  by  both  the  Emperor  and  his  chief-of- 


had  been  at  the  front,  where  he  was  between  one  and  two  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  to  see  if  the  English  army  was  still  in  position,  a  competent  chief -of- 
staff  should,  of  his  own  motion,  have  sent  back  at  once  to  Grouchy  the  infor- 
mation possessed  at  headquarters. 

■♦Especially  when,  according  to  Marshal  Marmont,  the  subordinate  was  a 
man  like  Grouchy :  M^m.,  vol.  4,  p.  125.  See,  also,  Napoleon  k  Waterloo, 
p.  226,  n. 

'Marbot,  vol.  3,  pp.  404  et  seg.j  Gdrard :  Dern.  Obs,  p.  44. 


248  jUNEiS:  [chap.  15.] 

staff  as  indicating  with  sufficient  certainty  that,  if  he 
found  that  the  Prussians  were  retiring  on  Wavre,  he 
would  proceed  at  once  to  cross  the  Dyle  at  Moustier  or 
Limale,  and  operate  on  the  left  bank  of  that  river,  on  the 
right  of  the  main  army.^  This  course  was  almost  neces- 
sarily implied  in  an  attempt  to  prevent  the  Prussians  at 
Wavre  from  joining  the  English,  as  we  have  just  pointed 
out;  it  may  be,  therefore,  that  the  Emperor  thought 
another  order  needless.  But  whatever  the  reason,  no 
order  was  sent  to  Grouchy  till  10  A.  M.  the  next  morn- 
ing. This  did  not  reach  him  till  4  P.  M.^  that  afternoon, 
when  he  w^as  fighting  in  front  of  Wavre. 

Marshal  Grouchy,  then,  acted  up  till  4  o'clock  of  the 
1 8th  of  June  under  the  order  dictated  the  previous  day 
by  the  Emperor  to  Count  Bertrand.  This  fact  we  desire 
distinctly  to  bring  out,  so  that  there  shall  be  no  possibility 
of  further  mistake  on  this  subject.  The  history  of  this  day, 
from  the  very  first  narratives  down  to  the  very  last,  has 
been  illustrated  by  the  mistakes  of  historians  and  critics 
as  to  the  orders  under  which  Marshal  Grouchy  acted. 
Not  only  did  Grouchy  himself  deliberately  deny  for 
nearly  thirty  years  that  he  received  any  written  order  on 
the  17th,  thereby  misleading  the  most  sagacious  critics  and 
rendering  their  criticisms  on  this  part  of  the  campaign  in 
great  part  valueless,  but  even  long  after  the  fact  was  uni- 
versally acknowledged  that  he  did  get  a  written  order  in 
the  shape  of  the  Bertrand  letter,  a  certain  unwillingness 
or  inability  to  take  in  the  meaning  of  this  written  order, 
to  recognize  that  it  imposed  a  different  task  on  Marshal 
Grouchy  from  that  laid  upon  him  by  the  verbal  orders 
which  had  previously  been  given  him,  has,  nevertheless, 
strangely  enough  existed.  We  have  pointed  this  out  in 
the  Notes  to  Chapter  XIII ;  but  we  will  add  one  or  two 
more  instances  here. 


^Cf.  La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  pp.  232,  233,  245. 
'  Grouchy  Mdm.,  vol.  4,  pp.  70,  87,  131,  n. 


[chap.  15.].  GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.  249 

The  Bertrand  order,  as  we  have  seen,  instructed 
Grouchy  to  find  out  what  tlie  Prussians  were  intending 
to  do, —  whether  they  were  intending  to  separate  themselves 
from  the  English,  or  to  U7iite  with  them  for  the  purpose 
of  trying  the  fate  of  another  battle  for  the  defence  of 
Brussels  or  Liege, —  and  the  order  closed  without  giving 
him  any  directions  whatever  in  case  either  of  these  emer- 
gencies should  arise.  The  thing  which  Grouchy  was  to 
do,  therefore,  was  to  ascertain  whether  the  Prussians 
were  intending  to  unite  with  the  English,  and  then  to 
act  in  accordance  with  his  best  judgment.  No  directions 
whatever,  we  repeat,  were  given  to  him  for  his  conduct 
if  he  should  find  that  the  Prussians  were  intending  to 
unite  with  the  English.  We  have  just  adverted  to  this 
omission  of  the  Emperor  to  give  Grouchy  precise 
instructions  in  this  emergency.  There  is  no  question 
that  he  did  not  give  any.  Grouchy  was  entirely  untram- 
melled. If  he  found  that  the  Prussians  were  intending 
to  unite  with  the  English  to  fight  another  battle  for  the 
defence  of  Brussels,  he  was  absolutely  free  to  adopt  what- 
ever course  might  seem  to  him  best. 

Yet  we  find  the  latest  American  historian  of  this  cam- 
paign, in  speaking  of  Grouchy 's  rejection  of  the  advice 
given  by  Gerard,  when  the  cannon  of  Waterloo  was 
heard,  saying,  that  the  question  was,  "  whether  to  turn 
the  army  to  its  left  on  reaching  Corbaix,  and,  crossing 
the  Dyle  by  the  bridges  of  Moustier  and  Ottignies,  to  take 
the  road  to  Maransart  and  Planchenoit,  or  to  adhere  to  the 
Emperors  orders  to  follow  the  Prussians  whom  they  now 
knew  to  be  at  Wavre,"  —  ^  and,  again,  that  Grouchy 
''persisted  in  adhering  to  the  orders  the  E7nperor  had 
given  hiin''"^ 

In  the  same  way  we  find  the  latest  English  commen- 
tator on  the  campaign  saying,  *'  Whether  Grouchy  can 


'Gardner,  pp.  160,  161.    The  italics  are  our  own. 
'lb.,  pp.  161,  162. 


250  JUNE  18:  [chap.  15.] 

be  held  responsible  for  not  having"  marched  to  the 
sound  of  the  guns  "  when  Napoleo7is  instructions  directed 
him  on  Wavre,  will  always  be  a  subject  for  endless,  and, 
I  think,  not  very  profitable,  debate." '° 

It  is  quite  time  that  an  end  should  be  put  to  misun- 
derstandings on  this  subject.  Until  4  P.  M.,  we  repeat, 
Grouchy  acted  under  the  Bertrand  order  only. 

To  return  to  the  narrative. 

Marshal  Grouchy  had  written  to  the  Emperor  at  10 
P.  M.  of  the  17th,  as  we  have  seen,  telling  him  that, 
"  arrived  at  Sauvenieres,the  Prussians  had  divided  into  two 
columns,  one  taking  the  road  for  Wavre  in  passing  by 
Sart-a-Walhain,  and  the  other  appearing  to  be  directed 
on  Perwez."  He  then  went  on  to  say  that  he  would 
operate  in  the  direction  in  which  he  found  that  the  mass 
of  their  forces  had  gone. 

Being  thus  in  doubt  as  to  the  direction  of  the  retreat 
of  the  enemy,  he  determined  to  move  at  first  on  Sart-a- 
Walhain,  from  which  point  he  could  march  either  on 
Wavre  or  on  Perwez  according  to  the  information  he 
might  there  receive.  Inclining  probably  at  this  time  to 
the  opinion  that  the  Prussians  had  retreated  by  way  of 
Perwez,  in  which  case  there  would  be  no  necessity  for 
unusual  haste,  he  determined  to  give  his  troops  a  good 
night's  rest.  Of  the  absolute  necessity  of  gaining  time 
in  case  he  should  find  that  the  Prussians  had  retreated 
on  Wavre  with  the  intention  of  joining  Wellington,  he 
seems  to  have  been  utterly  unmindful. 

Hence,  at  or  soon  after  10  P.  M.,  he  issued  his  orders 
to  his  corps-commanders  to  march  in  the  morning  to 
Sart-a-Walhain.      Vandamme,"  whose  corps  had    biv- 


'°Maurice,  p.  550:  Sept.  1890.,  The  italics  are  our  own.  It  is  possible 
that  Colonel  Maurice  may  have  had  in  mind  the  language  of  Soult's  order 
dated  10  A.  M.,  in  which  Grouchy's  movement  on  Wavre  is  approved.  But 
this  did  not  reach  Grouchy  till  4  P.  M.,  as  we  have  just  stated.  See,  also, 
Kennedy,  p.  159. 

"La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  p.  315,  n.  i.     The  hour  of  starting  is  given  in  the 


[chap.  15.]  GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.  25I 

ouacked  somewhat  in  advance  of  Gembloux,  was  to 
start  at  6  A.  M.  It  was  to  be  preceded  in  the  march  by 
Exelm-ans'  cavalry,  the  bulk  of  which  was  at  Sauvenieres. 
Gerard,"  whose  troops  were  in  and  about  Gembloux,  was 
to  follow  with  his  corps  at  8  A.  M.  Pajol'^  was  ordered 
from  Mazy  on  the  Namur  road,  where  he  then  was,  tak- 
ing with  him  the  division  of  Teste,  to  Grand  Leez,  where 
he  would  receive  further  orders. 

Then,  at  2  A.  M.,  Grouchy  writes  to  the  Emperor  to 
inform  him  that  he  was  intending  to  march  on  Sart-a- 
Walhain,''*  but  without  indicating  his  ulterior  course. 

During  the  early  morning  hours,  however,  information 
was  received'^  which  removed  his  doubts  as  to  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Prussian  retreat,  for  we  find  him  writing  to 
Pajol'^  "  at  daybreak,"  as  follows :  — 

"  The  movement  of  retreat  of  Bliicher's  army  appears  to  me  very 
clearly  to  be  upon  Brussels."  ^^ 

Marshal  Grouchy,  therefore,  at  daybreak, —  which  in 
Belgium  at  that  season  of  the  year  is  at  least  as  early  as 
3.30  A.  M., —  for  the  sun  rises  at  3.48  A.  M., —  had  come 


Grouchy  Memoirs  (vol.  4,  p.  56)  as  "  before  four  o'clock."  But  this  is  a 
gross  and  manifest  error.  Cf.  Charras,  vol.  2,  p.  33,  where  the  hour  is  given 
as  6  A.  M. 

•^La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  p.  316,  n.  i  ;  Grouchy  Mdm.,  vol.  4.  p.  55. 

"La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  p.  316,  n.  2  ;  Grouchy  Mdm.,  vol.  4,  p.  57. 

"This  despatch  is  not  in  existence,  but  its  receipt  was  acknowledged  and 
the  above  statement  in  it  was  referred  to  in  Soult's  despatch  to  Grouchy, 
dated  i  P.  M.,  June  i8th.  From  Grouchy's  statement  that  he  was  going  to 
Sart-k-Walhain,  Soult  drew  the  inference  that  he  was  going  to  Corbaix  or  to 
Wavre. 

"  Gdrard  :  Dern.  Obs.,  pp.  13,  14  ;  Letter  of  General  Exelmans.] 

'^Grouchy  Mdm.,  vol.  4,  pp.  62,  ^i. 

"There  is  in  the  Grouchy  Mdmoires,  vol.  4,  pp.  65,  (i6,  what  purports  to  be 
a  copy  of  a  despatch  to  the  Emperor  dated  Gembloux,  3  A.  M.  But  its 
authenticity  is  more  than  doubtful.  Cf.  La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  p.  318,  n.  It 
begins  with  the  statement  that  all  Grouchy's  reports  and  information  confirm 
the  idea  that  the  Prussians  are  retiring  on  Brussels,  to  concentrate  there,  or 
to  deliver  battle  after  being  united  to  the  English, 


252  JUNE  18:  [chap.   15.] 

to  the  conclusion  that  Bliicher  was  retiring  on  Brussels 
by  way  of  Wavre.  Yet  he  still  adhered  to  his  plan  of 
marching  on  Sart-a-Walhain,  although  that  place  had 
been  chosen  the  evening  before  as  the  first  stage  in  the 
next  day  s  march  because  he  had  then  been  in  doubt  as 
to  whether  his  ultimate  movement  would  be  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Wavre  or  in  that  of  Perwez.'^  Moreover, 
although  he  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
Prussians  were  retiring  on  Wavre,  towards  the 
English,  which  made  promptness  and  celerity  on  his 
part  of  the  very  first  importance,  he  did  not  change  the 
very  late  hours  he  had  fixed  for  the  march  of  the  next 
morning.  In  fact,  even  these  hours  were  not  adhered  to. 
Exelmans,'^  who  preceded  the  column,  did  not  start  till 
7.30  A.  M. ;  Vandamme,^°  who  came  next,  did  not  move 
until  8  A.  M. ;  and  it  was  not  until  9  A.  M.  that  Gerard's" 
corps  got  through  the  town  of  Gembloux,  and  was  in  full 
march  for  Sart-a-Walhain.  And  yet  no  one  knew  better 
than  Marshal  Grouchy  that  the  Prussians  had  many 
hours  the  start  of  him,  and  that  if  he  was  going  to  do 
anything  that  day  to  prevent  them  from  joining  Welling- 
ton, there  was  no  time  to  be  lost. 

There  is  no  difference  of  opinion  among  the  Continen- 
tal" authorities  as  to  Marshal  Grouchy's  true  course  on 
this  morning.  As  soon  as  he  had  arrived  at  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  Prussians  were  retiring  on  Wavre,  which 
was,  as  we  have  seen,  between  3  and  4  A.  M.,  he  should 
have   changed   his  evening  orders   entirely;  he   should 


"8  Charras,  vol.  2,  pp.  33,  55.  Charras  seems  to  us  to  be  in  error  in  suppos- 
ing that  Grouchy's  uncertainty  still  existed  on  the  morning  of  the  i8th.  He 
has,  perhaps,  overlooked  the  statement  in  Grouchy's  order  to  Pajol,  dated  at 
daybreak,  quoted  in  the  text. 

'5  Gdrard :  Dernieres  Obs.,  p.  24  ;  Letter  of  General  Exelmans. 

^°Ib.,  p.  25  ;  Letter  of  General  Berthez^ne. 

"'  G(5rard:  Quelques  Doc,  p.  12. 

="  We  shall  examine  the  English  authorities  in  the  Notes  to  this  chapter. 
See  Post,  p.  280. 


[chap.  15.]  GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.  253 

have  begun  his  march  at  once,  and  should  have  directed 
it  to  the  bridge  of  Moustier.  (See  Map  9.) 

Says  Jomini :  —  '^ 

"  The  Marshal  should  not,  then,  have  hesitated;  he  should  at 
daybreak  on  the  i8th  have  marched  with  all  speed  on  Moustier 
with  Exelmans,  Vandamme  and  Gerard,  directing  Pajol's  cavalry 
and  Teste's  division  on  Wavre,  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy's  rear- 
guard. 

"  Being  able  to  reach  Moustier  by  ten  o'clock,^'*  he  could  have 
then  forwarded  his  infantry  on  Wavre  by  Limale,  pushing 
Exelmans'  dragoons  on  St.  Lambert,  or  else  have  marched  to  Lasne 
himself." 

Says  Clausewitz :  —  ^^ 

"  But  the  moment  he  learnt  that  Bliicher  had  turned  towards  the 
Dyle,  which  must  have  happened  in  Gembloux  in  the  night 
between  the  17th  and  iSth,  the  idea  must  have  shot  at  once  into 
his  mind  that  this  could  only  be  in  order  to  join  Wellington,  for 
one  does  not  leave  one's  natural  line  of  retreat  without  reason. 
From  that  moment  he  had  to  consider  it  his  duty,  not  to  lie  at  the 
heels  of  Bliicher's  rear-guard,  but  to  get  between  him  and  Bona- 
parte, in  order  to  be  able  to  throw  himself  in  front  of  Bliicher  in 
case  he  wanted  to  march  off  to  his  right.  According  to  this,  he 
would  have  to  turn  from  Gembloux  to  the  Dyle  by  the  shortest 
road,  &c." 

Says  Charras  :  —  '^ 

"  Everything  indicated  that  the  most  advantageous  manoeuvre 
for  Bliicher  was  that  which  would  bring  him  the  most  quickly  near 
Wellington,  — would  unite  the  Prussians  to  the  Anglo-Dutch. 
Since  the  opening  of  hostilities  the  two  allied  generals  had  ma- 
noeuvred to  bring  about  this  union ;  and  it  was  evident  that  they 
were  not  going  to  renounce  this  idea  after  the  defeat  of  one  of  their 
armies;  the  activity,  energy,  audacity,  —  so  well  known,  —  of 
Bliicher  —  the  tenacity, — equally  well   known, —  of  Wellington, 


"3  Jomini,  pp.  175  et  seq. 

^  10.30  A.  M.,  according  to  Charras,  vol.  2,  p.  62. 

*5  Clausewitz,  ch.  50,  p.  146. 

'^^  Charras,  vol.  2,  pp.  57,  58. 


254  JUNE  i8:  [chap.  15.] 

sufficed  to  guarantee  that  they  would  not  easily  renounce  this 
intention. 

"If  they  should  succeed  in  this,  Napoleon  would  find  himself 
exposed  to  being  crushed  under  the  weight  of  the  two  allied  armies. 

"  This  catastrophe,  the  greatest  of  all  misfortunes.  Grouchy 
ought,  before  everything,  to  put  himself  in  position  to  avert,  so  far 
as  he  could  do  so.  Hence  it  was  imperative  that  he  should  come 
as  speedily  as  possible  within  the  sphere  of  Napoleon's  operations ; 
and  hence,  also,  he  must  march  on  Moustier. 

"  From  this  point,  in  fact,  better  than  from  any  other,  he  would 
be  equally  in  position  to  diminish  the  consequences  of  the  union  of 
the  Prussians  and  the  Anglo-Dutch,  if  it  should  already  have  been 
effected,  or  to  hinder  it,  if  it  should  not  yet  have  taken  place." 

With  these  authorities  we  entirely  concur.  Marshal 
Grouchy,  as  soon  as  he  had  made  up  his  mind  that 
Bliicher  was  retiring  on  Brussels  by  way  of  Wavre, 
should  have  marched  for  the  bridge  of  Moustier,  and 
should  have  started  at  daybreak.  ^^  Instead  of  this,  he 
adhered  to  the  direction  of  Sart-a-Walhain,  although,  even 
if  he  were  proposing  to  follow  Bliicher  straight  to  Wavre, 
Sart-a-Walhain  was  out  of  the  direct  route.  It  had  in 
fact  been  selected  because  it  lay  to  the  eastward  of  the 
Wavre  road.  He  might  have  saved  from  two  to  four 
hours  by  starting  at  daybreak,  but  of  this  he  was  utterly 
unmindful.  He  did  not  thoroughly  reconnoitre  with  his 
cavalry  towards  the  Dyle,  to  see  if  the  enemy  were  not 
marching  towards  the  English,  although  it  was  certainly 
his  manifest  duty  to  do  so.  ''^  All  he  did  in  this  direction 
was  to  send  ^^  a  staff-of^cer  with  a  small  escort  at  day- 
break or  soon  after  to  the  bridge  of  Moustier,  to  see, 
apparently,  if  any  Prussian  troops  had  crossed  there,  but 


^''  We  reserve  for  the  Notes  to  this  chapter  the  consideration  of  the  various 
opinions  on  the  consequences  of  this  movement,  had  it  been  made. 

"  See  Siborne's  excellent  remarks  on  this  subject,  —  vol.  i,  pp.  318  et  seq. 

^9  Declaration  of  M.  Leguest,  in  the  Grouchy  M^m.,  vol.  4,  pp.  141,  142.  The 
staff-officer,  by  name  Pont-Bellanger,  must  have  left  Moustier  several  hours 
before  Marbot's  officer,  Captain  Eloy,  got  there.    See  Marbot,  vol.  3,  p.  407. 


[chap.  15.]  GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.  255 

he  rejoined  Grouchy  before  Grouchy  had  arrived  at  Sart- 
a-Walhain,  that  is,  before  1 1  A.  M.  With  this  exception 
the  Marshal  made  absolutely  no  reconnoissances  to  his 
left  until  he   had  arrived  in  front  of  Wavre. 

Somewhere  between  lo  and  ii  A.  M.  he  reached  Sart- 
a-Walhain.  Thence  he  proceeded  to  Walhain,  or,  as  it 
is  sometimes  called,  Walhain  St.  Paul.^''  He  alighted  at 
the  house  of  a  M.  Hollert,  the  notary  of  the  neighboring 
village  of  Nil  St.  Vincent,  who  lived  in  a  large  house  in 
Walhain  known  as  the  Chateau  Marette.  Here  he  stopped 
to  write  a  despatch  to  the  Emperor  and  to  get  his 
breakfast.  The  cavalry  of  Exelmans  and  the  3d  Corps 
under  Vandamme  had  passed  this  point  on  the  road  to 
Wavre,  and  had  reached  or  perhaps  passed  Nil  St. 
Vincent. 

The  despatch,  which  is  dated  Sart-a- Walhain,  by  an 
error  for  Walhain, —  11  A.  M.,  —  begins  by  stating  that 
the  1st,  nd  and  Hid  Corps  of  Bllicher's  army  are 
marching  in  the  direction  of  Brussels.  Grouchy  sub- 
sequently says :  —  ^' 

"  This  evening  I  expect  to  be  concentrated  at  Wavre,  and  thus  to 
find  myself  between  Wellington,  whom  I  presume  to  be  in  retreat 
before  your  majesty,  and  the  Prussian  army." 

He  also  states  that  some  of  the  Prussians  are  proceed- 
ing towards  the  plain  of  the  Chyse,  near  the  Louvain 
road,  with  the  design  of  concentrating  there,  or  of  fighting 
any  troops  which  may  pursue  them  there,  or  of  uniting 
themselves  to  Wellington.  This  part  of  the  despatch 
looks  as  if  Grouchy  thought  that  a  part  of  the  Prussians 
intended  to  concentrate  to  his  right.  Still,  as  he  dis- 
tinctly states  that  the  1st,  Hd  and  Hid  Corps  are 
marching  in  the  direction  of  Brussels,  we  must  suppose 
that  he  is  not  referring  to  these  three  corps  when  he 


^See  the  Notes  to  this  chapter. 

^'Grouchy  Mem.,  vol.  4,  pp.  71,  72.    This  despatch  is  given  in  full  in  Appen- 
dix C,  XXX ;  post,  pp.  3S6,  3S7. 


256  JUNE    18:  [chap.   15.] 

speaks  of  those  Prussians  who  are  proceeding  towards 
the  plain  of  the  Chyse.  So  that,  when  he  says  that  at 
Wavre  he  expects  to  be  between  WelHngton,  who  he 
supposes  is  retiring  on  Brussels  by  the  Charleroi  turn- 
pike, and  the  Prussian  army,  three  of  whose  corps  are,  he 
says,  also  retiring  on  Brussels,  it  is  difficult,  if  not  impos- 
sible, to  know  what  he  means.  He  seems  to  have  been 
completely  bewildered. 

This  despatch  had  hardly  been  handed  to  the  staff- 
officer  ^"^  who  was  to  carry  it  to  the  Emperor,  when  the 
cannon  of  Waterloo  was  heard.  Then,  at  any  rate, 
Marshal  Grouchy  knew  that  the  English  were  not  re- 
treating before  Napoleon,  but  were  standing  "  on  this  side 
of  the  Forest  of  Soignes,"  as  the  Emperor  had,  the  after- 
noon before,  conjectured  they  might.  Three  Prussian 
corps  had  gone  towards  Brussels,  as  Grouchy  had  just 
written  to  the  Emperor.  It  was  very  possible  that  they 
might  at  that  moment  be  marching  across  the  country 
to  join  the  Anglo-Dutch  army.  Perhaps  nothing  could 
prevent  this.  But  it  was  plainly  Grouchy 's  duty  to  march 
towards  the  Emperor  as  fast  as  he  could.  If  he  could 
not  prevent  the  Prussians  from  joining  the  English,  he 
might  at  any  rate  be  able  to  prevent  them  from  attacking 
the  French.  If  he  should  cross  the  Dyle  at  Moustier  and 
Ottignies,  and  move  directly  towards  the  line  of  march 
which  they  must  take  in  order  to  attack  the  French, 
their  march  would,  if  he  arrived  in  time,  assuredly  be  sus- 
pended. This  was  at  any  rate  the  thing  to  try  to  do.  It 
was  to  be  feared  that  a  terrible  disaster  was  impend- 
ing over  Napoleon  and  his  army;  but  there  w^as  a 
chance  of  averting  it.  There  was  only  one  thing  to  do, 
—  and  that  was,  promptly  and  gallantly  to  make  the 
attempt  to  avert  it.     (See  Map  10.) 

Gerard,  who  had  arrived  at  Walhain  with  his  corps, 
strenuously  urged  Grouchy  to  march  to  the  sound  of  the 


^Grouchy  Mem.,  vol.  4,  p.  75. 


[chap,  15.]  GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.  257 

cannon.  He  pressed  this  on  Grouchy  with  perhaps 
undue  heat ;  but  the  occasion  was  one  that  admitted  of 
no  delay.  The  son  of  Marshal  Grouchy,  who  may  be 
supposed  to  have  heard  his  father's  account  of  the  inter- 
view, says :  — " 

"  The  commander  of  the  4th  Corps  uttered  haughtily,  and  in  a 
fashion  little  in  harmony  with  the  respect  due  to  his  chief  and  with 
military  discipline,  the  advice  that  the  right  wing  ought  to  march  to 
the  sound  of  the  cannon  in  order  to  effectuate  a  junction  with  the 
Emperor. 

"Grouchy  did  not  find  the  advice  bad  in  itself,  but  the  form 
employed  to  present  it.  At  the  same  time  he  consented  to  discuss 
Gerard's  opinion  with  him." 

That  personal  feelings  had  some  influence  on  Marshal 
Grouchy 's  decision  would  seem  from  the  above  statement 
very  probable.  ^'^ 

We  do  not  reproduce  the  arguments  of  Marshal 
Grouchy  here,  because  they  are  based  mainly  upon  his 
statement,  which  we  have  found  to  be  erroneous,  that 
"his  instructions,  from  which  he  was  not  permitted  to 
depart,  enjoined  formally  upon  him  not  to  lose  sight  of 
the  Prussians  when  he  should  have  joined  them." 

A  discussion  w^here  one  of  the  parties  concealed  the 
existence  of  a  written  order,  which  prescribed  no  such 
instructions  as  those  stated  above,  cannot  enlighten  us 
much. 

The  difficulties  of  marching  across  the  country  by 
way  of  Mont  St.  Guibert  to  the  Dyle  were  also  dwelt 
upon,  —  the  chief-of-artillery  of  the  4th  Corps,  Baltus, 
having  great  doubts  as  to  the  possibility  of  such  a  march, 
and  the  chief-of-engineers,  Valaze,  offering  to  remove  the 
obstacles. 

Grouchy  finally  decided  to  resume  the  march  towards 
Wavre.     His  army  marched  in  a  single  column  by  the 


^^Le  Mai.  de  Grouchy,  p.  15,  n.  2  :  p.  59  ;     Grouchy  Mem.,  vol.  4,  p.  75. 
^La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  p.  328.     Cf.  Grouchy  Mdm.,  vol.  4,  p.  295. 


258  JUNE  18:  [chap.  15.] 

road  which,  passing  through  Nil  St.  Vincent  and  just  to 
the  north  of  Corbaix,  reaches  La  Baraque,  and  thence 
leads  to  Wavre  by  a  line,  almost  straight.  Not  a  half  a 
mile  beyond  La  Baraque  there  is  a  road  which  leads  to 
the  bridge  of  Moustier,  less  than  three  miles  off ;  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  farther  on  is  another  road,  which,  with 
its  branches,  leads  to  the  bridges  of  Limelette  and 
Limale,  at  a  distance  of  only  two  miles.  Half  a  mile 
north  of  the  bridge  of  Moustier  is  another  bridge,  that  of 
Ottignies.  These  bridges  had  not  been  destroyed,  and 
they  were  all  unguarded.  ^^  Then  there  were  convenient 
woods  able  to  conceal  any  movement  of  the  troops 
towards  the  river. 

There  was  a  slight  affair  in  a  w^ood  a  short  distance 
beyond  La  Baraque,  in  which  the  cavalry  of  Ledebur,  ^^ 
assisted  by  two  battalions  of  infantry,  skirmished  for  an 
hour  or  so.  While  this  was  going  on,  two  divisions  of 
the  lid  Corps,  which  had  been  making  their  way  through 
the  town  of  Wavre,  were  brought  back,  and  took  up 
position,  facing  south,  about  a  mile  south  of  the  town. 
But  there  was  no  resistance  to  speak  of.  When  the 
French  advanced,  the  Prussians  retired  on  Wavre. 

In  its  march,  which  was  made  to  the  sound  of  the 
cannon  of  Waterloo, "  the  army  of  Marshal  Grouchy  had 
then  abundant  opportunity  to  cross  the  Dyle  at  Moustier 
and  Ottignies,  at  Limelette  and  Limale.  ^^  La  Baraque, 
on  the  main  road  to  Wavre,  from  near  which  the  roads 
to  these  bridges  diverge,  was  reached  about  two  o'clock." 


3SThe  one  of  these  bridges  which  was  nearest  Wavre,  that  at  Limale,  was 
passed  at  six  o'clock  by  Valin's  cavalry,  without  experiencing  any  serious 
resistance.  Siborne,  vol.  2,  p.  286.  Berton,  pp.  66,  67.  Marbot's  cavalry- 
picket  occupied  the  bridge  of  Moustier  all  the  afternoon.  Marbot,  vol.  3,  p. 
407.    Cf.  Charras,  vol.  2,  p.  69. 

^^Ollech,  pp.  208,  209. 

3^Berthez^ne,  in  Gdrard,  Dem.  Obs.,  p.  25. 

^^Berton,  p.  66,  n. 

^'Charras,  vol.  2,  p.  44. 


[chap.  15.]  GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.  259 

From  this  point  on  to  Wavre,  the  Prussians  were  clearly  to 
be  seen  marching  to  the  field  of  Waterloo.""  If  Grouchy 
had  in  season  recalled  Pajol  and  the  division  of  Teste 
from  the  extreme  right  of  the  column,  in  order  to  mask 
the  movement  by  threatening  Wavre,  it  would  certainly 
seem  that  Vandamme's  Corps  might  have  crossed  at 
Limale  and  Limelette,  and  Gerard's  at  Ottignies  and 
Moustier,  and  that,  before  4  P.  M.,  the  whole  force  could 
have  been  en  route  for  St.  Lambert.  "*' 

The  fact  is,  the  whole  question  of  Grouchy's  flank 
march  at  noon  has  been  unnecessarily  confused  by  three 
very  general  misconceptions,  namely :  — 

(i)  That  it  was  at  Sart-a-Walhain  where  the  sound  of 
the  cannon  was  heard.  It  was  at  Walhain,  a  good  mile 
nearer  to  the  bridges. 

(2)  That  it  was  necessary,  in  order  to  go  to  the 
bridges,  for  Grouchy's  column  to  cut  across  the  marshy 
and  difficult  country  between  Walhain  and  Moustier,  ^^ 
by  way  of  Mont  St.  Guibert.  Instead  of  this,  the  main 
road  could  be  kept  until  the  army  had  arrived  at  La 
Baraque ;  or,  possibly,  the  4th  Corps  could  have  taken  a 
somewhat  long  cross-road  which  leads  to  Moustier  from 
Neuf  Sart,  a  village  on  the  main  road  about  a  mile  to  the 
south-east  of  La  Baraque,  while  the  3d  Corps  could  have 
marched  on  the  roads  which  branch  off  to  the  bridges 
just  beyond  La  Baraque. 

No  doubt,  if  Grouchy  had  started  at  daybreak  from 
Gembloux,  as  he  ought  to  have  done,  he  would  have 
passed  through  Mont  St.  Guibert,  and  over  very  bad  and 
miry  roads;  but  to  gain  the  bridge  of  Moustier  from 
Walhain,  the  route  he  actually  pursued,  by  way  of  La 
Baraque,  was  nearly  as  short  as  the  other,  and  was,  up  to 


*°Berthez&ne,  in  Gdrard,  Dern.  Obs.,  p.  25. 

■•'Charras'  discussion  of  this  movement  will  be  considered  in  the  Notes  to 
this  chapter:  post^  p.  284,  n.  6. 

■^Charras,  vol.  2,  p.  69,  n. 


26o  JUNE  i8:  [chap.  15.] 

that  point,  so  far  as  we  know,  a  tolerable  road.  *^  At  least 
there  were  no  such  complaints  of  it  as  were  made  of  the 
roads  from  Ligny  to  Gembloux. 

Now,  from  the  point  just  beyond  La  Baraque,  where 
the  first  road  branches  off,  it  is  nearer  to  Moustier  than 
it  is  to  Wavre.  From  where  the  other  road  branches  off 
to  Limale  and  Limelette,  the  distance  is  about  the  same 
as  to  Wavre.  Making  allowance,  then,  for  the  badness  of 
the  river  roads,  on  the  one  hand,  and  for  the  time  saved 
by  passing  the  army  over  several  instead  of  over  one 
single  road  on  the  other  hand,  and  assuming  that  there 
had  been  no  fighting,  the  whole  force  could  have  suc- 
cessfully crossed  the  river  by  4  P.  M.,  which  was  the  hour 
at  which  Grouchy 's  force  arrived  in  front  of  Wavre. 

(3)  That  there  would  have  been  any  serious  resistance 
experienced  at  the  bridges. 

Not  one  of  these  bridges,  as  has  been  above  pointed 
out,  ■*■*  was  occupied  in  force  by  the  Prussians.  Only  one, 
that  at  Limale,  was  occupied  at  all,  and  that  only  by  a 
small  detachment.  They  had  had  also  some  cavalry  and 
two  battalions  of  infantry  in  observation  at  Mont  St.  Gui- 
bert,but  these  retreated  to  La  Baraque  on  finding  that  the 
cavalry  of  Exelmans  had  got  in  their  rear  by  way  of 
Corbaix. 

Had  Marshal  Grouchy,  therefore,  pursued  his  march  to 
the  neighborhood  of  La  Baraque,  which  place  his  head  of 
column  reached  about  2  P.  M.,  and  had  he  then  promptly 
availed  himself  of  the  roads  which  lead  to  the  bridges, 
directing  Pajol,  who  was  a  very  able  and  experienced 
officer,  to  cover  and  conceal  the  movement  with  his 
cavalry  and  the  division  of  Teste,  he  could,  as  it  seems  to 
us,  in  all  probability,  have  been  across  the  Dyle  at  4 
o'clock,  ready  to  march  towards  Lasne  and  St.  Lambert. 


•♦^The  paved  chaussie  which  now  runs  straight  from  Gernbloux  to  Wavre 
was  not  built  in  1815.    Nor  was  the  chaicssec  from  Sombreffe  to  Gembloux. 

**Anie,  p.  258. 


[chap.  15.]  GROUCHY  AND  ELUCHER.  26I 

Now  at  4  o'clock  only  two  brigades  *^  of  Bulow's  (I  Vth) 
Corps  had  passed  through  Lasne,  They,  with  the  artillery 
and  cavalry  which  accompanied  them,  were  at  that  moment 
resting  and  reforming  in  the  Wood  of  Paris,  '^^  a  little 
wood  just  west  of  the  town  of  Lasne,  after  an  exhausting 
march."*'  The  other  two  brigades  were  between  St. 
Lambert  and  Lasne.  The  lid  Corps  was  stretched  along 
the  road  between  Wavre  and  St.  Lambert.  It  had  not 
yet  reached  the  latter  place. ''^  The  1st  Corps  was  a  mile 
and  a  half  from  Chain,  on  the  northerly  road.  The  Hid 
Corps  was  in  and  about  Wavre.    (See  Map  ii.) 

If,  then,  Marshal  Grouchy  had  succeeded  in  the 
operation  of  crossing  the  Dyle  at  the  four  bridges  or  any 
of  them  while  Thielemann's  Corps  was  detained  in 
Wavre  by  Pajol  and  Teste,  and  if  he  had  boldly  advanced 
towards  Lasne  and  St.  Lambert,  he  would  certainly  have 
arrested  the  march  of  Biilow  and  Pirch  I.  Although  the 
Prussians  would  have  been  superior  in  numbers,  they  yet 
would  have  been  compelled  to  halt  and  form  line  of 
battle  on  observing  the  advance  of  Grouchy's  30,000 
men.  The  chances  are  that  Grouchy  would  ultimately 
have  been  forced  to  retire ;  he  could  hardly  have  been  a 
match  for  the  50,000  men  opposed  to  him ;  and  his 
retreat  could  at  any  time  have  been  precipitated  by  an 
attack  on  his  right  flank  by  Thielemann,  if  that  officer 
had  felt  himself  at  liberty  to  leave  Wavre.  Yet  these 
operations  would  without  question  have  consumed  the 
rest  of  the  afternoon ;  it  would  almost  certainly  have  been 
impossible  for  the  corps  of  Biilow  and  Pirch  I.  to  have 
attacked  the  French  at  Planchenoit  that  day.  Zieten 
certainly  might  have  pursued  his  march  unmolested  if 


■^^The    Prussian  brigade  corresponded   then  to  the   French   or   English 
division. 

■♦^Sometimes  called  the  Wood  of  Frischermont. 

*^Siborne,  vol.  2,  pp.  127,  128, 

*^See  Siborne's  Map  of  the  Field  of  Wavre,  4  o'clock  P.  M.,  i8th  June. 


262  JUNE  i8:  [chap.  15.] 

he  had  thought  it  wise  to  do  so.  How  these  movements 
would  have  affected  the  result  of  the  battle  of  Water- 
loo, we  will  consider  when  we  come  to  the  account  of 
the  battle.  All  we  want  to  show  at  this  stage  of  the 
narrative  is,  that,  had  Gerard's  counsel  been  taken, 
Marshal  Grouchy's  command  might  have  been  across  the 
Dyle  at  Moustier  and  the  other  bridges  by  4  P.  M.,  and 
that  at  that  moment  the  van  of  the  IVth  Corps  had  only 
just  passed  through  Lasne. 

It  is  time  that  we  returned  to  the  Prussians. 

Billow,  whose  corps  (the  IVth)  had  not  been  engaged  at 
Ligny,  was  ordered  to  march  at  daybreak  from  Dion-le- 
Mont,  where  he  had  passed  the  night,  for  St.  Lambert, 
with  the  view  of  attacking  the  French  right.  '^^  He  had 
a  long  distance  to  go,  and  was,  moreover,  detained  by  a 
fire  which  broke  out  in  the  streets  of  Wavre,  and  his 
main  body  did  not  reach  St.  Lambert  till  noon.  ^°  Here 
there  was  a  long  halt.  ^' 

The  lid  Corps  was  to  follow  the  IVth,  but  for  some 
reason  or  other  it  did  not  begin  to  leave  Wavre  till  nearly 
noon,  ^'  and  it  was  not  until  4  P.  M.  that  the  whole  corps 
had  got  through  the  town  and  had  taken  the  road  for  St. 
Lambert. " 

The  1st  Corps, —  Zieten's, —  which  was  to  march  by 
the  northerly  road,  by  way  of  Ohain,  to  join  the  army  of 
Wellington,  also  did  not  start  until  nearly  noon.^^  The 
1 1  Id  Corps,  which  was  to  be  the  last  to  leave  Wavre,  was 
to  march  by  way  of  Couture  towards  Planchenoit,  in 
support  of  the  IVth  and  lid  Corps.    But  it  was  to  remain 


*»011ech,  p.  187. 

5°  Clausewitz,  ch.  42,  p.  107. 

5'  Maurice,  p.  549 :    Sept.,  1890. 

s^  Charras,  vol.  2,  p.  43. 

"  lb.,  p.  45.    Cf.  Siborne's  Map  of  the  Field  of  Wavre,  4  o'clock  P.  M., 
June  i8th. 

"lb.,  p.  43. 


[chap.  15.]  GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.  263 

in  Wavre,  if  the  enemy  should  show  himself  there  in 
force. 

These  arrangements,  it  must  be  confessed,  do  not 
indicate  that  determination  to  march  with  all  possible 
speed  to  the  support  of  an  ally  in  danger  of  being  defeated 
before  the  promised  support  arrives,  which  has  usually 
been  attributed  to  Marshal  Blucher.  They  are  so 
deliberate,  so  tardy  even,  that  we  must  seek  an  explana- 
tion of  them.  Biilow,  it  is  true,  moved  out  promptly 
enough  ;  but  the  delay  of  the  lid  Corps  in  leaving  Wavre 
is  most  extraordinary,  under  the  circumstances,  con- 
sidering that  its  commander  had  been  informed  at  mid- 
night that  the  IVth  Corps  had  been  ordered  to  march  at 
break  of  day,  and  that  he  himself  had  been  ordered  to 
join  that  corps  immediately,  and  follow  its  line  of 
march." 

It  appears  now,  from  the  recent  history  of  Von  Ollech, 
that  about  9.30  A.  M.  Marshal  Blucher  dictated  a  note 
to  General  MUffling,  stating  that  he  would  place  himself, 
ill  as  he  was,  at  the  head  of  his  troops  in  order  to  attack 
at  once  the  right  of  Napoleon's  army ;  and  that  Gneisenau, 
still  disposed  to  be  cautious  in  trusting  to  the  assurances 
of  the  English  general  that  he  would  accept  battle  at 
Waterloo,  added  a  postscript  in  these  words:  — ^6 

"  General  Gneisenau  has  been  informed  of  the  contents  of  this 
letter,  but  asks  your  Excellency  to  ascertain  definitely  whether  the 
Duke  really  has  a  fixed  determination  to  fight  in  his  pi'esent  posi- 
tion, or  whether  perhaps  it  is  a  mere  demonstration,  which  at  the 
best  would  be  very  unfortunate  for  our  army.  Your  Excellency 
will  have  the  kindness  to  obtain  for  me  full  information  on  this 
matter,  as  it  is  of  the  highest  importance  to  be  thoroughly  assured 
of  what  the  Duke  is  going  to  do,  in  order  to  determine  our  course 
of  action." 

Ollech  "  goes  on  to  tell  us  that  Gneisenau  was,  even 


"  OUech,  p.  18S. 

5*  lb.,  p.  189;  Maurice,  p.  537  :   Sept.,  1890. 

^^Ollech,  p.  190. 


264  juNEiS:  [chap.  15.] 

at  this  late  hour,  not  without  his  misgivings.  He  says 
that  Gneisenau  believed  that  the  Duke  had  left  him  in  the 
lurch  at  Ligny.  He  also  says  that  he  fully  took  in  the 
exposed  situation  of  the  Prussian  army,  if  the  Anglo- 
Dutch  forces  should  fall  back  to  Brussels,  —  a  retreat  by 
\^ay  of  Louvain  being  probably  then  the  only  thing  open 
o  the  Prussians.  He  says,  indeed,  that  before  an  an- 
uver  was  received  to  this  communication,  Gneisenau 
iiad  determined  to  go  ahead,  and  carry  out  the  plan,  and 
:hat  between  11  and  12  in  the  morning  Zieten  had  been 
ordered  to  Ohain. 

But  may  we  not  fairly  infer,  that,  under  the  impression 
of  these  feelings,  —  of  this  doubt  whether  Wellington 
really  intended  to  fight,  —  a  doubt,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered, which  no  sound  of  cannon  until  half-past  eleven 
in  the  morning  came  to  dispel,  —  Biilow  had  been 
ordered  to  be  very  cautious,  and  to  proceed  with  all 
deliberation,  —  and  that  the  departure  of  Pirch  I.  and 
Zieten  had  been  delayed?  It  would  certainly  seem  as  if 
this  were  the  case. 

The  welcome  sound  of  the  cannon  of  Waterloo,  how- 
ever, shortly  before  noon,  dispelled  all  doubts  and  all 
hesitations;  and  there  can  be  no  question  that  every 
one  in  the  Prussian  army  from  the  old  Field  Marshal 
down  to  the  privates  in  the  ranks  did  their  best  for  the 
success  of  the  day.  The  roads  were  frightful;  it  was 
almost  impossible  to  get  the  artillery  and  waggons  over 
them  ;  but  every  exertion  was  made. 

Grouchy's  obstinate  determination  to  operate  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Dyle  brought  him  in  front  of  Wavre. 
He  displayed  more  troops  than  the  Prussian  generals 
had  supposed  that  he  had  with  him.  But  their  plan  was 
not  altered.  To  Thielemann's  Corps  alone  was  it  left  to 
defend  the  town. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  go  into  the  details  of  this  action. 
It  was  not  fought  by  Marshal  Grouchy  with  any  skill. 
The  troops  of  Vandamme  entsno-lpd  themselves  in  the 


[chap.  15.]  GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.  265 

vain  endeavor  to  carry  the  lower  bridges  in  the  town. 
The  4th  Corps  repeatedly  but  ineffectually  endeavored 
to  get  possession  of  the  Mill  of  Bierges,  just  above  the 
town.  Here  Gerard  was  wounded.  Between  6  and  7 
P.  M.  Pajol  carried  the  bridge  of  Limale,  and  this  posi- 
tion was  held,  despite  an  attempt  of  the  Prussians  to 
repossess  themselves  of  it.  The  attack  on  Wavre  was 
conducted  in  the  most  gallant  manner  by  the  French, 
but  without  any  well-arranged  plan.  Their  efforts  were 
in  the  main  uselessly  directed  against  an  enemy  behind 
walls  and  in  houses,  when  nothing  would  have  been 
easier  than  to  have  turned  the  whole  position  by  crossing 
the  river  at  Limale.  The  resistance  of  the  Prussians  was 
worthy  of  all  praise. 

During  the  action  Marshal  Grouchy  received  two 
despatches  from  Marshal  Soult.  These  demand  our 
careful  consideration,  not  because  they  can  in  any  way 
explain  the  motives  which  actuated  Marshal  Grouchy  in 
directing  his  command  upon  Wavre  instead  of  upon 
Lasne  and  St.  Lambert,  for  they  were  received  too  late 
to  have  influenced  him  at  all,  but  because  they  throw 
light  on  the  expectations  entertained  by  Napoleon  in 
regard  to  Grouchy's  movements  and  especially  in  regard 
to  his  cooperation  with  the  main  army. 

These  orders  were  both  signed  by  Marshal  Soult,  the 
chief-of-staff,  and  were  no  doubt  drafted  by  him. 

The  first,  dated  at  10  A.  M.,  reads  as  follows  :  —  '^ 

In  front  of  the  Farm  of  Caillou, 

June  18,  1S15,  10  A.  M. 
Marshal : 

The  Emperor  has  received  your  last  report,  dated  from 
Gerabloux.59 

You  speak  to  his  Majesty  of  only  two  Prussian  columns,  which 
have   passed  at   Sauvenieres  and   Sart-a-Walhaln.      Nevertheless, 


5^  Grouchy  Mdm.,  vol.  4,  p.  79 ;  Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.  2S3,  2S4  ;  App.  C,  xxxiii; 
^osi,  p.  3SS. 

i^Ante,  p.  212 ;  also  App.  B,post,  p.  358. 


266  ^         JUNE  i8:  [chap.  15.] 

reports  say  that  a  third  column,  which  was  a  pretty  strong  one,  has 
passed  by  Gery  and  Gentinnes,  directed  on  Wavre.^ 

The  Emperor  instructs  me  to  tell  you  that  at  this  moment  his 
Majesty  is  going  to  attack  the  English  army,  which  has  taken  posi- 
tion at  Waterloo,  near  the  Forest  of  Soignes.  Thus  his  Majesty 
desires  that  you  will  direct  your  movements  on  Wavre,  in  order 
to  approach  us,  to  put  yourself  in  the  sphere  of  our  operations,  and 
to  keep  up  your  communications  with  us,  pushing  before  you  those 
portions^'  of  the  Prussian  army  which  have  taken  this  direction,  and 
which  may  have  stopped  at  Wavre,  where  you  ought  to  arrive  as 
soon  as  possible. 

You  will  follow  the  enemy's  columns  which  are  on  your  right  by 
some  light  troops,  in  order  to  observe  their  movements  and  pick  up 
their  stragglers.  Instruct  me  immediately  as  to  your  dispositions 
and  your  march,  as  also  as  to  the  news  which  you  have  of  the  en- 
emy ;  and  do  not  neglect  to  keep  up  your  communications  with  us. 
The  Emperor  desires  to  have  news  from  you  very  often. 

The  Marshal,  Duke  of  Dalmatia. 

To  understand  this  despatch  one  must  refer  to  that  to 
which  it  professes  to  be  an  answer,  namely,  that  dated 
Gembloux,  at  ten  o'clock  the  night  before.  In  that 
despatch  Grouchy  says,  as  will  be  remembered,  ^^  that,  at 
Sauvenieres,  the  Prussians  apparently  divided  into  two 
columns,  one  directed  on  Wavre  and  the  other  on 
Perwez ;  and  that  he  will  follow  the  principal  force  of  the 
enemy  in  either  direction  as  his  information  may 
indicate.  Now  Soult,  having  this  before  his  eyes  when 
he  is  writing  the  10  A.  M.  despatch,  simply  says,  —  Do 
not  take  the  Perwez  direction,  —  take  the  Wavre  direc- 
tion, —  for  that  will  bring  you  nearer  to  us.  We,  also, 
have  heard  of  a  pretty  strong  Prussian  column  which 
has  retreated  on  Wavre ;  that  is  an  additional  reason  why 
you  should  take  that  direction.  We  want  you  to  approach 
us,  —  to  get  within  the  sphere  {eji  rapport)  of  our  opera. 


^This  must  have  been  the  1st  and  lid  Corps. 

*'  The  original  has  "  corps  "  ;  but  army-corps  are   not  meant.     The  same 
word  is  used  below,  —  "  quelques  corps  lagers." 
^Ante  p.  212  ;  App.  'S>,post,  p.  358. 


[chap.  15.]  GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.  267 

tions;  to  keep  up  your  communications  with  us; 
therefore  you  ought  to  get  to  Wavre  as  soon  as  possible. 

The  object  of  directing  Grouchy  on  Wavre  was 
therefore  that  he  might  approach  the  main  army ;  that  he 
might  keep  in  strict  communication  with  it,  —  might  be 
within  the  sphere  of  its  operations.  There  is  no  strate- 
gical or  other  object  even  hinted  at  in  directing  Grouchy 
on  Wavre,  save  that  of  approaching  the  main  army.  ^^ 
Nor  is  there  any  difficulty  whatever  in  discerning  the 
meaning  of  the  writer. 

It  is  also  perfectly  plain  that  no  opposition  to  Marshal 
Grouchy's  occupation  of  Wavre  was  apprehended.  It  is 
therefore  fairly  to  be  inferred  that  the  writer  intended, 
that,  if  the  situation  should  be  such  from  any  cause  that 
the  occupation  of  Wavre  or  the  attempt  to  occupy  it, 
would  not  subserve  the  purpose  of  enabling  Grouchy  to 
draw  nearer  to  the  main  army,  he  should  carry  out  this 
purpose  in  some  other  way.  It  seems  to  us  foolish  to 
say  that  this  despatch  would  have  justified  Grouchy  in 
taking  the  course  which  he  did  take,  supposing,  that  is, 
that  he  had  received  it  in  time  for  it  to  affect  his  action. 
If,  for  example,  a  gentleman  on  a  walking  tour  should 
order  his  servant  to  bring  his  baggage  to  a  certain  town, 
so  that  he  might  easily  get  at  it  from  the  place  where  he 
was  himself  expecting  to  be  the  next  day,  and  the  servant 
should  find  that  all  communication  between  this  town 
and  the  region  where  his  master  expected  to  be  had  been 
interrupted  by  some  accident,  like  the  destruction  of  a 
railway-bridge,  for  instance,  and  he  should  nevertheless 
bring  his  master's  baggage  to  that  town,  instead    of 


"Gerard  (Dern.  Obs.  p.  rg)  remarks :  —  "  If  one  analyzes  separately  the 
text  of  these  two  despatches,  *  *  *  one  perceives  that  the  Emperor  has 
spoken  of  the  direction  of  Wavre  only  because  he  finds  it  indicated  in  the 
reports  of  the  commander  of  the  right  wing.  The  principal  object  of  both 
of  them  was  to  insist  upon  movements  which  would  bring  the  troops  of  the 
right  wing  near  the  main  body."  Gerard  is  here  referring  to  the  order  sent 
to  Grouchy  at  i  P.  M.  {post,  p.  270),  as  well  as  to  that  dated  10  A.  M. 


268  JUNE  i8:  [chap.  15.] 

bringing  it  within  his  master's  reach  by  carrying  it  to 
some  other  place,  justifying  himself  by  the  terms  of  the 
letter,  he  would  generally  be  regarded  as  having  acted 
like  a  fool.  Yet  this  is  very  nearly  a  parallel  case  to  that 
of  Marshal  Grouchy,  supposing  that  he  had  received  the 
despatch  in  time  to  have  acted  on  it,  and  had  then  acted 
as  he  did.  The  only  thing  needed  to  make  it  absolutely 
parallel  is,  that  the  servant  in  the  case  supposed  should 
be  in  possession  of  information,  of  which  his  master  was 
ignorant,  making  the  carrying  of  the  baggage  to  him  at 
the  earliest  possible  moment  a  matter  of  the  utmost 
importance.  Then  the  cases  would  be  on  all  fours  with 
each  other. 

But  we  have  delayed  perhaps  too  long  to  show  that 
this  order  cannot  justify  Grouchy 's  action.  Our  excuse 
is  that  it  has  been  so  used  by  more  than  one  authority.^'* 
Nor  does  the  order  show  that  Napoleon  would  have 
made  the  same  mistake  that  Grouchy  did,  as  has  some- 
times been  thoughtlessly  said  ;  for  Napoleon,  at  the  time 
the  despatch  was  sent  off,  knew  nothing,  as  has  just  been 
pointed  out,  of  the  circumstances  then  under  Grouchy's 
observation. 

It  cannot,  of  course,  be  contended  that  Napoleon  was 
not  responsible  for  this  order  of  10  A.  M.  A  commander- 
in-chief  must  be  supposed  to  know  what  orders  are  issued 
in  his  name.  Yet  it  is  certainly  true  that  the  directions 
given  to  Marbot  do  not  tally  at  all  with  this  order  to 
Grouchy.  According  to  the  latter.  Grouchy  would  be 
looked  for  in  the  direction  of  Wavre,  —  that  is,  of  Lasne 
and  St.  Lambert ;  but  Marbot  was  given  to  understand 
that  the  Emperor  expected  Grouchy  to  cross  the  Dyle  at 
the  bridges  of  Moustier  and  Ottignies.  Colonel  Marbot, 
in  a  letter  written  to  Marshal  Grouchy  in  1830,  says :  —  ^^ 


^"Chesney,  p.  206 ;  Kennedy,  p.  162;  Gardner,  p.  161,  n. ;  Grouchy  Me'm., 
vol.  4,  pp.  78,  80,  87. 
"Marbot,  vol.  3,  pp.  404  et  seq.    This  letter  is  chiefly  made  up  from  his 


[chap.  15.]  GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.  269 

"  At  the  commencement  of  the  action,  towards  11  A.  M.,  I  was 
detached  from  the  division  with  my  own  regiment  and  a  battahon 
of  infantry,  which  had  been  placed  under  my  command.  These 
troops  were  posted  on  our  extreme  right,  behind  Frischermont,  fac- 
ing the  Dyle. 

"  Particular  instructions  were  given  to  me  on  the  part  of  the 
Emperor  by  his  aide-de-camp,  Labedoyere,  and  by  a  staff  officer 
whose  name  I  do  not  recall.  They  prescribed  to  me  to  leave  the 
bulk  of  my  command  always  in  view  of  the  field  of  battle,  to  post 
300  infantry  in  the  Wood  of  Frischermont,^^  one  squadron  at  Lasne, 
having  outposts  as  far  as  St.  Lambert;  another  squadron,  half  at 
Couture,  half  at  Beaumont,  sending  reconnoissances  as  far  as  the 
Dyle,  to  the  bridges  of  Moustier  and  Ottignies." 

He  then  describes  the  arrangements  for  the  speedy 
transmission  of  intelligence,  and  proceeds :  — 

"A  note  from  Captain  Eloy,^7  which  the  intermediate  posts 
promptly  transmitted  to  me,  informed  me  that  he  had  found  no 
force  at  Moustier,  nor  at  Ottignies,  and  that  the  inhabitants  assured 
him  that  the  French  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Dyle  would  pass 
the  river  at  Limale,  Limelette  and  Wavre." 

He  sent  this  word  to  the  Emperor,  who  ordered  him 
to  push  reconnoissances  in  those  directions.  Then,  half 
a  mile  beyond  St.  Lambert,  they  captured  some  Prus- 
sians, who  informed  him  that  they  were  followed  by  a 
large  part  of  the  Prussian  army.     He  then  says :  — 

"  I  proceeded  to  St.  Lambert  with  a  squadron  to  reinforce  the 
troops  there.  I  saw  in  the  distance  a  strong  column,  approaching 
St.  Lambert.  I  sent  an  officer  in  all  haste  to  forewarn  the 
Emperor,  who  replied,  telling  me  to  advance  boldly,  that  this  body 
of  troops  could  be  nothing  else  than  the  corps  of  Marshal  Grouchy, 
coming  from  Limale,  and  pushing  before  it  some  stray  Pixissians, 
of  whom  the  prisoners  I  had  just  taken  were  a  part." 


report,  which  is  to  be  found  in  "  Napoleon  k  Waterloo,"  pp.  344  ef  seg. 
The  editors  of  Marbot's  Memoirs  say  (vol.  3,  p.  408)  that  the  steps  they  have 
taken  to  find  the  report  at  the  War  Office  have  been  unsuccessful. 

^''Sometimes  called  the  Wood  of  Paris. 

^^He  commanded  the  picket  at  Moustier. 


270  JUNE  i8:  [chap.  15.] 

Soon  after,  the  fact  that  the  approaching  column  was 
composed  of  Prussian  troops  was  manifest.  The 
Emperor  was  now  sure  that  Grouchy  would  come  by  the 
upper  bridges :  — 

"  My  adjutant,  whom  I  had  ordered  to  go  and  inform  the 
Emperor  of  the  positive  arrival  of  the  Prussians  at  St.  Lambert, 
returned,  saying  to  me  that  the  Emperor  ordered  me  to 
inform  the  head  of  Marshal  Grouchy's  column,  which  ought  at  this 
moment  to  be  debouching  by  the  bridges  of  Moustier  and  Ottignies, 
since  it  had  not  come  by  Limale  and  Limelette,  of  the  fact  that  the 
Prussians  were  advancing  by  way  of  St.  Lambert." 

It  is  plain  from  the  above  narrative  that  the  Emperor, 
when  he  sent  Marbot  off,  shortly  before  11  A.  M., 
expected  Marshal  Grouchy  to  arrive  during  the  after- 
noon,°^  and  that  his  first  idea  was  that  he  would  arrive  by 
the  bridges  of  Moustier  and  Ottignies.  This  seems  to 
show  that  the  Emperor  did  not  revise  the  10  A.  M. 
despatch  sent  off  by  Soult,  which  indicated  that 
they  expected  Grouchy  to  arrive  from  Wavre.  Napoleon 
must  have  been  at  this  hour, —  lo-ii  A.  M.,  —  making 
his  final  preparations  for  the  battle. 

Then  there  was  another  despatch  to  Grouchy,  which 
we  also  give  here  in  full :  —  ^^ 

Field  of  Battle  of  Waterloo, 

the  iSth  of  June:   i  P.  M. 
Marshal : 

You  wrote  to  the  Emperor  at  2  o'clock?"  this  morning, 
that  you  would  march  on  Sart-lez-Walhain ;  your  plan  then  is  to 
proceed  to  Corbaix  or?'  to  Wavre.  This  movement  is  conformable 
to  his  Majesty's  arrangements  which  have  been  communicated  to 


^'This  was  Marbot's  own  conviction ;  vol.  3,  p.  40S. 

^'La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  pp.  270,  271 ;  Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.  286,  287  ;  Siborne, 
vol.  I,  pp.  400,  401;  Napoleon  h.  Waterloo,  pp.  279,  280;  App.  C,  xxxiv; 
^osi,  p.  3S9. 

^The  Grouchy  Memoirs  (vol.  4,  p.  82)  give  this  as  3  o'clock. 

"The  text  given  in  the  Grouchy  Memoirs,  vol.  4,  p.  82,  replaces  this  "or" 
by  an  "  and."    This  is  not  followed  in  any  other  work. 


[chap.  15.]  GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.  27I 

you.  Nevertheless,  the  Emperor  directs  me  to  tell  you  that  you 
ought  always  to  manoeuvre  in  our  direction. 7^  It  is  for  you  to  see 
the  place  where  we  are,  to  govern  yourself  accordingly,  and  to  con- 
nect our  communications,  so  as  to  be  always  prepared  to  fall  upon 
any  of  the  enemy's  troops  which  may  endeavor  to  annoy  our  right, 
and  to  destroy  them. 

"At  this  moment  the  battle  is  in  progresses  on  the  line  of  Water- 
loo. The  enemy's  centre  is  at  Mont  St.  Jean ;  manoeuvre,  there- 
fore, to  join  our  right. 

The  Marshal,  Duke  of  Dalmatia. 

"  P.  S.  A  letter,  which  has  just  been  intercepted,  says  that  Gen 
eral  Biilow  is  about  to  attack  our  right  flank ;  we  believe  that  we 
see  this  corps  on  the  height  of  St.  Lambert.  So  lose  not  an  instant 
in  drawing  near  us  and  joining  us,  in  order  to  crush  Biilow,  whom 
you  will  take  in  the  very  act." 

In  this  letter  the  Emperor's  desire  that  Grouchy  would 
manceuvre  in  his  direction  is  expressed  again  and  again, 
and  even  in  the  body  of  the  letter  it  is  plain  that  some 
apprehension  is  entertained  at  headquarters  of  an  attack 
upon  the  right  of  the  army  by  the  Prussians.  The  post- 
script, of  course,  speaks  for  itself. 

Grouchy  did  not  receive  this  letter  till  between  6  and  7 
P.  M.,  ''^  when  it  was  too  late  for  him  to  accomplish 
much.  He,  however,  carried  the  bridge  of  Limale,  and 
established  himself  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Dyle  for  the 
night. 


'^The  text  of  the  Grouchy  Memoirs  inserts  here  the  f oUowing :  —  "  and  to 
seek  to  come  near  to  our  army,  in  order  that  you  may  join  us  before  any  body 
of  troops  can  put  itself  between  us.  I  do  not  indicate  to  you  the  direction 
you  should  take. " 

"^The  original  is  "  engagde."  "  This  letter,"  says  Marshal  Grouchy  (Fragm. 
Hist,  Lettre  k  MM.  M^ry  et  Barthdlemy;  p.  14),  "was  in  a  hand  writ- 
ing so  difficult  to  decipher  that  I  read  it,  as  did  also  my  chief-of- 
staff,  and  my  senior  aide-de-camp,  '  gagnde.'  "  The  chief-of-staff,  General 
Le  Sdndcal,  says  that  the  Marshal  closely  questioned  the  officer  who  was 
the  bearer  of  the  despatch,  but  he  was  so  intoxicated  that  they  could 
not  get  anything  from  him.  Grouchy  Mdm.,  vol.  4,  pp.  132,  133.  Cf. 
Gerard,  Dern.  Obs.,  p.  20,  n. 

^'•Grouchy  Mdm.,  vol.  4,  p.  87. 


272  JUNE  l8:    GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.      [CHAP.  I5.] 

Taking  the  two  letters  together,  —  and  leaving  out  of 
view  for  the  moment  the  postscript  of  the  second,  —  we 
see  that  Napoleon  was  expecting  that  Grouchy 
would  approach  him.  He  had  learned  of  the  "pretty 
strong  column"  which  had  passed  by  Gery  and  Gentinnes, 
directed  on  Wavre.  He,  no  doubt,  supposed  that 
Grouchy  had  also  learned  of  it;  and  he  knew  from 
Grouchy's  despatches  of  lo  P.  M.  of  the  17th  and  2  A.  M. 
of  the  1 8th,  that  Grouchy  had  recognized  the  necessity 
of  manoeuvring  in  the  direction  of  Wavre,  if  the  mass  of 
the  Prussian  army  should  have  taken  that  course.  Hence 
he  expected  to  see  him.  He  thought  it  likely  that  he 
would  come  by  the  bridges  of  Moustier  and  Ottignies, 
and  strike  in  on  his  right  and  keep  off  any  of  the 
enemy's  troops  who  might  seek  to  molest  him. 

Of  any  apprehension  of  a  serious  attack  by  the  Prus- 
sians in  force  there  is  no  trace  till  we  come  to  the  post- 
script to  the  second  letter.  Up  to  the  time  when  this 
postscript  was  written.  Napoleon  would  seem  to  have  felt 
pretty  sure  (though  perhaps  with  some  misgivings), 
either  that  Grouchy  would  prevent  the  Prussians  from 
attacking  him,  or  would  himself  join,  or  connect  with, 
the  main  army.  But  the  appearance  of  the  Prussians  at 
St.  Lambert  and  the  absence  of  any  information  from 
Grouchy  evidently  alarmed  him. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  XV. 

I.  The  first  question  that  demands  consideration  in 
connection  with  the  matters  narrated  in  this  chapter  is 
this:  — 

Was  it  wise  in  Napoleon  to  detach  from  his  main  army 
such  a  large  force  as  that  which  he  gave  to  Grouchy  ? 
Or,  —  to  state  the  question  more  carefully,  —  Napoleon, 
being,  at  i  P.  M.  of  the  17th  (through  his  own  neglect, 
but  the  cause  is  not  important  in  this  connection),  in 
ignorance  of  the  direction  of  the  retreat  of  the  Prussians, 
but  having  in  mind  that  they  might  be  intending  to  unite 
with  the  English  and  fight  another  battle  for  the  defence 
of  Brussels, '  —  was  it  wise  in  him  to  detach  33,000  men 
from  his  main  army  to  find  out  about  and  take  care  of 
the  Prussians? 

This  question,  it  must  be  observed,  is  quite  a  different 
one  from  that  presented  to  Napoleon  in  the  forenoon  of 
the  17th,  when  he  and  Grouchy  and  every  one  else 
believed  that  the  Prussians  had  fallen  back  on  Namur. 
If  the  Prussians  had  retreated  on  Namur,  they  had 
assuredly  given  up  all  idea  of  further  cooperation  with 
the  English,  at  any  rate  for  the  present.  The  two  corps 
entrusted  to  Marshal  Grouchy  might  perhaps  accelerate 
their  retreat,  and  ought  to  be  able  to  prevent  an  offensive 
return  on  their  part  against  the  communications  of  the 
French.  For  this  purpose  they  could  perfectly  well  be 
spared ;  for  the  army  which  Napoleon  was  taking  with 


See  the  Bertrand  order,  ante^  p.  210. 
373 


274  JUNE  i8  :-NOTES.  [chap.  15.] 

him  to  Waterloo  was  able  alone  to  defeat  the  army  of 
Wellington.  It  was  a  somewhat  larger  army,  ^  —  it  was 
composed  throughout  of  excellent  troops,  —  it  was  full  of 
enthusiasm,  —  and  it  was  commanded  by  the  greatest 
general  of  the  day.  Nor  was  it  a  matter  of  any  great 
importance  that  Grouchy  could  not  well  be  detached  till 
after  twelve  o'clock,  owing  to  the  necessity  of  giving  his 
troops  time  to  recover  from  the  fatigues  of  the  battle  of 
the  day  before,  the  stress  of  which  had  fallen  almost  wholly 
on  them,  for,  if  the  Prussians  had  retreated  oh  Namur 
and  Liege,  there  was  no  special  and  imminent  danger  to 
be  apprehended.^  To  detach  Marshal  Grouchy  with 
33,000  men  under  these  circumstances,  which  were  then 
believed  to  exist,  was  one  thing.  But  the  question  we 
are  now  considering  is,  —  whether  Napoleon's  adhering 
to  the  plan  of  sending  Grouchy  off  with  two  corps  is  to 
be  justified  after  he  had  seen  reason  to  be  apprehensive 
of  the  possibility  of  the  Prussians  uniting  with  the 
English  to  fight  another  battle  for  the  defence  of 
Brussels. 

This  danger  of  the  union  of  the  two  allied  armies  was, 
as  the  Bertrand  order  shows,  distinctly  recognized  as  a 
possible  danger  by  Napoleon  when  he  dictated  the  order 
to  Bertrand.  It  is  true  that  Napoleon  did  not  think 
it  likely  that  this  union  would  be  made,  but  he  knew 
perfectly  well  that  if  it  should  be  made,  it  would  place 
him  in  the  greatest  peril.  He,  therefore,  expressly  warned 
Grouchy  that  the  Prussians  might  be  intending  to  unite 
with  the  English  to  fight  another  battle  for  the  defence  of 
Brussels;    and    we  have  seen  that,  in    the    event    of 


^  This  statement  is  true  only  of  the  army  which  the  Duke  had  in  line  of 
battle  at  Waterloo.  There  were  besides  some  18,000  men,  stationed  at  Hal 
and  Tubize,  of  whom  he  did  not  avail  himself. 

3"  Napoleon  would  not  have  lost  his  line  of  communication  with  France 
had  Bliicher  immediately  reoccupied  the  position  of  Ligny  upon  Napoleon's 
leaving  it ;  for  his  advance  upon  Wellington  necessarily  opened  to  him  both 
the  Mons  and  Lille  great  lines  to  France."     Kennedy,  pp.  154,  155. 


[chap.  15.]        GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.-NOTES.  275 

Grouchy's  finding  this  to  be  the  case,  Napoleon  expected 
him  to  cross  the  Dyle  and  act  in  conjunction  with  the 
main  army.  If  this  was,  in  Napoleon's  opinion,  to  be  his 
true  course  in  the  not  impossible  event  of  Blucher's  fall- 
ing back  on  Wavre,  why  send  him  off  at  all  ?  What  was 
there  to  be  gained  by  sending  him  off  which  made  it 
worth  while  to  run  the  risks  inseparable  from  detaching 
such  a  large  force  from  the  main  army  when  such  a 
terrible  danger  as  the  union  of  the  Prussian  and  English 
armies  was  even  remotely  apprehended  ?  For  there  cer- 
tainly was  a  chance  of  Grouchy's  not  coming  back  in  time 
to  prevent  the  catastrophe;  Napoleon  ran  the  risk  of 
Grouchy's  not  receiving  accurate  or  trustworthy  informa- 
tion as  to  the  doings  of  the  enemy,  —  of  his  not  acting  on 
the  information  which  he  might  obtain  in  accordance 
with  sound  military  principles,  —  of  his  being  delayed 
by  the  destruction  of  the  bridges,  and  by  the  manoeuvres 
of  the  enemy. 

But  this  is  not  all.  If  the  Prussians  had  fallen  back  on 
Wavre  with  the  intention  of  uniting  with  the  English  and 
fighting  another  battle  for  the  defence  of  Brussels,  as 
Napoleon  in  the  Bertrand  order  warns  Grouchy  they 
might  be  intending  to  do,  they  must  have  carried  out 
their  project  in  great  part  at  the  time  when  Napoleon  was 
dictating  his  order  to  Bertrand.  On  this  hypothesis, 
they  had  certainly  already  obtained  a  great  advantage 
over  any  force  sent  to  pursue  them  or  to  interrupt  the 
execution  of  their  scheme.  Was  it  not  therefore  much 
wiser  to  keep  the  whole  army  together,  well  in  hand,  and 
under  the  Emperor's  immediate  direction  ? 

These  risks  and  chances,  and  others,  Napoleon  took, 
when  he  sent  Grouchy  off  with  his  33,000  men ;  and  for 
what  ? 

The  fact  probably  is  this ;  that  Grouchy  was  originally 
ordered  to  follow  up  and  observe  the  Prussians  when 
every  one  supposed  them  to  be  retreating  towards  the 
Rhine,  and  especially  to  prevent  or  check  any  offensive 


276  JUNE  l8:-N0TES.  [chap.  15.] 

return  upon  the  French  communications ;  and  that  when 
Napoleon,  between  12  and  i,  received  information  which 
awakened  in  his  mind  doubts  of  the  correctness  of  this 
supposition,  and  even  some  apprehension  that  Bliicher 
might  be  intending  to  unite  with  WelHngton  and  fight 
another  battle  for  the  defence  of  Brussels,  he  adhered  to 
his  original  disposition  of  Grouchy's  force,  contenting 
himself  with  giving  him  an  express  warning  of  the  danger 
to  be  apprehended. 

The  question  then  comes  down  to  this :  — 

If  the  Prussians  were  going  to  separate  themselves 
from  the  English,  there  was  no  great  risk  in  making  such 
a  large  detachment  from  the  main  army,  and  there 
might  very  possibly  be  occasions  in  which  a  force  of 
33,000  men  might  accomplish  more  than  a  smaller  one. 
It  may,  however,  well  be  questioned  whether  half  the 
number  would  not  have  answered  every  end,  and  allowed 
the  Emperor  the  use  of  15,000  more  men  in  his  contest 
with  Wellington,  who  certainly  could  have  brought  to 
the  encounter  18,000  more  men  than  he  actually  had  on 
the  field. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  Prussians  were  intending  to 
unite  with  the  English,  as  Napoleon  had  some  reason 
at  any  rate  to  believe,  and  if  Grouchy  did  not  rejoin 
the  main  army,  or  at  least  act  in  connection  with  it, 
or  defeat  the  Prussians  while  marching  to  the  field 
of  battle.  Napoleon  was  ruined.  There  was  then  the 
risk  of  his  not  doing  either  of  these  things,  — whether 
through  the  Prussians  having  so  many  hours  the  start 
of  him,  —  or  through  ignorance  of  the  facts,  —  bad 
roads,  —  broken  bridges,  —  unsound  judgment,  —  it  mat- 
ters not,  —  and  that  risk  was  assumed  by  Napoleon  when 
he  detached  him,  without,  as  it  seems  to  us,  any  com- 
pensating advantage. 

Our  conclusion,  then,  is  this:  if  Napoleon  had  sent  off 
Grouchy  with  his  33,000  men  in  the  full  belief  that  the 
Prussians   had   fallen   back   on    Namur,   he    would    be 


[chap.  15.]        GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER. -NOTES.  277 

chargeable  only  with  neglect  in  not  having  found  out 
where  they  had  gone ;  but  his  sending  off  this  large  force 
after  he  had  so  much  reason  to  apprehend  that  the 
Prussians  were  intending  to  unite  with  the  English  that 
he  expressly  warned  Grouchy  to  that  effect,  was  to  take 
a  wholly  unnecessary  and  very  dangerous  risk.  It  was 
to  persist  in  carrying  out  a  plan  which  new  information 
had  rendered  entirely  inapplicable  to  the  circumstances 
as  now  understood  to  exist. 

Had  Napoleon,  when  he  had  come  to  entertain  the 
apprehension  that  the  Prussians  might  be  intending  to 
unite  with  the  English,  followed  on  the  17th  the  same 
general  plan  which  he  had  adopted  on  the  15th,  and, 
leaving,  say,  Pajol  with  the  division  of  Teste,  to  find  out 
where  the  Prussians  had  gone  and  what  they  were 
proposing  to  do,  had  taken  the  rest  of  the  army  with  him, 
sending  Grouchy  at  daybreak  of  the  i8th  with  one,  or 
perhaps  both,  of  his  corps  to  St.  Lambert,  with  instruc- 
tions to  delay  the  Prussians  in  every  way  possible  should 
they  come  from  Wavre  either  to  attack  the  main  army 
or  to  reinforce  Wellington,  he  would  have  taken  no  serious 
risk,  and  he  would  have  had  his  whole  army  under  his 
own  eye  and  subject  to  his  immediate  control  on  the  day 
of  the  great  battle.  In  this  case  Grouchy  would  have 
performed  at  St.  Lambert  the  task  which  Ney  performed 
at  Quatre  Bras,  —  of  preventing  the  intervention  of  the 
other  allied  army  in  the  battle  then  in  progress.  There 
is  not  the  least  reason  to  suppose  that  this  course  would 
have  affected  the  decision  either  of  Wellington  to  accept 
battle  or  of  Bllicher  to  support  him.  But  the  chances  in 
favor  of  Napoleon's  success  in  the  battle  would  have  been 
vastly  greater  than  they  actually  were. 

2.  We  have  expressed  the  doubt  whether,  even  if  the 
Prussians  were  known  to  be  separating  from  the  English, 
it  would  not  have  been  wiser  if  Napoleon  had  given 
Grouchy  only  one  corps  wherewith  to  pursue  them.  But 
while  this  may  be  true,  we  cannot  agree  with  Sir  James 


278  JUNE  l8:-NOTES.  [chap.  15.] 

Shaw-Kennedy  in  his  reasons  for  criticising  the  detach- 
ment of  Grouchy's  force  from  the  main  army.  He 
says :  —  * 

"  His  (Napoleon's)  great  difficulty  —  as  he  ought  well  to  have 
known  from  the  experience  of  a  whole  succession  of  disastrous 
campaigns  to  his  armies  in  Spain  —  was  the  overthrow  of  the  Anglo- 
Allied  army ;  and  against  it  he  should  have  led  his  last  man  and 
horse,  even  had  the  risk  been  great  in  the  highest  degree ;  which, 
as  has  been  seen,  s  it  clearly  was  not.  Had  Napoleon  attacked  the 
Anglo-Allied  army  with  his  whole  force,  and  succeeded  in  defeating 
it,  there  could  be  little  question  of  his  being  able  to  defeat  aftei'wards 
the  Prussian  army  when  separated  from  Wellington." 

And  again :  —  ^ 

"  If  Grouchy's  proper  place  was  on  the  field  of  battle  at  Waterloo, 
then  Napoleon  should  have  sent  for  him  at  daylight  on  the  morning 
of  the  1 8th,  when  he  saw  the  Anglo-Allied  army  in  position  and 
determined  to  attack  it." 

The  difficulty  with  this  reasoning,  as  it  seems  to  us, 
Hes  in  the  fact  that  it  was  not  that  he  might  be  strong 
enough  to  defeat  Welhngton  that  Napoleon  needed  to 
have  all  his  army  on  the  field  of  Waterloo,  but  in  order 
to  prevent  his  being  overwhelmed  by  the  union  of  the 
army  of  Bliicher  to  that  of  Wellington.  With  the  army 
of  Wellington  the  force  Napoleon  had  at  Waterloo  was 
abundantly  able  to  cope ;  but  against  the  two  armies  of 
Wellington  and  Bliicher  united,  he  was  certain  to  suc- 
cumb. Hence,  inasmuch  as  he,  at  i  P.  M.  of  the  17th, 
had  changed  his  mind  as  to  the  Prussian  retreat,  had 
come  to  regard  as  very  questionable  the  view  which  until 
after  12  o'clock  of  that  day  he  certainly  had  entertained, 
that  the  Prussians  were  separating  themselves  definitely 
from  the  English,  and  had  recognized  the  possibility  of 
their  uniting  with  the  English  and  even  joining  with 


*  Kennedy,  p.  157. 

*/i«/^,  p.  274,  n.  3. 

'Kennedy,  p.  160;    Chesney,  pp.  206,  207. 


[chat.  15.]        GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.-NOTES.  279 

them  in  a  battle  to  be  fought  for  the  defence  of  Brussels, 
he  should  have  changed  his  dispositions  accordingly. 
He  should  have  left  a  comparatively  small  force, — 
perhaps  of  cavalry  only,  —  to  follow  up  and  find  out 
about  the  Prussians,  and  should  have  taken  all  his  army- 
corps  with  him,  because  if  the  Prussians  should  attempt 
to  take  part  in  the  battle  he  would  be  sure  to  need  every 
man  he  could  muster. ' 

3.  It  seems  for  many  writers  to  be  well-nigh  impos- 
sible to  treat  separately  of  the  conduct  of  Marshal 
Grouchy.  This  may  require  some  effort  of  mind  ;  but  it 
surely  is  worth  while  to  make  it.  ^  Suppose  we  are  of 
opinion  that  Napoleon  made  a  mistake  in  the  first  place 
in  detaching  him  with  his  33,000  men;  that  he  was 
furthermore  inexcusable  in  not  advising  him  on  the  night 
of  the  17th  and  i8th  of  the  most  important  fact  that  the 
two  armies  were  confronting  each  other  at  Mont  St. 
Jean,  —  in  not  sending  him  the  information  which  Domon 
had  picked  up  as  to  the  retreat  of  a  part  of  the  Prussians 
towards  Wavre,  —  and,  finally,  in  not  directing  him  in 
precise  terms,  that,  if  he  should  find  that  the  Prussians 
were  retiring  on  Wavre,  he  should  cross  the  Dyle  at 
Moustier  and  Ottignies,  and  operate  in  connection  with 
the  main  army.  Suppose,  we  say,  we  find  all  this  to  be 
true.    We  have  yet  to  pass  upon  Grouchy 's  conduct. 


^Marshal  Soult,  according  to  Baudus  (vol.  r,  pp.  222,  223),  was  opposed  to 
detaching  Grouchy  with  the  large  bodyiof  troops  assigned  to  him.  He  said 
to  one  of  his  aides  that  it  was  a  great  fault  to  detach  so  considerable  a  force 
from  the  army  which  was  going  to  march  against  the  Anglo-Belgian  troops ; 
that  in  the  condition  in  which  the  defeat  of  the  evening  before  had  put  the 
Prussian  army,  a  feeble  force,  with  the  cavalry  of  General  Exelmans,  would 
suffice  to  follow  and  observe  it  in  its'retreat.  We  concur  in  Marshal  Soult's 
conclusion,  but  not  with  his  reasons.  It  was  not  because  the  Prussian  army 
was  so  weak,  but  because  it  was  still  so  formidable,  that  Napoleon  should 
have  kept  all  his  army  together. 

*See  the  admirable  observations  of  Sibome  (vol.  i,  pp.  318  ^/j^^.);  and  of 
Van  Loben  Sels,  pp.  319  et  seq.  With  many  writers,  to  blame  Napoleon  is  to 
exonerate  Grouchy;  with  others,  again,  to  blame  Grouchy  is  to  exonerate 
Napoleon. 


280  JUNE  l8:-N0TES.  [CHAP.   I5.] 

The  Emperor's  faults  cannot  excuse  Grouchy's  faults,  nor 
can  his  faults  excuse  those  of  the  Emperor.  ^  The  object 
of  military  criticism  is  not  to  see  which  officer  made  the 
most  mistakes. 

4.  As  to  the  proper  course  for  Marshal  Grouchy  to 
take  after  he  became  satisfied  (as  he  did  about  daybreak 
of  the  1 8th)  that  the  Prussians  were  retreating  on  Wavre, 
we  have  seen  that  the  principal  continental  critics, — 
Jomini,  Clausewitz  and  Charras,  —  are  of  opinion  that  he 
should  at  once  have  manoeuvred  to  his  left  and  crossed 
the  Dyle,  so  as  to  get  in  communication  with  the  main 
army  under  the  Emperor. 

But  General  Hamley  '°  is  of  a  different  opinion.  He 
approves  of  Grouchy's  direct  movement  on  Wavre. 
After  remarking  that  Grouchy  did  not  know  that 
Wellington  would  stop  to  fight  at  Waterloo,  he  says :  — 

"  He  thought  the  Prussians,  if  they  were  really  moving  on 
Wavre,  intended  to  join  Wellington  at  Brussels.  *  *  * 
And  were  they  so  moving,  he,  by  marching  to  Wavre,  would 
threaten  decisively  their  communications  with  their  base  by  Louvain, 
and  so  either  prevent  the  execution  of  their  project,  or  render  it 
disastrous." 

It  is  unnecessary  to  say  anything  in  regard  to  this 
observation,  except  that,  if  Grouchy  thought  as  Hamley 
thinks  he  did,  —  and  as  he  very  likely  did,  —  he  was 
wholly  mistaken  as  to  the  intention  of  Marshal  Bllicher. 
Very  possibly  he  might  have  injured  the  Prussians  a 
good  deal  had  they  been  intending  to  go  to  Brussels ; 
but,  as  they  were,  on  the  contrary,  intending  to  join 
Wellington,  who  had  taken  up  a  position  for  battle  to  the 
south  of  the  Forest  of  Soignes,  Grouchy's  calculations, 
as  given  us  by  Hamley,  were  beside  the  mark,  and  his 
movements  were  entirely  useless. 


^Cf.  Kennedy,  pp.  160, 161 ;  Chesney,  pp.  206,  207.    On  the  other  hand  see 
Van  Loben  Sels,  pp.  323,  324. 

'°  Operations  of  War,  p.  196  et  sen. 


[chap.  15.]        GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.-NOTES.  281 

It  is  certainly  true,  as  Hamley  says,  "  that  Grouchy 
did  not  know  that  "  WeUington  would  stop  to  fight  at 
Waterloo."  But  Grouchy  expressly  says  that  Napoleon 
told  him  "  that  he  was  going  "  to  march  upon  the  English, 
and  fight  them,  if  they  stood  this  side  [/.  e.,  south  of  ]  the 
Forest  of  Soignes,"  i.  e.,  at  Waterloo.  This  indicated  that 
Napoleon  thought  it  quite  possible  that  the  English 
might  take  their  stand  there  and  fight.  And  the 
Bertrand  order  warned  Grouchy  that  the  Prussians 
might  be  intending  to  unite  with  them  to  fight  a  battle 
for  the  defence  of  Brussels.  But  this  order,  as  we  have 
observed  before,  is  utterly  ignored  by  General  Hamley. 
5.  We  have  pointed  out  in  the  text  that  the  three  princi- 
pal Continental  critics,  — Jomini,  Clausewitz  and  Charras, 
—  unite  in  the  opinion  that  Marshal  Grouchy  should  have 
marched  at  daybreak  for  the  bridge  of  Moustier,  —  cover- 
ing the  movement  by  his  cavalry.  What  would  have 
been  the  result  of  this  manoeuvre  1     (See  Map  9.) 

Let  us  suppose  that  the  Prussian  detachment  of 
Ledebur,  which  was  stationed  at  Mont  St.  Guibert  to 
observe  the  movements  of  Marshal  Grouchy 's  column, 
had  been  driven  out  of  their  position,  or  flanked  out  of  it 
(as  they  finally  were),  before  six  in  the  morning,  by  the 
French  cavalry,  and  had  been  compelled  to  retire  to  the 
neighborhood  of  Wavre.  The  movements  of  the  main 
body  of  Grouchy's  command  might,  therefore,  without 
much  difficulty,  have  been  concealed  from  observation. 
At  least  this  seems  to  be  assumed  by  Jomini,  '^  who  says 
that  Grouchy  could  have  been  at  the  bridge  of  Moustier 
at  10  A.  M.,  — and  then  have  moved  "on  Wavre  by 
Limale,  pushing  Exelmans'  dragoons  on  St.  Lambert,  or 
else  have  marched  to  Lasne  himself." 


"  Hamley,  p.  196. 

'^Frag.    Hist;    Lettre   k    MM.    M^ry    et    Barthdlemy,  p.  5;    Grouchy 
Mdm.,  vol.  4,  p.  44. 
'^Jomini,  p.  176. 


282  JUNE  l8:-N0TES.  [CHAP.  1 5.] 

But  Charras  ''*  thinks  that  the  movement  to  Moustier 
would  have  been  at  once  perceived  by  Ledebur's  cavalry, 
and  that  Grouchy  would  probably,  on  arriving  at  Moustier 
and  Ottignies,  have  found  himself  in  face  of  40,000  men 
and  150  pieces  of  cannon,  in  position  behind  the  Dyle, 
and  that  it  could  only  have  been  by  a  very  unlikely  con- 
currence of  circumstances  that  Grouchy  could  have 
seized  these  bridges  before  the  Prussians  would  have 
been  in  sufficient  force  to  oppose  him. 

These  conclusions  seem  to  us  very  strained.  Grouchy 
had  6,000  excellent  cavalry.  Ledebur's  detachment 
consisted  of  two  battalions  of  infantry,  four  squadrons  of 
cavalry  and  two  guns,  —  possibly  1,500  men  in  all. '^  A 
movement  on  Corbaix  would  have  compelled  him  to  fall 
back  to  La  Baraque  as  surely  at  five  in  the  morning  as 
at  one  in  the  afternoon,  when,  as  we  have  seen,  it  had  this 
effect.  Certainly,  Ledebur  could  have  been  got  out  of 
the  way,  and  could  only  have  reported  that  the  French 
were  very  active,  and  were  manoeuvring  apparently  on 
Wavre  by  way  of  Corbaix  and  La  Baraque.  We  see  no 
reason  to  doubt  that  Jomini  is  perfectly  correct  in  sup- 
posing that  the  column  of  Marshal  Grouchy,  with  the 
exception  of  one  of  his  cavalry  divisions,  say,  that  of 
Pajol,  supported,  perhaps,  by  the  infantry  division  of 
Teste,  could  have  crossed  the  bridges  of  Moustier  and 
Ottignies,  without  any  molestation  whatever,  by  or  soon 
after  10  A.  M.,  and  that  they  might  have  been  well  on 
their  way  towards  Lasne  and  St.  Lambert  before  the 
Prussians  were  aware  what  they  were  about. 


'*  Charras,  vol.  2,  pp.  62,  63.  Hooper's  view  [pp.342  ef  seg.]  is  substan- 
tially that  of  Charras.  He  also  seems  to  think  that  unless  Grouchy  could 
succeed  in  defeating  the  Prussian  troops  opposed  to  him,  his  intervention 
would  be  useless.  It  seems  to  us,  on  the  other  hand,  that  all  that  it  was 
needful  for  Grouchy  to  do  was  to  engage,  and  so  to  detain,  the  corps  of 
Billow  and  Pirch  I. ;  and  by  marching  from  the  Dyle  upon  their  line  of  march 
from  Wavre  to  St.  Lambert,  he  was,  it  seems  to  us,  certain  to  accomplish 
this.    This  view  is  well  presented  by  Quinet,  pp.  301-304. 

"  Charras,  vol.  2,  p.  42. 


[chap.  15.]        GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.-NOTES.  283 

In  speculations  of  this  kind,  it  is  very  easy,  of  course, 
to  omit  by  accident  some  of  the  data  of  the  problem. 
But  when  it  is  remembered  that  the  principal  subject 
which  the  Prussians  were  contemplating  that  morning 
was  not  the  movements  of  the  12,000  or  15,000  men,  who 
were  (as  they  supposed)  '^  all  the  troops  which  Napoleon 
had  detached  against  them,  but  the  very  serious  question 
whether  the  whole  army,  or  three-fourths  of  it,  should 
march  across  the  country  to  attack  Napoleon  and  succor 
Wellington,  we  can  hardly  believe  that  any  reports  which 
Ledebur  could  have  brought  in  would  have  brought 
40,000  men  to  the  bridges  of  Moustier  and  Ottignies  by 
10  or  10.30  A.  M. 

It  seems  to  us,  then,  altogether  probable  that  Marshal 
Grouchy  could  have  crossed  the  Dyle  at  Moustier  and 
Ottignies  with  the  bulk  of  his  forces  before  1 1  A.  M.  '^ 

At  this  hour,  only  "  the  advanced  guard  of  Bulow's 
corps  had  *  *  *  reached  St.  Lambert. 
The  i6th,  and  then  the  13th,  brigade  arrived  much  later, 
and  the  14th  brigade,  which  formed  the  rear-guard  was  a 
long  way  behind."  "  At  this  hour  the  1st,  lid  and  1 1  Id 
Corps  were  still  in  and  about  Wavre.  It  would  have 
been  at  this  moment,  when  the  IVth  Corps  was  thus 
strung  out,  toiling  through  the  bad  roads,  that  Grouchy 
would  have  made  his  appearance,  and  have  commenced 
his  march  from  Moustier  and  Ottignies  to  Lasne  and 
St.  Lambert.  Can  it  be  believed  that  he  would  not  have 
stopped  Billow  ?  What  else  could  Bulow  have  done  but 
halt,  and  concentrate  his  command,  and  await  the  rein- 
forcements which  were  expected  from  Wavre.?  But 
this  would  have  involved  him  in  an  engagement  with 


^^  Ante,  p.  232. 

'^Siborne  (vol.  i,  p.  320)  thinks  that  Grouchy  could  have  successfully 
crossed  the  Dyle  even  if  he  had  not  started  from  Gembloux  earlier  than  he 
did. 

"  Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  311  ;  Charras,  vol.  2,  pp.  72,  73. 


284  JUNE  lS:-NCTES.  [chap.   I5.] 

Grouchy's  force,  from  which  he  could  be  released 
only  by  the  arrival  of  those  reinforcements.  When  would 
they  have  arrived?     (See  Map  lo.) 

If  Grouchy's  movement  on  Moustier  had  not  been 
observed  and  promptly  reported  to  Blucher,  — which  is 
the  assumption  on  which  we  are  proceeding,  as  being  on 
the  whole  the  most  probable,  —  there  is  no  reason  to 
suppose  that  the  1st  and  lid  Prussian  Corps  would  have 
moved  out  of  Wavre  earlier  than  they  did,  —  that  is, 
about  noon. '9  The  lid  Corps  followed  the  IVth,  and 
would  of  course  have  become  engaged  with  Grouchy. 
The  1 1  Id  would  in  time  very  likely  have  followed  the  lid; 
but  it  probably  would  not  have  left  Wavre  till  much  later. 
These  three  corps  would  have  been  Grouchy's  oppo- 
nents ;  they  would  have  outnumbered  him  considerably, 
and  would,  no  doubt,  ultimately  have  worsted  him.  But 
he  probably  would  have  prevented  any  portion  of  their 
troops  from  attacking  the  main  army  under  Napoleon. 

As  for  the  1st  Corps,  there  would  have  been  nothing  to 
prevent  its  marching  along  the  northerly  road  by  way  of 
Chain  to  join  Wellington,  if  Zieten  had  thought  it  safe 
to  run  the  chance  of  the  Anglo-Dutch  army  holding  out 
until  his  arrival. 

What  effect  these  operations  would  have  had  on  the 
issue  of  the  battle  of  Waterloo  will  be  considered  later. 

6.  We  have  stated  above '°  that  Grouchy,  once  arrived 
at  La  Baraque,  might  have  crossed  the  Dyle  by  the  four 
bridges  of  Moustier  and  Ottignies,  Limale  and  Limelette, 
v/ithout,  as  it  seems  probable  to  us,  encountering  serious 
opposition.''  This  view  is  strongly  maintained  by 
Thiers,    and   as  strongly  contested    by    Charras.    The 


'5  Charras,  vol.  2,  p.  43;  Siborne,  vol.  i,  pp.  311,  312.  Kennedy  (p.  163) 
seems  to  suppose  that  Pirch  I.  and  Zieten  followed  Biilow  without  any 
interval. 

'°AnU,  p    259. 

"Van  Loben  Sels  (pp.  322,  323,  340)  is  very  positive  as  to  this. 


[chap.  15.]        GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.-NOTES.  2S5 

latter's  principal  reason  for  doubting  the  feasibility  of  this 
movement  is  the  supposed  presence  in  the  woods  of  Sarats 
and  Warlombrout,  which  line  the  road  from  La  Baraque 
to  Wavre  on  the  east  and  west  sides  respectively,  just  after 
passing  the  former  place,  of  the  two  divisions  of  Reckow 
and  Brause  of  the  lid  Corps,  some  i  i,ooo  or  12,000  men. " 
The  wood  of  Warlombrout  lies  between  the  road  leading 
to  Moustier  and  that  leading  to  Limelette. 

We  think  Charras  in  error  as  to  the  advanced  position 
of  these  two  brigades,  or  divisions,  as  they  may  more 
properly  be  called. 

Siborne  makes  no  mention  at  all  of  the  occupation  of 
the  wood  of  Warlombrout,  and  says  that  that  of  Sarats 
was  occupied  by  some  battalions  of  the  8th  brigade, 
Reckow's,  ^^  and  that  the  rest  of  the  brigade  was  in  rear 
of  the  wood.  He  says  that  the  7th  brigade,  that  of 
Brause,  was  in  reserve.  Ollech  ^'^  says  that  Reckow's 
brigade  sent  two  battalions  into  this  wood  of  Sarats,  '^  and 
that  the  brigade  took  up  position  between  Manil  and  St. 
Anne,  which  is  nearly  a  mile  in  rear  of  the  wood ;  and 
that  the  other  brigade  was  in  rear  of  this.  He  says 
nothing  about  the  occupation  of  the  wood  of  War- 
lombrout. 

We  do  not  know  w^iere  Charras  obtained  his  informa- 
tion ;  but  it  seems  quite  clear  that  the  movement  to  the 
bridges  would  not  have  met  wdth  the  amount  of  oppo- 
sition which  he  claims.  These  brigades  of  Reckow  and 
Brause  were  portions  of  the  Hd  Corps,  and  were  expect- 
ing to  cross  the  Dyle  at  Wavre,  and  march  to  support 
Billow.  No  one,  of  course,  can  say  what  these  troops 
would  have  done  had  Grouchy  attempted  to  cross  the 


^^  Charras,  vol.  2,  p.  376  ;  also,  p.  44. 

^^  Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  313.     He  strictly  follows  Damitz,  p.  247. 

^  Ollech,  pp.  208,  209. 

"^  Called  by  him  Lautelle.     It  is  sometimes  called  the  wood  of  Lauzel,  as  it 
adjoins  a  farm  of  that  name. 


286  JUNE  i8:-N0TES.  [chap.  15.] 

Dyle  by  the  bridges  or  any  of  them ;  but  it  is  certain 
that  these  troops  were  not  then  expecting  any  such 
movement,  nor  were  they  stationed  where  they  could  at 
once  or  easily  have  interfered  with  it. 

7.  Where  was  Grouchy  when  he  heard  the  sound  of 
the  cannon  of  Waterloo,  and  rejected  the  advice  of 
Gerard  to  march  to  the  support  of  the  Emperor  ? 

That  it  was  at  Sart-a-Walhain  where  Marshal  Grouchy 
heard  the  sound  of  the  cannon  of  Waterloo,  is  the 
universally  accepted  belief.  But  it  is  an  error.  It  may 
be  interesting  to  see  how  it  originated. 

Berton,  who  wrote  in  181 8,  says^^  that  Grouchy's 
column  "was  still  at  the  village  of  Walhain  when  it 
heard  the  first  cannon-shots  of  Mont  St.  Jean,"  and  that 
it  was  there  that  Gerard  gave  his  advice.  ^' 

Grouchy,  writing  his  "  Observations  "  the  same  year  in 
Philadelphia,  which  were  reprinted  in  Paris  in  1819, 
states  ""^  that  the  cannon  was  heard  while  they  were 
skirmishing  in  the  wood  of  Limelette,  between  i  and  2 
P.  M. 

Gerard,  in  a  letter  also  written  in  1819,  states  ^^  that  it 
was  "at  Wallin,  or  Sart-a-Wallin."  He  says  he  found 
the  Marshal  eating  some  strawberries.  It  was  about  1 1 
A.  M.,  a  little  more,  or  a  little  less.  He  gives  an  account 
of  the  interview,  and  then  says  "  We  quitted  Wallin,  &c." 

His  acting  chief-of-sta£f,  Colonel  Simon  Loriere, 
says  in  his  report : —  ^° 

"At  II  o'clock  the  Third  [Fourth]  Corps  was  entirely  assembled 
at  Walin. 

"The  Count  Gerard,  who  preceded  the  march  of  his  corps, 
learnt  that  Marshal  Grouchy  had  stopped  at  a  house  in  the  village 


=^  Berton,  p.  55. 

"  Berton,  pp.  55,  59. 

^^  Grouchy,  Obs.,  p.  16. 

-9  Quelques  Doc,  p.  7.    He  means  Walhain  and  Sart-a-Walhain. 

^  lb.,  12.    By  "  Walin,"  he  means  Walhain. 


[chap.  15.]        GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.-NOTES.  287 

belonging  to  a  M.  Hollaert ;  he  went  there  with  the  officers  of  his 
staff ;  he  told  me  to  follow ;  we  found  his  Excellency  at  breakfast." 

Colonel  Denniee  of  Gerard's  staff  locates  the  incident 
at  Sarra-Walin,  and  speaks  of  Gerard's  having  found  the 
Marshal  at  breakfast.  ^' 

Gerard  wrote  to  a  friend  of  his  at  Brussels  to  look  up 
M.  Hollaert ;  he  did  so,  and  wrote  ^^  to  Gerard  to  say  that 
he  had  been  to  see  him  at  Sarra-Walin. 

This  seems  to  have  decided  Gerard  that  the  place  was 
Sart-a-Walhain ;  for  he  writes  in  1820  to  Colonel  Grouchy, 
a  son  of  the  Marshal,  as  follows : —  ^^ 

"It  was  not  at  3  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  that  I  rejoined  the 
commander-in-chief  of  the  right  wing,  but  towards  1 1  o'clock  in 
the  morning;  he  was  at  Sarra-Walin,  at  the  house  of  a  M. 
Hollaert,  a  notary,  where  he  was  breakfasting." 

Grouchy  finally  conceded  to  Gerard  that  it  was  long 
before  they  were  skirmishing  in  the  wood  of  Limelette, 
that  the  sound  of  the  cannon  of  Waterloo  was  heard. 
He  admitted  in  a  letter '^  published  in  1829,  that  it  was 
at  Sart-a-Walhain,  and  at  ii.30^A.  M.  This  is  also  the 
statement  made  in  the  Grouchy  Memoirs.  ^^ 

Nevertheless  it  was  at  Walhain  and  not  at  Sart-a- 
Walhain  where  Marshal  Grouchy  was  when  he  heard 
the  sound  of  the  cannon,  and  Gerard  proffered  his  advice 
to  march  toward  the  field  of  battle.  It  is  certain  that 
the  incident  took  place  at  the  house  of  a  notary  —  a  M. 
Hollaert  (or  Hollert,  as  it  should  be  spelled),  — for  many 
of  the  officers  who  give  their  recollections  mention  his 
name ;  and  it  is  in  no  wise  remarkable  that  the  name  of 
the  village  in  which  his  house  stood  should  have  made  no 


s'  Quelques  Doc,  pp.  17,  18.    By  "  Sarra-Walin,"  he  means  Sart-^-Walhain, 
^  lb.,  p.  19.    His  letter  was  dated  September  30,  1819. 
"lb.,  p.  24.     See  also   Gdrard's  "  Lettre  h.  MM.  Germain-Sarrut  et  B. 
Saint  Edme,"  pp.  10,  11 ;  and  his  "  Derniferes  Observations,"  pp.  8,  29. 
^  Fragm.  Hist. ;    Lettre  k  MM.  M6ry  and  Barthelemy,  p.  9. 
35  Grouchy  M6m.,  vol.  4,  pp.  71,  75- 


288        JUNE  l8:    GROUCHY  AND  BLUCHER.-NOTES.  [CHAP.  I5.] 

distinct  impression  on  their  memories.  Now  there  was 
at  that  time  no  notary  at  Sart-a-Walhain.  There  is  none 
now.  It  is  a  very  small  village.  There  was  not  in  fact  a 
notary's  office  at  Walhain  in  1815  ;  there  was  none  until 
1818.  But  M.  Joseph  Hollert  was  in  181 5  the  notary  of 
the  neighboring  town  of  Nil  St.  Vincent,  and  he  lived  in 
a  large  house  in  Walhain  known  as  the  Chateau  Marette. 
It  was  here  that  he  received  Marshal  Grouchy  in  the 
forenoon  of  the  i8th  of  June,  181 5,  and  it  was  into  his 
garden  that  the  officers  went  out  from  the  house  to  catch 
the  direction  of  the  firing.  ^^ 

The  matter  is  of  no  very  great  importance.  Still, 
Walhain  was  certainly  a  good  mile  nearer  than  Sart-a- 
Walhain  to  the  bridges,  whether  Grouchy  marched  by 
way  of  Mont  St.  Guibert  or  La  Baraque.    (See  Map  11.) 


^*  The  writer  has  abundant  proof  of  the  above  statements.  He  has  also 
visited  the  house.  M.  Wenseleers,  who  is  referred  to  in  the  Preface,  obtained 
for  him  this  information  in  iS8S  and  18S9. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE    BATTLE    OF    WATERLOO. 

Napoleon,  as  we  have  seen,  took  up  his  headquarters  on 
the  evening  of  the  17th  at  the  Caillou  house  on  the  Brus- 
sels road,  about  a  mile  and  a  half  south  of  the  little 
tavern  known  then  and  now  as  La  Belle  Alliance.  All 
the  afternoon  and  night  it  rained  hard.  We  may  sup- 
pose that,  as  his  custom  was,  he  slept  during  the  evening. 
At  I  A.  M.  of  the  i8th,he  mounted  his  horse,  and,  with 
Bertrand,  rode  out  to  the  front.'  Here  he  rode  or  walked 
along  the  line  of  the  pickets  until  he  had  satisfied  himself 
that  Wellington's  army  was  in  position,  awaiting  battle. 
The  fires  at  which  the  soldiers  of  the  English  and  Dutch 
army  were  drying  and  warming  themselves  left  no  doubt 
of  this.  He  must  have  been  occupied  in  this  way  more 
than  two  hours,  as  he  was  near  the  wood  of  Hougomont 
at  half-past  two  in  the  morning. 

After  returning,  various  reports  came  in.  Between  7 
and  8  A.  M.  he  received  from  an  officer  who  had  been 
sent  to  the  advanced  posts,  word  that  the  enemy  were 
retiring.  This  information  he  at  once  communicated  to 
d'Erlon,^  whose  corps  was  in  the  first  line,— that  of 
Reille  not  having  got  fully  up,—  and  ordered  him  to  put 
his  troops  in  march  and  to  pursue  the  enemy  with  vigor. 
But  d'Erlon  having  judged  the  enemy's  movement  quite 
differently,  sent  his  chief-of-staff  to  the  Emperor  to  tell 


'Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  219 ;  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  263. 
^Drouet,  pp.  96,  97  ;  Vaudoncourt,  vol.  4,  p.  24. 


290  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.  1 6.] 

him  that  he,  d'Erlon,  thought  that  the  EngHsh  were 
making  their  dispositions  to  receive  battle.  D'Erlon 
proceeds : — 

"The  Emperor  came  immediately  to  the  advanced  posts.  I 
accompanied  him  ;  we  dismounted  in  order  to  get  near  the  enemy's 
vedettes,  and  to  examine  more  closely  the  movements  of  the  English 
army.  He  perceived  that  I  was  right,  and  being  convinced  that 
tlie  English  army  was  taking  position,  he  said  to  me  :  — 

"  Order  the  men  to  make  their  soup,  to  get  their  pieces  in  order, 
and  we  will  determine  what  is  to  be  done  towards  noon.'  " 

Napoleon  seems  in  fact  not  to  have  spared  himself  any 
trouble,  and  there  evidently  was  no  very  conspicuous 
deficiency  in  the  physical  energy  of  a  man  who,  after  a 
good  afternoon's  work  in  the  saddle  in  directing  the 
march  of  an  army,  was  able  to  go  out  twice  in  the  deep 
mud  during  a  rainy  night  and  morning  to  visit  the  outer 
pickets  of  his  line  of  battle,  nearly  two  miles  from  the 
house  where  he  had  established  his  headquarters. 

The  reason  of  this  apparently  rather  unnecessary  solic- 
itude is  really  not  far  to  seek.  Napoleon  felt  as  confi- 
dent of  beating  Wellington's  army  that  day  as  he  had 
felt  of  beating  Bliicher's  army  on  the  day  but  one  before, 
provided  only  that  it  would  accept  battle.  He  believed, 
and  he  was  justified  in  believing,  that  his  army  was 
superior  to  that  opposed  to  him,  in  fighting  capacity  cer- 
tainly, and  even,  possibly,  in  numbers.  He  trusted  to 
Grouchy  to  keep  the  Prussians  off,  as  he  had  on  the  day 
of  Ligny  trusted  to  Ney  to  protect  him  against  the  Eng- 
lish, and  he  may  also  have  thought  it  possible  that 
Grouchy  would  arrive  on  the  field  in  time  to  make  the 
victory  more  crushing, —  playing,  in  this  way,  much  the 
same  role  which  Napoleon  had  marked  out  for  Ney  at 
Ligny.  He  accordingly  feared  nothing  so  much  as  the 
retreat  of  the  English. 

That  he  supposed  that  Grouchy  would  cross  the  Dyle 
at  Moustier  is  certainly  a  fair  inference  from  Marbot's 
report   and  letter,  from  which  we  have  made  extracts 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  29 1 

above.^  That  he  should  have  been  so  certain  about  it, 
however,  is  remarkable,  as  he  had  given  Grouchy  no 
instructions^  of  any  kind  whatsoever  since  he  had  sent 
him  the  Bertrand  order,  and  that  left  him  entire  freedom 
of  action. 

Another  very  remarkable  thing  is  that  Napoleon 
should  not  have  drawn  from  the  fact  that  Wellington  was 
awaiting  battle  the  inference  that  he  was  expecting  the 
assistance,  and  the  powerful  assistance,  of  Bliicher.^ 
At  least  it  would  seem  pretty  certain  that  he  did  not 
draw  this  inference,  for  he  took  neither  of  the  steps 
which,  if  he  had  come  to  that  conclusion,  would  seem  to 
be  dictated  by  common  sense, —  he  neither  attacked 
Wellington  as  early  as  he  possibly  could,  nor  did  he  do 
anything  to  make  sure  of  Grouchy 's  intervention  until 
10  A.  M.,  when  he  sent  him  the  order  which  we 
have  given  above.^  If,  on  his  return  to  the  Caillou 
house  at  half-past  three  or  thereabouts  in  the  morning, 
he  had  sent  an  officer  to  order  Grouchy  to  march  towards 
the  main  army  by  the  bridges  of  Moustier  and  Ottignies, 
he  would  have  done  only  what  the  fact  of  Wellington's 
confronting  him,  which  he  had  just  ascertained  with  his 
own  eyes,  should  have  led  him  to  do. 

The  rain  ceased,  according  to  Charras/  at  6  A.  M. ; 
Vaudoncourt,^  a  much  earlier  authority,  puts  it  at  8 
o'clock ;  Van  Loben  Sels^  says  that  the  rain  had  dimin- 
ished at  break  of  day,  but  it  was  not  until  lo  o'clock  that 
the  atmosphere  became  clear ;  Baudus,'°  who  was  at  the 


^Ante,  pp.  268  et  seq. 

*The  question  of  the  alleged  orders  sent  to  Grouchy  during  this  night  will 
be  treated  of  in  Appendix  A ;  post,  p.  353. 
'Van  Loben  Sels,  p.  319. 
^Ante,  p.  265. 
'Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  265. 
^Vaudoncourt,  vol.  4,  24. 
'Van  Loben  Sels,  p.  270. 
»°Baudus,  vol.  x,  p.  225. 


292  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.  1 6.] 

battle  on  S cult's  staff,  says  the  rain  ceased  towards  9 
o'clock.  We  may  probably  assume  that  the  rain  had 
ceased  by  8  o'clock,  and  that  in  another  hour,  had  Napo- 
leon so  chosen,  he  might  have  begun  the  battle. 

This,  in  point  of  fact,  he  originally  intended  to  do.  He 
had  issued  an  order  in  good  season  to  the  corps-com- 
manders, that  they  should  see  that  the  soldiers  cleaned 
their  guns  and  got  their  breakfasts,  so  that  at  9  o'clock 
precisely  they  should  be  ready  to  commence  the  battle." 
Drouot,  who  was  a  distinguished  artillery-officer,  and  was 
then  acting  as  adjutant-general  of  the  Guard,  tells  us" 
that  Napoleon  intended  to  begin  the  battle  by  8  or  9  at 
the  latest.  But  Drouot  advised  a  delay  of  two  to  three 
hours  on  account  of  the  condition  of  the  ground,  which 
the  heavy  rain  of  the  past  afternoon  and  night  had  ren- 
dered too  soft  for  the  rapid  and  effective  movements  of 
artillery ;  and  Napoleon,  who  was  himself  an  artillery 
ofiEicer,  and  always  made  great  use  of  this  arm,  yielded  to 
the  suggestion,  and  determined  to  put  off  the  main 
attack  till  towards  one  o'clock  P.  M. 

About  8  A.  M.  the  Emperor  rode  along  the  lines,'^ 
examining  the  enemy's  position,  which  he  had  already,  as 
we  have  seen,  inspected  twice  since  midnight.  He  then 
dictated  an  order  of  battle,  or,  rather,  an  order  of  move- 
ment, the  result  of  which  would  be  that  the  army  would 
be  arranged  in  three  lines,  ready  for  the  attack.  This 
marshalling  of  the  army  was,  according  to  all  accounts,  a 
magnificent  and  imposing  spectacle ;  the  bands  played ; 
the  men  shouted  "Vive  I'Empereur!";  the  movement 
was  skilfully  designed  and  beautifully  executed;  but, 
except  as  a  way  of  occupying  the  time,  it  would  probably 
never  have  been  thought  of.      It  began  shortly  before 


"Doc.  Indd.,  XVIII,  p.  52 ;  App.  C,  xxxi ;  i>ost,  p.  387. 
'^Thiers,  vol.  xx,  p.  157,  n. 
"Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  270. 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  293 

nine  and  was  over  by  half-past  ten/^  It  showed  at  any 
rate  that  had  it  been  thought  advisable,  the  battle  might 
have  been  begun  at  9  A.  M. 

After  this  pageant  "  Napoleon  passed  before  the  lines 
and  was  received  by  immense,  by  enthusiastic  acclama- 
tions." '5  He  then,  shortly  before  eleven  o'clock,  dictated 
his  plan  of  attack.     Of  this  we  shall  speak  later  on. 

One  cannot  but  be  struck  with  a  recurrence  here  of 
the  same  error  to  which  we  have  had  occasion  to  call 
attention  before, — namely,  the  error  of  acting  on  the  prob- 
abilities of  the  situation  when  it  is  admitted  that  a  differ- 
ent state  of  things  may  nevertheless,  in  spite  of  the  prob- 
abilities, exist,  and  that,  if  it  does  exist,  a  wholly  different 
course  of  action  must  be  taken,  or  a  fatal  result  will  inevi- 
tably follow.  Napoleon  was,  very  likely,  warranted  in 
thinking  it  probable  that  morning  that,  what  with  the 
loss  and  demoralization  consequent  on  their  defeat  at 
Ligny,  and  what  with  the  interference  with  their  plans 
which  Grouchy  with  his  33,000  men  could  reasonably  be 
expected  to  make,  he  himself  was  safe  against  any  inter- 
vention on  the  part  of  the  Prussians.  But  he  did  not  and 
could  not  know  where  the  Prussians  were ;  in  fact,  he  had 
great  reason  to  believe  that  a  large  part  of  them  had  gone 
to  Wavre ;  and  at  that  very  moment  he  thought  it  very 
likely  that  their  action  in  going  to  Wavre  would  induce 
Grouchy  to  come  to  him  by  way  of  Moustier.  If,  then, 
the  exigency  called  in  the  Emperor's  mind  for  this  course 
on  the  part  of  Grouchy,  why  did  it  not  equally  demand 
from  Napoleon  the  promptest  action  against  Wellington, 
and  the  exertion  of  every  means  to  make  sure  of 
Grouchy's  intervention  ?  This  criticism  is,  in  fact,  only 
an  extension  of  that  made  in  reference  to  the  step  taken 
by  Napoleon  in  detaching  Grouchy's  large  force  when  he 
felt   it  necessary   at  the  same    time  to  warn   Grouchy 


'"•Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  274. 
"5Ib.,  p.  275. 


294  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.  1 6.] 

expressly  that  the  Prussians  might  be  intending  to  unite 
with  the  English. 

However  we  may  explain  these  apparent  contradictions, 
they  certainly  existed  in  Napoleon's  mind  and  also  in  his 
actions.  He  was  so  sure  of  having  only  the  Anglo-Dutch 
army  to  fight  that  he  deliberately  postponed  attacking  it 
until  he  could  do  so  in  the  most  approved  style ;  he  was 
confident  that  if  the  Prussians  had  gone  in  the  direction 
of  Wavre  with  the  intention  of  joining  the  English  or  of 
attacking  the  French,  Grouchy  would  return  to  him  by 
the  bridge  of  Moustier.  And  yet,  from  i  P.M.  of  the  after- 
noon of  the  17th  to  10  A.  M.  of  the  i8th,  he  sent  Grouchy 
no  orders,  and  no  information.  Where  such  is  the  lack 
of  ordinary  care  on  the  part  of  the  commanding  general, 
a  great  deal  surely  must  depend  upon  the  energy  and 
capacity  of  the  subordinate. 

While  this  was  the  general  situation  at  the  French 
headquarters,  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  having  with 
his  customary  carefulness  set  his  army  in  battle  array, 
was  quietly  waiting  until  it  should  suit  his  adversary 
to  assault  his  lines.  Every  hour's  delay  was  a  dis- 
tinct gain  to  him;  and  he  knew  .'t.  He  knew,  what 
Napoleon  of  course  could  not  know,  that  the  Prussians 
were  on  their  way  to  attack  the  French  and  to  join  the 
English. 

At  the  same  time,  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  the 
Duke  had  no  cause  for  anxiety.  Of  the  defects  of  his 
army  he  was  well  aware.  No  one  knew  better  than  he 
that  such  a  conglomerate  mass  of  troops  as  that  which  he 
commanded,  consisting,  too,  in  great  part  of  raw  and 
untried  soldiers,  could  not  possibly  be  equal  to  the  well- 
appointed  army  of  Napoleon's  veterans  whose  blows  he 
was  soon  to  receive.  His  only  reliance,  therefore,  was  on 
Bliicher's  promised  support.  As  Sir  James  Shaw-Ken- 
nedy well  says  : — '^ 


^Kennedy,  p.  131. 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  295 

"  In  ordei-  at  all  to  understand  the  views  of  the  Duke  of  Welling- 
ton as  to  accepting  battle  on  the  field  of  Waterloo,  it  is  essential  to 
keep  this  arrangement  [«'.  e.,  with  Bliicher]  fully  in  view;  other- 
wise the  Duke  might  justly  be  accused  of  the  utmost  temerity  and 
folly  in  accepting  battle,  as  much  the  greater  portion  of  his  army 
consisted  of  mere  Landwehr  and  of  Dutch-Belgian  troops.  The 
latter,  from  political  and  other  causes,  could  not  be  depended  upon; 
which,  in  fact,  had  been  already  proved  on  the  i6th.  It  would  be 
an  error  to  suppose  that  it  was  from  any  want  of  courage  that  the 
Dutch-Belgian  troops  could  not  be  depended  upon;  proof  enough 
exists  that  the  people  of  those  countries  are  capable  of  the  most 
heroic  and  persevering  exertions  when  engaged  in  a  cause  that 
they  care  to  support ;  but  under  the  circumstances  in  which  they 
were  placed  on  this  occasion,  they  were  without  confidence,  were 
not  acting  in  a  cause  which  they  cordially  supported,  and  showed 
that  it  was  not  one  in  which  they  wished  to  oppose  themselves 
seriously  to  French  troops." 

But  Wellington  felt  that  he  could  rely  on  Bllicher's 
promise,  and  he  took  his  chance  that  Bliicher  would  be 
able  to  fulfil  his  promise,  and  that  he  himself  would  be  able 
to  hold  out  until  the  promise  should  be  fulfilled.  These 
risks,  however,  were  by  no  means  small. 

In  the  first  place,  the  Duke  not  only  did  not  know  that 
Napoleon  had  given  Grouchy  two  whole  corps ;  he  even 
supposed  that  he  had  given  him  but  one,  and  that  Napo- 
leon was  confronting  him  on  the  morning  of  the  battle 
with  his  whole  army,  "with  the  exception  of  the  3d 
Corps,  which  had  been  sent  to  observe  Marshal 
Bliicher.'''^'  This  risk,  fortunately  for  the  Duke  of  Wel- 
lington, was  not  actually  incurred.  But,  all  the  same, 
Wellington  is  entitled  to  the  credit  of  having  faced  it 
with  his  eyes  open. 

Secondly,  there  was  the  chance  that  Grouchy  might 
intervene,  and  prevent  the  Prussians  from  fulfilling  their 
promise.  We  have  already  shown  what  Grouchy  could 
have  done  in  this  way  had  he  either  acted  of  his  own 


"Wellington's   Official   Report:   Gurvvood,  vol.  xil,  p.  481 


■296  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.  16.] 

motion  in  accordance  with  the  demands  of  the  situation 
by  marching  at  daybreak  for  the  bridge  of  Moustier,  or 
had  followed  the  counsel  of  Gerard  at  noon. 

The  issue  of  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  in  fact,  might  have 
been  entirely  changed  if  the  movements  of  troops  not 
under  the  control  of  either  of  the  commanding  generals 
had  been  other  than  they  were ;  it  is  this  fact  among 
others  which  gives  the  battle  a  peculiar  interest. 

The  position  to  the  south  of  the  villages  of  Mont  St. 
Jean  and  Waterloo,  known  as  the  field  of  Waterloo, 
had  been,  some  time  before  the  campaign  opened, 
reconnoitred  by  the  English  engineers;  "the  sev- 
eral sketches  of  the  officers  had  been  put  together, 
and  one  fair  copy  made  for  the  Prince  of  Orange ; 
a  second  had  been  commenced  for  the  Duke."'^  The 
chief-of-engineers,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Smyth,  who  was 
present  at  the  action  of  Ouatre  Bras,  sent  back  to  Brus- 
sels during  the  afternoon,  presumably  by  the  Duke's 
direction,  for  a  plan  of  this  position ;  and  the  original 
sketches,  which,  together,  constituted  a  plan,  were  for- 
warded to  him  by  Captain  Oldfield,  the  brigade-major  of 
engineers.'^  The  next  morning,  "  upon  the  receipt  of  a 
communication  from  Bliicher,"  ^°  the  Duke  obtained  from 
Colonel  Smyth  these  sketches,  and  gave  them  to  Sir 
William  De  Lancey,  his  Deputy-Quartermaster-General, 
or  chief-of-staff,  "with  orders  "  (as  Major  Oldfield  states)" 
"  to  take  up  the  ground  on  which  we  fought  the  next  day. 
Colonel  Smyth  was  at  the  same  time  desired  to  take  the 


"Oldfield  IMSS. ;  Porter's  Hist.  Royal  Engineers,  vol.  i,  p.  380.  A  copy  of 
this  sketch  is  inserted  opposite  page  565  of  C.  D.  Yonge's  "  Life  of  Wel- 
lington"; London:  Chapman  and  Hall ;  1S60.  See,  also,  p.  6i6  of  the  same 
work. 

'^Curiously  enough  they  were  very  nearly  lost  in  the  action;  the  officer 
who  had  them  in  his  keeping,  Lieutenant  Waters,  being  unhorsed  in  the 
fne/ee. 

""Probably  the  information  brought  by  Lieutenant  Massow ;  ante,  p.  233. 

"Oldfield  MSS. 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  297 

necessary  measures  for  entrenching  the  village  of 
Braine-la-Leud." 

To  this  position,  then,  well  understood  and  mapped  out, 
the  Duke  of  Wellington  fell  back  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
17th  from  Quatre  Bras  with  that  part  of  his  army  which 
was  under  his  immediate  command,  and  to  it  also  he 
directed  the  greater  part  of  the  troops  which  were  at 
Nivelles  and  other  places.     (See  Map  13.) 

The  position  was  a  strong  one.  The  first  or  main  line 
of  battle  crossed  the  Charleroi-Brussels  pike  at  right 
angles  where  the  road  from  Ohain  and  Wavre  strikes 
into  it,  nearly  three-quarters  of  a  mile  south  of  the  hamlet 
of  Mont  St.  Jean,  where  the  chatcssee  to  Nivelles  branches 
off  from  the  pike.  To  the  east  of  this  pike  the  English 
left  extended  for  a  mile  or  so, —  for  more  than  half  this 
distance  on  the  crest  of  a  gentle  slope ;  but  the  little  vil- 
lages of  Smohain,  Papelotte  and  La  Haye,  lying  from  a 
quarter  to  a  half  a  mile  in  front,  were  occupied.  To  the 
west  of  the  pike  the  line  ran  along  the  same  ridge  for 
nearly  a  third  of  a  mile,  when  it  turned  somewhat 
towards  the  southwest,  but  still  ran  along  the  crest  of  the 
ridge,'  and  so  continued  for  nearly  a  half  a  mile  farther. 
Here  the  line  was  covered  by  a  garden  and  a  consider- 
able wood  enclosing  a  solid  old  building,  known  as  the 
Chateau  of  Hougomont.  This  building  and  its  enclos- 
ures lay  about  350  yards  in  front  of  the  main  line  of  bat- 
tle, at  its  extreme  right,  and  they  were  occupied  in  force. 
The  ridge  was  admirably  suited  for  defensive  purposes. 
The  reverse  slope  offered  excellent  protection  for  infantry 
lying  behind  it ;  and  in  front,  there  were  no  trees  or  other 
impediments ;  every  movement  of  the  enemy  was  plainly 
to  be  seen,  and  was  exposed  to  fire.  Moreover  the  ground 
over  which  the  enemy  must  advance  for  the  attack 
was  so  moist  and  muddy,  that  all  rapidity  of  movement, 
even  of  cavalry,  was  out  of  the  question. 

Wellington  had  on  the  field  the  whole  of  the  ist,  2d, 
3d,   5th  and  6th  British  divisions,  one  brigade  (Mitch- 


298  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.  1 6.] 

ell's)  of  the  4th  division,  the  2d  and  3d  Dutch-Belgian 
divisions,  and  the  contingents  from  Brunswick  and  Nas- 
sau,—  numbering  in  all  49,608  infantry,  12,408  cavalry  and 
5,645  artillery,  with  156  guns, —  a  total  of  67,661  men." 

These  troops,  as  we  have  before  observed,^^  were  sta- 
tioned on  the  field  without  reference  to  the  corps  to 
which  they  belonged.  The  reason  for  this  probably  was 
that  the  Duke  desired  to  distribute  his  foreign  troops,  on 
some,  at  any  rate,  of  whom  he  placed  no  great  reliance, 
among  his  British  troops  and  those  of  the  King's  Ger- 
man Legion,  which  were  his  main  dependence.  Then, 
inasmuch  as  the  army  had  never  before  acted  by  corps, 
or,  in  fact,  at  all,  in  the  field,  no  special  inconvenience 
was  to  be  apprehended  from  this  arrangement. 

The  army  of  the  Duke  was  composed  as  follows :  —  ^'^ 
British  troops :  — 

Infantry  15,181 

Cavalry  5,843 

Artillery  2,967 


King's  German  Legion :  — 

Infantry  3,301 

Cavalry  i,997 

Artillery  526 


23>99i 


5>824 


Total  British  and  King's  German 

Legion  29,815  Men 

Hanoverians :  — 

Infantry  10,258 

Cavalry  497 

Artillery  465 


11,220 


Carried  forward  41,035 


^Siborne,  vol.  r,  pp.  460, 461  ;'App.  xxx.  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  269,  n.  2,  raises 
the  total  to  70,187  men  of  all  arms,  of  whom  13,432  were  cavalry.  He  gives 
the  number  of  guns  as  159. 

'^Anie,  p.  35,  n.  3. 

'^Sibome,  vol.  i,  pp.  460,  461 :  App.  xxx. 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  299 

Brought  forward  4i,035  Men 

Brunswickers :  — 

Infantry  •  4,586 


Cavalry  866 

Artillery  510 


5,962 


Nassauers :  — 

Infantry  2,880 

Dutch-Belgians :  — 

Infantry  13,402 

Cavalry  3,205 

Artillery  1,177     17,784 


Total  as  above.  67,661     " 

To  the  eastward,  or  English  left,  of  the  turnpike,  were 
stationed  in  the  first  line  the  5th  and  6th  British 
divisions,  the  2d  Dutch-Belgian  division,  and  the  British 
cavalry  brigades  of  Vivian  and  Vandeleur.  This  part  of 
the  line  seems  to  have  been  commanded  by  Sir  Thomas 
Picton,  ^^  although  it  is  not  clear  whether  he  had  any 
authority  except  over  his  own  division,  the  5th.  Of  these 
troops  the  cavalry  were  stationed  on  the  extreme  left. 
One  brigade  of  Dutch-Belgians,  that  of  Prince  Bernhard 
of  Saxe  Weimar,  occupied  the  villages  of  Smohain, 
Papelotte  and  La  Haye.  The  English  infantry  were 
placed  on  the  reverse  of  the  slope  of  the  ridge,  so  as  to 
be  sheltered  from  the  enemy's  fire.  But  the  other  Dutch- 
Belgian  brigade,  Bylandt's,  was,  as  Sir  James  Shaw- 
Kennedy  says,  ^^  "  posted,  most  unaccountably,  in  front 
of  the  Wavre  road,  on  the  slope.  *  *  *  j^ 
this  position,  it  was  jutted  forward  in  front  of  the  real 
line  of  battle,  which  was  mainly  the  Wavre  road.  It  was 
directly  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  greatest  French  battery 


^^  Sir  Lowry  Cole,  commanding  the  6th  British  division,  was  not  in  the 
action. 

*^  Kennedy,  p.  6i  ;  Waterloo  Letters,  pp.  30,  31,  Sir  W.  Gomm, 


300  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.   1 6.] 

that  was  on  the  field,  and  singly  exposed  to  the  first  onset 
of  the  French  attacking  columns."  Who  was  responsible 
for  this  inconsiderate  and  dangerous  measure  we  do  not 
know.  In  rear  of  the  left  wing,  and  protected  from  the 
French  fire,  stood  the  Union  brigade,  so  called,  of  Major 
General  Sir  William  Ponsonby,  composed  of  the  Royal 
Dragoons,  the  Scots  Greys,  and  the  Inniskilling  Dra- 
goons. 

The  right  of  the  left  wing  rested  on  the  Charleroi  turn- 
pike. The  3d  British  division,  Alten's,  continued  the 
line  to  the  west  of  the  turnpike.  On  the  westerly  side  of 
the  pike,  and  about  300  yards  to  the  south  of  the  point 
where  the  Wavre  road  crosses  it,  was  the  farmhouse  of 
La  Haye  Sainte,  which  was  strongly  occupied  by  a 
battalion  of  the  King's  German  Legion  under  Major 
Baring.  An  abatis  was  formed  across  the  road  at  the 
south  end  of  the  boundary  wall  of  the  house,  ""^  but  it  was 
broken  up  during  the  course  of  the  battle. 

Beyond  the  third  division,  on  the  allied  right,  were 
stationed  the  two  brigades  constituting  the  ist  division, 
Cooke's,  —  a  part  of  the  2d  brigade,  Byng's,  occupying, 
with  some  Nassau  and  other  foreign  troops,  the  Chateau 
and  enclosures  of  Hougomont. 

The  2d  division,  Clinton's,  was  in  reserve  near  Merbe 
Braine,  as  was  also  the  Brunswick  contingent.  The  3d 
Dutch-Belgian  division,  Chasse's,  was  on  the  extreme 
right,  and  partly  in  the  village  of  Braine-la-Leud.  The 
heavy  cavalry  brigade  of  Lord  Edward  Somerset  was 
stationed  in  the  rear,  near  the  Charleroi  pike  ;  the  Dutch- 
Belgian  cavalry  were  farther  to  the  right. 

It  is  plain  from  the  foregoing  that,  with  the  exception 
of  the  unfortunate  brigade  of  Bylandt,  the  army  was 
skilfully  arranged  so  as  to  escape  as  far  as  was  possible 
the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery,  which  was  known  to  be 
extremely  formidable.  The  occupation  of  Hougomont 
was  most  carefully  attended  to;    the  walls  were  loop- 


*' Waterloo  Letters,  pp.  403,  40i. 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  3OI 

holed,  —  not  only  of  the  house,  but  of  the  garden ;  and, 
surrounded,  as  it  was,  on  the  sides  nearest  the  French  by 
a  considerable  wood,  it  was  a  really  strong  place.  So 
long  as  it  was  held,  the  right  of  Wellington's  line  was 
practically  unassailable.  ^^  The  farmhouse  of  La  Haye 
Sainte  on  the  Brussels  road  was  also  made  very  strong, 
although,  owing  to  some  oversight,  no  adequate  mode  of 
reinforcing  the  defenders,  or  of  supplying  them  with 
ammunition,  was  provided.  No  earth-works  had  been 
thrown  up  anywhere.  ^^  An  abatis  had,  as  has  been 
observed,  been  placed  across  the  Charleroi  road,  and 
another  was  thrown  across  the  Nivelles  road  in  rear  of 
Hougomont. 

Napoleon  brought  to  the  field  of  Waterloo  the  ist,  2d, 
and  6th  Corps  {minus  the  division  of  Teste),  the  Im- 
perial Guard,  the  heavy  cavalry  of  Kellermann  and 
Milhaud,  the  light  cavalry  of  Domon,  detached  from  the 
3d  Corps,  and  of  Subervie,  detached  from  the  cavalry- 
corps  of  Pajol,  —  a  total  of  71,947  men,  of  whom  48,950 
were  infantry,  15,765  cavalry,  and  7,232  artillery.  There 
were  246  guns.  ^° 

The  ist  Corps  constituted  the  right  of  the  first  line. 
Its  left  rested  on  the  Charleroi  turnpike  near  the  inn  of 
La  Belle  Alliance,  and  its  light  cavalry  observed  the 
villages  of  La  Haye  and  Papelotte  on  the  extreme  right. 
The  2d  Corps  continued  the  first  line  to  the  west,  the 
cavalry  of  Pire  being  stationed  beyond  the  Nivelles  road. 
The  6th  Corps  and  the  Guard,  with  the  cavalry  of 
Kellermann  and  Milhaud,  were  in  reserve. 

Of  the  three  divisions  of  the  2d  Corps  present  at  the 
battle,  —  that  of  Girard  having  been  left  at  Ligny,  —  the 
division  of  Jerome  was  on  the  left,  that  of  Foy  in   the 


^'  Kennedy,  p.  65. 

^Oldfield  MSS. 

*'Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  461 :  App.  xxxi.    Charras  (vol.   i.  p.  238,  n.)  gives  the 
total  as  72,447  men  and  240  guns. 


302  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.  1 6.] 

centre,  and  that  of  Bachelu  on  the  right,  —  its  right 
resting  on  the  Charleroi  road. 

Of  the  four  divisions  of  the  ist  Corps,  that  of  Donzelot 
was  the  left,  and  its  left  rested  on  the  Charleroi  road ; 
then  came  that  of  Allix,  commanded  by  Quiot ;  then  that 
of  Marcognet,  and  then  that  of  Durutte.  This  last  was 
opposite  Papelotte  and  La  Haye. 

The  two  armies  were  nearly  equal  in  numbers;  and 
had  that  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington  been  equal  in  point 
of  material  to  that  of  the  Emperor,  the  advantage  of 
position  which  it  possessed  would  have  fully  made  up  for 
the  slight  superiority  in  numbers  possessed  by  the 
French.  As  it  was,  however,  the  superiority  of  the 
French,  not  only  in  artillery  and  cavalry,  but  so  far  as  a 
large  part  of  the  Anglo-Dutch  army  was  concerned,  in 
moral,  was  unquestionable,  and  Wellington's  only  justifi- 
cation for  receiving  battle  lay,  as  Kennedy  points  out 
above,  in  his  expectation  of  receiving  help  from  Bllicher. 

Napoleon,  as  we  have  seen,  dictated  his  plan  of  battle 
before  eleven  o'clock.  It  provided  that, ''  as  soon  as  the 
whole  army  should  be  ranged  in  order  of  battle,  about  i 
P.  M.,  and  the  Emperor  should  give  the  order  to  Marshal 
Ney,  the  attack  should  commence,  having  for  its  object 
to  get  possession  of  the  village  of  Mont  St.  Jean,  where 
the  road  from  Nivelles  strikes  into  the  Charleroi  turn- 
pike. This  attack  was  to  be  made  by  the  ist  Corps, 
supported  on  the  left  by  the  2d  Corps.  To  aid  this 
attack  a  formidable  battery  of  seventy-eight  guns,  many 
of  them  twelve-pounders,  was  to  be  moved  forward  on  the 
east  side  of  the  road  to  a  ridge  which  ran  in  front  of  and 
parallel  to  the  French  line  of  battle,  and  only  600  yards 
from  the  English  position. 

The  Emperor  had  then  definitely  decided  before  eleven 
o'clock  to  defer  the  principal  move  of  the  day  till  about 
one  in  the  afternoon.     In  this  decision  he  was  mainly,  if 


^  Doc.  Indd.,  XIX,  pp.  53,  54;  App.  C,  xxxii;  j)ost,  p. 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  3O3 

not  wholly,  influenced  by  the  difficulties  which  he  saw 
would  be  caused  by  the  deep  mud  of  the  fields  over  which 
his  troops  would  have  to  manoeuvre. 

The  determination  of  Napoleon  to  make  his  main 
effort  against  the  village  of  Mont  St.  Jean,  so  as  to 
possess  himself  of  the  principal  avenue  of  retreat  open  to 
the  enemy,  —  the  road  to  Brussels,  —  has  always  elicited 
the  commendation  of  military  men.  The  Emperor 
undoubtedly  intended  to  aid  the  attack  of  the  ist  Corps 
by  advancing  the  6th  Corps  in  its  support ;  but  this,  as 
we  shall  see,  owing  to  the  intervention  of  the  Prussians, 
he  did  not  attempt.  Whether,  in  case  the  attack  had 
succeeded,  so  far  as  to  give  to  the  French  the  possession 
of  the  Brussels  road,  the  Forest  of  Soignes  would  have 
afforded  cover  to  Wellington's  retreating  army,  as  English 
writers  have  always  maintained,  or  would  have  neces- 
sitated the  abandonment  of  the  greater  part  of  their 
artillery,  as  Napoleon  contended,  is  a  question  which  we 
will  not  undertake  to  discuss  here. 

At  1 1.30  A.M.,  before  the  time  arrived  for  beginning  the 
main  operation  of  the  day.  Napoleon  ordered  Reille  to 
attack  Hougomont  with  his  left  division,  that  of  Prince  Je- 
rome.^" This  movement,  intended  only  as  a  diversion,  was 
undertaken  without  any  sufficient  examination  of  the  en- 
emy's position,  and  in  the  most  inconsiderate  manner.  " 
Neither  Jerome,  who    commanded    the    division,    nor 


*^,We  shall  not  attempt  to  give  a  complete  tactical  description  of  the  battle 
of  Waterloo.  The  narratives  of  Siborne,  Charras,  Hooper,  La  Tour  d'Au- 
vergne,  and  others  give  aU  the  facts.  With  the  exception  of  two  or  three 
points,  their  accounts  do  not  differ  materially. 

"  The  following  extract  from  a  letter  by  Baron  Miiffling  written  on  June 
24,  1815,  is  directly  in  point  here  :  — 

"  Before  we  arrived  there  I  said  to  the  Duke,  '  If  only  there  were  an  ap- 
parently weak  point  in  the  right  flank  of  your  position,  so  that  Bonaparte 
might  assail  it  right  furiously,  and  neglect  his  own  right  wing  to  such  an 
extent  that  he  should  fail  to  discover  the  march  of  the  Prussians ! ' 

"  And  see !  when  we  arrived  there,  there  lay  the  advanced  post  of 
Hougomont,  upon  which  he  (B.)  indeed  fell."  Militar  Wochenblatt,  Nov. 
14,  1891. 


304  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.  1 6.] 

Guilleminot,  who,  Charras  maintains,  really  controlled 
its  operations,  took  the  pains  to  direct  the  boiling  courage 
and  superfluous  energy  of  the  men,  which,  skilfully  used, 
might  have  resulted  in  obtaining  at  least  partial  success. 
For  example,  the  western  entrance  of  the  Chateau  was 
perfectly  open  to  artillery  fire,  and,  had  a  few  heavy  guns 
been  employed,  the  doors  and  adjacent  wall  would  have 
been  demolished,  and  the  building  would  probably  have 
been  taken,  ^"^  although  it  is  doubtful  if  it  could  have  been 
held.  Bags  of  powder,  also,  would  have  destroyed  the 
garden  wall,  but  no  one  thought  of  supplying  them  to  the 
men. "  In  consequence  of  these  neglects,  the  soldiers  of 
Jerome's  division,  after  possessing  themselves  of  the 
wood  and  orchard,  were  shot  down  by  their  opponents 
from  behind  the  garden  wall,  and  from  the  loopholes  in 
the  house  and  its  outbuildings,  and  could  make  no 
further  progress.  This,  of  itself,  was,  perhaps,  of  no 
great  consequence;  but  Reille,  impatient  of  being 
thwarted,  and  still  neglecting  to  ascertain  the  precise 
reasons  of  the  ill-success  of  the  attack,  sent  in  the 
division  of  Foy  to  support  that  of  Jerome.  In  fact,  later 
in  the  day,  the  division  of  Bachelu  was  also  employed  in 
this  useless  and  most  costly  attempt  to  get  possession  of 
Hougomont.  When  it  is  considered  that  the  2d  Corps 
contained  on  this  morning  not  far  from  12,000  foot 
soldiers,  and  that  very  few  of  them  assisted  in  the  attacks 
on  the  main  line  of  the  English  army,  one  gets  an  idea 
of  the  wasteful,  and,  in  fact,  inexcusable  mismanagement 
of  the  resources  of  the  French  army  on  this  day.  Not 
more  than  half  the  above  number  of  men  were  employed 
to  maintain  the  position. 

The  main  operation  of  the  day  was  to  be,  as  we  have 
said,  an  advance  by  the  ist  Corps  under  d'Erlon  to  break 
the  centre  of  the  English  line  at  and  near  the  junction  of 

^  La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  p.  266 ;    Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  281. 
"Charras,  vol.  2,  p.  18. 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  3O5 

the  Wavre  road  with  the  turnpike.  The  great  battery 
of  seventy-eight  pieces  of  cannon  continued  firing  for 
an  hour  and  a  half  at  a  distance  of  less  than  a  third  of 
a  mile  from  the  crest  in  front  of  which  lay  the  brigade 
of  Bylandt,  and  behind  which  lay  the  brigades  of  Kempt 
and  Pack  and  Best  of  Picton's  division.  At  half-past 
one  Napoleon  ordered  d'Erlon  forward. 

His  attack  was  to  be  made  in  four  columns,  marching 
in  echelon,  the  left  in  advance.  The  formation  of  these 
columns  was  so  extraordinary^  and  so  ill-suited  for  the 
work  to  be  done,  that  it  has  always  excited  the  comment 
of  military  men.  We  owe  to  Charras  ^^  a  clear  explanation 
of  this  formation.  The  first,  or  left,  column  consisted 
of  the  brigade  of  Bourgeois  of  the  division  of  Allix, — 
the  other  brigade  of  this  division,  that  of  Quiot,  being 
assigned  to  the  special  task  of  capturing  La  Haye  Sainte. 
This  brigade  of  Bourgeois  contained  four  battalions,  one 
behind  another ;  each  battalion  stood  in  three  ranks,  one 
behind  the  other ;  and  there  was  a  distance  of  five  paces 
between  the  battalions.  The  front  of  this  column,  there- 
fore, consisted  of  one-third  of  the  number  of  men  in  the 
leading  battalion ;  and  there  being  four  battalions  in  the 
brigade,  there  were  of  course  tv/elve  ranks  in  the  column. 
It  was  the  same,  mutatis  mutandis,  v/ith  the  other 
columns.  Donzelot's  division,  which  contained  nine 
battalions,  had,  therefore,  twenty-seven  ranks  in  its 
column ;  the  divisions  of  Marcognet  and  Durutte,  which 
had  only  eight  battalions  each,  had  each  twenty-four 
ranks.  This  formation  was  quite  an  exceptional  one.  A 
column  very  generally  in  use  at  that  day  consisted  of  a 
battalion  in  the  centre,  in  line,  —  that  is,  in  three  ranks, 
—  flanked  on  either  side,  by  battalions  in  column  of 
divisions,  capable  of  promptly  forming  line  or  square. 
And  then  there  were  other  convenient  formations  in 
frequent  use.     But  these  formations  of  d'Erlon's  divis- 


*  Charras,  vol.  1,  p.  2S8,  and  note  2. 


306  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [cHAP.  1 6.] 

ions  were  unwieldy,  —  they  lacked  mobility.  Why  Ney 
and  d'Erlon  should  have  departed  from  the  usual  practice 
on  this  occasion,  no  one  knows." 

The  story  of  d'Erlon's  charge  has  been  often  told.  ^^ 
How  the  soldiers  of  the  unfortunate  brigade  of  Bylandt, 
utterly  unable,  as  they  were,  after  having"  been  exposed 
to  the  fire  of  the  great  battery  for  an  hour  and  a  half,  to 
resist  alone  the  impact  of  such  an  enormous  force,  broke 
in  confusion  and  fell  to  the  rear  amid  the  undeserved 
curses  of  their  English  allies ;  ^^  how  the  French  in  their 
unwieldy  masses  pressed  forward  to  the  crest  of  the 
ridge  to  receive  the  fire  at  short  range  of  the  brigades  of 
Pack  and  Kempt,  which  only  the  leading  battalions  were 
able,  owing  to  the  faulty  formation  of  the  columns,  to 
return  at  all ;  and  how,  when  staggered  by  the  fire,  and 
while  endeavoring  to  disengage  their  closely  following 
ranks,  Ponsonby's  brigade  of  heavy  cavalry  charged  them 
furiously,  riding  down  between  the  columns,  throwing 
them  into  confusion,  cutting  down  the  exposed  foot- 
soldiers,  capturing  two  eagles,  and  many  prisoners, 
disabling  some  15  guns,  and  forcing  the  three  left  columns 
to  fall  back  in  disorder,  —  all  this  is  familiar  to  all  readers 
of  the  story  of  Waterloo.  It  is  difficult  to  find  a  parallel 
to  this  clumsily  executed  movement  of  d'Erlon's.  At 
the  same  time,  faulty  as  the  formation  of  the  columns 
was,  the  troops  got  actually  on  the  crest  of  the  British 
position ;  and  had  there  been  any  timidity  or  hesitation 
on  the  part  of  their  adversaries,  the  columns  would 
undoubtedly  have  forced  their  way  through  the  British 
line.  But  the  necessary  time  was  not  allowed  them.  Sir 
Thomas  Picton  was  alive  to  the  danger ;  he  was  prompt 
to  seize  the  opportunity;  his  troops  by  their  close  and 


''' Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  28S;    La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  p.  274.     D'Erlon  in  his 
autobiography  throws  no  light  on  the  matter;  Drouet,  p.  97. 

'^  Nowhere  better,  perhaps,  than  in  Erckmann-Chatrian's  "  Waterloo." 

^  Siborne,  vol.  2,  pp.  5,  6. 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  3O7 

deadly  fire  threw  the  heads  of  the  columns  into  confusion, 
and  then  charged  them  with  the  bayonet.  Lord 
Uxbridge,  who  commanded  the  cavalry,  rode  over  from 
his  own  position  on  the  other  side  of  the  turnpike,  and 
ordered  Ponsonby  to  charge.  He  then  returned  to  lead 
Somerset's  cavalry  brigade  in  a  successful  charge  on  the 
west  of  the  pike.  The  whole  affair  was  a  great  and 
deserved  success  for  the  English.  Their  cavalry,  how- 
ever, was  very  severely  handled  on  returning  to  its 
original  positions. 

Shortly  before  d'Erlon  moved  out,  Napoleon  had  seen 
a  body  of  troops  on  the  heights  of  St.  Lambert,  far  off  on 
his  right.  It  was  soon  ascertained  that  they  were 
Prussians.  He  then  sent  off  the  i  P.  M.  order  to 
Grouchy.  '*°  By  the  time  that  the  unfortunate  charge  of 
the  ist  Corps  had  resulted  in  the  repulse  narrated  above, 
certainly  before  3  P.  M:,  Napoleon  had  decided  that  he 
must  employ  the  6th  Corps  in  resisting  the  Prussians, 
and  not  in  supporting  the  ist  Corps  in  further  operations 
against  the  English,  as  he  had  originally  intended  to  do. 
But  whatever  shape  the  next  movement  might  assume, 
the  first  thing  to  be  done  was  evidently  to  carry  the  farm- 
house of  La  Haye  Sainte,  which  had  just  been  unsuccess- 
fully attempted. 

This  was  undertaken  in  the  same  reckless  and  careless 
manner  which  had  characterized  the  assault  on  Hougo- 
mont.  Although  the  French  had  an  abundance  of  heavy 
guns,  none  were  used  to  batter  down  the  doors  and  walls, 
in  front  of  which  the  bravest  officers  and  men  could 
accomplish  but  little,  and  were  sacrificed  to  no  pur- 
pose.'*' The  place  was  finally  taken  shortly  before  4 
P.  M.  '^ 


*°  Ante,  p.  270. 

*'  Charras,  vol.  2,  p.  iS.  Colonel  Heym^s  of  Ney's  staff  says  that  more  than 
2,000  men  were  killed  in  endeavoring  to  get  possession  of  La  Haye  Sainte. 
Doc.  Indd.,  p.  17.    This,  however,  must  be  an  excessive  estimate. 

"^  Charras,  vol.  i,  pp.  302,  303  ;  vol.  2,  p.  18  ;  Hooper,  p.  213,  n. ;  O'Connor 


308  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.  1 6.] 

But  the  capture  of  La  Haye  Sainte  was  only  a 
necessary  preliminary  to  a  serious  attack  on  the  enemy's 
main  line.  Napoleon  (or  perhaps  Ney)  seems  to  have 
thought  that  the  troops  of  d'Erlon  had  been  too  severely 
handled  to  warrant  the  expectation  of  any  immediate  aid 
from  them.  They  would  require  an  hour  or  two,  perhaps, 
to  recover.  At  any  rate,  it  was  determined  to  assail  the 
English  centre  to  the  west  of  the  Charleroi  road,  and  as 
the  infantry  of  the  ist  Corps  were  not  for  the  moment 
available,  and  as  that  of  the  2d  Corps,  or  at  least,  the 
greater  part  of  it,  was  engaged  in  attacking  Hougomont, 
it  vv^as  decided  to  make  the  assault  this  time  with  cavalry 
alone. 

The  troops  on  this  portion  of  Wellingtons  line, — 
between  the  Charleroi  road  and  Hougomont,  —  had  been 
subjected  only  to  artillery  fire,  and  even  that  had  not 
been  anything  like  as  severe  as  that  sustained  by  the 
troops  exposed  to  the  great  French  battery  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  road.  They  consequently  were  in 
good  condition  to  resist  cavalry,  '^^  especially  considering 
that  the  bad  ground  over  which  the  cavalry  must  pass 
would  be  certain  to  diminish  the  force  of  their  assaults. 
Sir  James  Shaw-Kennedy,  who  was  on  this  part  of  the 
line,  tells  us  that  the  opinion  at  the  time  among  the 
English  officers  was  that  the  attack  was  premature. 

This  was  also  Napoleon's  own  opinion ;  he  seems  to 
have  yielded  to  Ney's  solicitations  against  his  own  judg- 
ment. But  at  this  time,  shortly  after  4  P.  M.,  the  advance 
of  Billow's  Corps  occupied  the  constant  attention  of  the 
Emperor ;  he  was  constrained  to  leave  the  conduct  of  the 


Morris,  p.  352.  Other  authorities  put  the  capture  of  La  Haye  Sainte  two 
hours  later.  Colonel  Heym^s  of  Ney's  staff  places  the  hour  between  6  and 
7  P.  M.    Doc.  In6d.,  pp.  i8,  19. 

*' Kennedy,  pp.  114-116.  Kennedy's  account  of  this  part  of  the  battle,  as 
indeed  of  all  parts  of  it,  is  most  valuable ;  but  we  think  he  is  in  error  in  sup- 
posing that  La  Haye  Sainte  had  not  fallen  before  these  cavalry  attacks  were 
made. 


[chap.   1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  3O9 

battle  against  Wellington  to  Marshal  Ney,  in  whose 
tactical  skill  and  management  he  had  great  confidence, 
and  to  devote  himself  mainly  to  the  task  of  directing  the 
movements  of  the  6th  Corps  and  of  those  portions  of  the 
Guard,  which  from  time  to  time  he  was  obliged  to  detach 
for  its  support,  so  as  to  prevent  the  Prussians  from  seiz- 
ing the  village  of  Planchenoit  and  thus  menacing  the 
communications  of  the  army.  Napoleon's  neglect  of  the 
conduct  of  the  operations  against  the  English  has  often 
been  the  subject  of  comment  and  severe  criticism ;  but 
we  imagine  that  he  was  far  more  anxious  to  hinder  the 
Prussians,  who  were  aiming,  so  to  speak,  at  a  vital  part, 
from  succeeding,  than  even  to  defeat  the  English. 
To  fend  off  the  Prussians  was  an  absolute  necessity ;  to 
drive  the  English  from  the  field,  a  thing  no  doubt  very 
desirable;  but  as  there  was  no  fear  that  they  would  take 
the  offensive,  and  as,  if  they  did,  the  army,  or,  at  least,  the 
great  bulk  of  it,  was  in  line  of  battle  opposed  to  them,  no 
great  danger  was  to  be  apprehended  from  them. 
Whereas  the  Prussians  were  striking  at  the  flank  and 
rear,  aiming  to  get  control  of  the  Charleroi  road,  and  thus 
of  the  line  of  communications  and  retreat  of  the  army. 
To  prevent  their  succeeding  in  this  was,  therefore,  of 
vital  importance.  Hence  Napoleon  attended  to  this 
himself,  and  left  to  Ney  the  conduct  of  the  fight  against 
Wellington's  army. 

Marshal  Ney,  then,  determined  to  carry  the  allied 
centre  by  charges  of  cavalry.  He  seems  to  have  made 
no  effort  to  support  this  attack  by  the  infantry  of  the  2d 
Corps,  although  it  would  certainly  have  been  quite 
possible  to  have  withdrawn  at  least  Bachelu's  division  from 
the  wood  of  Hougomont  and  to  have  used  it  with  good 
effect.  But  Ney  was  originally  an  officer  of  cavalry ;  this 
fact  may  have  made  him  think  it  possible  to  accomplish 
more  with  cavalry  alone  than  to  others  would  seem 
practicable.  At  any  rate,  from  4  to  6  P.  M.  the  splendid 
divisions  of  Milhaud,  Lefebvre-Desnouettes,  Kellermann 


310  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.  l6,] 

and  Guyot  were  successively  launched  against  the 
English  lines.  Every  one  has  heard  of  the  magnificent 
gallantry  of  these  fine  troops;  every  one  knows  the 
indomitable  steadiness  with  which  their  repeated  onsets 
were  borne.  At  the  close  of  these  assaults  the  French 
cavalry  had  become  wellnigh  exhausted;  and  they  had 
not  broken  a  single  square.  Nevertheless,  the  English, 
Hanoverian,  Nassau  and  Brunswick  troops  had  suffered 
severely;  obliged  to  remain  in  squares  for  fear  of  the 
repeated  irruptions  of  the  French  cavalry,  they  presented 
an  easy  mark  to  the  French  infantry  skirmishers  of 
Donzelot's  division,  which  with  a  portion  of  Quiot's  was 
finally  brought  over  from  the  east  side  of  the  turnpike,  as 
well  as  to  the  artillery  from  the  French  main  position, 
which,  necessarily  silent  while  the  cavalry  were  on  the 
plateau,  constantly  recommenced  its  fire  as  soon  as  the 
cavalry  retired  down  the  slope,  as  was  done  many  times 
during  these  two  hours.  In  fact  this  part  of  the  allied 
line  was  finally  weakened  so  much  that  it  was  very  near 
giving  way,  as  we  shall  shortly  see.  At  one  time,  all  the 
troops  for  nearly  half  a  mile  to  the  west  of  the  Brussels 
pike  had  retired  from  exhaustion,  and  in  disorder,  and  the 
Duke  himself  had  to  lead  up  fresh  troops  to  take  their 
places.  ""^ 

More,  however,  might  have  been  accomplished  by  the 
French.  For  instance,  the  enfilading  batteries,  which 
towards  the  close  of  the  day,  dismounted  Mercer's  guns  *^ 
and  practically  destroyed  several  squares  of  infantry, 
might  have  been  employed  quite  as  easily  two  hours 
before,  and  more  of  them  might  well  have  been  used.  ^^ 


**  Kennedy,  pp.  127  ef  seq. ;  Siborne,  vol.  2,  pp.  152  et  seq. 

*'  Mercer,  vol.  i,  p.  325  ;  Napoldon  h.  Waterloo,  p.  315  ;  Siborne,  vol.  2,  pp. 
154,  155.  Mercer  in  his  Diary  seems  to  think  these  enfilading  batteries  were 
Prussian;  but  see  his  letter  and  plan  in  the  Waterloo  Letters,  pp.  214  et  seq. 
Cf.  Waterloo  Letters,  p.  330. 

**Van  Loben  Sels,  p.  333. 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  3II 

But  no  use  whatever  was  made,  except  as  above  stated, 
of  the  very  great  advantage  afforded  by  the  position  of 
La  Haye  Sainte  for  the  posting  of  batteries  which  should 
sweep  the  whole  line  of  the  allies,  dismount  their  guns, 
riddle  their  squares,  and  render  their  infantry  unable  to 
resist  the  shock  of  cavalry.  Nor  was  the  infantry  of  the 
I  St  Corps  brought  up  in  season.  As  for  that  of  the  2d 
Corps,  Ney  hardly  made  any  use  of  it  at  all ;  he  suffered 
it  to  remain  in  the  wood  and  enclosures  of  Hougomont. 

Napoleon  said,  and  it  cannot  be  seriously  disputed,  that 
the  heavy  cavalry  of  the  Guard,  the  division  of  Guyot, 
went  in  without  his  orders.  Whether  Ney  ordered  it 
in  is,  however,  doubtful.  His  chief-of-sta£f.  Colonel 
Heymes,  denies  that  he  did.  He  says  that  the  cavalry 
of  the  Guard  went  in  of  its  own  accord.  (Doc.  Ined.,  pp. 
16,  17.)  At  any  rate,  it  was  a  great  mistake,  whoever 
committed  it,  as  all  the  authorities  freely  say.  It  de- 
stroyed the  last  cavalry-reserve  of  the  army. 

While  these  operations  were  going  on  in  front.  Napo- 
leon was  personally  superintending  the  desperate  and 
gallant  fight  made  by  the  two  divisions  of  the  6th  Corps 
under  Lobau  against  Billow's  advance.  The  two  leading 
divisions  of  the  I  Vth  Corps,  which  moved  out  about  4.30 
P.  M.,  were  easily  checked  at  first ;  but  they  rallied,  and 
were  reinforced  by  the  rest  of  the  corps ;  and,  between  5 
and  6  P.  M.,  Lobau  was  driven  back,  and  Planchenoit 
itself  was  threatened.  The  Emperor  was  obliged  to  put 
in  the  Young  Guard,  which,  with  three  batteries,  occupied 
Planchenoit,  while  the  6th  Corps  extended  on  its  left  so 
as  to  connect  with  the  right  of  the  ist  Corps.  But  the 
Prussians  drove  the  Young  Guard  out  of  the  village ;  and 
the  Emperor  had  to  order  in  three  battalions  of  the  Old 
and  Middle  Guard  with  two  batteries.  These  troops, 
gallantly  supported  by  the  Young  Guard,  retook  the  town, 
and  the  Prussians  fell  back  some  distance.  Napoleon 
then  seems  to  have  thought  that  the  attack  of  the 
Prussians     was     exhausted.       It     was     nearly     seven 


312  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.  1 6.] 

o'clock.  ^"^  In  this  action  the  fighting  on  both  sides  was 
very  obstinate.  The  French  troops  were  superior  in 
point  of  experience  to  those  of  Billow,  —  those  of  the  6th 
Corps  were  led  by  a  very  able  officer,  Lobau,  and  the 
regiments  of  the  Guard  were  the  elite  of  the  arm}'-. 
Hence,  though  much  inferior  in  numbers,  they  obtained 
this  success,  which  under  other  circumstances,  would 
have  been  decisive.  But  in  this  case  their  enemies  had 
reinforcements  at  hand.  Pirch  I.,  at  the  head  of  the  lid 
Corps,  was  only  two  miles  in  rear. 

This,  however.  Napoleon  of  course  could  not  know. 
Hence,  thinking  that  the  danger  from  the  Prussians  was 
practically  over,  he  hastened  towards  the  front,  where  for 
the  last  hour,  ever  since  the  conclusion  of  the  cavalry 
attacks,  the  battle  had  languished.  It  had  in  fact  con- 
sisted during  this  period  only  of  a  general  skirmish  firing 
along  the  centre  of  the  English  position  to  the  west  of 
the  Brussels  pike,  the  result  of  which,  however,  was, 
undoubtedly,  to  weaken  perceptibly  the  strength  and 
moral  of  the  allied  troops.  This  part  of  the  English  line 
was  in  fact  in  a  bad  way  at  this  period  of  the  battle.  ^^ 
As  Sir  James  Shaw-Kennedy,  who  was  on  this  part  of 
the  line  on  the  staff  of  the  3d  division,  says :  — "^^ 

"  La  Have  Sainte  was  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy;  also  the  knoll 
on  the  opposite  side  of  the  road  ;  also  the  garden  and  ground  on  the 
Anglo-Allied  side  of  it ;  Ompteda's  brigade  was  nearly  annihilated, 
and  Kielmansegge's  so  thinned,  that  those  two  brigades  could  not 
hold  their  position.  That  part  of  the  field  of  battle,  therefore, 
which    was   between   Halkett's  5°   left  and   Kempt's  s'    right,    was 


*'  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  318. 

**Siborne,  vol.  2,  pp.  152  et  seq.\  Van  Loben  Sels,  p.  295.  Cf.  Porter's 
Hist.  Royal  Engineers,  vol.  i,  p.  382:  Waterloo  Letters,  p.  339,  where  the 
hour  is  fixed  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Dawson  Kelly  at  "  about  half-past  six. " 

^'Kennedy,  p.  127. 

5°  Halkett's  brigade  was  on  the  main  line,  nearly  half  of  a  mile  west  of  the 
pike. 

"  Kempt's  brigade  was  on  the  east  side  of  the  Brussels  pike ;  its  right 
rested  on  it. 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  3I3 

unprotected;  and  being  the  very  centre  of  the  Duke's  line  of  battle, 
was  consequently  that  point,  above  all  others,  which  the  enemy 
wished  to  gain.  The  danger  was  imminent ;  and  at  no  other  period 
of  the  action  was  the  result  so  precarious  as  at  this  moment.  Most 
fortunately  Napoleon  did  not  support  the  advantage  his  troops  had 
gained  at  this  point  by  bringing  forward  his  reserve ;  proving  that 
he  did  not  exert  that  activity  and  personal  energy  in  superintending 
and  conforming  to  the  progress  of  the  action,  which  he  ought  to 
have  done." 

As  to  this  last  observation,  we  have  just  seen  how  the 
Emperor  was  employed  during  this  critical  period  of  the 
action.  He  was  in  truth  fighting  another  battle  with 
inferior  forces  against  the  Prussians,  and  this,  too,  at  a 
distance  of  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  English  line  of 
battle.  ^^  The  criticism  on  Napoleon  is  therefore 
unfounded ;  it  is  due  simply  to  the  fact  that  his  occupa- 
tion during  this  period  of  the  battle  was  not  borne  in 
min-d  by  General  Shaw-Kennedy.  But  the  fact  remains ; 
if  there  had  been  no  other  battle  to  fight,  —  no  desperate 
action  at  Planchenoit,  requiring  the  presence  and  per- 
sonal direction  of  the  Emperor,  —  if  the  attack  upon  the 
allied  lines  could  have  been  made  under  the  eye  and 
direct  orders  of  Napoleon  himself,  —  in  the  opinion  of 
Kennedy,  whose  account  of  the  battle  is  one  of  the  best 
we  have,  it  would  have  gone  hard  with  Wellington's 
army.  Add  to  this,  that  if  there  had  been  no  other  battle 
to  fight,  the  Emperor  could  have  brought  16,000  fresh 
men  to  bear  upon  this  exhausted  force  of  Wellington's. 
It  should  be  added,  also,  that  the  English  heavy  cavalry 
of  Somerset  and  Ponsonby,  which  had  been  well  nigh 
exhausted  by  their  charges  at  the  beginning  of  the  action, 
and  had  suffered  more  or  less  during  the  afternoon,  were 
not  able  to  render  efficient  service  at  the  close  of  the 
day. 


''  It  is  almost  exactly  a  mila  and  a  half  from  the  point  of  intersection  of 
the  Brussels  turnpike  with  the  VVavre  road  to  the  church  in  Planchenoit. 


314  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.   1 6.] 

Napoleon,  as  we  have  seen,  as  soon  as  he  had,  as  he 
supposed,  definitely  repulsed  the  Prussians  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Planchenoit,  hastened  to  the  front,  where  he 
must  have  arrived  somewhere  about  seven  o'clock.  His 
absence  from  the  field  during  this  time  was,  as  we  have 
seen,  not  due  to  any  fault  or  neglect  of  his,  but  neverthe- 
less it  was  most  unfortunate  for  the  success  of  his  army. " 
Marshal  Ney  had  exhausted,  as  he  supposed,  ^^^  all  the 
resources  available  to  him.  Over  the  Imperial  Guard  he 
had  no  authority ;  and  the  only  infantry  in  the  army  that 
had  not  been  put  in  belonged  to  the  Guard.  Meanwhile 
Wellington  had  exerted  himself  to  the  utmost  to  restore 
at  least  a  semblance  of  strength  to  his  line  of  battle  west 
of  the  turnpike ;  he  had  rallied  the  men  of  Alten's  divis- 
ion, who  had  been  shaken  by  the  fall  of  that  officer,  who 
was  severely  wounded;  he  had  brought  forward  some 
Brunswick  troops ;  he  had  ordered  Chasse's  (3d)  Dutch- 
Belgian  division  from  its  position  near  Merbe  Braine  to 
a  position  in  rear  of  the  guards;  he  had  brought  over 
to  the  centre  the  light  cavalry  brigades  of  Vivian  and 
Vandeleur  from  the  extreme  left.  He  had,  in  fact,  done 
all  that  could  be  done,  and  he  was  now  awaiting  the  next 
move  of  his  antagonist  with  a  coolness,  vigilance  and 
alertness  which  the  discouraging  aspects  of  the  fight  did 
not  in  the  least  affect.  But  his  situation  was  a  perilous 
one.  His  losses  had  been  very  great.  His  English  troops 
were  much  exhausted;  the  patience  and  confidence  of 
most  of  his  foreign  allies  were  nearly  worn  out ;  and  on 
that  part  of  his  line  lying  to  the  west  of  the  turnpike  his 
artillery  was  mostly  dismounted.  He  had,  however,  in 
reserve  som.e  of  his  best  troops,  and  one  or  two  batteries. 


'^See  Napol(5on  h.  Waterloo,  pp.  313,  31S. 

^*  The  principal  question  as  to  this  is  in  regard  to  the  corps  of  Reille,  a  part 
of  which,  certainly,  might  have  been  more  usefully  employed  in  sustaining  the 
cavalry  attacks  than  in  fighting  in  the  wood  of  Hougomont,  or  on  the 
Nivelles  road  on  the  west  side  of  Hougomont.  See  Heym^s'  statement  in 
Doc.  Indd.,  pp.  17,  18. 


[chap.  i6.]  the  battle  of  WATERLOO.  3I5 

Maitland's  brigade  of  guards  and  Adam's  brigade  of 
Clinton's  division  had  suffered  but  little,  and  were  troops 
of  the  best  quality. 

Ney  had  acquainted  the  Emperor  with  the  state  of 
things  in  his  front,  and  had  been  informed  that,  as  soon 
as  he  could,  the  Emperor  would  sustain  him  with  a  part 
of  the  Guard.  Meantime,  he  was  to  collect  as  much  of 
the  cavalry,  and  of  Reille's  infantry,  as  he  could,  to  sup- 
port the  attack  which  might  soon  be  expected  to  be  made 
by  the  Guard,  supported  by  the  infantry  of  the  ist  Corps. 

It  was,  as  must  be  sufficiently  apparent  to  the  reader,  out 
of  the  question  at  this  period  of  the  action  for  Napoleon  to 
organize  an  attack  against  the  English  lines  with  the  Impe- 
rial Guard,  in  any  such  fashion  as  that  which  he  employed 
with  such  crushing  effect  on  the  day  but  one  before,  at 
Ligny.  To  begin  with,  the  cavalry  of  the  Guard,  both 
the  light  and  the  heavy,  had  been  shattered,  and  virtually 
ruined  for  the  time  being,  by  their  repeated,  ineffectual, 
and  costly  efforts  to  carry  the  plateau  during  the  previous 
few  hours.  Then,  but  a  fraction  of  the  infantry  and 
artillery  of  the  Guard  was  disposable.  The  Young 
Guard,  consisting  of  eight  battalions,  organized  in  four 
regiments,  with  twenty-four  guns,  was  in  Planchenoit, " 
where,  also,  was  one  of  the  eight  battalions  of  the  Old 
Guard  (grenadiers),  two  battalions  of  the  Middle  Guard 
(chasseurs),  and  two  batteries.  ^^  Two  more  battalions  ^^ 
of  the  Old  Guard  and  one  battery  were  on  the  road 
which,  leading  from  Planchenoit  to  the  Charleroi  pike, 
comes  out  near  the  Maison  du  Roi,  and  one  battalion  of 
the  Middle  Guard  was  at  the  farm  of  Chantelet,  in  the 
neighborhood  of  the  Caillou  house,  where  were  the  head- 
quarters-baggage and  trains.    As  each  of  the  divisions  of 

"  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  316. 
=^Ib.,p.3i7- 

"  lb.,  p.  321,  n. ;  correcting  the  statement  on  p.  318,  which  speaks  of  onlji 
one  battalion  of  grenadiers  being  on  the  road  to  the  IMaison  du  Roi. 


3l6  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.   1 6.] 

the  Guard  consisted  of  eight  battahons,  there  were  there- 
fore but  ten  battahons  left  which  could  be  employed 
against  the  English.  ^^  But,  in  addition  to  these  detach- 
ments, for  which  we  have  the  authority  of  Charras,  we 
learn  from  Damitz,  ^^  who  states  with  more  minuteness 
than  any  other  author  the  disposition  made  of  the 
Imperial  Guard,  that  one  battalion  of  grenadiers  and  one 
of  chasseurs  were  brought  forward  from  Rossomme  and 
stationed  near  La  Belle  Alliance.  This  left  but  eight 
battalions  disposable  for  the  projected  attack. 

These  eight  battalions^"  constituted  four  regiments, 
namely,  the  3d  and  4th  grenadiers  (Old  Guard)  and  the 
3d  and  4th  chasseurs  (Middle  Guard).  The  3d  and  4th 
regiments  of  grenadiers  constituted  the  brigade  of 
General  Roguet ;  the  3d  regiment  was  comimanded  by 
General  Poret  de  Morvan,  the  4th  by  General  Harlet. 
The  3d  and  4th  regiments  of  chasseurs  constituted  the 
brigade  of  General  Michel;  the  3d  regiment  was  com- 
manded by  General  Mallet,  the  4th  by  General  Henrion.^' 
The  whole  force,  which  could  not  have  much  exceeded 
3,000  men,  was  under  the  command  of  General  Friant, 
a  very  distinguished  officer,  titular  colonel  of  the  ist  reg- 
iment of  foot-grenadiers  of  the  Guard. 

The  Imperial  Guard,  which  consisted  of  24  battalions, 
organized  into  12  regiments,  of  which  4  belonged  to  the 


5^  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  321. 

"  Damitz,  vol.  i,  p.  285.  Damitz  gives  a  complete  roster  of  the  Guard,  and, 
in  fact,  of  the  whole  army,  at  the  end  of  his  first  volume.  He  also  gives  the 
numbers  of  the  regiments  and  battalions  detached  in  and  around  Planchenoit. 

^°  Damitz,  vol.  i,  p.  285,  states  that  owing  to  the  losses  suffered  at  Ligny 
these  eight  battalions  had  been  consolidated  into  six.  Batty  (pp.  106,  107) 
also  says  that  the  4th  regiment  of  grenadiers  consisted  of  but  one  battalion, 
and  that  the  same  was  true  of  the  4th  regiment  of  chasseurs. 

"  At  least  this  was  the  fact  on  the  i6th  of  June,  prior  to  the  battle  of  Ligny. 
See  the  Roster  at  the  end  of  Damitz'  first  volume.  AU  these  officers,  except 
Henrion,  are  mentioned  by  Charras  (vol.  i,  p.  322)  as  participating  in  this 
charge.  Cf.  Gore,  p.  59.  This  work  is  an  explanation,  in  181 7,  of  Craan's 
Map  of  the  Field. 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  317 

Old  Guard,  4  to  the  Middle  Guard,  and  4  to  the  Young 
Guard,  had  been  stationed  at  the  beginning  of  the 
day  just  in  front  of  the  farm  of  Rossomme,  and  on  either 
side  of  the  Charleroi  turnpike.  From  this  point  16 
battalions  had  been  detached  to  various  points,  as  we  have 
seen.  The  Emperor  in  person  now  took  the  remaining 
8  battalions  ^'  from  this  position  to  the  front,  and  handed 
them  over  to  Ney  just  to  the  south  of  La  Haye  Sainte. 
This  was  about  7  P.  M.  Here  he  addressed  them ;  he 
encouraged  them,  and  urged  them  to  make  their  best 
efforts.  These  eight  (or,  probably,  only  six  battalions) 
were  then  formed  in  as  many  columns,  each  of  a  front  of 
two  companies,  and  arranged  in  echelon,^^  the  right 
battalion  in  front.  ^*  This  w^as  the  ist  battalion  of  the  3d 
regiment  of  grenadiers,  commanded  by  General  Poret 
de  Morvan.  Two  batteries  of  horse-artillery,  placed 
on  the  left  flank,  accompanied  the  infantry.  There  seems 
to  have  been  no  arrangement  for  the  proper  support  of 
the  movement  by  cavalry,  although  a  body  of  cuirassiers 
did,  shortly  before  the  main  shock  took  place,  charge 
Napier's  battery.  They  were,  however,  easily  and  speed- 
ily driven  off.  The  French  cavalry  was,  in  fact,  nearly 
exhausted.  Protection  on  the  left  of  the  advancing  column, 
however,  the  Guard  imperatively  needed,  as,  in  its  march 
towards  the  enemy,  its  left  flank  would  inevitably  be 
exposed  to  all  the  troops  stationed  between  the  north 
end  of  Hougomont  and  the  main  British  line.      On  its 


'^  Ney :  Letter  to  the  Duke  of  Otranto ;  Jones,  p.  3S7.  But  Drouot 
(Jones,  p.  227)  and  Napoleon  (Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  238)  say  four  battalions  only, 
and  the  latter  adds  "  of  the  Middle  Guard."  It  is  not  unlikely  that  the  other 
battalions  had  previously  been  brought  up  to  the  neighborhood  of  La  Haye 
Sainte. 

"  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  321. 

''^  This  is  implied  in  Damitz'  statement,  vol.  i,  p.  2S6,  as  well  as  from 
Charras'  statement  that  the  horse-batteries  were  on  the  left  flank  of  the 
column.     It  is  distinctly  so  stated  in  Van  Loben  Sels,  p.  295. 


3l8  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.  1 6.] 

right,  the  column  was  protected  from  a  flank  attack  by 
the  troops  of  the  ist  Corps.     (See  Map  14.) 

It  was,  according  to  all  the  accounts,  Napoleon's  inten- 
tion that  Reille  should  disengage  at  least  one  division  of 
his  corps  from  the  enclosures  of  Hougomont,  and  support 
this  charge  of  the  Guard  on  the  left ;  but  this  does  not 
seem  to  have  been  even  attempted.  D'Erlon,  on  the 
other  hand,  must  have  exerted  himself  to  the  utmost  to 
support  the  Guard ;  for  the  divisions  of  Donzelot  and 
Quiot  most  gallantly  and  forcibly  attacked  the  Anglo- 
Allied  line  for  about  a  third  of  a  mile  to  the  west  of  the 
turnpike,  overthrowing  and  driving  back  the  Brunswick 
and  Nassau  troops,  and  even  the  Hanoverians  and 
English,  so  that  the  personal  interposition  of  the  Duke 
was  required  to  reestablish  the  line.  These  attacks  were 
made  about  the  time  when  the  Guard  began  its  forward 
movement,  and  they  had  the  effect  of  shaking  the  allied 
troops  on  this  part  of  the  field  so  much  that  they  cer- 
tainly could  not  have  stood  another  serious  and  well- 
sustained  assault,  such  as  might  have  been  delivered  by 
the  Imperial  Guard. 

But  the  movement  of  the  column^^  of  the  Imperial 
Guard  was  not  made  in  this  direction,  but  diagonally 
across  the  field  towards  the  enemy's  right  centre,  where 
Wellington  had  stationed  his  reserves,  and  where  he  had 
at  least  one  battery,  Bolton's,  then  commanded  by  Napier, 
in  good  condition. 

The  English,  as  soon  as  they  perceived  the  famous 
bearskin  caps  of  the  Imperial  Guard,  directed  all  their 
disposable  guns  upon  their  approaching  foes;  but, 
whether  it  was  owing  to  the  smoke,  or  to  the  inequalities 
of    the  ground,   the    Guard    does    not    seem    to    have 


^^We  call  the  whole  mass,  consisting  of  columns  of  battalions, —  division 
(or  two  company)  front, —  arranged  in  echelon, —  a  column,  merely  for  con- 
venience' sake.  It  may  be  remarked  that  the  French  infantry  were  formed 
in  three  ranks. 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  3ig 


suffered    until   it  got   to   close    quarters    with    the   ist 
(Maitland's)  brigade  of  the  English  guards.^^ 

The  leading  battalion  of  the  Guard  was,  as  we  have 
seen,  formed  in  column  with  a  front  of  two  companies  in 
three  ranks.  As  each  battalion  had  four  companies,^^ 
and  consisted  of  about  500  men,^^  there  would  be  about 
75  men  in  the  front  rank  of  the  leading  battalion,  allow- 
ing for  the  file-closers.  To  its  left  and  rear,  marching  in 
echelon,  were  the  other  battalions  which  constituted  the 
attacking  force,  accompanied  by  two  batteries  of  horse 
artillery  of  six  pieces  each,  which  kept  up  a  destructive 
fire  as  the  infantry  advanced.  We  quote  from  the  jour- 
nal of  an  of^cer^^  in  the  English  guards :  — 

"  Suddenly  the  firing  ceased,  and,  as  the  smoke  cleared  away,  a 
most  superb  sight  opened  on  us.  A  close  column  of  Grenadiers 
(about  seventies  in  front)  of  la  Moyenne  Garde^''°  about  6,000 
strong,  led,  as  we  have  since  heard,  by  Marshal  Ney,  were  seen 
ascending  the  rise,  au  pas  de  charge^  shouting"  ViveV  Empereur." 
They  continued  to  advance  till  within  fifty  or  sixty  paces  of  our 
front,  when  the  brigade?'  were  ordered  to  stand  up.  Whether  it 
was  from  the  sudden  and  unexpected  appearance  of  a  corps  so 
near  them,  which  must  have  seemed  as  starting  out  of  the  ground, 
or  the  tremendously  heavy  fire  we  threw  into  them,  La  Garde^ 
who  had  never  before  failed  in  an  attack,  suddenly  stopped.  Those, 
who  from  a  distance  and  more  on  the  flank  could  see  the  affair,  tell 


'^Waterloo  Letters,  pp.  254,  257  ;  Contra,  Siborne,  vol.  2,  p.  166. 

''St.  Hilaire :  Hist,  de  la  Garde,  p.  634. 

"Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  67. 

^^Captain  Powell,  in  Waterloo  Letters,  pp.  254,  255. 

'°This  is  an  error,  "  La  Moyenne  Garde  "  consisted  solely  of  the  chasseurs 
of  the  Guard ;  the  grenadiers  constituted  the  Old  Guard,  strictly  so  called. 
It  is  not  uncommon  to  find  the  grenadiers  and  chasseurs  spoken  of  as  consti- 
tuting the  Old  Guard ;  this  is  Charras'  usage.  But  it  is  an  error  to  speak  of 
the  grenadiers  of  the  Middle  Guard.  The  grenadiers  whom  he  saw  were 
the  ist  battalion  of  the  3d  regiment,  —  ante,  p.  317.  See  Napoleon  k  Water- 
loo, p.  315,  n.  I ;  pp.  321,  325,  327,  n.  i.     Contra,  Gore,  p.  75. 

"The  ist  brigade  of  guards,  about  1,800  strong, —  Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  460. 
App.  XXX.     They  were  formed  in  four  ranks. 


320  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.   1 6.] 

US  that  the  effect  of  our  fire  seemed  to  force  the  head  of  the  col- 
umn bodily  back. 

"In  less  than  a  minute  above  300  were  down.  They  now 
wavered,  and  several  of  the  rear  divisions  began  to  draw  out  as  if 
to  deploy,  whilst  some  of  the  men  in  their  rear  beginning  to  fire  over 
the  heads  of  those  in  front  was  so  evident  a  proof  of  their  confusion 
that  Lord  Saltoun  *  *  *  holloaed  out,  '■Now's  the 
tiine^  my  boys'  Immediately  the  brigade  sprang  forward.  La 
Garde  turned,  and  gave  us  little  opportunity  of  trying  the  steel. 
We  charged  down  the  hill  till  we  had  passed  the  end  of  the  orchard 
of  Hougomont,  when  our  right  flank  became  exposed  to  another 
heavy  column  (as  we  afterwards  understood,  of  the  chasseurs  of 
the  Garde')  who  were  advancing  in  support  of  the  former  column. 
This  circumstance,  besides  that  our  charge  was  isolated,  obliged 
the  brigade  to  retire  towards  their  original  position." 

It  is  plain  from  this  account  that  the  head  of  the 
French  column  consisted  of  some  70  (or  75)  men,  as 
we  have  pointed  out  would  be  the  case  if  the  leading 
battalion  was  in  column  with  a  two  company  front;  and 
that  the  fire  of  Maitland's  brigade,  which  must  have  had  a 
front  of  about  450  men,  added  to  that  of  a  part  of  Hal- 
kett  s  brigade,  to  that  of  Napier's  battery,  and  to  that  of 
the  Dutch-Belgian  battery  of  Van  der  Smissen/'  which 
General  Chasse  had  most  opportunely  brought  up,  de- 
stroyed this  leading  battalion  and  one  or  more  of  those 
in  echelon  with  it  on  its  left  and  rear.  It  is  also  clear 
from  this  account  that  the  pursuing  troops  soon  found 
themselves  flanked  by  the  other  battalions  of  the  Imperial 
Guard,  which  they  took  to  be  a  separate  column,  and 
were  obliged  to  fall  back.  It  is  very  unlikely,  by 
the  way,  that  they  advanced  as  far  as  the  end  of  the 
orchard  of  Hougomont,  a  quarter  of  a  mile  from  their 
position. 

It  may  be  that  the  rear  battalions  of  the  Guard 
inclined  in  their  advance,  by  accident  or  oversight,  more 
to  their  left  than  they  should  have  done,  and  thus  pre- 


'^  Relation  Beige,  pp.  74  et  seq. 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  32 1 

sented  the  appearance  of  a  separate  column.      General 
Maitland  says :  —  " 

"  As  the  attacking  force  moved  forward,  it  separated ;  the 
chasseurs  inclined  to  their  left.  The  grenadiers  ascended  the 
accHvity  towards  our  position  in  a  more  direct  course,  leaving  La 
Haye  Sainte  on  their  right,  and  moving  towards  that  part  of  the 
eminence  occupied  by  the  ist  brigade  of  Guards.  " 

He  also  speaks  of  the  effect  of  the  fire  of  the  batteries 
which  accompanied  the  Guard :  — 

"Numerous  pieces  of  ordnance  were  distributed  on  the  flanks  of 
this  column.  The  brigade  suffered  by  the  enemy's  artillery,  but  it 
withheld  its  fire  for  the  nearer  approach  of  the  column.  The  lat- 
ter, after  advancing  steadily  up  the  slope,  halted  about  twenty  paces 
from  the  front  rank  of  the  brigade. 

"  The  diminished  range  of  the  enemy's  artillery  was  now  felt 
most  severely  in  our  ranks ;  the  men  fell  in  great  numbers  before 
the  discharges  of  grape  shot  and  the  fire  of  the  musketry  distributed 
among  the  guns.  " 

General  Maitland  goes  on  to  describe  the  repulse  of 
the  French  attack :  — 

"  The  smoke  of  the  [French]  artillery  happily  did  not  envelop 
the  hostile  column,  or  serve  to  conceal  it  from  our  aim. 

"  With  what  view  the  enemy  halted  in  a  situation  so  perilous, 
and  in  a  position  so  comparatively  helpless,  he  was  not  given  time 
to  evince. 

"  The  fire  of  the  brigade  opened  with  terrible  effect. 

"  The  enemy's  column,  crippled  and  broken,  retreated  with  the 
utmost  rapidity,  leaving  only  a  heap  of  dead  and  dying  men  to 
mark  the  ground  which  it  had  occupied." 

The  attempt  of  some  of  the  rear  battalions  to  deploy, 
noticed  by  Captain  Powell,  is  thus  mentioned  by  Char- 
ras :  —  ''^ 

^"  Unhappily,  whether  by  orders,  or  by  the  instinct  of  the  soldier, 
the  Guard  deploys,  in  order  to  reply  to  the  musketry  which  deci- 
mates it  from  moment  to  moment ;  and,  by  this  movement,  it  masks 


"Waterloo  Letters,  pp.  244,  245. 
^^Charras,  vol,  i,  pp.  325,  326. 


322  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.  1 6.] 

the  two  batteries  which  have  followed  it,  which  have  taken  posi- 
tion on  the  crest  of  the  plateau,  and  whose  fire  has,  up  to  this 
instant,  protected  its  flanks." 

But  what  the  leading  battaHons  of  the  Guard  needed 
at  the  moment  when  they  were  being  destroyed  by  the 
superior  fire  of  the  brigade  of  EngHsh  guards  was  not  so 
much  the  continued  effect  of  the  fire  of  artillery  upon  the 
brigade  as  the  prompt  advance  of  cavalry,  w^hich  would 
have  compelled  Maitland  to  throw  his  regiments  into 
squares. 

Failing  this,  the  best  thing  for  the  Guard  would  have 
been  a  flank  attack  on  Maitland's  brigade  by  troops  of 
the  1st  Corps;  but  this  was  averted  by  the  gallant  and 
skilful  conduct  of  Sir  Colin  Halkett  and  Colonel  Elphin- 
stone  in  bringing  the  remains  of  Halkett's  brigade,  which 
had  suffered  terribly  during  the  past  hour,  to  the  left  of 
the  English  guards,  and  thus  protecting  them  in  their  con- 
test with  the  Imperial  Guard. ^^  In  fact  the  attack  on 
Halkett's  brigade  by  Donzelot's  troops  at  this  time  was 
very  sharp,  and  at  one  time  caused  great  confusion.  It 
was  a  critical  moment;  for,  if  Halkett  had  been  beaten, 
Donzelot's  troops  would  have  flanked  Maitland's  bri- 
gade, and,  attacked  as  it  then  would  have  been,  on  front 
and  flank,  it  would  have  been  forced  to  retire,  and  per- 
haps even  routed.  Donzelot's  troops  did  their  best  to 
gain  a  foothold  on  the  plateau ;  they  did  gain  a  tempo- 
rary success;  they  knew  the  importance  of  the  task 
assigned  to  them,  and  gallantly  strove  to  support  the 
charge  of  the  Guard.  On  the  other  hand,  the  intelligent 
appreciation  of  the  emergency  on  the  part  of  Halkett  and 
his  subordinates,  and  their  obstinate  and  courageous 
maintenance  of  their  exposed  position  deserve  the  high- 
est commendation. 

If  this  attack  of  the   Imperial   Guard  had  been  sup- 


"See  Waterloo  Letters,  pp.  320,  321  ;  Siborne,  vol.  11,  pp.  170  171,  n. ;  See, 
also,  Waterloo  Letters,  pp.  33c,  331,  339,  3-10. 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  323 

ported  on  the  right  by  cavalry,  this  resistance  on  the  part 
of  Halkett's  and  Maitland's  commands  could  not  have 
been  encountered. 

It  seems  probable  that  the  failure  of  the  attack  of  the' 
Guard  upon  Maitland's  brigade  involved  in  confusion 
both  the  3d  and  4th  regiments  of  grenadiers  (Old 
Guard),  the  four  (or,  more  probably,  three)  battalions  of 
which  were  the  leading  battalions  in  the  whole  column. 
This,  however,  is  by  no  means  certain.  All  we  know  is, 
that  those  troops  which  were  not  swept  off  the  field  by 
the  charge  of  Maitland's  guards,  among  which  assuredly 
were  the  3d  and  4th  regim.ents  of  chasseurs  (Middle 
Guard),  ignorant,  probably,  of  the  fate  which  had  befallen 
their  comrades,  steadily  pursued  their  way  towards  the 
right  centre  of  the  English  position.  As  the  eight  (or, 
more  probably,  six)  battalions  of  the  original  column  were 
formed  in  echelon,  the  right  in  advance,  it  is  plain  that  the 
march  of  the  four  (or,  more  probably,  three)  rear  battal- 
ions would  bring  them  on  a  part  of  the  English  line  to  the 
English  right  of  the  position  of  Maitland's  brigade, —  in 
fact,  "  towards  that  part  of  "  the  English  "  position  which 
had  been  vacated  by  the  second  brigade  of  Guards,  when 
it  moved  to  Hougomont."  ^^  In  this  direction,  then,  these 
remaining  battalions  of  the  Imperial  Guard  advanced. 
To  all  intents  and  purposes  they  now  constituted  a  sec- 
ond column.  As  a  second  column  they  must  have 
appeared  not  only  to  the  men  of  Maitland's  brigade, 
when  their  pursuit  of  the  leading  and  defeated  battalions 
brought  them  on  a  line  with  the  left  echelons  of  the  orig- 
inal formation,  but  also  to  the  troops  of  the  brigade  of 
Sir  Frederick  Adam,  who,  having  been  lying  behind  a 
ridge,  a  little  to  the  north  of  Hougomont,  were  now 
advanced,  and  found  the  French  guard  in  full  march  for 
the  summit  of  the  acclivity. 

The  initiative  seems  to  have  been  assumed  without  a 


^* Waterloo  Letters,  p.  245  ;  Maitland's  narrative. 


324  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.  1 6.] 

moment's  hesitation  by  Sir  John  Colborne,  the  lieuten- 
ant-colonel of  the  52d  regiment,  who  brought  his  command 
into  line  parallel  to  the  flank  of  the  Imperial  Guard,  and 
at  once  opened  fire.  This  action  was  approved  on  the 
spot  by  General  Adam,  who  ordered  the  other  regiments 
of  the  brigade  to  support  the  5 2d.  The  French  column 
was  obliged  to  halt,  and  to  deploy  to  its  left,  in  order  to 
return  the  fire,  and  for  a  few  minutes  the  action  was  very 
heavy  on  both  sides.^''  But  the  other  British  regiments 
coming  up,  and  the  French,  who  were  acting  at  a  mani- 
fest disadvantage  in  being  thus  compelled  to  halt  when 
half  way  up  the  slope,  and  resist  an  unexpected  and  reso- 
lute attack  on  their  flank  while  they  were  exposed  also  to 
the  fire  from  the  enemy's  batteries  in  front,  becoming 
evidently  uneasy,  Colborne  ordered  a  charge,  which 
broke  the  column  up  completely.  He  followed  the  dis- 
integrated and  demoralized  battalions  without  an 
instant's  hesitation  even  across  the  Charleroi  turnpike. 

In  this  attack,  the  Imperial  Guard  was  supported  on 
its  left  flank  neither  by  cavalry  nor  by  the  infantry  of 
Reille's  Corps.  Had  either  been  employed,  the  disaster 
could  not  have  happened.  A  charge  of  cavalry  would 
have  forced  the  5 2d  to  form  square ;  an  advance  of 
Bachelu's  division,  or  a  part  of  it,  would  have  engaged  all 
the  attention  of  Adam's  brigade,  and  permitted  the 
Guard  to  pursue  its  way  unmolested  to  the  crest  of  the 
hill. 

What  would  have  succeeded  the  repulse  and  defeat  of 
the  Imperial  Guard  had  the  Prussians  not  interposed,  no 
one  of  course  can  tell.  But  while  these  movements  were 
going  on,  about  7.30  P.  M.,  the  van  of  Zieten's  Corps 
reached  Papelotte ;  ^^  and  the  division  of  Steinmetz,  sup- 
ported by  cavalry  and  artillery,  turning  at  once  the  right 


"Waterloo  Letters ;  Colbome's  narrative,  pp.  284,  285 ;  Gawler's  narra- 
tive, p.  293. 
^^Charras,  vol.  1,  p.  327,  n. 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  325 

of  the  ist  Corps  and  the  left  of  the  6th,  advanced  upon 
the  field  of  battle,  spreading  terror  and  confusion  through- 
out the  right  wing  of  the  French  army.  Durutte's  and 
Marcognet's  divisions  abandoned  their  positions ;  Lobau 
retired  towards  Planchenoit ;  while  the  immense  success 
which  the  English  had  obtained  over  the  French  left  in 
routing  the  Imperial  Guard  was  instantly  improved  by 
Wellington  in  ordering  his  two  remaining  and  as  yet 
untouched  cavalry  brigades,  those  of  Vivian  and  Vande- 
leur,  to  charge.  These  bodies  of  horse,  which  had  been, 
in  the  latter  part  of  the  afternoon,  brought  over  from  the 
English  left  to  the  rear  of  their  centre,  were  now 
launched  upon  the  troops  of  Donzelot  and  Quiot,  and 
the  remains  of  the  French  cavalry;  and  then  the  Duke, 
seeing  that  the  battle  was  won,  ordered  the  whole  line  to 
advance.     (See  Map  12.) 

There  was  no  resistance  of  any  consequence  made, 
except  by  the  scattered  regiments  of  the  Imperial  Guard, 
and  by  the  6th  Corps  under  the  Count  de  Lobau,  which 
held  Planchenoit  against  the  renewed  assaults  of  Bulow's 
Corps,  supported  now  by  two  divisions  of  the  corps  of 
PIrch  I.  until  the  retreat  of  the  army  beyond  that  point 
was  assured.  The  Emperor  did  what  he  could;  he 
exerted  himself  in  every  way  ;^'^  his  headquarters-cavalry 
charged  the  English  light  horse ;  but  the  army  was  too 
much  exhausted  to  make  any  extraordinary  exertions ; 
and,  attacked  both  In  front  and  flank  as  the  French  were, 
nothing  but  extraordinary  exertions  could  possibly  suf- 
fice to  check  the  victorious  enemy,  superior  in  numbers 
as  well  as  in  position.  Hence  with  the  exception  of  the 
6th  Corps,  whose  task  was  a  definite  one,  and  undoubt- 
edly comprehended  by  every  soldier  in  it,  and  of  which 
one  of  the  most  courageous  and  efficient  officers  in  the 
French  army  had  charge,  no  resistance  on  a  large  scale 
was  offered.    The  ist  Corps  was  hopelessly  disorganized, 


''Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  331 


326  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.  16.] 

and  necessarily  so ;  the  2d  Corps  could  no  doubt  have 
effected  an  orderly  retreat  on  Nivelles,^°  but  Reille  did 
not  see  the  necessity  of  this  course,  and  perhaps  could 
not  have  been  expected  to  do  so.  Most  of  the  battalions 
of  the  Guard  preserved  their  organization,  and  resisted 
heroically  to  the  last.  The  Emperor  was  finally  forced 
to  take  refuge  in  one  of  the  squares  of  the  Guard,  and  in 
its  midst  he  was  safely  borne  off  his  last  field  of  battle.^' 

The  French  army  was  routed ;  but  its  condition  was 
made  exceptionally  bad  because  only  one  avenue  of 
retreat  was  follow^ed,  and  also  because  this  avenue  was 
practically  blocked  at  Genappe  by  the  supposed  necessity 
of  crossing  the  Dyle  on  a  single  bridge. ^^  Had  the  army 
been  able  to  spread  itself  over  an  open  countr}^  it  is  not 
likely  that  the  rout  would  have  been  so  complete,  and  it  is 
quite  certain  that  the  captures  of  artillery  would  not  have 
been  so  great.  But  the  Prussian  cavalry  took  up  the 
pursuit  which  neither  the  Prussian  nor  the  British  infan- 
ti-y  were  sufficiently  fresh  to  maintain;  and  in  the  ex- 
hausted condition  of  body  and  bewildered  state  of  mind 
in  which  the  mass  of  the  French  soldiers  were  when  the 
catastrophe  came,  little  was  needed  to  complete  their 
demoralization.  At  Genappe  over  a  hundred  pieces  of 
cannon  were  abandoned,  and  from  that  point  on  no 
attempt  was  made  to  keep  up  even  a  semblance  of  order. 
Such  was  the  famous  battle  of  Waterloo.  It  has 
become  a  synonym  for  hopeless  and  irremediable  dis- 
aster. It  is  not,  however,  necessary  here  to  review  the 
causes  of  the  catastrophe.  What  we  have  still  to  say  on 
this  head  we  shall  put  into  the  Notes  to  this  chapter. 
But  there  is  one  subject  that  properly  belongs  here. 

What  would  have  been  the  effect  if  Grouchy  had 
detained  the  corps  of  Biilow  and  Pirch  I.,  so  that  they 
could  not  have  taken  part  in  the  action  ? 


*°Doc.  Indd.,  p.  62  ;  Reille's  Statement. 
"Hist,  de  I'Ex-Garde,  pp.  53S,  539- 
^-Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  334. 


[chap.  1 6.]  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  327 

In  this  discussion  we  shall  assume  the  correctness  of 
our  conclusions,  reached  previously,  that  if  Grouchy  had 
started  at  daybreak  for  the  bridge  of  Moustier,  or  even  if 
he  had  followed  the  counsel  of  Gerard,  he  would  almost 
certainly  have  prevented  Billow,  Pirch  I.  and  Thielemann 
from  taking  any  part  in  the  battle. ^^  We  shall  not 
reargue  these  questions,  for  they  have  been  already  fully 
discussed. 

Let  us  suppose,  then,  that  Napoleon  could  have  uti- 
lized his  whole  force  against  the  army  of  Wellington  dur- 
ing the  w^hole  afternoon ;  that  he  could  have  given  his 
personal  direction  to  the  conduct  of  the  action ;  that  he 
could  have  followed  up  the  repulse  of  the  ist  Corps  with 
a  new  attack  in  which  Lobau  should  support  d'Erlon, 
and  in  which  the  cavalry  should  take  its  proper  part ; 
that  he  had  been  on  the  spot  when  La  Haye  Sainte  fell, 
and  had  improved  that  advantage  as  he  well  knew  how 
to  do ;  that  he  had  had  the  whole  of  the  Imperial  Guard, — 
infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery, —  at  his  disposal  for  the  car- 
rying of  Wellington's  position ;  it  seems  to  us  there  can  be 
no  reasonable  question  as  to  the  result ;  the  Duke  would 
have  been  badly  beaten,  and  the  action  would  in  all 
probability  have  been  over,  or  substantially  so,  by  six 
o'clock.  This  question  is  not  asked  to  gratify  the 
imagination,  or  for  purposes  of  speculation,  but  simply 
that  we  may  form  a  judgment  on  the  adequacy  of  Napo- 
leon's means  to  the  end  which  he  had  in  view ;  for,  if 
military  history  cannot  assist  us  in  forming  correct 
opinions  on  the  adequacy  of  certain  available  means  to 
the  attainment  of  certain  proposed  objects,  it  is  of  no  use 
whatever.  The  view  we  hold  as  to  the  necessity  of 
Bllicher's  support  to  Wellington's  success  is  the  same  as 
that  which  we  have  seen^'*  put  forth  by  Sir  James  Shaw- 


^^Ante,  pp.  261,  283. 
^*Afite,  pp.  294,  295. 


328  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.  [CHAP.  1 6.] 

Kennedy,  where  he  is  justifying  the  Duke  for  accepting- 
battle  at  Waterloo.'^ 

As  for  Zieten,  he  could  not  have  come  up  till  half- 
past  seven  o'clock,  which  would  have  been  too  late  for 
him  to  be  of  any  use  to  the  English.  The  prob- 
ability is  that  he  would  have  joined  the  other  corps  that 
were  fighting  Grouchy.  It  is  hardly  likely  that  he  would 
have  pursued  his  intention  of  joining  Wellington,  after 
he  had  heard  that  the  other  three  corps  were  not  likely 
to  interfere  in  the  battle  between  Napoleon  and  Wel- 
lington. This  would  have  been  to  run  a  great  risk ;  and 
one  that  under  the  circumstances  no  prudent  officer 
would  run.  We  are  supposing  now  that  Zieten  hears 
at  Ohain,  for  instance,  that  the  other  corps  are  engaged 
with  Grouchy  at  St.  Lambert  or  Couture, —  now,  then, 
he  must  admit  that  if  Grouchy  shall  be  able,  owing  to 
obstinate  or  skilful  fighting,  or  to  the  lateness  of  the  hour, 
or  to  chance,  to  prevent  Bulow,  Pirch  I.  and  Thielemann 
from  attacking  Napoleon  that  afternoon,  the  chances  are 
that  Napoleon  will  defeat  Wellington  before  he,  Zieten, 
can  possibly  arrive ;  and,  therefore,  for  him  to  proceed 
further  than  Ohain  will  simply  be  to  involve  himself  in 
the  disaster  of  the  Anglo-Dutch  army. 

But  while  we  must  state  our  conviction  that  Grouchy 
would  have  prevented  the  defeat  of  Napoleon  had  he 
crossed  the  Dyle,  we  certainly  do  not  consider  him  the 
sole  cause  of  the  defeat. 


^^Cf.  Wellington's  Report  (Gurwood,  vol.  xii,  p.  484;  App.  C,  xii;  post, 
pp.  372, 373),  where  he  says  that  he  attributes  the  successful  result  of  the  day 
to  the  assistance  he  received  from  the  Prussians. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  XVI. 

I.  That  the  tactics  employed  by  the  French  at  the 
battle  of  Waterloo  in  their  operations  against  the  army 
of  the  Duke  of  Wellington  were  unworthy  of  the  experi- 
ence and  reputation  of  their  commanders  is  almost  uni- 
versally admitted.  The  word  "commanders"  is  used 
advisedly,  because  Ney  seems  to  have  had  the  immediate 
direction  of  the  ist  and  2d  Corps  even  when  the  Em- 
peror was  personally  superintending  the  battle,  and  when 
Napoleon  was  called  off  to  direct  the  defence  of  Planche- 
noit,  Ney  was  certainly  in  sole  control.  But  this  does 
not  fully  exonerate  the  Emperor  from  responsibility  for 
the  dispositions  which  were  made. 

The  faulty  formation  of  d'Erlon's  Corps  in  its  great 
assault  on  the  English  left  was  the  first  blunder.  The 
employment  of  the  whole  of  Reille's  Corps  in  the  attack 
on  Hougomont  was  the  next.  Then  the  negligent  and 
wasteful  way  in  which  the  attacks  on  both  Hougomont 
and  La  Haye  Sainte  were  conducted  warrant  severe  criti- 
cism. The  employment  of  all  the  reserve  cavalry  of  the 
army  was  a  most  unheard  of  and  uncalled  for  proceed- 
ing ;  they  were  all  put  in,  and  kept  in  until  they  were  all 
exhausted.  One  would  certainly  suppose  that  Ney,  who 
was  responsible  for  this  proceeding,  must  have  seen,  long 
before  the  close  of  the  afternoon,  that  the  cavalry  were 
being  completely  ruined,  and  that  no  appreciable  injury 
was  being  inflicted  on  the  enemy. 


330  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.-NOTES.      [CHAP.    1 6.] 

We  cannot  but  think  that  if  Napoleon  had  personally 
directed  the  battle  at  this  period,  this  useless  and  waste- 
ful employment  of  the  cavalry  would  not  have  been 
made.  And  we  cannot  help  thinking,  also,  that  the  Em- 
peror would  have  brought  some  at  least  of  Reille's  troops 
out  of  the  enclosures  of  Hougomont  to  support  any 
attacks  of  cavalry  which  he  might  have  ordered,  either  in 
conjunction  with  the  divisions  of  Donzelot  and  Quiot,  or 
with  the  Imperial  Guard,  which,  but  for  the  attack  of  the 
Prussians,  he  would  no  doubt  have  put  in  between  4  and 
5  o'clock.  We  must  bear  in  mind,  that  Napoleon  was 
fighting  the  Prussians  near  Planchenoit  during  a  large 
part  of  the  afternoon,  and,  in  fact  during  the  critical 
period  of  the  battle ;  and  that  he  cannot  fairly  be  held 
liable  to  the  censure  for  the  tactics  used  in  the  fight 
against  the  English,  which  some  English  writers,  in  for- 
getfulness  of  this  fact,  have  undertaken  to  apply  to 
him. 

The  1st  Corps,  after  its  severe  repulse,  rallied  well  and 
did  extremely  good  work.  The  persistent  attacks  of 
Quiot's  and  Donzelot's  infantry  showed  great  enterprise 
and  daring,  up  to  the  very  last ;  and  these  troops  deserve 
all  praise.  No  doubt  the  bravery  of  the  men  of  the  2d 
Corps  in  their  ineffectual  attacks  on  Hougomont  was 
equally  commendable ;  but  it  was  a  great  waste  of  material 
to  employ  the  entire  corps  in  such  an  operation  as 
attacking  Hougomont.  Hougomont  should  have  been 
attacked,  undoubtedly,  but  only  by  a  moderate  force ; 
very  possibly  it  might  have  been  carried,  had  proper 
means  been  employed.'  But  it  w^as  of  far  more  impor- 
tance to  utilize  the  infantry  of  the  2d  Corps  in  breaking 
the  English  lines  to  the  eastward  of  Hougomont,  in 
conjunction  with  cavalry  or  the  Imperial  Guard,  than  to 
persist  in  throwing  fresh  regiments  against  the  brick 
walls   of  the  house  and  garden.    Hougomont  might   in 


M«A',  pp.  303,  304. 


[chap.  1 6.]     THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.-NOTES.  33 1 

fact  have  been  turned ;  and,  if  the  last  charge  had  suc- 
ceeded, it  would  have  been.  A  notable  exception  to  the 
unfavorable  criticism  on  the  French  tactics  on  this  day 
is  made  by  all  historians  when  speaking  of  the  gallant, 
skilful  and  obstinate  defence  of  Planchenoit  against  the 
Prussians  by  the  6th  Corps  under  the  Count  de  Lobau, 
assisted  by  the  Young  Guard  and  some  regiments  of 
grenadiers  and  chasseurs.  No  praise  is  too  high  for 
these  troops. 

2.  The  English  tactics  deserved,  and  have  always 
received,  the  high  commendation  of  historians.  Not 
only  was  the  Duke  himself  always  watchful  and  alert,  but 
his  efforts  were  admirably  seconded  by  his  officers.  The 
unfailing  energy  and  enterprise  shown  even  at  the  very 
close  of  this  exhausting  day  by  the  Duke  himself  and  his 
lieutenants  is  at  least  quite  as  remarkable  as  the  obsti- 
nacy and  courage  displayed  in  resisting  the  repeated 
attacks  of  their  antagonists.  The  conduct  of  Maitland, 
Halkett  and  Colborne  in  the  last  great  emergency  exhib- 
its the  tenacity,  courage,  presence  of  mind,  and  readi- 
ness to  seize  the  opportunity,  which  are  the  great  mili- 
tary virtues,  existing  in  undiminished  vigor  at  the  close 
of  a  most  bloody  and  doubtful  contest. 

3.  The  account  given  in  the  text  of  the  charge  of  the 
Imperial  Guard  does  not  agree  fully  with  any  of  the  nar- 
ratives, but  will  be  found,  on  reflection,  it  is  submitted, 
to  harmonize  most  of  the  conflicting  evidence.  The  sub- 
ject is  a  large  one,  and  the  testimony  is  very  confusing. 
It  is  impossible  to  reconcile  all  the  statements.  But  it  is 
believed  that  the  view  maintained  in  the  text, —  that  the 
Imperial  Guard  advanced  in  one  body,  or  column,  not  in 
two ;  that  this  column  (as  we  may  call  it,  for  lack  of  a 
better  term)  consisted  at  most  of  eight,  and  probably  of 
only  six  battalions,  each  formed  in  close  column  of  grand 
divisions, —  that  is,  with  a  front  of  two  companies, —  the 
usual  practice  in  those  days, —  presenting  about  75  men 
in  the   front   rank, —  that  these  battalions  advanced  in 


;^^2  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO -NOTES.      [CHAP.  1 6.] 

echelo7t,  the  right  in  advance, —  explains  most  of  the  dis- 
crepancies, and  accounts  for  all  or  nearly  all  the  impor- 
tant statements  contained  in  the  different  narratives.  It 
was  the  leading"  battalions  of  this  column  which  were 
met  and  defeated  by  Maitland's  guards ;  it  was  the  rear 
battalions  which  were  flanked  and  routed  by  the  5 2d  and 
the  other  regiments  of  Adam's  (light)  brigade. 

A.  There  is,  in  our  judgment,  no  foundation  for  the 
hypothesis  of  two  columns,  which,  introduced  by 
Siborne,  has  received  the  indorsement  of  Chesney,  Ken- 
nedy and  Hooper.  It  is  opposed  to  the  contemporane- 
ous authorities  of  both  nations.  Napoleon's  report  of 
the  battle,'— Ney's  letter  to  the  Duke  of  Otranto,^— 
Drouot's  speech  in  the  chamber  of  Peers,'* —  speak  but  of 
one  column, —  of  one  attack, —  of  one  repulse.  Sir 
Digby  Mackworth,  who  was  on  Lord  Hill's  staff,  in  a 
position  where  he  could  observ^e  ever}''thing,  wrote  in  his 
journal  at  eleven  o'clock  at  night,  after  the  battle  was 
over,  as  follows :  — ^ 

"  A  black  mass  of  the  grenadiers  of  the  Imperial  Guard,  with 
music  playing  and  the  great  Napoleon  at  their  head,  came  rolling 
onward  from  the  farm  of  La  Belle  Alliance.  *  *  *  "Yho. 
point  at  which  the  enemy  aimed  was  now  evident.  It  was  an 
angle  formed  by  a  brigade  of  guards  [Maitland's]  and  the  light  bri- 
gade [Adam's]  of  Lord  Hill's  Corps." 

Mackworth  then  goes  on  to  describe  the  contest,  and 
the  rout  of  the  enemy.  There  is  not  a  word  of  there 
being  two  columns  and  two  attacks. 

This  is  true,  it  is  believed,  of  all  the  early  narratives  by 
British  officers.''     It  may  fairly  be  deduced  from  this  evi- 


^Corresp.,  vol.  28,  p.  343  ;  Jones,  p,  384. 

^Jones,  p.  387. 

*Ib.,  p.227. 

^Sidney's  Life  of  Lord  Hill,  p.  309. 

^Jones  (Artillery  Operations),  p.  177;  Sharpin  in  the  "  Waterloo  Letters,'" 
pp.  228  etseq. ;  Gore,  pp.  58  et  seq.      See,  also,  Captain  Batty  s  account  (pp. 


[chap.  1 6.]     THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.-NOTES.  2>33 

dence  that  the  repulse  of  the  right  and  advanced  battal- 
ions by  the  guards,  and  the  attack  on  the  left  and  rear 
ones  by  the  light  brigade  were  nearly  synchronous, — 
the  latter  being  probably  a  few  minutes  later  than  the 
former. 

B.  The  claims  put  forward  on  behalf  of  the  light  bri- 
gade (Adam's),  and  specially  of  the  5 2d  regiment,  next 
demand  our  consideration. 

Gawler,  a  distinguished  officer  of  the  52d,  in  his 
"  Crisis  and  Close  of  the  Action  at  Waterloo  " ''  admits 
that  "  the  headmost  companies  of  the  Imperial  Guard 

*  *  *  crowned  the  very  summit  of  the  posi- 
tion." He  says  that  "  the  fire  of  the  brigade  of  guards 
then  opened  upon  them,  but  they  still  pressed  forward." 
And  he  claims^  that  their  attack  was  repulsed  not  "  by  a 
charge  of  General  Maitland's  brigade  of  guards,"  "  but 

*  *  *  by  a  charge  of  the  5 2d,  covered  by  the 
71st  regiment,  without  the  direct  cooperation  of  any 
other  portion  of  the  allied  army." 

Unfortunately  for  this  claim,  however,  we  have  it  from 
another  officer  of  the  52d,  Leeke,  that  Gawler  was  on  the 
extreme  right  of  the  regiment.^      In   this   position,  as 


106  (?/  seq.,)  in  his  "Historical  Sketch  of  the  Campaign  of  1815":  London, 
1820.  He  was  an  ensign  in  the  ist  regiment  of  foot-guards  in  Maitland's 
brigade.  He  speaks,  it  is  true,  of  the  chasseurs  of  the  Guard  "forming 
another  attack  " ;  but  he  says  that  it  was  when  Maitland  was  advancing,  that 
he  perceived  the  chasseurs  "  so  far  advanced  as  to  menace  the  right  flank  of 
the  brigade," — which  is  substantially  the  view  maintained  in  the  text.  Cf. 
Siborne,  vol.  2,  p.  170,  where  the  same  statement  is  made.  Yet  Siborne  (vol. 
2,  p.  174)  says  that  "  between  the  heads  of  the  two  attacking  columns  there 
was  a  distance  during  their  advance  oi/rom  ten  to  twelve  minutes''  march!''' 
How  such  an  interval  was  possible,  when  the  contest  of  the  Guard  with  Mait- 
land's brigade  was  of  such  extremely  short  duration,  is  not  apparent.  See 
Maitland's  statement  in  "Waterloo  Letters,  pp.  244,  245  ;  also  statements  of 
Powell  and  Dirom ;  pp.  255  ;  257,  258. 

^Gawler,  p.  15. 

"lb.  pp.  31,  32. 

'Leeke,  vol.  i,  p.  84. 


334  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.-NOTES.      [cHAP.  l6,j 

Leeke  remarks,  he  could  not  have  seen  what  took  place 
at  the  head  of  the  French  column/"  When  he  says, 
therefore,  that  the  flank  attack  of  the  5 2d  alone  over- 
threw the  Imperial  Guard,  he  is  speaking  without  any- 
personal  knowledge  of  what  took  place  in  the  front  of 
that  column,  and  we  are  thrown  back  on  the  evidence  of 
the  officers  of  Maitland's  brigade. 

Leeke  has  a  curious  theory  on  this  matter.  He  says 
that  the  advance  of  the  Guard  was  preceded  and  covered 
by  "  a  mass  of  skirmishers,"  "  and  that  it  was  these  skir- 
mishers and  these  only  that  were  driven  off  by  Mait- 
land's brigade. 

In  order  to  maintain  this  contention,  Leeke  is  com- 
pelled to  assume  the  presence  in  front  of  the  main  body 
of  the  Imperial  Guard  of  "  massed  skirmishers  "  thrown 
out  by  the  Guard,  and  also  that  the  battalions  of  the  Guard 
never  got  nearer  to  Maitland's  brigade  than  300  yards." 

But  this  is  mere  guess  work.  Sharpin,  an  officer  in 
Napier's  battery,  which  was  stationed  close  to  Maitland's 
brigade,  says  :  —  '^ 

"  We  saw  the  French  bonnets  just  above  the  high  corn  and 
within  40  or  50  yards  of  our  guns.  I  believe  they  were  in  close 
columns  of  grand  divisions." 

Says  Captain  Powell  of  the  ist  Foot  Guards  :  —  '* 
"A  close  column  of  grenadiers  (about  seventies  in  front)  * 

*  *  were  seen  ascending  the  rise  *  *  *  They  contin- 
ued to  advance  till  within  50  or  60  paces  of  our  front." 

'°Lord  Seaton,  then  Sir  John  Colborne,  who  commanded  the  52d,  admits 
that  he  did  not  himself  see,  and  could  not  have  seen,  any  movement  of  the 
guards.  He  simply  claims  that  the  Imperial  Guard  halted  when  his  skir- 
mishers opened  fire  on  their  flank.    Leeke,  vol.  i,  p.  loi. 

"lb.,  pp.  43,  44,  84. 

'^Leeke,  vol.  i,  p.  84.  See  also  his  letter  to  the  Editor  of  the  Army  and 
Navy  Gazette,  August  17,  1867. 

"Waterloo  Letters,  p.  229.  Cf.  a  statement  of  an  officer  in  the  same  bat- 
tery,—  Jones,  p.  177,— probably  Sharpin. 

'♦Waterloo  Letters,  pp.  254,  255. 


[chap.  1 6.]      THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO -NOTES.  335 

Says  Captain  Dirom  of  the  same  regiment :  —  '^ 

"The  Imperial  Guard  advanced  in  close  column  with  ported 
arms,  the  officers  of  the  leading  division  in  front  weaving  their 
swords.  The  French  columns  showed  no  appearance  of  having 
suffered  on  their  advance,  but  seemed  as  regularly  form  ed  as  if  at  a 
field-day.  When  they  got  within  a  short  distance  we  were  ordered 
to  make  ready,  present  and  fire." 

Leeke's  theory  of  "massed  skirmishers"  needs  no 
further  refutation.  There  can  be  no  question  that  the 
officers  of  Maitland's  guards  saw  right  before  them  the 
leading  battahons  of  the  Imperial  Guard  formed  in  the 
ordinary  manner,  in  close  columns  of  grand  divisions. 
The  skirmishers  had  all  been  withdrawn  by  the  time  the 
leading  battalions  reached  the  top  of  the  acclivity. 

It  should,  however,  be  added  that  the  left  and  rear 
battalions  which  Colborne  attacked  in  flank  were  entirely 
unaffected  by  the  charge  of  Maitland's  brigade.  The 
British  guards  did  undoubtedly  charge  the  troops  in  their 
front,  and  drove  them  down  the  hill  a  short  distance,  but 
on  finding  other  troops,  i.  e.,  the  four  (or,  more  probably, 
three)  rear  and  left  battalions  of  the  Imperial  Guard,  on 
their  right  flank,  they  retired  to  the  crest  of  the  hill,  and 
certainly  did  not  assist  the  52d  and  the  other  regiments  of 
Adam's  brigade  in  their  brilliant  flank  attack.  The  credit 
of  having  overthrown  the  rear  half  of  the  column  of  the 
Imperial  Guard  is  due  entirely  to  that  brigade ;  and  it 
assuredly  was  a  most  skilfully  designed  and  daringly  exe- 
cuted movement.  Colborne  saw  at  a  glance  that  the 
several  battalions  of  the  Guard  could  not  be  deployed  in 
such  a  way  as  to  return  anything  like  as  destructive  a 
fire  as  that  which  the  unbroken  line  of  the  5 2d  could 
deliver.  The  Guard  undoubtedly  did  its  best ;  the  firing 
was  very  hot  for  a  time ;  Gawler  says  '*"  his  regiment  lost 
150  officers  and  men  in  four  or  five  minutes.     But  his 


"  Waterloo  Letters,  p.  257. 

'*  lb.,  p.  293  ;  Cf.  Colbcrne's  Letter,  p.  2S5. 


33^  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.-NOTES.      [CHAP.  1 6.] 

men  were  perfectly  steady ;  their  fire  was  at  very  close 
range  and  well  kept  up ;  they  had  the  advantage  of  posi- 
tion ;  the  loss  of  the  French  columns  was  fearful ;  '^  and 
when  Colborne,  perceiving  that  the  moment  had  come, 
ordered  a  charge,  the  Guard  broke  into  a  confused  mass, 
and  were  pursued  to  and  across  the  Charleroi  road.  The 
flank  attack  of  Adam's  brigade  was  certainly  a  most  bril- 
liant, and  yet  a  well-justified,  manoeuvre,  —  impossible  to 
any  but  veteran  troops,  and  which  none  but  an  experi- 
enced, vigilant  and  daring  officer  would  ever  have  ordered. 
Colborne  took,  it  must  be  admitted,  great  risks.  He  says 
himself'^  that,  as  his  skirmishers  opened  fire  on  the 
Guards,  his  attention  was  completely  drawn  to  his  posi- 
tion and  dangerous  advance,  —  a  large  mass  of  cavalry 
having  been  seen  on  the  right.  Certainly  it  must  have 
required  some  nerve  to  decide  to  run  such  a  risk  as  this, 
and  on  his  own  responsibility  too,  for  he  advanced  his 
regiment  before  receiving  any  order  from  General  Adam. 
But  success  justified  his  decision. 

4.  Whether  Napoleon  was  warranted  in  ordering  the 
Guard  forward,  or  rather  that  portion  of  it  which  could 
be  mustered,  is  a  question  which  has  been  much  dis- 
cussed, and,  we  are  inclined  to  think,  to  no  great  profit. 
The  answer  must  depend  on  the  extent  of  the  informa- 
tion possessed  by  Napoleon  as  to  the  actual  condition  of 
things  at  the  time  when  he  ordered  the  movement ;  and 
this,  of  course,  must  be  mainly  a  matter  of  conjecture. 
The  order  was  given  somewhere  about  half-past  six 
o'clock, — an  hour  before  Zieten  arrived  at  Papelotte ; 
and  Napoleon  certainly  did  not  expect  him.  BUlow  had 
been  forced  to  retire.  The  news  from  the  front  received 
by  the  Emperor  when  he  was  conducting  the  fight  against 
the  Prussian  flank  attack  near  Planchenoit  had  been 
decidedly  favorable.      The    army    of    Wellington    was 


Leeke,  vol.  i,  p.  104;  Letter  of  Colonel  Brotherton. 
lb.,  p.  loi. 


[chap.  1 6.]     THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERTOO -NOTES.  ZZ7 

reported  as  manifestly  getting  weaker  and  weaker.  The 
guns  placed  near  La  Haye  Sainte  had  done  serious 
damage  to  the  English  squares  and  batteries.  The 
activity  and  energy  of  Quiot's  and  Donzelot's  infantry 
showed  no  abatement.  It  seems  to  us  that  the  Emperor 
had  good  reason  to  think  that  the  English  lines  would 
give  way  before  a  determined  attack  made  by  fresh  troops, 
and  those  the  veterans  of  the  Imperial  Guard.  He  told 
Ney  to  mass  on  the  right  of  Hougomont  all  the  troops  of 
Reille  s  Corps  that  he  could  collect,  to  concentrate  the 
divisions  of  Quiot  and  Donzelot  near  La  Haye  Sainte, 
and  to  prepare  to  support  the  attack  with  cavalry.  "^ 

He  must,  however,  have  been  grievously  disappointed 
as  to  the  execution  of  this  order  by  Marshal  Ney.  When 
the  Emperor  brought  up  the  Guard,  Bachelu's  infantry 
had  not  been  drawn  out  of  the  wood  of  Hougomont. '° 
Fire's  cavalry,  which  were  in  perfectly  good  condition, 
had  not  been  brought  over  from  the  Nivelles  road.  ^'  No 
attempt  apparently  had  been  made  to  organize  any  cavalry 
force  from  the  wrecks  of  the  splendid  divisions  which 
Ney  had  so  obstinately  and  blindly  launched  again  and 
again  upon  the  English  squares.  And  the  Emperor,  who 
must  have  expected  that  an  officer  of  the  ability  and 
experience  of  Marshal  Ney  would  have  made  some  at 
least  of  the  necessary  arrangements  for  the  proper  support 
of  the  charging  column,  must  have  experienced  a  disap- 
pointment as  sudden  as  it  must  have  been  bitter,  w^hen 
he  saw  the  battalions  of  the  Guard  ascend  the  plateau 
without  a  regiment  of  cavalry  to  protect  their  flanks,  or 
any  part  of  the  2d  Corps  supporting  their  attack. 

The  charge,  such  as  it  was,  of  the  Imperial  Guard  at 


'9  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  321. 

^Wellington  brought  up  about  this  time  to  the  right  centre  of  his  line 
Chass^'s  Dutch-Belgian  Division,  besides  other  troops. 

^'  WeUington  about  this  time  brought  over  the  brigades  of  Vivian  and 
Vandeleur  to  the  threatened  centre  of  his  line,  as  well  as  the  remnants  of 
Somerset's  and  Ponsonby's  brigades. 


338  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.-NOTES.      [CHAP.   16.] 

Waterloo  was  most  firmly  and  gallantly  met  and  repulsed. 
But  it  should  never  be  forgotten  that  it  was  not  the  sort 
of  charge  which  Napoleon  was  in  the  habit  of  making 
with  his  Guard ;  that  it  was,  at  best,  a  charge  of  8  battal- 
ions out  of  24,  —  of  1 2  guns  out  of  96,  —  and  that  no  cavalry 
at  all,  light  or  heavy,  supported  the  charging  column. 
Made,  as  it  was,  without  supports,  except  so  far  a: 
Donzelot's  gallant  infantry  protected  its  right  flank,  it 
was  a  terrible  mistake  to  make  it.  And  it  is  all  but  cer- 
tain that  if  proper  care  and  skill  had  been  expended  on 
the  preparations  and  accompaniments  of  the  movement, 
—  if,  in  a  word,  Ney  had  kept  his  head  cool  and  his  hand 
steady,  as  did  the  Duke,  —  Pire's  lancers  and  Bachelu's 
division  would  have  given  abundant  employment  to  the 
whole  of  Adam's  brigade,  and  a  few  squadrons  of  horse 
could  have  protected  the  advance  on  the  right.  This 
is  not,  we  submit,  going  too  far  in  the  region  of 
conjecture.  Bachelu  and  Pire,  at  any  rate,  were  close  at 
hand,  and  under  Ney's  command,  and  were,  so  far  as  we 
know,  doing  nothing  at  the  time  when  the  charge  was 
ordered. 

Ney,  in  fact,  contributed  apparently  little,  except  his 
example  of  desperate  courage,  to  the  success  of  the  day. 
But  courage,  though  indispensable,  does  not  take  the  place 
of  judgment  and  presence  of  mind."  Ney  failed  most  un- 
mistakably to  make  the  most  of  his  resources ;  he  lost 
sight,  practically,  of  one  of  the  two  corps  under  his  orders ; 
he  used  up  all  his  cavalry ;  and  he  neglected  to  make  even 
the  preparations  and  arrangements  which  were  yet  feas- 
ible to  second  the  attack  of  the  Guard.  It  is  impossible 
not  to  contrast  his  conduct  with  that  of  Wellington, 
whose  admirable  forethought  and  coolness  gave  him  the 


^  On  Marshal  Ney's  state  of  mind  at  this  time,  see  Gourgaud,  pp.  4S,  n.; 
Ill,  112;  Corresp.,  vol.  31,  pp.  249,  250;  Muquardt,  p.  149,  n.;  Life  of  Sir  W. 
Napier,  vol.  i,  p.  505, — where  Soult  gives  his  opinion  on  Ney's  conduct; 
Berton,  p.  41,  where  Ney's  extraordinary  letter  to  Fouche  Qones,  pp.  3S5 
et  seq.)  is  examined. 


[chap.  17.]      THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO -NOTES.  339 

control  of  the  situation,  and  enabled  him  to  utilize 
fully  all  the  resources  which  at  the  close  of  this  trying 
day  still  remained  to  him. 

5.  We  have  not  thought  it  necessary  to  do  more  than 
to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  Duke  of  Wellington 
retained  some  18,000  men  of  Colville's  division  at  Hal 
and  Tubize  throughout  this  perilous  and  bloody  day. 
The  best  English  authorities  '^  unhesitatingly  condemn 
the  Duke's  action  in  this  regard.  Says  Sir  James  Shaw- 
Kennedy  :  — '^ 

"Wellington  certainly  ought  to  have  had  Colville,  with  the  force 
under  his  command,  on  the  field  of  battle  at  Waterloo.  There  was 
no  cause  whatever  for  his  being  kept  in  the  direction  of  Hal.  It 
would  have  been  a  gross  error  on  the  part  of  Napoleon  to  have 
detached  any  important  force  on  that  road,  and  Colville  should, 
early  on  the  morning  of  the  iSth,  have  been  ordered  to  march  to 
Waterloo,  if  he  had  no  information  of  the  advance  of  the  enemy  on 
Hal." 

6.  It  may  be  thought  by  some  that  the  effect  upon  the 
corps  of  Billow  and  Pirch  I.  of  the  appearance  of  Marshal 
Grouchy's  command,  marching  from  Moustier  and 
Ottignies  upon  Lasne  and  St.  Lambert,  has  been  stated 
too  strongly  in  the  text.  But  we  cannot  think  so.  Imag- 
ine 30,000  or  40,000  men  marching  in  a  long  column 
along  miry  roads  to  attack  an  enemy,  and  still  some  miles 
from  the  field  of  battle,  perceiving  a  body  of  troops  of 
apparently  equal  or  nearly  equal  strength  moving  right 
upon  their  line  of  march,  which  is  also  their  line  of  com- 
munications.  How  many  officers  in  Bialow's  position 
would  not  have  halted  to  resist  such  an  attack  ? 

It  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  dilemma  in  which  Biilow 
and  Pirch  I.  were  placed  by  knowing  that  Grouchy  was 
attacking  Wavre  was  quite  a  different  one.  In  the  first 
place,  they,  as  we  now  know,  estimated  Grouchy's  force 


Chesney,  p.  217  ;  Hamley,  p.  198, 
Kennedy,  p.  174. 


340  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.-NOTES.      [CHAP.   1 6.] 

at  only  half  its  strength,  —  they  never,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered, actually  saw  it ;  and  in  the  second  place,  Grouchy 
might  well  be  detained  by  Thielemann  at  and  about 
Wavre  until  the  battle  of  Waterloo  had  been  won. 

If,  however.  Grouchy  had  been  observed  marching  from 
the  Dyle  directly  on  their  columns  en  route  for  Planch e- 
noit,  the  Prussian  commanders  almost  certainly  would 
have  been  compelled  to  halt  and  to  give  him  battle.  And 
this  they  must  have  done  even  although  they  might  have 
been  satisfied  that  their  forces  were  superior  in  numbers. 
A  smaller  force,  if  it  is  directed  on  the  line  of  march  of  a 
larger  one,  almost  inevitably  must  detain  it. 

7.  The  complete  ruin  which  overtook  the  French 
army  at  Waterloo  is  to  be  attributed  mainly  to  the 
unexpected  appearance  and  vigorous  attack  of  Zieten's 
Corps  at  the  close  of  the  day,  when  the  French  had  become 
thoroughly  exhausted,  and  when,  owing  to  the  darkness, 
it  was  impossible  for  the  Emperor  to  accomplish  anything 
in  the  way  of  rallying  them  or  making  new  dispositions. 
The  English  had  certainly  won  a  great  success  in  routing 
the  Imperial  Guard ;  but  they  were  not  strong  enough  to 
drive  the  French  army  from  the  field,  even  with  the 
assistance  which  Blilow  and  Pirch  I.  afforded  on  the  side 
of  Planchenoit.  They  had  cleared  their  front  of  the 
enemy  from  Hougomont  to  the  turnpike ;  but  they  were 
in  no  condition  to  attack  the  strong  position  of  the  French, 
defended  by  the  troops  of  the  2d  Corps,  and  crowned 
with  many  and  powerful  batteries.  The  French  centre, 
Miifiling  tells  us,  ^^  remained  immovable  after  their  right 
wing  was  in  full  retreat,  and  it  was  not  until  some  of 
Zieten's  batteries,  which  had  been  brought  over  to  the 
west  of  La  Haye  Sainte,  opened  fire,  that  it  began  to 
retire.  Then  Wellington  ordered  his  whole  line  to 
advance.  But  it  was  a  very  thin  line  indeed,  consisting, 
as  Muffling  says,  only  of  small  bodies,  of  a  few  hundred 


Muffling  ;  Passages,  p.  249. 


[chap.   i6.]     the  battle  of  WATERLOO-NOTES.  34I 

men   each,   and   at  great    intervals    from    each    other. 
Muffling  goes  on  to  say :  —  ^^ 

"  The  advance  of  such  weak  battalions,  with  the  great  gaps 
between,  appeared  hazardous,  and  General  Lord  Uxbridge,  who 
commanded  the  cavalry,  drew  the  Duke's  attention  to  the  danger ; 
the  Duke,  however,  would  not  order  them  to  stop.  ♦  *  * 
The  Duke  with  his  practised  eye  perceived  that  the  French  army 
was  no  longer  dangerous ;  he  was  equally  aware,  indeed,  that,  with 
his  infantry  so  diminished,  he  could  achieve  nothing  more  of  im- 
portance :  but  if  he  stood  still,  and  resigned  the  pursuit  to  the 
Prussian  army  alone,  it  might  appear  in  the  eyes  of  Europe  as  if  the 
English  army  had  defended  themselves  bravely  indeed,  but  that  the 
Prussians  alone  decided  and  won  the  battle." 

The  rout  of  the  divisions  of  Durutte  and  Marcognet 
was  entirely  due  to  Zieten's  attack;  this  is  universally 
admitted.  Had  it  not  been  for  Zieten,  then,  the  only 
contest  that  would  have  gone  on  that  evening  would  have 
been  at  and  near  Planchenoit ;  and  it  is  hard  to  suppose 
that  Napoleon  could  not  have  maintained  his  position 
there,  if  he  had  had  his  whole  army  to  draw  from  when 
the  Young  Guard  and  Lobau  needed  reinforcements. 
To  the  unexpected  irruption  of  Zieten's  Corps, —  or 
rather  of  his  leading  division  of  infantry,  all  his  cavalry, 
and  most  of  his  artillery,  —  arriving  at  the  close  of  the 
day,  on  the  flank  of  the  army,  and  in  perfectly  open 
ground,  is  the  rout  of  the  French  army,  therefore,  princi- 
pally to  be  attributed. 

8.  It  only  remains  to  discuss  the  question  of  the 
responsibility  for  the  intervention  of  the  Prussians,  as 
between  the  Emperor  and  Marshal  Grouchy.  It  may 
fairly  be  said  that  if  either  of  them  had  taken  all  the  steps 
which  the  situation,  as  it  presented  itself  to  his  mind, 
demanded,  this  intervention  might  have  been  prevented. 

If  the  Emperor,  when  he  thought  it  possible  that  the 
Prussians  might  be  intending  to  unite  with  the  English, 


^^Miiffling;  Passages,  p.  250. 


342  THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO.-NOTES.      [CHAP.  1 6.] 

had  taken  Grouchy  with  him,  and  had  stationed  his  two 
corps,  or  one  of  them,  on  the  day  of  the  battle,  at  or 
near  Lasne  and  St.  Lambert,  or  if  he  had  employed  one 
or  both  of  Grouchy's  corps  in  attacking  the  English, 
Bliicher,  it  is  safe  to  say,  would  not  have  interfered  in 
the  duel  between  Napoleon  and  Wellington. 

If,  after  sending  Grouchy  off.  Napoleon  had  informed 
him  of  the  impending  battle,  and  had  charged  him  to 
return  to  the  main  army  by  way  of  Moustier  if  he  found 
that  the  Prussians  had  gone  to  Wavre,  it  is  altogether 
probable  that  the  march  of  the  Prussians  would  have  been 
arrested. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  Grouchy  had  acted  of  his  own 
motion  on  sound  military  principles  at  daybreak  of  the 
1 8th,  or  even  had  been  willing  to  follow  the  counsel  of 
Gerard  at  noon,  the  same  result  would  probably  have  been 
attained. 

Napoleon  took  a  wholly  unnecessary  risk  when  he 
detached  Grouchy  with  such  a  large  force,  after  he  had 
reason  to  apprehend  that  the  Prussians  were  intending  to 
unite  with  the  English,  and  he  negligently  omitted  to 
take  the  usual  means  to  reduce  this  risk  by  supplying  his 
lieutenant  with  the  necessary  information,  and  with 
precise  orders  in  case  he  should  find  that  Bliicher  in- 
tended to  cooperate  with  Wellington.  He  trusted  to 
Grouchy  to  take  the  right  course,  and  Grouchy  failed  to 
do  so.  Both  Napoleon  and  Grouchy  are  therefore  re- 
sponsible for  the  intervention  of  the  Prussians  and  the 
loss  of  the  battle. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 
CONCLUDING  OBSERVATIONS. 

The  justification  for  this  book  on  the  well-worn  subject 
of  the  campaign  of  Waterloo  is  to  be  found,  if  at  all,  in  its 
treatment  of  certain  topics  to  which  we  now  propose  very 
briefly  to  advert. 

1.  First  among  them  is  Napoleon's  plan  of  campaign.' 
In  regard  to  this  we  have  followed  his  own  account,  and 
have  pointed  out  the  difference  between  it  and  the  plan 
which  it  has  been  claimed  he  either  really  did  entertain 
or  ought  to  have  entertained. 

2.  In  regard  to  the  much-vexed  question  of  the  alleged 
verbal  order  to  Marshal  Ney  to  seize  Quatre  Bras  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  15th  of  June,  new  light,  it  is  submitted, 
has  been  thrown.^  The  contemporaneous  evidence  of  the 
bulletin,  and  the  statement  made  by  Marshal  Grouchy  in 
1818,  make  it  very  difficult  to  disbelieve  Napoleon's 
account  of  this  matter. 

3.  The  true  cause  of  the  delay  on  the  morning  of  the 
1 6th  of  June  has  been,  we  submit,  pointed  out.^  The  fact 
that  d'Erlon's  Corps  was  so  far  in  the  rear  seems  to  have 
been  the  chief  reason  for  delaying  the  forward  movement 
both  of  the  left  wing  and  of  the  main  army. 

4.  It  has  been  shown  by  Marshal  Ney's  orders  to  his 
command,  and  from   other  evidence   furnished   by   his 


'Chapter  I,  and  Notes :  Notes  to  Chapter  IV. 
^Anie,  pp.  64  et  seq. 
^Afae,i)p.  131.  132;  139. 


344  CONCLUDING  OBSERVATIONS.  [CHAP.  1 7.] 

defenders,  that  his  arrangements  for  carrying  out  his 
instructions  on  the  i6th  were  extremely  defective,  and,  in 
fact,  that  he  perversely  departed  from  the  letter  and  spirit 
of  his  orders.'*  It  has  also  been  shown  that  a  vigorous  and 
unhesitating  compliance  with  the  orders  which  he 
received  would  in  all  probability  have  changed  the  issue 
of  the  campaign. 5 

5.  In  regard  to  the  movements  of  d'Erlon's  Corps 
on  the  1 6th,  it  has  been  shown  that  its  leading  division 
was  two  hours  and  a  half  behind  the  rear  divisions 
of  the  2d  Corps  on  the  road  to  Quatre  Bras ;  and  that 
if  d'Erlon's  Corps  had  closely  followed  the  rear  divis- 
ion of  the  2d  Corps,  it  could  not  have  been  turned 
aside  by  the  staff-ofiicer's  blunder.^ 

6.  Attention  has  been  called  to  Napoleon's  plan  of 
battle  at  Ligny,  and  to  the  criticisms  which  it  has  met 
with/ 

7.  The  view  of  those  writers  who  regard  it  as  great 
negligence  on  the  part  of  Napoleon  that  on  the  morning 
of  the  17th  he  did  not  take  adequate  measures  to  ascertain 
the  direction  of  the  Prussian  retreat,  is  fully  adopted.^ 

8.  It  is  also  maintained  that  Napoleon  should  on  that 
morning  at  daybreak  have  marched  with  the  6th  Corps 
and  the  Guard  to  attack  the  English  at  Quatre  Bras  in 
conjunction  with  Ney's  forces,  —  a  point  on  which  most 
writers  strongly  insist.^ 

9.  The  connection  between  the  injunction  contained 
in  the  Bertrand  order  and  the  new  idea  as  to  the  projects 
of  Marshal  Bliicher,  which  Berton's  discovery  of  a 
Prussian  corps  at  Gembloux  had  started  in  Napoleon's 

-•Chapter  VIII.,  and  Notes. 
^Ante,  pp.  184-1S6. 
^Ante,  p.  I  Si. 
''Ante,  pp.  164  et  seq. 
^Anie,  p.  205. 
'^Anfe,  pp.  197  ei  seq. 


[chap.  17.]  CONCLUDING  OBSERVATIONS.  345 

mind,  is  brought  out;'°  and  Napoleon  is  censured  for 
having  on  the  afternoon  of  the  17th  detached  so  large  a 
force  from  his  army  when  he  had  reason  to  apprehend 
that  a  movement  by  BlUcher  with  the  intention  of  co- 
operating with  Wellington  had  been  in  operation  since 
the  previous  evening." 

10.  The  warning  contained  in  the  Bertrand  order  is 
given  its  due  prominence;  and  the  fact  that  Marshal 
Grouchy  was  acting  under  that  order,  and  therefore  had 
entire  liberty  to  take  any  steps  which  his  own  judgment 
might  approve  to  frustrate  the  attempt  of  the  Prussians 
to  act  in  conjunction  with  the  English,  is  strongly  insisted 
on.'^ 

11.  It  is  shown  that  Grouchy  was  at  Walhain,  and  not 
at  Sart-a-Walhain  when  he  heard  the  sound  of  the  cannon 
of  Waterloo  and  rejected  the  counsel  of  Gerard.'^ 

12.  That  Napoleon  expected  Grouchy  to  arrive  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Dyle  by  crossing  it  at  the  bridge  of 
Moustier  is  shown  by  Marbot's  testimony ;  and  attention 
is  called  to  the  inference  which  this  fact  warrants,  that 
Napoleon  was  not  cognizant  of  the  language  used  in  the 
10  A.  M.  order  to  Marshal  Grouchy,  which  seemed  to 
imply  that  Grouchy  was  expected  to  reach  Wavre  first. '^ 

13.  It  is  pointed  out  that  from  about  four  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon  of  the  i8th  of  June  to  about  half-past  six, 
Napoleon's  attention  was  absorbed  by  the  attack  of 
BiJlow's  Corps  upon  the  right  and  rear  of  the  French 
army ;  and  that,  for  the  mistakes  committed  during  this 
period  in  the  assaults  on  the  English  army,  Ney  is 
mainly  responsible.'^     It  is  furthermore  shown  that  by 


^°Ante,  p.  209. 
"Chapter  XV.,  note  i. 
"An/e,  p.  211 ;  pp.  249  et  seq. 
^^Atite,  p.  255  ;  pp.  286  et  seq. 
^^Au/e,  pp.  268  e^  seq. 
^'Ante,  pp.  311  ^^  seq.'j  p.  330. 


346  CONCLUDING  OBSERVATIONS.  [CHAP.  1 7.] 

reason  of  this  distraction  of  the  Emperor's  attention  from 
the  operations  in  his  front,  valuable  opportunities  for 
success  against  Wellington's  army  were  lost.'^ 

14.  Marshal  Ney  is  censured  for  having  done  so  little 
in  the  way  of  preparation  for  the  successful  charge  of  the 
Imperial  Guard.'^ 

15.  The  questions  relating  to  the  formation  of  the 
Imperial  Guard  in  its  charge  against  the  English,  and  of 
its  repulse  and  defeat  by  the  English  guards  and  the  light 
brigade,  have  received  particular  attention.  It  is  believed 
that  the  view  here  presented  will  be  found  to  harmonize 
nearly  all  the  conflicting  statements.'^ 

16.  It  is  maintained  that  Marshal  Grouchy,  if  he  had 
started  for  the  bridge  of  Moustier  at  daybreak,'*^  or  had 
followed  the  advice  of  Gerard  at  noon,''°  would  probably 
have  stopped  Biilow  and  Pirch  I.  by  engaging  them,  and 
that  Zieten,  in  all  probability,  would  not  have  proceeded 
further  than  Chain ;  ^'  in  which  case  Napoleon  would  have 
been  able  to  employ  his  whole  army  against  that  of 
Wellington,  and  would  have  defeated  it. 

Coming  now  to  the  Allies :  — 

17.  It  is  contended  that  the  definite  understanding  as 
to  the  steps  to  be  taken  in  the  event  of  a  French  invasion, 
which  has  generally  been  attributed  to  the  Duke  of 
Wellington  and  Marshal  Bliicher,  did  not  exist. " 

18.  That  the  Duke,  in  the  early  morning  hours  of  the 
1 6th,  ordered  a  general  concentration  of  his  army  at 
Quatre  Bras,  as  he  says  in  his  Report  he  did,  is  shown  by 


^^Ante,  pp.  314,  330- 

"Ante,  pp.  337,  338. 

^^Ante,  pp.  316  ef  seq.;  pp.  331  et  seg, 

^"^Ante,  pp.  281  et  seq. 

^Ante,  pp.  259  et  seq. 

^^Ante,  p.  328. 

^Ante,  pp.  70  et  seq.;  p.  91. 


[chap.  17.]  CONCLUDING  OBSERVATIONS.  347 

an  examination  of  his  letter  to  Marshal  BlUcher,  and  a 
comparison  of  that  letter  with  the  statement  as  to  the 
situation  and  destination  at  7  A.  M.  of  the  1 6th  of  the 
different  divisions  of  his  army,  known  as  "  The  Disposi- 
tion," drawn  up  by  Sir  William  De  Lancey,  the  Deputy 
Quartermaster  General,  before  the  Duke  left  Brussels.^^ 

19.  That  the  Duke,  in  issuing  the  order  for  concen- 
trating at  Quatre  Bras  after  he  had  become  satisfied  that 
Napoleon  was  concentrating  in  front  of  Bliicher,  was  act- 
ing in  strict  accordance  with  the  demands  of  the  situa- 
tion, is  maintained  :  ^^  but  it  is  shown  that  it  was  several 
hours  after  Wellington  received  this  information  as  to 
Bliicher  and  Napoleon  before  he  issued  the  order,  and 
that  this  delay  was  not  only  uncalled  for,  but  that  it 
gravely  imperilled  the  success  of  the  allies. ^^ 

20.  It  is  shown  that  it  is  not  true  that  Bliicher's  deci- 
sion to  fight  at  Ligny  was  based  on  a  promise  of  support 
from  Wellington.^^ 

21.  Attention  is  called  to  the  now  generally  admitted 
fact  that  it  was  not  until  the  early  morning  hours  of  the 
1 8th  that  Bliicher  was  able  to  give  Wellington  definite 
assurance  of  his  support  in  the  battle  of  Waterloo.'^ 

22.  The  evidence  in  regard  to  the  story  that  the  Duke 
rode  over  to  Wavre  on  the  evening  of  the  17th  is 
given,^^  and,  on  that  evidence,  the  story  is  rejected. 

A  few  words  in  conclusion. 

I.  It  does  not  seem  to  us  that  Napoleon  can  be 
charged  with  any  lack  of  activity  or  decision  of  character, 
except  on  the  morning  after  the  battle  of  Ligny,  when  he 
was,  as  we  imagine,  pretty  well  tired  out.   But  his  energy 


'■^Ante,  pp.  87  et  seq. 
'*Ante,  p.  94. 
-^Ante,  p.  89. 
^^  Chap.  X. 
^''Ante,  p.  234. 
^^A7tte,  pp.  238  et  seq. 


348  CONCLUDING  OBSERVATIONS.  [CHAP.   1 7.] 

speedily  returned,  and  we  find  him  conducting  the  pur- 
suit of  the  Enghsh  during  the  afternoon,  and  making  an 
examination  of  their  position  in  the  mud  and  rain  in  the 
middle  of  the  night. 

2.  Nor  was  there  any  defect  in  his  plan  of  campaign. 
Had  Ney  executed  his  orders  with  promptness  and  with- 
out hesitation,  the  campaign  would  have  been  finished 
on  the  1 6th  of  June,  either  by  Ney's  furnishing  the 
needed  force  to  take  the  Prussians  in  rear  at  Brye  and 
Wagnelee,  or  by  his  defeating  Wellington  badly  by  the 
help  of  the  ist  Corps.  If  either  of  these  things  had  hap- 
pened, there  could  not  possibly  have  been  any  battle  of 
Waterloo ;  the  Prussian  and  English  armies  would  have 
been  definitely  separated ;  one,  and  perhaps  both,  would 
have  been  beaten ;  and  never,  in  all  probability,  would 
they  have  acted  together  again.  For  this  failure  to 
achieve  success  on  the  second  day  of  the  campaign,  Ney 
and  not  Napoleon  was  responsible. 

3.  But  for  not  overwhelming  at  Quatre  Bras  on  the 
early  morning  of  the  17th  the  two-thirds  of  his  army 
which  Wellington  had  collected  there,  no  one  but  Napo- 
leon was  responsible ;  and  his  failure  to  do  this  must  be 
attributed  to  his  excessive  fatigue. 

4.  Then,  for  his  neglect  to  ascertain  the  direction  of 
the  Prussian  retreat  on  the  same  morning,  Napoleon  is 
responsible ;  and  although  Soult  ought  to  have  attended 
to  this,  in  his  capacity  of  chief-of-sta£f,  yet,  as  the  Em- 
peror does  not  appear  to  have  blamed  him  for  not  having 
reconnoitred  in  the  direction  of  Wavre,  we  must  con- 
sider Napoleon  as  open  to  this  censure.  It  is  true,  it  was 
not  likely  that  Bliicher  had  retired  in  the  direction  of 
Wavre ;  but  it  was  of  vital  importance  to  know  whether 
he  had  or  not.  Hence  it  was  a  great  neglect  not  to  find 
out. 

5.  Napoleon  is  also  solely  responsible  for  having  per- 
sisted in  his  original  design  of  detaching  Grouchy  in  pur- 
suit of  the  Prussians  after  he  had  reason  to  believe  that  they 


[chap.  17.]  CONCLUDING  OBSERVATIONS.  349 

were  intending  to  unite  with  the  EngHsh,  and  to  suspect, 
in  fact,  that  they  had  been  approaching  the  EngHsh  dur- 
ing the  previous  night  and  morning;  and  for  contenting 
himself  with  merely  giving  Grouchy  a  warning  that  this 
might  be  their  intention.  He  laid  upon  Grouchy,  in  fact, 
a  burden  which  to  that  officer,  as  Napoleon  was  well 
aware,  was  entirely  new ;  hence,  the  Emperor  was  not  v/ar- 
ranted  in  risking  so  much  on  the  chance  of  Grouchy  s  be- 
ing able  to  sustain  it.  It  is  this  that  Napoleon  is  to  blame 
for  in  this  connection ;  for  having,  when  he  saw  that  the 
Prussians  might  (as  the  Bertrand  order  expresses  it)  be 
"  intending  to  unite  with  the  English  to  cover  Brussels 
in  trying  the  fate  of  another  battle,"  persisted  in  adher- 
ing to  his  original  plan, —  devised  when  he  and  Grouchy 
and  everybody  else  supposed  that  the  Prussians  had  gone 
to  Namur, —  of  sending  Grouchy  in  pursuit  of  them  with 
two  corps  cTarmee.  Many  writers  will  have  it  that  "  Napo- 
leon did  not  in  the  least  foresee  the  flank  march  of  the 
Prussians."  ""^  This, — if  to  foresee  be  equivalent  to  expect, — 
may  be  true.  But  Napoleon  certainly  did,  at  i  P.  M.  of 
the  17th,  recognize  the  possibility  of  the  Prussians  unit- 
ing with  the  English ;  and  the  true  criticism  on  him  is, 
as  it  seems  to  us,  that,  having  this  in  mind,  as  a  possibil- 
ity, he  should  have  detached  Marshal  Grouchy  with 
,33,000  men  from  the  main  army,  and  have  been  content 
to  rely  on  Grouchy's  being  able  to  prevent  this  project 
of  the  Prussians  from  being  carried  out.  It  must  be 
added  to  this,  that  his  neglect  to  send  Grouchy  any 
information  of  his  own  situation,  and  any  orders  as 
to  what  he  expected  him  to  do  if  he  found  the  Prussians 
were  marching  to  join  Wellington  or  to  attack  the  main 
French  army,  showed  an  unjustifiable  reliance  on  the 
favors  of  fortune. 

6.     To  Marshal  Grouchy  belongs  the  blame  of  having 
entirely  failed  to  apprehend  his  mission,  as  indicated  to 


^Chesney,  p.  207;  Kennedy,  pp.  163, 164. 


35°  CONCLUDING  OBSERVATIONS.  [CHAP.  1 7.] 

him  by  the  express  warning  contained  in  the  Bertrand 
order.  Had  he  acted  intelligently  in  accordance  with 
the  information  which  he  acquired  in  the  night  of  the 
17th  and  i8th,  he  could  have  prevented  the  Emperor 
from  being  overwhelmed  by  both  the  allied  armies.  At 
daybreak,  as  appears  from  his  letter  to  Pajol,  he  knew 
that  the  Prussians  had  retired  towards  Wavre  and  Brus- 
sels. But  the  meaning  of  this  fact  he  utterly  failed  to 
grasp.  He  made  no  change  in  his  previously  ordered 
dispositions,  which  this  news  should  have  shown  him 
were  wholly  unsuited  to  the  situation  as  now  ascertained. 
Nor  did  the  sound  of  the  cannon  of  Waterloo  produce 
on  him  a  greater  effect.  He  would  not  accept  the  sug- 
gestion of  Gerard.  He  persisted  in  a  course  which  com- 
pletely isolated  his  command,  and  prevented  it  from 
playing  any  part  in  the  events  of  that  memorable  day. 
Napoleon,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  made  a  great  mistake 
in  trusting  so  much  to  Grouchy's  good  judgment;  he 
took  a  wholly  unnecessary  risk ;  he  might,  as  well  as 
not,  have  taken  Grouchy,  with  far  the  larger  part  of  his 
command,  with  the  main  army;  had  he  done  so,  the 
catastrophe  of  Waterloo  could  not,  so  far  as  we  can 
judge,  have  happened.  But  had  Grouchy  acted  up  to 
the  demands  of  the  situation  in  which  he  found  himself, 
he  also  would  have  averted  the  ruin  which  the  unhin- 
dered union  of  the  allies  brought  upon  Napoleon  and 
his  army. 


APPENDIX  A. 

ON    SOME    CHARACTERISTICS    OF   NAPOLEOn's    MEMOIRS. 

Probably  no  military  narratives  that  ever  were  written 
have  been  subjected  to  more  harsh  and  unjust  criticism 
than  the  two  accounts  of  the  campaign  of  Waterloo, 
which,  under  the  names  of  the  Gourgaud  Narrative  and 
the  Memoirs,  were  dictated  or  written  by  Napoleon  at 
St.  Helena.  To  read  the  remarks  of  Charras,  Chesney, 
Hooper,  and  others,  about  these  books,  one  would  sup- 
pose that  a  military  narrative  is  the  easiest,  plainest  sort 
of  narrative  to  write,  and  that  if  a  general  wished  to  com- 
pose it  properly  he  would  isolate  himself  from  his  fellow- 
officers  and  subordinates,  and  get  into  some  secluded 
corner  of  the  world  thousands  of  miles  from  the  records 
of  the  war-department.  For  if  this  is  not  the  view  of 
these  writers  and  of  others  like  them,  they  are  either 
ignorant  of  the  extreme  difficulty  which  attends  the  com- 
position of  a  military  narrative,  or  else  are  bent  upon 
treating  the  fallen  Emperor  with  gross  injustice. 

For  instance,  Napoleon  says  in  his  "  Memoirs  " '  that 
"  on  the  14th  in  the  evening''  ^  General  Bourmont  deserted 
to  the  enemy.  The  whole  army  broke  camp  in  the  early 
hours  of  the  15th.  When  the  4th  Corps  moved  at 
five  o'clock,  it  was  discovered  that  Bourmont  had  left. 
Charras  states  that  the  staff-records  of  the  4th  Corps,  to 
which  Bourmont  belonged,  mention  that  he  deserted  on 
the  15th,  and  that  he  wrote  a  letter  to  Gerard  announcing 
his  desertion  dated  at  Philippeville  on  the  15th.     But 


'  Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  251. 
'^  The  italics  are  ours. 


352  APPENDIX  A. 

Napoleon  at  St.  Helena  had  neither  the  staff-records  of 
the  4th  Corps  to  go  by,  nor  the  letter  of  Bourmont  to 
Gerard.  Yet  Charras '  calls  the  Emperor's  statement  a 
designed  misstatement  {luie  inexactitude  calculee). 

But  we  have  no  disposition  to  dwell  on  harsh  criticisms 
of  this  kind.  Our  purpose  at  present  is  to  call  attention 
to  a  peculiarity  of  Napoleon's  which  may  serve  to  explain 
the  existence  in  his  Memoirs  of  very  definite  statements 
which  are  apparently  very  wide  of  the  truth.  This  peculiar- 
ity is,  that  while  his  orders  to  his  lieutenants  were  often  very 
general  in  their  character,  —  pointing  out  clearly  enough, 
it  is  true,  the  thing  to  be  aimed  at,  or  the  danger  to  be 
feared,  —  but  leaving  entirely  to  the  officer  the  course  to 
be  adopted  if  the  emergency  should  arise,  —  yet  these 
orders  never  seem  to  have  been  retained  in  Napoleon's 
memory  in  the  shape  in  which  they  were  given,  but  what 
he  did  recall  about  them  was  his  expectation  that,  on 
receiving  his  order,  his  lieutenant  would  act  in  such  or 
such  a  manner.  This  expectation,  that  such  or  such 
action  would  be  taken  by  his  lieutenant  on  receiving  such 
or  such  an  order,  was  all  that  was  left  of  the  order  in  his 
mind ;  and,  when  he  came  to  write  his  narrative,  he  would 
often  (at  any  rate)  state  that  he  had  given  definite  instruc- 
tions to  such  or  such  an  effect,  when  all  he  had  really 
done  was  to  give  a  general  order,  from  the  giving  of 
which  he  expected  such  or  such  a  course  of  action  to  be 
taken  by  his  subordinate. 

Thus,  take  the  orders  to  Ney,  issued  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  1 6th,  at  2  and  3.15  P.  M.  ^  They  were,  as  we  have 
seen,  very  general  in  character;  Ney  was  directed,  after 
he  should  have  beaten,  or,  at  least,  checked,  the  English, 
to  turn  round,  and  manoeuvre  so  as  to  take  the  Prussians 
in  flank  and  rear.     But  the  "  Memoirs  "  ^  say :  — 


'  Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  104,  n.  i. 

*  Doc.  Indd.,  XIII.,  p.  40;  XIV.,  p.  24;  App.  C,  xxv.,  xxvi ;  post,  pp.  3S3, 
384. 
^  Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  204. 


APPENDIX  A.  353 

*'He  [Napoleon]  reiterated  the  order  for  him  to  push  on  In 
front  of  Quatre  Bras ;  and,  as  soon  as  he  should  have  taken  posi- 
tion there,  to  detach  a  column  of  8,000  Infantry,  with  the  cavalry- 
dlvlslon  of  Lefebvre-Desnouettes,  and  28  pieces  of  cannon,  by  the 
turnpike  which  ran  from  Qiiatre  Bras  to  Namur,  which  he  was  to 
leave  at  the  v^Illage  of  Marbais,  in  order  to  attack  the  heights  of 
Brye,  in  the  enemy's  rear." 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  Memoirs  make  no  men- 
tion of  the  orders  which  were  actually  sent  to  Ney  that 
afternoon.  And  Napoleon  sent  to  Ney  no  such  order  as 
this.  What  he  here  calls  an  order  was  really  what  he 
expected  Ney  to  do  when  he  should  get  the  2  and  3.15 
P.  M.  orders.  That  this  was  so,  appears  from  what  fol- 
lows :  — 

"After  having  made  this  detachment,  there  would  still  remain  to 
him  [Ney]  in  his  position  of  Quatre  Bras  32,000  men  and  80  pieces 
of  cannon,  which  would  be  sufficient  to  hold  in  check  all  the  Eng- 
lish troops  which  could  be  expected  to  arrive  from  their  canton- 
ments during  the  day  of  the  i6th." 

That  is,  —  the  Emperor  had  figured  it  all  out  in  his 
own  head,  as  if  he  were  in  Ney's  place.  Ney  could  spare 
so  many  men  and  so  many  guns ;  he  would  have  so  many 
men  and  so  many  guns  left.  But,  in  fact,  the  orders  to 
Ney  left  it  to  him  to  make  these  calculations  for  himself. 

Let  us  apply  now  this  mode  of  working  of  Napoleon's 
mind  to  his  statements  in  regard  to  the  orders  which  he 
says  in  his  "  Memoirs  "  he  sent  to  Grouchy.  ^ 

"At  ten  o'clock  in  the  evening  the  Emperor  sent  an  officer  to 
Marshal  Grouchy,  whom  he  supposed  to  be  at  Wavre,  to  inform 
him  that  there  would  be  a  great  battle  the  next  day ;  that  the  Anglo- 
Dutch  army  was  in  position  in  front  of  the  Forest  of  Soignes,  its 
left  resting  on  the  village  of  La  Haye;  that  he  ordered  him  to 
detach  before  daybreak  from  his  camp  at  Wavre  a  division  of 
16,000  men  of  all  arms  and  16  pieces  of  cannon  on  St.  Lambert,  in 
order  to  connect  with  the  main  army  and  operate  with  it ;  that  as 
soon  as  he  should  be  assured  that  Bliicher  had  evacuated  Wavre, 
whether  to  continue  his  retreat  on  Brussels  or  to  move  in  any  other 


'  Corresp.,  vol.  31,  p.  216  ;  ijee,  also,  p. 


354  APPENDIX  A. 

direction,  he  (Grouchy)  was  to  march  with  the  larger  part  of  his 
troops  to  support  the  detachment  which  he  had  sent  to  St.  Lambert." 

Thiers  ^  finds  in  the  minuteness  of  detail  in  which  this 
supposed  order  is  stated  in  the  Memoirs  a  proof  that  it 
could  not  have  been  invented.  We  do  not  so  regard  the 
matter.  To  our  mind,  the  terms  in  which  Napoleon  has, 
in  the  extract  given  above,  framed  what  he  says  was  the 
order  which  he  sent  to  Grouchy,  simply  express  the  expec- 
tations formed  in  his  own  mind  of  what  Grouchy  would  do, 
when,  after  having  received  the  Bertrand  order,  he  found 
that  Blijcher  had  fallen  back  towards  the  English.  We 
think  the  orders  sent  to  Ney  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
battle  of  Ligny  should  serve  as  a  guide  to  us  here.  We 
do  not  believe  that  Napoleon  sent  to  Grouchy  any  such 
order  as  that  which  he  gives  in  his  Memoirs ;  but  then 
we  do  believe  that  he  sent  him  the  Bertrand  order,  which 
he  does  not  even  mention  in  his  Memoirs,  and  which  in 
fact  he  no  doubt  forgot  all  about.  And  we  believe  that, 
having  a  distinct  recollection  of  having  sent  Grouchy 
an  order,  and  also  a  very  distinct  recollection  of  what  he 
expected  Grouchy  would  do  when  he  got  the  order,  he 
has  fused  the  two  things  in  his  mind,  and  has  given  us 
his  order  in  the  terms  of  his  expectations. 

There  is  nothing  very  uncommon  about  this.  It  is 
certainly  to  be  distinguished  from  deliberate  misrepre- 
sentation. It  is  partly,  at  any  rate,  the  result  of  an  active 
imagination  working  on  facts  imperfectly  recollected, 
but  which  have  been  dwelt  upon  until  the  mind  has 
become  disturbed  and  warped. 

'  Thiers,  vol.  xx,  p  95,  n. 


APPENDIX  B. 

ON  MARSHAL  GROUCHY  AND  THE  BERTRAND  ORDER. 

We  have  stated  {ante,  p.  208)  that  Marshal  Grouchy 
"denied,  over  and  over  again,  in  his  pamphlets  written 
about  the  battle,  ever  having  received  any  written  order, 
whether  from  Napoleon  or  Soult,  until  the  next  day  (the 
i8th)  " ;  and  we  have  pointed  out  the  grave  misconceptions 
of  the  conduct  of  Napoleon  which  have  been  the  result 
of  these  denials  on  the  part  of  Marshal  Grouchy,  which, 
for  many  years,  were  very  generally  credited.  We  now 
propose  to  prove  the  truth  of  our  statement. 

In  1818  Marshal  Grouchy  published  in  Philadelphia  his 
''Observations  snr  la  Relatioii  de  la  Campagne  de  181 5 
publiee  par  le  General  Gourgattd^  After  giving  an 
account  of  the  verbal  orders  which  Napoleon  gave  him, 
of  his  observations  in  regard  to  them,  and  of  the  Emperor's 
reply  {ante,  p.  207),  he  says  :  — ' 

"  Such  are  the  only  dispositions  which  were  communicated  to 
me;  the  only  orders  which  I  received." 

In  the  same  pamphlet  he  says :  —  ^ 

"  But  why,  unceasingly  repeats  this  '  Combatant  of  Waterloo,' 
—  why  does  not  Marshal  Grouchy  publish  the  text  of  the  orders 
which  he  received  ? 

"  The  reason  is  simple.     It  is  that  they  were  only  transmitted  to 


'  Obser\^ations,  Phila.  ed.  iSiS,  p.  13.  In  the  Philadelphia  edition  of  1819, 
p.  12,  and  in  the  Paris  edition,  1819,  p.  13,  the  statement  is  made  somewhat 
stronger  by  the  insertion  of  the  words  "  word  for  word." 

^  Obs.,  Phila.  ed.,  1818,  pp.  26,  27  ;  ed.  1819,  pp.  24,  25  ;  Paris  ed.,  pp.  30,  31. 


356  APPENDIX   B. 

me  verbally.  Those  who  have  sensed  under  Napoleon  know  how 
rarely  he  gives  them  in  writing.  *  *  *  If  it  is  of  any  consequence  to 
show  that  they  wei'e  only  verbal,  I  can  find  if  not  a  proof,  certainly 
a  strong  indication  of  it  in  the  letter  of  the  Major-General,  Marshal 
Soult,  in  speaking  of  my  march  on  Sartavalin.  He  expresses  him- 
self in  these  terms :  — 

"'This  movement  is  conformed  to  the  dispositions  which  have 
been  communicated  to  you.' 

"He  would  not  have  failed  to  say  to  the  instructions  or  the  orders 
which  I  have  transmitted  to  you,  and  which  you  are  acting  under, 
if  I  had  received  any  except  verbal  orders." 

The  point  of  this  argument  is  fully  seen  only  when  we 
remember  that  the  Bertrand  order  was  dictated  by  the 
Emperor  in  the  absence  of  Soult,  the  chief-of-sta£f,  and 
therefore  no  copy  of  it  was  likely  to  be  found  on  the  regu- 
lar official  files.  But  fortune  enabled  Grouchy  to  make 
sure  of  this,  for  he  had,  soon  after  Waterloo,  an  opportu- 
nity of  examining  the  records  of  the  chief-of-sta£f. 

Accordingly,  we  find  him,  soon  afterwards,^  in  support 
of  his  denial  of  having  received  the  orders  alleged  in  the 
Memoirs  to  have  been  sent  to  him,  saying,  not,  as  he 
ought  to  have  done,  that  he  did  receive  an  order  through 
Bertrand,  which,  however,  was  entirely  different  in  its 
tenor  from  those  given  in  the  Memoirs,  but  that  he  re- 
ceived on  the  17th  no  written  order  at  all. 

'  The  proof  of  this  is  In  the  order-book  and  correspondence  of 
the  major-general,  the  organ  of  communication  of  the  General-in- 
chlef  with  his  lieutenants.  This  irrefutable  document,  which, 
when  I  received  the  command  of  the  army  after  the  loss  of  the  battle 
of  Waterloo,  came  into  my  possession,  shows  that  no  orders  or  in- 
structions except  those  contained  in  the  two  letters  given  herewith, 
and  dated  at  10  A.  M.  and  i  P.M.  of  the  iSth,  were  ever  sent  to  me." 

In  a  work  published  in  Paris  in  1829,  speaking  of  the 
10  A.  M.  order  to  him  of  the  i8th  of  June,  he  says:  —  '^ 

'  Doutes  sur  Tauthenticitd  des  Mdmoires  Historiques  attribu^s  k  Napole'on. 
Par  le  Cte  de  Grouchy.     Philadelphie  ;  Avril,  1820. 
■•  Fragments  Historiques  :  Lettre  h.  MM.  M'iry  et  Barthdlemy,  p.  5,  note. 


APPENDIX   B.  357 

"  This  letter,  and  that  dated  from  the  field  of  battle  of  Waterloo, 
at  one  o'clock,  are  the  only  ones  which  I  received  and  which  were 
written  to  me  on  the  17th  and  iSth.  The  book  of  the  orders  and 
correspondence  of  the  major-general,  which  I  possess,  proves  this. 
It  gives  the  hours  at  which  orders  are  given,  and  the  names  of  the 
officers  who  carry  them ;  and  its  details  do  not  permit  a  suspicion 
of  an  omission  any  more  than  of  a  misstatement." 

It  is  rather  remarkable,  to  say  the  least,  that  General 
Bertrand  should  not  have  stated  what  he  recollected 
about  the  matter.  But  he  does  not  appear  to  have  done 
so ;  unless  the  mention  in  Jomini's  "  Political  and  Mili- 
tary History  of  the  Campaign  of  Waterloo,"^  that 
General  Bertrand  sent  Grouchy  a  positive  order  to 
march  on  Gembloux,  may  be  attributed  to  information 
received  from  Bertrand. 

The  Bertrand  order  first  saw  the  light  in  1842, — 
twenty-seven  years  after  the  battle  of  Waterloo.  It  was 
printed  in  a  work  entitled  ''Notice  Biographique  sur  le 
Marechal de  Grouchy,  &c.','^  by  E.  Pascallet,  editor  of  a 
Review  treating  of  Biography,  Politics  and  Letters. 
The  biography  is  eulogistic.  The  order  is  accompanied 
by  no  explanation  of  the  repeated  denials,  to  which  we 
have  called  attention  above,  of  any  such  order  ever 
having  been  received  by  the  Marshal.'' 

After  this  publication,  however,  the  Bertrand  order 
was  acknowledged  in  the  memoirs  of  Marshal  Grouchy. 
It  is  found  in  the  work  of  the  Marquis  de  Grouchy,  pub- 
lished in  1S64,  entitled  ''  Le  Marechal  de  Grouchy  du  16 
a2i  \^  jirin,  1815,"^  written  to  refute  the  accusations  of 
Thiers,  and  in  the  4th  volume"'  of  the '' Memoircs  du  Mar- 
echal de  Gj'ouchy','  by  his  son,  the  Marquis.     In  neither  of 


^Jomini,  p.  149.    Jomini's  Preface  is  dated  in  1838. 

^Pascallet,  p.  79. 

"^Cf.    Napoldon  k  Waterloo,  p,  199,  n. 

^Le  Mai  de  Grouchy  en  1815,  pp.  26-28. 

'Grouchy  Mdm.,  vol.  4,  pp.  50,  51. 


358  APPENDIX  B. 

these  books  is  there  any  attempt  at  explaining  away  the 
point  blank  denials  of  the  Marshal's  having  received  any 
written  order  on  the  17th  of  June.  It  would  certainly 
not  be  easy  to  conjecture  what  explanation  could  be 
given.     The  order  reads  as  follows  (Pascallet,  p.  79)  : — 

"  Rendez-vous  a  Gei7ibloux  avec  le  corps  de  cavaleric  de general 
Pajol^  la  cavalerie  Icgere  du  qtiatrieme  corps^  le  corps  de  caval- 
erie  du  general  Excelmans^  la  division  du  general  Teste^  dont 
vous  aurez  un  soin particulier^  ctant  detachee  de  son  corps  d'armee^ 
et  les  troisieme  et  quatrieme  corps  d'infantcrie.  Vous  vous  ferez 
eclairer  sur  la  direction  de  Namur  et  de  Afaestricht,  et  vous  pour- 
suivrez  Vennemi.  Eclairez  sa  marche^  et  instruisez-moi  de  ses 
manoeuvres^  de  nianicre  que  je  puisse  penetrer  ce  qu'il  veut 
faire.  Je  porta  mon  quartier-general  azix  ^uatre-  CJicmins^  ok 
ce  matin  etaient  encore  les  Anglais.  Notre  communication  sera 
done  directe  par  la  route  pavee  de  Natnur.  Si  V enne?ni  a  evacuc 
Namur^  ecrivez  au  general  commandant  la  detixieme  division 
militaire  a  Charlemont^  de  faire  occuper  Namur  par  quelques 
bataillons  de  garde  nationale  et  quelques  batteries  de  ca7207t  qu'il 
formera  a  Charlemont.  II  donnera  ce  commandement  a  un  mar- 
echal-de-camp . 

II  est  important  de  penetrer  ce  que  Vennemi  veut  faire :  ou  il 
se  separe  des  Anglais^  ozi  ils  veulent  se  reunir  encore^  pour  couv- 
rir  Bruxelles  et  Liege ^  e7t  tentant  le  sort  d'une  nouvelle  bataiUe. 
Dans  totis  les  cas^  tenez  constamment  vos  deux  corps  d'infanterie 
reunis  dans  une  lieue  de  terrain^  et  occupez  tozis  les  soirs  une 
bonne  position  militaire^  ayant  plusieurs  debouches  de  retraitc. 
Placez  detache?nens  de  cavalerie  interjnediaires  pour  comtjiuni- 
quer  avec  le  quartier-general. 

Ligny^  le  lyjuin,  1813. 

i^Dicte  par  Vempereur^  en  I' absence  du  major-geticral^  au 
grand-marechal  Bertrand.) 

Passing  now  to  Marshal  Grouchy 's  report  to  the 
Emperor,  dated  Gembloux,  June  17, 1815, 10  P.  M.  This 
was  printed  for  the  first  time  in  the  Count  Gerard's 
'' Dernier es  Observations  sur  les  Operations  de  VAile 
Droite  de  VArmee  Franfaise  a  la  BataiUe  de  Waterloo',' 
published  in  Paris  in  1830.     It  reads  as  follows :  — '° 


'Gdrard:  Dern.  Obs.,  p.  15. 


APPENDIX  B.  359 

"  Sire: 

'■'■  J''ai  rhonneur  de  vous  rendre  compte  que  f  occupc  Gembloux^ 
et  que  ma  cavalerie  est  a  Sauvenihres.  L''enne7ni^fort  d'etiviron 
trente  mille  ho7nmeSi  contlmce  son  niouvetnent  de  retraite;  on  lui 
a  saisi  ici  un  pare  de  4.00  betes  a  cornes^  des  mag-asms  et  des 
bagages. 

"  II parait  d'aprcs  tons  les  rapports^  qzi" arrives  a  Sauvenihres^ 
les  Prussiens  se  sont  diviscs  en  deux  colonnes :  Vzine  a  dti  prendre 
la  route  de  Wavres,  en  passaitt  par  Sart-a-  Waiiain;  V autre 
colonne  parait  s^ctre  dirigce  sur  Perivcs. 

"  On  peut  peut-etre  en  infer er  qu^2ine  portion  va  joi?idre  Wel- 
lington^  et  que  le  centre,  qui  est  Varmee  de  BlUcher,  se  retire 
sur  Li<ge:  une  aiitre  coloftne  avec  de  Vartillerie  ay  ant  fait  son 
mouvement  de  retraite  par  Na?nur,  le  general  Excelmans  a  ordre 
de  poKsser  ce  soir  six  escadrons  sur  Sart-a-  Wallain,  et  trois 
escadrons  sur  Pertves.  D'apres  leur  rapport,  si  la  masse  des 
Prussiens  se  retire  sur  Wavres,  je  la  suivrai  dans  cette  direction, 
a  fin  quails  ne  puissent  pas  gagner  Bruxelles,  et  de  les  separer  de 
Wellington. 

'■'•Si,  au  contraire,  jnes  renseignetnents protive?zt  que  la principale 
force  prussienne  a  inarche  sur  Perwes,  je  7ne  dirigerai  par  cette 
ville  a  la  poursuite  de  Vennemi. 

"  Les  generaux  Thiclman  et  Borstell  faisaieJtt  partie  de  Parmce 
que  Votre  Majeste  a  battue  hier ;  ils  etaient  e^tcore  ce  matin  a  10 
heures  ici,  et  ont  annonce  qtte  vingt  mille  honimes  des  leurs  avaient 
ete  mis  hors  de  combat.  lis  ont  demande  en  partant  les  distances 
de  Wavres,  Perwes  et  Hannut.  Bliicher  a  ete  blesse  Icgerement 
au  bras,  ce  qui  ne  Va  pas  empecke  de  continuer  a  cotnmander 
<ipres  s'etrefait  panser.     II  n'a  point  passe  par  Gembloux. 

Je  suis  avec  respect 

de  Votre  Majeste, 
Sire,  Le  fidele  sujet, 

(^Signe)  Le  Marechal  Co?nte  de  Grouchy.^' 

This  version  of  Grouchy 's  report  from  Gembloux  has 
been  adopted  textually  by  all  writers  on  the  campaign, — 
Charras,"  Siborne,"  La  Tour  d'Auvergne/^  Chesney,"* 
Quinet,'^  the  author  of  "  Napoleon  a  Waterloo,'"^  and 
others. 


'Charras,  vol.  i,  p.  244.  '''Chesney,  p.  153. 

^Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  297.  "Quinet,  p.  430. 

-La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  p.  23c.        '^Xapoldon  h.  Waterloo,  p.  219. 


360  APPENDIX  B. 

The  salient  thing  in  this  report  is  its  response  to  the 
Bertrand  order.  That  directed  Grouchy  to  find  out 
what  the  Prussians  were  intending  to  do,  whether  to 
separate  from  the  EngHsh,  or  to  unite  with  them  to 
cover  Brussels  or  Liege  in  trying  the  fate  of  another 
battle.  Grouchy  says  in  this  despatch,  that,  if  the  mass 
of  the  Prussians  retires  on  Wavre  he  will  follow  them  in 
that  direction  in  order  that  they  may  not  be  able  to  gain 
Brussels  a7id  to  separate  them  from  Wellingtoji ;  but  if 
on  the  contrary  his  information  proves  that  their  prin- 
cipal force  is  marching  on  Perwes  he  will  march  on  that 
city  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  But  in  the  Grouchy 
Ivlemoirs  this  expression  of  intention  is  supplanted  by 
another.'^ 

The  whole  clause  reads  as  follows :  — 

"  Si  f  apprends  par  des  rapports  qui,  j'espere,  tne  parvie7idront 
pendant  la  nuit^  que  de fortes  7nasses  prussiemies  se  portent  stir 
Wavre,  Je  les  suivrai  dans  cette  direction,  ET  LES  ATTA-- 
^  UERAI  DES  ^UEfELESA  URAIfOINTESr  'S 

This  substitution  of  an  expressed  intention  to  attack 
the  Prussians  as  soon  as  he  should  have  caught  up  with 
them,  if  he  finds  them  going  to  Wavre,  is  a  radical  de- 
parture from  the  received  text.  It  is  not  difficult  to  see 
the  motive  for  making  this  mutilation.  Grouchy  and 
his  defenders  were  unwilling  to  allow  that  he  had,  in  this 
despatch,  expressed  his  intention  of  manoeuvring  with  the 
object  of  separating  the  Prussians  from  Wellington,  for 
that  was  exactly  what  he  distinctly  refused  to  do  on  the 
next  day.  And  the  reason  which  he  alleged  for  refusing 
to  follow  Gerard's  advice  was,  that  he  had  been  told  by 
the  Emperor  to  follow  the  Prussians  up  closely,  and 
attack  them  as  soon  as  he  should  catch  up  with  them. 
Hence,  to  admit  that  the  received  text  of  his  10  P.  M. 


"Grouchy  Mdm.,  p.  58 ;  see,  also,  p.  263,  where  the  writer  says  that  he  has 
the  original  under  his  eyes.  See,  also,  the  same  thing  in  the  "  Mai  de 
Grouchy  en  1815,"  p.  37;  and  also  p.  194,  where  Thiers  is  sharply  taken  to 
task  for  following  the  generally  received  version. 


APPENDIX  B.  361 

report  on  the  17th  is  correct,  is  to  admit  that  Grouchy, 
at  the  time  he  wrote  it,  took  a  different  view  of  his  task 
from  that  which  he  put  forward  the  next  day,  and  ever 
afterwards  maintained ;  it  is,  in  fact,  to  admit  that  he  had 
received,  understood,  and  was  intending  to  act  under  the 
Bertrand  order,  which  warned  him  that  the  Prussians 
might  be  intending  to  unite  with  the  EngHsh ;  that  on 
that  evening  of  the  17th,  at  any  rate,  he  fully  recognized 
the  real  danger  to  be  feared,  and  regarded,  as  his  great 
task,  not  the  following  on  the  heels  of  the  Prussians,  and 
attacking  their  rear  guard,  but  manoeuvring  so  as  to  pre- 
vent them  from  carrying  out  their  purpose  of  joining  the 
English.'^ 

That  the  changes  in  the  two  Grouchy  books  are  wilful 
mutilations  of  the  correct  text,  made  for  the  purpose 
stated  above,  appears  sufHciently  from  the  fact  that  the 
statement  of  what  Grouchy  was  going  to  do,  if  he  found 
the  Prussians  retiring  on  Perwes  is  entirely  omitted, 
apart  from  the  fact  that  not  a  single  writer  adopts  the 
Grouchy  version. 

Charras  puts  it  mildly  in  our  opinion  when  he  says  of 
Grouchy,^° — "He  has  not  always  been  very  exact,  or  very 
sincere." 


"The  capitals  are  ours. 

•'C/:  Clausewitz,  ch.  48,  p.  131 ;  ch.  50,  p.  146. 

20  Charras,  vol.  2,  p.  53. 


APPENDIX  C. 

I. 

ADDRESS  TO  THE  ARI^IY:  June  14,  1815. 
Corresp.  Vol.  28,  p.  324. 

22052.— A  L'ARMfiE. 

AvESNES,  14  juin  1815. 

Soldats,  c'est  aujourd'hui  I'anniversaire  de  Marengo  et  de  Friedland,  qui 
ddciderent  deux  fois  du  destin  de  TEurope.  Alors,  comme  apres  Austerlitz, 
comme  apres  Wagram,  nous  fumes  trop  gendreux ;  nous  crumes  aux  protesta- 
tions et  aux  serments  des  princes  que  nous  laissames  sur  le  trone! 
Aujourd'hui,  cependant,  coalisds  contre  nous,  ils  en  veulent  k  I'inddpendance 
et  aux  droits  les  plus  sacr^s  de  la  France.  lis  ont  commencd  la  plus 
injuste  des  agressions.  Marchons  done  k  leur  rencontre:  eux  et  nous  ne 
sommes-nous  plus  les  memes  hommes  ? 

Soldats,  h  lena,  contre  ces  memes  Prussiens  aujourd'hui  si  arrogants,  vous 
dtiez  un  contre  trois  ;  k  Montmirail,  un  contre  six. 

Que  ceux  d'entre  vous  qui  ont  dte  prisonniers  des  Anglais  vous  fassent  le 
rdcit  de  leurs  pontons  et  des  maux  affreux  qu'ils  ont  soufferts  ! 

Les  Saxons,  les  Beiges,  les  Hanovriens,  les  soldats  de  la  Confederation  du 
Rhin,  gemissent  d'etre  obliges  de  preter  leurs  bras  k  la  cause  des  princes 
ennemis  de  la  justice  et  des  droits  de  tons  les  peuples.  lis  savent  que  cette 
coalition  est  insatiable,  Apres  avoir  d6vor6  douze  millions  de  Polonais, 
douze  millions  d'ltaliens,  un  million  de  Saxons,  six  millions  de  Beiges,  elle 
devra  ddvorer  les  dtats  de  deuxieme  ordre  de  I'AUemagne. 

Les  insens^s !  Un  moment  de  prosperity  les  aveugle.  L'oppression  et 
I'humiliation  du  peuple  frangais  sont  hors  de  leur  pouvoir.  S'ils  entrent  en 
France,  ils  y  trouveront  leur  tombeau. 

Soldats,  nous  avons  des  marches  forcdes  k  faire,  des  batailles  k  livrer,  des 
perils  k  courir;  mais,  avec  de  la  Constance,  la  victoire  sera  k  nous:  les  droits, 
I'honneur  et  le  bonheur  de  la  patrie  seront  reconquis. 

Pour  tout  Fran^ais  qui  a  du  cceur,  le  moment  est  arrivd  de  vaincre  ou  de 
perir ! 

NAPOLfiON. 

D'apr^s  la  copie.     Dep6t  de  la  guerre. 
362 


APPENDIX   C.  363 


ORDER  OF  MOVEMENT:  June  14,  1815. 

Corresp.  vol.  28,  p.  325. 

22053  — ORDRE  DE  MOUVEMENT. 

Beaumont,  14  juin  1815. 

Demain  15,  h.  deux  heures  et  demie  du  matin,  la  division  de  cavalerie 
legere  du  general  Vandamme  montera  h.  cheval  et  se  portera  sur  la  route  de 
Charleroi.  EUe  enverra  des  partis  dans  toutes  les  directions  pour  dclairer  le 
pays  et  enlever  les  postes  ennemis;  mais  chacun  de  ces  partis  sera  au  moins 
de  50  hommes.  Avant  de  mettre  en  marche  la  division,  le  general  Van- 
damme s'assurera  qu'elle  est  pourvue  de  cartouches. 

A  la  meme;heure,  le  lieutenant  general  Paj  ol  rdunira  le  i er  corps  de  cavalerie 
et  suivra  le  mouvement  de  la  division  du  gdndral  Domon,  qui  sera  sous  les 
ordres  du  general  Pajol.  Les  divisions  du  ler  corps  de  cavalerie  ne  fournir- 
ont  point  de  detachements ;  ils  seront  pris  dans  la  3e  division.  Le  gdndral 
Domon  laissera  sa  batterie  d'artillerie  pour  marcher  apres  le  ler  bataillon  du 
30  corps  d'infanterie ;  le  lieutenant  general  Vandamme  lui  donnera  des 
ordres  en  consequence. 

Le  lieutenant  g^n^ral  Vandamme  fera  battre  la  diane  h  deux  heures  et 
demie  du  matin ;  h.  trois  heures,  il  mettra  en  marche  son  corps  d'armde  et  le 
dirigera  sur  Charleroi.  La  totality  de  ses  bagages  et  embarras  seront 
parqu^s  en  arriere,  et  ne  se  mettront  enjmarche  qu'apres  que  le  6e  corps  et 
la  Garde  impdriale  auront  passd.  lis  seront  sous  les  ordres  du  vaguemestre 
gdndral,  qui  les  reunirak  ceux,du  6e  corps,  de  la  Garde  impdriale  et  du  grand 
quartier  general,  et  leur  donnera  des  ordres  de  mouvement. 

Chaque  division  du  3e  corps  d'armee  aura  avec  elle  sa  batterie  et  ces 
ambulances ;  toute  autre  voiture  qui  serait  dans  les  rangs  sera  brulee. 

M.  le  comte  de  Lobau  fera  battre  la  diane  h  trois  heures  et  demie,  et  il 
mettra  en  marche  le  ,6e  corps  d'armee  h  quatre  heures  pour  suivre  le  mouve- 
ment du  gdndral  Vandamme  et  I'appuyer.  II  fera  observer,  pour  les  troupes, 
I'artillerie,  les  ambulances  et  les  bagages,  le  meme  ordre  de  marche  qui  est 
prescrit  au  3e  corps. 

Les  bagages  du  6e  corps  seront  rdunis  h.  ceux  du  3e,  sous  les  ordres  du 
vaguemestre  gdn^ral,  ainsi  qu'il  est  dit. 

La  jeune  Garde  battra  la  diane  h.  quatre  heures  et  demie,  et  se  mettra  en 
marche  h.  cinq  heures  ;  elle  suivra  le  mouvement  du  6e  corps  sur  la  route  de 
Charleroi. 

Les  chasseurs  h  pied  de  la  Garde  battront  la  diane  k  quatre  heures,  et  se 
mettront  en  marche  k  cinq  heures  et  demie  pour  suivre  le  mouvement  de  la 
jeune  Garde. 

Les  grenadiers  k  pied  de  la  Garde  battront  la  diane  k  cinq  heures  et  demie, 
et  partiront  k  six  heures  pour  suivre  le  mouvement  des  chasseurs  k  pied. 

Le  meme  ordre  de  marche  pour  I'artillerie,  les  ambulances  et  les  bagages, 
prescrit  pour  le  3e  corps  d'infanterie,  sera  observd  dans  la  Garde  imp^riale. 

Les  bagages  de  la  Garde  seront  r(3unis  k  ceux  des  3e  et  6e  corps  d'armde, 
sous  les  ordres  du  vaguemestre  general,  qui  les  fera  mettre  en  mouvement. 


364  APPENDIX    C. 

M.  le  mardchal  Grouchy  fera  monter  k  cheval,  h.  cinq  heures  et  demie  du 
matin,  celui  des  trois  autres  corps  de  cavalerie  qui  sera  le  plus  prfes  de  la 
route,  et  il  lui  fera  suivre  le  mouvement  sur  Charleroi ;  les  deux  autres  corps 
partiront  successivement  h  une  heure  d'intervalle  I'un  de  I'autre.  Mais  M.  le 
mardchal  Grouchy  aura  soin  de  f  aire  marcher  la  cavalerie  sur  les  chemins 
latdraux  de  la  route  principale  que  la  colonne  d'infanterie  suivra,  afin  d'dviter 
I'encombrement  et  aussi  pour  que  sa  cavalerie  observe  un  meilleur  ordre. 

II  prescrira  que  la  totality  des  bagages  restent  en  arrifere,  parques  et 
rdunis,  jusqu'  au  moment  oil  le  vaguemestre  gdndral  leur  donnera  I'ordre 
d'avancer. 

M.  le  comte  Reille  fera  battre  la  diane  k  deux  heures  et  demie  du  matin,  et 
il  mettra  en  marche  le  2e  corps  k  trois  heures ;  il  le  dirigera  sur  Marchienne- 
au-Pont,  oil  il  fera  en  sorte  d'etre  rendu  avant  neuf  heures  du  matin.  II  fera 
garder  tous  les  ponts  de  la  Sambre,  afin  que  personne  ne  passe;  les  postes 
qu'il  laissera  seront  successivement  relevds  par  le  ler  corps;  mais  il  doit 
tacher  de  prevenir  I'ennemi  k  ces  ponts  pour  qu'ils  ne  soient  pas  ddtruits, 
surtout  celui  de  Marchienne,  par  lequel  il  sera  probablement  dans  le  cas  de 
deboucher,  et  qu'il  faudrait  faire  aussitot  rdparer  s'il  avait  etd  endommagd. 

A  Thuin  et  k  Marchienne,  ainsi  que  dans  tous  les  villages  sur  sa  route,  M. 
le  comte  Reille  interrogera  les  habitants,  afin  d'avoir  des  nouvelles  des  posi- 
tions et  forces  des  armdes  ennemies.  II  fera  aussi  prendre  les  lettres  dans  les 
bureaux  de  poste  et  les  ddpouillera  pour  faire  aussitot  parvenir  k  I'Empereur 
les  renseignements  qu'il  aura  obtenus. 

M.  le  comte  d'Erlon  mettra  en  marche  le  ler  corps  k  trois  heures  du  matin, 
et  le  dirigera  aussi  sur  Charleroi,  en  suivant  le  mouvement  du  2e  corps, 
duquel  il  gagnera  la  gauche  le  plus  tot  possible,  pour  le  soutenir  et  I'appuyer 
au  besoin.  II  tiendra  une  brigade  de  cavalerie  en  arrifere,  pour  se  couvrir  et 
pour  maintenir  par  de  petits  detachements  ses  communications  avec 
Maubeuge.  II  enverra  des  partis  en  avant  de  cette  place,  dans  les  directions 
de  Mons  et  de  Binche,  jusqu'  k  la  frontifere,  pour  avoir  des  nouvelles  des 
ennemis  et  en  rendre  compte  aussitot ;  ces  partis  auront  soin  de  ne  pas  se 
compromettre  et  de  ne  pas  ddpasser  la  frontifere. 

M.  le  comte  d'Erlon  fera  occuper  Thuin  par  une  division ;  et,  si  le  pont  de 
cette  ville  dtait  ddtruit,  il  le  ferait  aussitot  reparer,  en  meme  temps  qu'il  fera 
tracer  et  exdcuter  immddiatement  une  tete  de  pont  sur  la  rive  gauche.  La 
division  qui  sera  k  Thuin  gardera  aussi  le  pont  de  I'abbaye  d'Aulne,  ou  M. 
le  comte  d'Erlon  fera  dgalement  construire  une  tete  de  pont  sur  la  rive 
gauche. 

Le  meme  ordre  de  marche  present  au  3e  corps  pour  I'artillerie,  les  ambu- 
lances et  les  bagages,  sera  observd  aux  2e  et  ler  corps,  qui  feront  re'unir  et 
marcher  leurs  bagages  k  la  gauche  du  ler  corps  sous  les  ordres  du  vague- 
mestre le  plus  ancien. 

Le  4e  corps  (armde  de  la  Moselle)  a  regu  ordre  de  prendre  aujourd'hui  posi- 
tion en  avant  de  Philippeville.  Si  son  mouvement  estopdrd  et  si  les  divisions 
qui  composent  ce  corps  d'armde  sont  rdunies,  M.  le  lieutenant  gdneral  Gerard 
les  mettra  en  marche  demain  k  trois  heures  du  matin,  et  les  dirigera  sur 
Charleroi.  II  aura  soin  de  se  tenir  k  hauteur  du  36  corps,  avec  lequel  il  com. 
muniquera,  afin  d'arriver  k  peu  prfes  en  meme  temps  devant  Charleroi :  mais 


APPENDIX   C.  365 

le  gendral  Gdrard  fera  dclairer  sa  droite  et  tous  les  debouches  qui  vont  sur 
Namur.  II  marchera  serrd  en  ordre  de  bataille,  et  fera  laisser  h.  Philippeville 
tous  ses  bagages  et  embarras,  afin  que  son  corps  d'armde,  se  trouvant  plus 
Idger,  se  trouve  h.  meme  de  manceuvrer. 

Le  gdndral  Gdrard  donnera  ordre  h  la  146  division  de  cavalerie,  qui  a  du 
aussi  arriver  aujourd'hui  h  Philippeville,  de  suivre  le  mouvement  de  son 
corps  d'  armde  sur  Charleroi,  ou  cette  division  joindra  le  4e  corps  de  cav- 
alerie. 

Les  lieutenants  gdndraux  Reille,  Vandamme,  Gerard  et  Pajol  se  mettront  en 
communication  par  de  frequents  partis,  et  ils  regleront  leur  marche  de  mani- 
fere  a  arriver  en  masse  et  ensemble  devant  Charleroi.  Ils  mettront,  autant 
que  possible,  h.  I'avant-garde  des  ofificiers  qui  parlent  flamand,  pour  interroger 
les  habitants  et  en  prendre  des  renseignements ;  mais  ces  officiers  s'annon- 
ceront  comme  commandant  des  partis,  sans  dire  que  I'armde  est  en  arriere. 

Les  lieutenants  gdneraux  Reille,  Vandamme  et  Gdrard  feront  marcher  tous 
les  sapeurs  de  leurs  corps  d'armde  (ayant  avec  eux  des  moyens  pour  rdparer 
les  ponts)  aprfes  le  premier  regiment  d'infanterie  Idgfere,  et  ils  donneront 
ordre  aux  officiers  du  gdnie  de  faire  rdparer  les  mauvais  passages,  ouvrir  des 
communications  laterales  et  placer  des  ponts  sur  les  courants  d'eau  ou  I'in- 
fanterie  devrait  se  mouiller  pour  les  franchir. 

Les  marins,  les  sapeurs  de  la  Garde  et  les  sapeurs  de  la  reserve  marche- 
ront  aprfes  le  premier  rdgiment  du  36  corps.  Les  lieutenants  gdneraux  Rogniat 
et  Haxo  seront  k  leur  tete ;  ils  n'emmfeneront  avec  eux  que  deux  ou  trois  voi- 
tures ;  le  surplus  du  pare  du  gdnie  marchera  k  la  gauche  du  36  corps.  Si  on 
rencontre  I'ennemi,  ces  troupes  ne  seront  point  engagees,  mais  les  gdneraux 
Rogniat  et  Haxo  les  emploieront  aux  travaux  de  passages  de  rividre,  de 
tetes  de  pont,  de  reparation  de  chemins  et  d'ouverture  de  communications 
etc. 

La  cavalerie  de  la  Garde  suivra  le  mouvement  sur  Charleroi  et  partira  k 
huit  heures. 

L'Empereur  sera  h.  I'avant-garde,  sur  la  route  de  Charleroi.  MM.  les 
lieutenants  gendraux  auront  soin  d'envoyer  k  Sa  Majestd  de  frequents  rap- 
ports sur  leurs  mouvements  et  les  renseignements  qu'ils  auront  recueillis. 
Ils  sont  prevenus  que  Tintention  de  Sa  Majeste  est  d'avoir  passe  la  Sambre 
avant  midi,  et  de  porter  I'armde  k  la  rive  gauche  de  cette  riviere. 

L'equipage  de  ponts  sera  divise  en  deux  sections ;  la  premiere  section  se 
subdivisera  en  trois  parties,  chacune  de  5  pontons  et  5  bateaux  d'avant-garde, 
pour  Jeter  trois  ponts  sur  la  Sambre.  II  y  aura  k  chacune  de  ces  subdivi- 
sions une  compagnie  de  pontonniers. 

La  premifere  section  marchera  k  la  suite  du  pare  du  gdnie  aprfes  le  3e  corps. 

La  deuxifeme  section  restera  avec  le  pare  de  reserve  d'artillerie  k  la  col- 
onne  des  bagages ;  elle  aura  avec  elle  la  46  compagnie  de  pontonniers. 

Les  equipages  de  I'Empereur  et  les  bagages  du  grand  quartier  gdndral 
seront  reunis  et  se  mettront  en  marche  k  dix  heures.  Aussitot  qu'il  seront 
passes,  le  vaguemestre  gdndral  fera  partir  les  Equipages  de  la  Garde  impdri- 
ale,  du  3e  corps  et  du  6e  corps;  en  meme  temps,  il  enverra  ordre  k  la  colonne 
d'equipages  de  la  reserve  de  cavalerie  de  se  mettre  en  marche  et  de  suivre 
la  direction  que  la  cavalerie  aura  prise. 


366  APPENDIX   C. 

Les  ambulances  de  I'arinde  suivront  le  quartier  gdndral  et  marcheront  en 
tete  des  bagages;  mais,  dans  aucun  cas,  ces  bagages,  ainsi  que  les  pares  de 
reserve  de  I'artillerie  et  la  seconde  section  de  Fequipage  de  ponts,  ne 
s'approcheront  h.  plus  de  trois  lieues  de  I'armde,  h  moins  d'ordres  du  major 
gdndral,  et  ils  ne  passeront  la  Sambre  aussi  que  par  ordre. 

Le  vaguemestre  gdndral  formera  des  divisions  de  ces  bagages,  et  il  y  met- 
tra  des  officiers  pour  les  commander,  afin  de  pouvoiren  detacher  ce  qui  sera 
ensuite  appeld  au  quartier  gdndral  ou  pour  le  service  des  officiers. 

L'intendant  gdndral  fera  rdunir  k  cette  colonne  d'dquipages  la  totality  des 
bagages  et  transports  de  I'administration,  auxquels  il  sera  assign^  un  rang 
dans  la  colonne. 

Les  voitures  qui  seront  en  retard  prendront  la  gauche,  et  ne  pourront  sortir 
du  rang  qui  leur  sera  donnd  que  par  ordre  du  vaguemestre  gdndral. 

L'Empereur  ordonne  que  toutes  les  voitures  d'dquipages  qui  seront 
trouvdes  dans  les  colonnes  d'infanterie,  de  cavalerie  ou  d'artillerie,  soient 
bruises,  ainsi  que  les  voitures  de  la  colonne  des  Equipages  qui  quitteront  leur 
rang  et  intervertiront  I'ordre  de  marche  sans  la  permission  expresse  du 
vaguemestre  general. 

A  cet  effet,  il  sera  mis  un  ddtachement  de  50  gendarmes  k  la  disposition 
du  vaguemestre  gdndral,  qui  est  responsable,  ainsi  que  tous  les  officiers  de  la 
gendarmerie  et  les  gendarmes,  de  I'exdcution  de  ces  dispositions,  desquelles  le 
succfes  de  la  campagne  peut  dependre. 

Par  ordre  le  I'Empereur : 

Le  mardchal  de  I'Empire,  major  gdndral, 

Due  de  Dalmatie. 

D'aprfes  I'original.     Ddpot  de  la  guerre. 

in. 

Doc.  Indd.,  p.  22. 

15  Juin. 

A  M.  LE  COAITE  REILLE. 

Commandant  le  2e  Corps  d'Armee. 

Monsieur  le  comte  Reille,  I'empereur  m'ordonne  de  vous  dcrire  de  passer 
la  Sambre,  si  vous  n'avez  pas  de  forces  devant  vous,  et  de  vous  former  sur 
plusieurs  lignes,  k  une  ou  deux  lieues  en  avant,  de  mani^re  h.  etre  a  cheval 
sur  la  grande  route  de  Bruxelles,  en  vous  ^clairant  fortement  dans  la  direc- 
tion de  Fleurus.  M.  le  comte  d'Erlon  passera  k  Marchiennes  et  se  formera 
en  bataille  sur  la  route  de  Mons  k  Charleroi,  ou  il  sera  a  port^e  de  vous 
soutenir  au  besoin. 

Si  vous  etes  encore  k  Marchiennes  lorsque  le  present  ordre  vous  parvien- 
dra,  et  que  le  mouvement  par  Charleroi  ne  put  avoir  lieu,  vous  I'opereriez 
toujours  par  Marchiennes,  mais  toujours  pour  remplir  les  dispositions  ci- 
dessus. 


APPENDIX   C.  367 

L'empereur  se  rend  devant  Charleroi.  Rendez  compte  immddiatement  k 
Sa  Majesty  de  vos  operations  et  de  ce  qui  se  passe  devant  vous. 

Le  marechal  d'empire,  major  gdndral, 

Due  de  Dalmatic. 
Au  bivouac  de  Jumignon,  le 
15  juin,  1815,  i\  8  heures  et 
demie  du  matin. 

IV. 
Doc.  Indd.,  p.  24. 

A  M.  LE  COMTE  D'ERLON. 

Bivouac  de  Jumignon,  15  juin, 
10  heures  du  matin. 

Monsieur  le  Comte,  l'empereur  m'ordonne  de  vous  dcrire  que  M.  le  comte 
Reille  regoit  ordre  de  passer  la  Sambre  h.  Charleroi,  et  de  se  former  sur  plu- 
sieurs  lignes  h  une  ou  deux  lieues  en  avant,  k  cheval  sur  la  grande  route  de 
Bruxelles. 

L'intention  de  Sa  Majestd  est  aussi  que  vous  passiez  la  Sambre  h  Mar- 
chiennes,  ou  a  Ham,  pour  vous  porter  sur  la  grande  route  de  Mons  k  Char- 
leroi, oil  vous  vous  formerez  sur  plusieurs  lignes,  et  prendrez  des  positions 
qui  vous  rapprocheront  de  M.  le  comte  Reille,  liant  vos  communications  et 
envoyant  des  partis  des  toutes  les  directions :  Mons,  Nivelles,  etc.  Ce 
mouvement  aurait  egalement  lieu  si  M.  le  comte  Reille  dtait  obligd  d'effec- 
tuer  son  passage  par  Marchiennes.  Rendez-moi  compte  de  suite  de  vos 
operations  et  de  ce  qui  se  passe  devant  vous;  l'empereur  sera  devant  Char- 
leroi. 

V. 

ORX)ER  TO  THE  COUNT  D'ERLON :  3  P.  M.,  June  15,  1815. 

Doc.  Indd.,  p.  25. 

A  M.  LE  COMTE  D'ERLON. 

(extrait  du  registre  du  major  general.) 

En  avant  de  Charleroi,  h.  3  heures  du  soir, 

15  juin  1815. 

Monsieur  le  comte  d'Erlon,  l'empereur  ordonne  h.  M.  le  comte  Reille  de 
marcher  sur  Gosselies,  et  d'y  attaquer  un  corps  ennemi  qui  paraissait 
s'y  arreter.  L'intention  de  l'empereur  est  que  vous  marchiez  aussi  sur 
Gossehes,  pour  appuyer  le  comte  Reille  et  le  seconder  dans  ses  opdr- 
ations.  Cependant,  vous  devrez  toujours  faire  garder  Marchiennes,  et 
vous  enverrez  une  brigade  sur  les  routes  de  Mons,  lui  recommandant  de  se 
garder  trfes  militairement. 


368  APPENDIX   C. 

VI. 

SUBSEQUENT    ORDER    TO    THE     COUNT    D'ERLON: 

June  15,  1815. 
Doc.  Indd.,  p.  25. 

A  M.  LE  COMTE  D'ERLON, 

COMMANDANT  LE    lER   CORPS. 

Charleroi,  le  15  juin  1815. 

Monsieur  le  Comte,rintention  de  I'empereur  est  que  vous  ralliez  votre  corps 
sur  la  rive  gauche  de  la  Sambre,  pour  joindre  le  2e  corps  k  Gosselies, 
d'aprfes  les  ordres  que  vous  donnera  k  ce  sujet  M.  le  mardchal  prince  de  la 
Moskowa. 

Ainsi,  vous  rappellerez  les  troupes  que  vous  avez  laissdes  h.  Thuin,  Sobre 
et  environs  ;  vous  devrez  cependant  avoir  toujours  de  nombreux  partis  sur 
votre  gauche  pour  dclairer  la  route  de  Mons. 

Le  marechal  d'empire,  major  gdndral, 
Due  de  Dalmatie. 

VII. 

ORDER  TO  GENERAL  NOGUES  :  3  A.  M.,  June  16,  1S15. 

"Napoldon  h.  Waterloo,"  p.  144. 

Ordre  de  mouvement  adress6  par  I'adjudant  commandant,  chef  d'dtat- 
major  de  la  36  division  du  ler  corps,  au  gdndral  Nogues,  commandant  la  ler 
brigade  de  cette  division. 

Ouartier  gdndral  h  Marchienne-au-Pont : 
16  juin  (trois  heures  du  matin). 
D'aprfes  I'intention  du  g^ndral  en  chef,  le  lieutenant  general  me  charge  de 
vous  inviter  h.  faire  partir  de  suite  votre  brigade  pour  etre  rendue  h  six 
heures  du  matin,  et  plus  tot  s'il  etait  possible,  h.  GosseHes. 

L'adjudant  commandant, 
chef  d'dtat-major : 

Ch.  d'Arsonval. 
P.  S. 

La  2e  brigade  reste  ici  jusqu'h  I'arriv^^e  de  la  premifere  division, 'pour 
se  rendre  ensemble  a  la  meme  destination. 

This  indicates  that  at  3  A.  M.  of  the  i6th,  while  the  4th  division  (Durutte's) 
was  in  bivouac  beyond  Jumet  (Doc.  Inc-d.,  Durutte's  statement,  p.  71,  where 
he  gives  Gosselies,  where  the  Second  Corps  was,  by  mistake  for  Jumet),  the 
2d  Division  (Donzelot's)  must  also  have  crossed  the  river,  the  3d  division 
(Marcognet's)  was  at  Marchienne,  and  the  ist  (AUix')  had  not  yet  reached 
the  Sambre. 


APPENDIX   C.  369 

VIII. 
BULLETIN  OF  THE  ARMY:  June  15,  1S15  :  Evening. 
Corresp.  vol.  28,  p.  331. 

22056.  —  BULLETIN  DE  l'ARMEE. 

Charleroi,  15  juin  1815,  au  soir. 

Le  14,  rarm^e  ^tait  placde  de  la  manibre  suivante  : 

Le  quartier  imperial  k  Beaumont. 

Le  ler  corps,  commandd  par  le  general  d'Erlon,  dtait  h.  Soire,  sur  la  Sambre. 

Le  26  corps,  commande  par  le  gdndral  Reille,  dtait  a  Ham-sur-Heure. 

Le  3e  corps,  command^  par  le  gdndral  Vandamme,  dtait  sur  la  droite  de 
Beaumont. 

Le  4e  corps,  command^  par  le  gdndral  Gerard,  arrivait  h,  Philippeville. 

Le  15,  k  trois  heures  du  matin,  le  g^ndral  Reille  attaqua  I'ennemi  et  se 
porta  sur  Marchienne-au-Pont.  II  eut  diffdrents  engagements  dans  lesquels  sa 
cavalerie  chargea  un  bataillon  prussien  et  fit  300  prisonniers. 

A  une  heure  du  matin,  1'  Empereur  dtait  a  Jamioulx-sur-Heure. 

La  division  de  cavalerie  Idgfere  du  gdndral  Demon  sabra  deux  bataillons 
prussiens  et  fit  400  prisonniers. 

Le  general  Pajol  entra  k  Charleroi  k  midi.  Les  sapeurs  et  les  marins  de  la 
Garde  ^taient  k  I'avant-garde  pour  rdparer  les  ponts ;  ils  pdndtrferent  les 
premiers  en  tirailleurs  dans  la  ville.  Le  general  Clary,  avec  le  ler  de  hussards, 
se  porta  sur  Gosselies,  sur  la  route  de  Bruxelles,  et  le  gdndral  Pajol  sur  Gilly, 
sur  la  route  de  Namur. 

A  trois  heures  apr^s  midi,  le  gdndral  Vandamme  ddboucha  avec  son  corps 
sur  Gilly. 

Le  mardchal  Grouchy  arriva  avec  la  cavalerie  du  gdndral  Exelmans. 

L'ennemi  occupait  la  gauche  de  la  position  de  Fleurus.  A  cinq  heures 
aprbs  midi,  I'Empereur  ordonna  I'attaque.  La  position  fut  tournde  et  enlevee. 
Les  quatre  escadrons  de  service  de  la  Garde,  commandos  par  le  gdndral 
Letort,  aide-de-camp  de  I'Empereur,  enfoncferent  trois  carrds  ;  les  26e,  27e  et 
28e  rdgiments  prussiens  furent  mis  en  ddroute.  Nos  escadrons  sabrbrent  400 
ou  500  hommes  et  firent  1,500  prisonniers. 

Pendant  ce  temps,  le  gdndral  Reille  passait  la  Sambre  k  Marchienne-au- 
Pont,  pour  se  porter  sur  Gosselies  avec  les  divisions  du  prince  Jdrome  et  du 
gdndral  Bachelu,  attaquait  I'ennemi,  lui  f  aisait  250  prisonniers  et  le  poursuivait 
sur  la  route  de  Bruxelles. 

Nous  devinmes  ainsi  maitres  de  toute  la  position  de  Fleurus. 

A  huit  heures  du  soir,  I'Empereur  rentra  k  son  quartier  gdndral  k 
Charleroi. 

Cette  journde  coute  k  I'ennemi  cinq  pieces  de  canon  et  2,000  hommes,  dont 
1,000  prisonniers.  Notre  perte  est  de  10  hommes  tuds  et  de  80  blessds,  la 
plupart  des  escadrons  de  service,  qui  ont  fait  les  charges,  et  des  trois 
escadrons  de  2oe  de  dragons,"  qui  ont  aussi  chargd  un  carrd  avec  la  plus 
grande  intrdpidite.  Notre  perte,  Idgfere  quant  au  nombre,  a  dtd  sensible 
k  I'Empereur,  par  la  blessure  grave  qu'a  reque  le  gdndral  Letort,  son  aide-de- 


370  APPENDIX   C. 

camp,  en  chargeant  k  la  tete  des  escadrons  de  service.  Cat  ofHcier  est  de  la 
plus  grande  distinction.  II  a  6t6  frappd  d'une  balle  au  bas-ventre,  et  le 
chirurgien  faitcraindre  que  sa  blessure  nesoit  mortelle. 

Nous  avons  trouv^  k  Charleroi  quelques  magasins.  La  joie  des  Beiges  ne 
saurait  se  ddcrire.  II  y  a  des  villages  qui,  h  la  vue  de  leurs  liberateurs,  ont 
form^  des  danses,  et  partout  c'est  un  dlan  qui  part  du  coeur. 

Dans  le  rapport  de  Tetat-major  gdndral,  on  insdrera  les  noms  des  officiers  et 
soldats  qui  se  sont  distinguds. 

L'Empereur  a  donn^  le  commandement  de  la  gauche  au  prince  de  la 
Moskova,  qui  a  eu  le  soir  son  quartier  gdndral  aux  Quatre-Chemins,  sur  la 
route  de  Bruxelles. 

Le  due  de  Trdvise,  k  qui  I'Empereur  avait  donne  le  commandement  de  la 
jeune  Garde,  est  restd  k  Beaumont,  malade  d'une  sciatique  qui  I'a  force  de  se 
mettre  au  lit. 

Le  4e  corps,  commanded  par  le  gdndral  Gerard,  arrive  ce  soir  k  Chatelet. 
Le  gdndral  Gdrard  a  rendu  compte  que  le  lieutenant  gendral  Bourmont,  le 
colonel  Clouet  et  le  chef  d'escadron  Villoutreys  ont  passe  k  I'ennemi.  Un 
lieutenant  du  ne  de  chasseurs  a  ^galement  passe  k  I'ennemi.  Le  major 
general  a  ordonnd  que  ces  deserteurs  fussent  sur-le-champ  jugds  confor- 
mdment  aux  lois. 

Rien  ne  pent  peindre  le  bon  esprit  el  I'ardeur  de  I'armde.  Elle  regarde 
comme  un  dvdnement  heureux  la  desertion  de  ce  petit  nombre  de  traitres,  qui 
se  ddmasquent  ainsi. 

Extrait  du  Moniteur  du  i8  juin  1815. 

IX. 
WELLINGTON'S   FIRST   MEMORANDUM   OF  ORDERS: 

June  15,  1815. 

Gurwood,  vol.  xii,  p.  472. 

MEiMORANDUM 

For  the  Deputy  Quarter  Master  General. 

Movements  of  the  Army. 

Bruxelles,  15  June,  1S15. 

General  Dornberg's  brigade  of  cavalry,  and  the  Cumberland  Hussars,  to 
march  this  night  upon  Vilvorde,  and  to  bivouac  on  the  high  road  near  to  that 
town. 

The  Earl  of  Uxbridge  will  be  pleased  to  collect  the  cavalry  this  night  at 
Ninhove,  leaving  the  2d  hussars  looking  out  between  the  Scheldt  and  the 
Lys. 

The  I  St  division  of  infantry  to  collect  this  night  at  Ath  and  adjacent,  and 
to  be  in  readiness  to  move  at  a  moment's  notice. 

The  third  division  to  collect  this  night  at  Braine  le  Comte,  and  to  be  in 
readiness  to  move  at  the  shortest  notice. 

The  4th  division  to  be  collected  this  night  at  Grammont,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  troops  beyond  the  Scheldt,  which  are  to  be  moved  to  Audenarde. 


APPENDIX   C.  371 

The  5th  division,  the  8ist  regiment,  and  the  Hanoverian  brigade  of  the 
6th  division,  to  be  in  readiness  to  march  from  Bruxelles  at  a  moment's 
notice. 

The  Duke  of  Brunswick's  corps  to  collect  this  night  on  the  high  road 
between  Bruxelles  and  Vilvorde. 

The  Nassau  troops  to  collect  at  daylight  to-morrow  morning  on  the 
Louvain  road,  and  to  be  in  readiness  to  move  at  a  moment's  notice. 

The  Hanoverian  brigade  of  the  5th  division  to  collect  this  night  at 
Hal,  and  to  be  in  readiness  at  daylight  to-morrow  morning  to  move  towards 
Bruxelles,  and  to  halt  on  the  high  road  between  Alost  and  Assche  for  further 
orders. 

The  Prince  of  Orange  is  requested  to  collect  at  Nivelles  the  2d  and  3d 
divisions  of  the  army  of  the  Low  Countries;  and,  should  that  point  have 
been  attacked  this  day,  to  move  the  3d  division  of  British  infantry  upon 
Nivelles  as  soon  as  collected. 

This  movement  is  not  to  take  place  until  it  is  quite  certain  that  the  enemy's 
attack  is  upon  the  right  of  the  Prussian  army,  and  the  left  of  the  British 
army. 

Lord  Hill  will  be  so  good  as  to  order  Prince  Frederick  of  Orange  to 
occupy  Audenarde  with  500  men,  and  to  collect  the  ist  division  of  the  army 
of  the  Low  Countries  and  the  Indian  brigade  at  Sotteghem,  so  as  to  be 
ready  to  march  in  the  morning  at  daylight. 

The  reserve  artillery  to  be  in  readiness  to  move  at  daylight. 

Wellington. 
X. 

WELLINGTON'S  LETTER  TO  THE  DUG  DE  FELTRE : 

10  P.M.,  June  15,  1815. 
Gurwood,  vol.  xii,  p.  473. 

To  THE  Due  DE  FeLTRE. 

k  Bruxelles,  ce  15  juin,  1815. 

h  10  heures  du  soir. 
Monsieur  Le  Due: 

Je  regois  les  nouvelles  que  I'ennemi  attaqua  les  postes  Prussiens  ce  matin 
h  Thuin  sur  la  Sambre,  et  il  paraissait  menacer  Charleroi.  Je  n'ai  rien  requ 
depuis  neuf  heures  du  matin  de  Charleroi.    *    *    *    * 

Wellington. 
XL 

WELLINGTON'S  "AFTER  ORDERS":  10  P.M.,  June  15, 

1815. 
Gurwood,  vol.  xii,  p.  474, 

MOVEMENT  OF  THE  ARMY. 

After  Orders,  id  o'eLOCK  p.m. 

Bruxelles,  15th  June,  1815. 
The  3d   division  of  infantry  to  continue  its  movement  from  Braine  le 
Comte  upon  Nivelles. 


372  APPENDIX   C. 

The  ist  division  to  move  from  Enghien  upon  Braiae  le  Comte. 
The  2d  and  4th  divisions  of  infantry  to  move  from  Ath  and  Grammont, 
also  from  Audenarde,  and  to  continue  their  movements  upon  Enghien. 
The  cavalry  to  continue  its  movement  from  Ninhove  upon  Enghien. 
The  above  movements  to  take  place  with  as  little  delay  as  possible. 

Wellington. 

XII. 
EXTRACT  FROM    WELLINGTON'S    REPORT    OF    THE 

OPERATIONS;  June  19,  1S15. 
Gurvvood,  vol.  xii,  p.  478. 

TO  EARL  BATHURST. 

Waterloo,  19th  June,  1815. 
My  Lord, 

Buonaparte,  having  collected  the  ist,  2d,  3d,  4th,  and  6th  corps  of  the 
French  army,  and  the  Imperial  Guards  and  nearly  all  the  cavalry,  on  the 
Sambre,  and  between  that  river  and  the  Meuse,  between  the  loth  and  14th 
of  the  month,  advanced  on  the  15th  and  attacked  the  Prussian  posts  at 
Thuin  and  Lobbes,  on  the  Sambre,  at  daylight  in  the  morning. 

I  did  not  hear  of  these  events  till  in  the  evening  of  the  15th ;  and  I 
immediately  ordered  the  troops  to  prepare  to  march,  and  afterwards  to  march 
to  their  left,  as  soon  as  I  had  intelligence  from  other  quarters  to  prove  that 
the  enemy's  movement  upon  Charleroi  was  the  real  attack. 

The  enemy  drove  the  Prussian  posts  from  the  Sambre  on  that  day ;  and 
General  Ziethen,  who  commanded  the  corps  which  had  been  at  Charleroi, 
retired  upon  Fleurus;  and  Marshal  Prince  Bliicher  concentrated  the  Prussian 
army  upon  Sombref,  holding  the  villages  in  front  of  his  position  of  St. 
Amand  and  Ligny. 

The  enemy  continued  his  march  along  the  road  from  Charleroi  towards 
Bruxelles;  and,  on  the  same  evening,  the  15  th,  attacked  a  brigade  of  the 
army  of  the  Netherlands,  under  the  Prince  de  Weimar,  posted  at  Frasne,  and 
forced  it  back  to  the  farmhouse,  on  the  same   road,  called  Les  Quatre  Bras. 

The  Prince  of  Orange  immediately  reinforced  this  brigade  with  another  of 
the  same  division,  under  General  Perponcher,  and,  in  the  morning  early, 
regained  part  of  the  ground  which  had  been  lost,  so  as  to  have  the  command 
of  the  communication  leading  from  Nivelles  and  Bruxelles  with  Marshal 
Bliicher's  position. 

In  the  meantime,  I  had  directed  the  whole  army  to  march  upon  Les 
Quatre  Bras ;  and  the  5th  division,  under  Lieut-General  Sir  Thomas  Picton, 
arrived  at  about  half-past  two  in  the  day,  followed  by  the  corps  of  troops 
under  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  and  afterwards  by  the  contingent  of  Nassau. 

At  this  time  the  enemy  commenced  an  attack  upon  Prince  Bliicher  with 
his  whole  force,  excepting  the  ist  and  2d  corps,  and  a  corps  of  cavalry  under 
General  Kellermann,  with  which  he  attacked  our  post  at  Les  Quatre  Bras. 
*        *        * 

I  should  not  do  justice  to  my  own  feelings,  or  to  Marshal  Bliicher  and  the 


APPENDIX   C.  373 

Prussian  army,  if  I  did  not  attribute  the  successful  result  of  this  arduous  day 
to  the  cordial  and  timely  assistance  I  received  from  them.  The  operation  of 
General  Biilow  upon  the  enemy's  iiank  was  a  most  decisive  one ;  and,  even  if 
I  had  not  found  myself  in  a  situation  to  make  the  attack  which  produced  the 
final  result,  it  would  have  forced  the  enemy  to  retire  if  his  attacks  should 
have  failed,  and  would  have  prevented  him  from  taking  advantage  of  them  if 
they  should  unfortunately  have  succeeded. 
*        *        * 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  &c. 

Wellington. 
Earl  Bathurst. 

XIII. 

WELLINGTON'S    CONVERSATION    WITH   THE    DUKE 
OF  RICHMOND:  June  i6,  1S15. 

Letters  of  the  First  Earl  of  Malmesbury,  London ;  Bentley.      1870.   vol.  2, 
P-  445- 

CAPTAIN  BOWLES  *  TO  LORD  FITZHARRIS. 
ORIGINAL  MEMORANDUM  BY  THE  WRITER. 

At  the  Duchess  of  Richmond's  ball  at  Brussels  the  Prince  of  Orange,  who 
commanded  the  ist  division  of  the  army,  came  back  suddenly,  just  as  the 
Duke  of  Wellington  had  taken  his  place  at  the  supper  table,  and  whispered 
some  minutes  to  his  Grace,  who  only  said  he  had  no  fresh  orders  to  give,  and 
recommended  the  Prince  to  go  back  to  his  quarters  and  go  to  bed. 

The  Duke  of  Wellington  remained  nearly  twenty  minutes  after  this,  and 
then  said  to  the  Duke  of  Richmond,  "  I  think  it  is  time  for  me  to  go  to  bed 
likewise ;"  and  then,  whilst  wishing  him  good-night,  whispered  to  ask  him  if 
he  had  a  good  map  in  his  house.  The  Duke  of  Richmond  said  he  had,  and 
took  him  into  his  dressing-room,  which  opened  into  the  supper-room.  The 
Duke  of  Wellington  shut  the  door  and  said,  "  Napoleon  has  hwnhigged  me 

(by  G ),  he  has  gained  twent>'-four  hours'  march  on  me."     The  Duke  of 

Richmond  said,  "  What  do  you  intend  doing  ?  " 

The  Duke  of  Wellington  replied,  "I  have  ordered  the  army  to  concentrate 
at  Quatre  Bras ;  but  we  shall  not  stop  him  there,  and  if  so  I  must  fight  him 
here  "  (at  the  same  time  passing  his  thumb-nail  over  the  position  of  Waterloo). 
He  then  said  adieu  and  left  the  house  by  another  way  out.  He  went  to  his 
quarters,  slept  six  hours  and  breakfasted,  and  rode  at  speed  to  Quatre  Bras, 
where  he  met  Hardinge  and  went  with  him  to  Bliicher,  who  took  him  over 
the  position  at  Ligny.  The  Duke  of  Wellington  suggested  many  alterations, 
but  Bliicher  would  not  consent  to  move  a  man. 

The  conversation  in  the  Duke  of  Richmond's  dressing-room  was  repeated 
to  me,  two  minutes  after  it  occurred,  by  the  Duke  of  Richmond,  who  was  to 

•Captain  George  Bowles  (Guards). 


374  APPENDIX   C. 

have  had  the  command  of  the  reserve,  if  formed,  and  to  whom  I  was  to  have 
been  aide-de-camp.  He  marked  the  Duke  of  WeUington's  thumb-nail  with 
his  pencil  on  the  map,  and  we  often  looked  at  it  together  some  months  after- 
wards. 

XIV. 
WELLINGTON'S  ORDERS  TO  LORD  HILL:  June  i6,  1S15. 
Gurwood,  vol.  xii,  p.  474. 

INSTRUCTIONS 

For  the  Movement  of  the  Army  on  the  i6th.  * 

Signed  by  Colonel  Sir  W.  DeLancey,  Deputy  Quarter  Master  General. 

To  General  Lord  Hill,  G.  C.  B. 

i6th  June,  1815. 
The  Duke  of  Wellington  requests  that  you  will  move  the  2d  division  of 
infantry  upon  Braine  le  Comte  immediately.     The  cavalry  has  been  ordered 
likewise  on  Braine  le  Comte.     His  Grace  is  going  to  Waterloo. 

To  General  Lord  Hill,  G.  C.  B. 

16th  June,  1815. 
Your  Lordship  is  requested  to  order  Prince  Frederick  of  Orange  to  move, 
immediately  upon  the  receipt  of  this  order,  the  ist  division  of  the  army  of  the 
Low  Countries,  and  the  Indian  brigade,  from  Sotteghem  to  Enghien,  leaving 
500  men,  as  before  directed,  in  Audenarde. 

*  The  original  instructions  issued  to  Colonel  DeLancey  were  lost  with  that  officer's  papers. 
These  memorandums  of  movements  have  been  collected  from  the  different  officers  to  whom 
they  were  addressed. 

XV. 

EXTRACT  FROM  WELLINGTON'S  "  ^^lEMORANDUM  ON 
THE  BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO." 

SUPPLEMENTARY  DESPATCHES,  &c.,  of  the  Duke  of  W^ellington: 
vol.  X,  pp.  523  et  seq. 
But  what  follows  will  show  that,  notwithstanding  the  extension  of  the 
Allied  army  under  the  command  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  such  was  the 
celerity  of  communication  with  all  parts  of  it,  that  in  point  of  fact  "^  his  orders 
readied  all  parts  of  the  army  in  six  hours  after  he  had  issued  them;  and 
that  he  was  in  line  in  person  with  a  sufficient  force  to  resist  and  keep  in  check 
the  enemy's  corps  which  first  attacked  the  Prussian  corps  under  General 
Zieten  at  daylight  on  the  15th  of  June;  having  received  the  intelligence  of 
that  attack  only  at  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  13 th,  he  was  at  Quatre 
Bras  before  the  same  hour  on  the  tnorning  of  the  idtJi^  with  a  sufficient  force 
to  engage  the  left  of  the  French  army. 


'  The  italics  are  ours. 

2  The  text  cited  is  from  the  Supplementary  Despatches  ;  but  it  seems  to  us  quite  possible  that 
the  reading  of  this  passage  given  in  the  Appendix  to  C.  D.  Yonge's  "Life  of  Wellington,"— 
London ;  Chapman  &  Hall,  i860, — is  the  correct  one.    It  there  reads  as  follows  : — 

"  He  was  at  Quatre  Bras  before  twenti'-four  hours  on  the  i6th,""— that  is  by  3  P.  M.,  on  the 
i6th,— which  was  the  fact.  There  are  other  points  where  these  versions  differ,  but  this  is  the 
nest  important  one.    See  ante,  p.  90. 


APPENDIX   C.  375 

It  was  certainly  true  that  he  had  known  for  some  days  of  the  augmentation 
of  the  enemy's  force  on  the  frontier,  and  even  of  the  arrival  of  Buonaparte  at 
the  army  ;  but  he  did  not  deem  it  expedient  to  make  any  movement,  excepting 
for  the  assembly  of  the  troops  at  their  several  alarm  posts,  till  he  should  hear 
of  the  decided  movement  of  the  enemy. 

The  first  account  received  by  the  Duke  of  Wellington  was  from  the  Prince 
of  Orange,  who  had  come  in  from  the  out-posts  of  the  army  of  the  Netherlands 
to  dine  with  the  Duke  at  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  He  reported  that 
the  enemy  had  attacked  the  Prussians  at  Thuin;  that  they  had  taken  posses- 
sion of,  but  had  afterwards  abandoned,  Binch ;  that  they  had  not  yet  touched 
the  positions  of  the  army  of  the  Netherlands.  While  the  Prince  was  with  the 
Duke,  the  staff  officer  employed  by  Prince  Bliicher  at  the  Duke's  head- 
quarters. General  Miiffling,  came  to  the  Duke  to  inform  him  that  he  had  just 
received  intelligence  of  the  movement  of  the  French  army  and  their  attack 
upon  the  Prussian  troops  at  Thuin. 

It  appears  by  the  statement  of  the  historian'  that  the  posts  of  the 
Prussian  corps  of  General  Zieten  were  attacked  at  Thuin  at  four  o'clock  on 
the  morning  of  the  15th ;  and  that  General  Zieten  himself,  with  a  part  of  his 
corps,  retreated  and  was  at  Charleroi  at  about  ten  o'clock  on  that  day ;  yet 
the  report  thereof  was  not  received  at  Bruxelles  till  three  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon. The  Prussian  cavalry  of  the  corps  of  Zieten  was  at  Gosselies  and 
Fleurus  on  the  evening  and  night  of  the  15  th. 

Orders  were  forthwith  sent  for  the  march  of  the  whole  army  to  its  left. 

The  whole  moved  on  that  evening  and  in  the  night,  each  division  and  por- 
tion separately,  but  unmolested ;  the  whole  protected  on  the  march  by  the 
defensive  works  constructed  at  the  different  points  referred  to,  and  by  their 
garrisons. 

The  reserve,  which  had  been  encamped  in  the  neighborhood  and  cantoned 
in  the  town  and  in  the  neighborhood  of  Bruxelles,  were  ordered  to  assemble 
in  and  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  park  at  Bruxelles,  which  they  did  on  that 
evening;  and  they  marched  in  the  morning  of  the  i6th  upon  Quatre  Bras, 
towards  which  post  the  march  of  all  the  troops  consisting  of  the  left  and 
centre  of  the  army,  and  of  the  cavalry  in  particular,  was  directed. 

The  Duke  went  in  person  at  daylight  in  the  morningof  the  i6th  to  Qiiatrt 
.5rflj,  where  he  found  some  Netherland  troops,  cavalry,  infantry,  and  artillery, 
which  had  been  engaged  with  the  enemy,  but  lightly  ;  and  he  went  on  from 
thence  to  the  Prussian  army,*  which  was  in  sight,  formed  on  the  heights 
behind  Ligny  and  St.  Amand.  He  there  communicated  personally  with 
Marshal  Prince  Bliicher  and  the  headquarters  of  the  Prussian  army. 

In  the  meantime  the  reserve  of  the  Allied  army  under  the  command  of  the 
Duke  of  Wellington  arrived  at  Quatre  Bras.  The  historian  asserts  that  the 
Duke  of  Wellington  had  ordered  these  troops  to  halt  at  the  point  at  which 
they  quitted  the  Foret  de  Soignics,    He  can  have  no  proof  of  this  fact,^  oj 


3  Clausewitz. 

*  About  I  o'clock,  at  the  Windmill  of  Bussy,  between  Ligny  and  Brie  :  so  Hardinge  told  me. 
-J.G. 
5  Cf.  Siborne,  vol.  i,  p.  102,  n. ;  Gomm,  p.  352;  Waterloo  Letters ;  Gomm  ;  p.  23. 


Z7^  APPENDIX   C. 

which  there  is  no  evidence;  *  and  in  point  of  fact  the  two  armies  were  united 
about  mid-day  of  the  i6th  of  June,  on  the  left  of  the  position  of  the  Allied 
army  under  the  command  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington.  These  troops,  forming 
the  reserve,  and  having  arrived  from  Bruxelles,  were  now  joined  by  those  of 
the  1st  division  of  infantry^ '  and  the  cavalry ;  and  notwithstanding  the 
criticism  of  the  Prussian  historian  on  the  positions  occupied  by  the  army 
under  the  command  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  and  on  the  march  of  the 
troops  to  join  with  the  Prussian  army,  it  is  a  fact,  appearing  upon  the  face  of 
the  History,  that  the  Allied  British  and  Netherland  ar?ny  was  in  line  at 
Quatre  Bras,  not  only  twenty  four  hours  sooner  than  one  whole  corps  of 
the  Prussian  army  under  General  Billow,  the  absence  of  which  is  attributed 
by  the  historian  to  an  accidental  mistake,  but  likewise  before  the  whole  of  the 
corps  under  Gejieral  Zieten,  which  had  been  the  first  attacked  on  the  13th, 
had  taken  its  position  in  the  line  of  the  aruty  assembled  on  the  heights 
behind  Ligny,  and  havifig  their  left  at  Sombref 

It  was  perfectly  true  that  the  Duke  of  Wellington  did  not  at  first  give 
credit  to  the  reports  of  the  intention  of  the  enemy  to  attack  by  the  valleys  of 
the  Sambre  and  the  Meuse. 

The  enemy  had  destroyed  the  roads  leading  through  those  valleys,  and  he 
considered  that  Buonaparte  might  have  made  his  attack  upon  the  Allied 
armies  in  the  Netherlands  and  in  the  provinces  on  the  left  of  the  Rhine  by 
other  lines  with  more  advantage.  But  it  is  obvious  that,  when  the  attack  was 
made,  he  was  not  unprepared  to  assist  in  resisting  it :  and,  in  point  of  fact, 
did,  on  the  afternoon  and  in  the  evening  of  the  i6th  June,  repulse  the  attack 
of  Marshal  Ney  upon  his  position  at  Quatre  Bras,  which  had  been  com- 
menced by  the  aid  of  another  corps  d'armde  under  General  Reille.  These 
were  the  troops  which  had  attacked  on  the  15th,  at  daylight,  the  Prussian 
corps  under  General  Zieten,  which  corps  the  Allied  troops,  under  the  Duke  of 
Wellington,  relieved  in  resistance  to  the  enemy. 

XVI. 

WELLINGTON'S   LETTER   TO   BLUCHER:    10.30  A.M., 

June  16,  1815. 

Ollech,  opposite  p.  124. 

Sur  les  hauteurs  derrifere 

Frasne  le  i6me  Juin  1815 

k  10  heures  et  demi. 
Mon  cher  Prince : 
Mon  arm^e  est  situd  comma  11  suit : 

Le  Corps  d'Armde  du  Prince  d'Orange  a  une  division  iciet  ^  Quatre  Bras; 
et  le  reste  k  Nivelles. 

La  Reserve  est  en  marche  de  Waterloo  sur  Genappe ;  ou  elle  arrivera  k 
Midi. 


*  The  italics  are  ours. 

7 The  ist  division  did  not  arrive  on  the  field  until  after  6  PM.  {ante,  pp.  183,  184), and  the 
cavaky,  not  at  all. 


APPENDIX   C.  377 

La  Cavalerie  Anglaise  sera  h  la  meme  heure  h  Nivelles. 
Le  Corps  de  Lord  Hill  est  h  Braine  le  Comte. 

Je  ne  vols  pas  beaucoup  de  I'ennemi  en  avant  de  nous;    et  j 'attends  les 
nouvelles  de  votre  Altesse,  et  Tarrivee  des  troupes  pour  decider  mes  opera- 
tions pour  la  journde, 
Rien  n'a  paru  du  cotd  de  Binch,  ni  sur  notre  droite. 

Votre  tr5s  obdissant  serviteur 

Wellington. 

XVIL 

SOULT'S  FIRST  ORDER  TO  NEY:  June  i6,  1815. 
Doc.  Indd.,  p.  26. 

A  M.  LE  MARfiCHAL 

PRINCE  DE   LA   MOSKOWA. 

Charleroi,  le  16  juin  1815. 

Monsieur  le  mardchal,  I'empereur  vient  d'ordonner  k  M.  le  comte  de 
Valmy,  commandant  le  36  corps  de  cavalerie,  de  le  rdunir  et  de  le  dinger  sur 
Gosselies,  ou  il  sera  k  votre  disposition. 

L'intention  de  Sa  Majestd  est  qui  la  cavalerie  de  la  garde,  qui  a  dtdportde 
sur  la  route  de  Bruxelles,  reste  en  arrifere  et  rejoigne  le  restant  de  la 
garde  imp^riale  ;  mais,  pour  qu'elle  ne  fasse  pas  de  mouvement  retrograde, 
vous  pourrez,  aprbs  I'avoir  fait  remplacer  sur  la  ligne,  la  laisser  un  peu  en 
arriere,  ou  il  lui  sera  envoyd  des  ordres  dans  le  mouvement  de  la  journee- 
M.  le  lieutenant  general  Lefebvre  Desnoettes  enverra,  h.  cet  effet,  un  officier 
pour  prendre  des  ordres. 

Veuillez  m'instruire  si  le  ler  corps  a  opdrd  son  mouvement,  et  quelle  est, 
ce  matin,  la  position  exacte  des  ler  et  2e  corps  d'armde,  et  des  deux  divisions 
de  cavalerie  qui  y  sont  attach^es,  en  me  faisant  connaitre  ce  qu'il  y  a 
d'ennemis  devant  vous,  et  ce  qu'on  a  appris. 

Le  major  gdndral, 

Due  de  Dalmatie. 

XVIIL 

THE  EMPEROR'S  LETTER  TO  NEY:  June  16,  1815. 

Doc.  Indd.,  p.  32. :  Corresp.  vol.  28,  p.  334. 

AU  MARfiCHAL  NEY. 

Mon  cousin,  je  vous  envoie  mon  aide  de  camp,  le  general  Flahaut,  qui 
vous  porte  la  presente  lettre.  Le  major  gdneral  a  du  vous  donner  des  ordres ; 
mais  vous  recevrez  les  miens  plus  tot,  parce  que  mes  officiers  vont  plus  vita 
que  les  siens.  Vous  recevrez  I'ordre  de  mouvement  du  jour,  mais  je  veux 
vous  en  ^crire  en  detail  parce  que  c'est  de  la  plus  haute  importance.  Je 
porte  le  mardchal  Grouchy  avec  les  36  et  46  corps  d'infanterie  sur  Sombref. 


378  APPENDIX   C. 

Je  porte  ma  garde  k  Fleurus  et  j'y  serai  de  ma  personne  avant  midi.  J'y 
attaquerai  I'ennemi  si  je  le  recontre,  et  j'tfclairerai  la  route  jusqu'  h.  Gem 
bloux.  Lh.,  d'apres  ce  qui  se  passera,  je  prendrai  mon  parti,  peut-etre  a  trois 
heures  apres  midi,  peut-etre  ce  soir.  Mon  intention  est  que,  immediatement 
apres  que  j'aurai  pris  mon  parti,  vous  soyez  pret  h  marcher  surBruxelles.  Je 
vous  appuierai  avec  la  Garde,  qui  sera  a  Fleurus  ou  a  Sombref,  et  je  ddsirerais 
arriver  k  Bruxelles  demain  matin.  Vous  vous  mettriez  en  marche  ce  soir 
meme,  si  je  prends  mon  parti  d'assez  bonne  heure  pour  que  vous  puissiez  en 
etre  inforrae  de  jour  et  faire  ce  soir  3  ou  4  lieues  et  etre  demain  k  7  heures 
du  matin  k  Bruxelles.  V^ous  pouvez  done  disposer  vos  troupes  de  la  maniere 
suivante.  Premiere  division  k  deux  lieues  en  avant  des  Ouatre-Chemins,  s'il 
n'y  a  pas  d'inconvenient.  Six  divisions  d'infanterie  autour  des  Quatre-Chemins 
et  une  division  k  Marbais,  afin  que  je  puisse  I'attirer  k  moi  k  Sombref,  si 
j'en  avals  besoin.  EUe  ne  retarderait  d'ailleurs  pas  votre  marche.  Le  corps 
du  comte  de  Valmy,  qui  a  3,000  cuirassiers  d'dlite,  k  Pintersection  du  chemin 
des  Romains  et  de  celui  de  Bruxelles,  afin  que  je  puisse  I'attirer  k  moi,  si  j'en 
avals  besoin ;  aussitot  que  mon  parti  sera  pris,  vous  lui  enverrez  I'ordre  de 
venir  vous  rejoindre.  Je  desirerais  avoir  avec  moi  la  division  de  la  Garde 
que  commande  le  general  Lefebvre  Desnoettes,  et  je  vous  envoie  les  deux 
divisions  du  corps  du  comte  de  Valmy  pour  la  remplacer.  Mais,  dans  mon 
projet  actuel,  je  prefere  placer  le  comte  de  Valmy  de  maniere  k  le  rappeler 
si  j'en  avals  besoin,  et  ne  point  faire  faire  de  fausses  marches  au  general 
Lefebvre  Desnoettes,  puisqu'il  est  probable  que  je  me  deciderai  ce  soir 
k  marcher  sur  Bruxelles  avec  la  Garde.  Cependant,  couvrez  la  divis- 
ion Lefebvre  par  les  deux  divisions  de  cavalerie  d'Erlon  et  de  Reille, 
afin  de  manager  la  Garde;  s'il  y  avait  quelque  echauffourde  avec  les 
Anglais,  11  est  preferable  que  ce  soit  sur  le  ligne  que  sur  la  garde.  J"ai 
adopte  comme  principe  gene'ral  pendant  cette  campagne,  de  diviser  mon 
armee  en  deux  ailes  et  une  reserve.  Votre  aile  sera  composee  des  quatre 
divisions  du  ler  corps,  des  quatre  divisions  du  2e  corps,  de  deux  divisions  de 
cavalerie  leg^re,  et  de  deux  divisions  du  corps  du  Comte  de  Valmy.  Cela  ne 
doit  pas  etre  loin  de  45  k  50  mille  hommes. 

Le  marechal  Grouchy  aura  k  peu  pres  la  meme  force,  et  commandera 
d'aile  droite.  La  Garde  formera  la  reserve,  et  je  me  porterai  sur  I'une  ou 
I'autre  aile,  selon  les  circonstances.  Le  major  general  donne  les  ordres  les 
plus  precis  pour  qu'il  n'y  ait  aucune  difficulte  sur  Tobeissance  a  vos  ordres 
lorsque  vous  serez  detach^;  les  commandants  de  corps  devant  prendre  mes 
ordres  directement  quand  je  me  trouve  present.  Selon  les  circonstances, 
j'affaiblirai  I'une  ou  I'autre  aile  en  augmentant  ma  reserve.  Vous  sentez 
assez  I'importance  attach^e  a  la  prise  de  Bruxelles.  Cela  pourra  d'ailleurs 
donner  lieu  a  des  incidents,  car  un  mouvement  aussi  prompt  et  aussi  brusque 
isoleral'armde  anglaise  de  Mons,  Ostende,  etc.  Je  desire  que  vos  dispositions 
soient  bien  faites  pour  qu'au  premier  ordre,  vos  huit  divisions  puissent 
marcher  rapidement  et  sans  obstacle  sur  Bruxelles. 

Charleroi,  le  16  juin  1S15. 
N. 


APPENDIX   C.  379 

XIX. 

COUNT  REILLE'S  LETTER  TO  NEY :  June  i6,  1S15. 
Doc.  Indd.,  p.  2,7- 

A  M.  LE   MARfiCHAL 
Prince  de  la  Moskowa. 

Gosselies,  le  16  juin  1815, 
10  heures  et  quart  du  matin. 
Monsieur  le  Marechal, 

J'ai  I'honneur  d'informer  Votre  Excellence  du  rapport  que  me  fait  faire 
verbalement  le  general  Girard  par  un  de  ses  officiers. 

L'ennemi  continue  h.  occuper  Fleurus  par  de  la  cavalerie  legere  qui  a  des 
vedettes  en  avant ;  Ton  apergoit  deux  masses  ennemis  venant  par  la  route 
de  Namur  et  dont  la  tete  est  k  la  hauteur  de  Saint-Amand;  elles  se  sont 
formdes  peu  k  peu,  et  ont  gagnd  quelque  terrain  k  mesure  qu'il  leur  arrivait 
dumonde:  on  n'a  pu  guere  juger  de  leur  force  k  cause  de  I'eloignement; 
cependant  ce  general  pense  que  chacune  pouvait  d'etre  de  six  bataillons  en 
colonne  par  bataillon.     On  apercevait  des  mouvements  de  troupes  derriere. 

M.  le  lieutenant  general  Flahaut  m'afait  part  des  ordres  qu'il  portait  k  Votre 
Excellence;  j'en  ai  prevenu  M.le  comte  d'Erlon,  afin  qu'il  puisse  suivre  mon 
mouvement.  J'aurais  commencd  le  mien  sur  Frasnes  aussitot  que  les  divi- 
sions auraient  d te  sous  les  armes  ;  mais  d'apres  le  rapport  du  gdneral  Girard, 
je  tiendrai  les  troupes  pretes  k  marcher  en  attendant  les  ordres  de  Votre  Ex- 
cellence, et  comme  ils  pourront  me  parvenir  tr^s  vite,  il  n'y  aura  que  triis 
peu  de  temps  de  perdu. 
J'ai  envoyd  k  I'empereur  I'officierqui  m'afait  le  rapport  du  general  Girard. 
Je  renouvelle  k  Votre  Excellence  les  assurances  de  mon  respectueux 
ddvouement. 

Le  gdndral  en  chef  du  2e  corps. 
Comte  Reille. 

XX. 

NEY'S  ORDERS  TO  REILLE  AND  D'ERLON :  June  16,  1S15. 
Doc.  Indd.,  p.  38. 

A  M.  LE  COMTE  REILLE, 

Commandant  le  2E  Corps  d'Arm^e. 

Ordre  de  Mouvement. 

Frasnes, le  16  juin  iSi^. 

Conformement  aux  instructions  de  I'empereur,  le  2e  corps  se  mettra  en 

marche  de  suite  pour  aller  prendre  position,  la  cinquifeme  division'  en  arrifere 

de  Gennapes,  sur  les  hauteurs  qui  dominent  cette  ville,  la  gauche  appuyee  k 

la  grande  route.    Un  bataillon  ou  deux  couvriront  tous  les  debouchds  en 


'That  of  Bachelu. 


380  APPENDIX   C. 

avant  sur  la  route  de  Bruxelles.  Le  pare  de  reserve  et  les  Equipages  de  cette 
division  resteront  avec  la  seconde  ligne. 

La  neuvi^me  division^  suivra  les  mouvements  de  la  cinqui^me,  et  viendra 
prendre  position  en  seconde  ligne  sur  les  hauteurs  h  droite  et  h.  gauche  du 
village  de  Banterlet^. 

Les  sixieme  et  septi^me  divisions^  h  I'embranchement  de  Quatre-Bras,  ou 
sera  votre  quartier  general.  Les  trois  premieres  divisions  du  comte  d'Erlon 
viendront  prendre  position  k  Frasnes;  la  division  de  droite  s'etablira  a 
Marbais  avec  la  deuxieme  division  de  cavalerie  Idgi^re  du  general  Pire;  la 
premiere  couvrira  votre  marche,  et  vous  ^clairera  sur  Bruxelles  et  sur  vos 
deux  flancs.     Mon  quartier  k  Frasnes. 

Pour  le  Mar^chal  prince  de  la  Moskowa, 

Le  Colonel,  premier  aide  de  camp, 

Heymfes. 

Deux  divisions  du  comte  de  Valmy,  s'^tabliront  k  Frasnes  et  h.  Liberchies. 
Les  Divisions  de  la  garde  des  gdndraux  Lefebvre  Desnoettes  et  Colbert 
resteront  dans  leur  position  actuelle  de  Frasnes. 

XXI. 

SOULT'S  FORMAL  ORDER  TO  NEY  TO  CARRY  QUATRE 

BRAS:  June  16,  1815. 
Doc.  In^d.,  p.  27. 

A  M.  LE  MARfiCHAL 

PRINCE  DE   LA   MOSKOWA. 

Charleroi,  le  16  juin  1815. 

Monsieur  le  Mardchal,  I'empereur  ordonne  que  vous  mettiez  en  marche 
les  2e  et  ler  corps  d'armee,  ainsi  que  le  36  corps  de  cavalerie,  qui  a  dtd  mis  k 
votre  disposition,  pour  les  diriger  sur  I'intersection  des  chemins  dits  les 
Trois-Bras  (route  de  Bruxelles),  ou  vous  leur  ferez  prendre  position,  et  vous 
porterez  en  meme  temps  des  reconnaissances,  aussi  avant  que  possible,  sur 
la  route  de  Bruxelles  et  sur  Nivelles,  d'oii  probablement  I'ennemi  s'est  retird. 

S.  M.  desire  que,  s'il  n'y  a  pas  d'inconv(^nient,  vous  dtablissiez  une  division 
avec  de  la  cavalerie  k  Genappe,  et  elle  ordonne  que  vous  portiez  une  autre  divi- 
sion du  c6t6  de  Marbais,  pour  couvrir  I'espace  entre  Sombref  et  les  Trois-Bras. 
Vous  placerez,  prfes  de  ces  divisions,  la  division  de  cavalerie  de  la  garde 
impdriale,  command^e  par  le  gdndral  Lefebvre  Desnoettes,  ainsi  que  le  ler 
regiment  de  hussards,  qui  a  dtd  ddtachd  hier  vers  Gosselies. 

Le  corps  qui  sera  k  Marbais  aura  aussi  pour  objet  d'appuyer  les  mouve- 


^That  of  Foy. 

3A  village  on  the  Brussels  turnpike  half  a  mile  north  of  Quatre  Bras. 

*Those  of  Jerome  and  Girard.    This  shows  that  Ney  expected  that  Girard's  division  would 
be  returned  to  him. 


APPENDIX   C.  381 

ments  de  M.  le  mardchal  Grouchy  sur  Sombref,  et  cie  vous  soutenir  h  la 
position  des  Trois-Bras,  si  cela  devenait  ndcessaire.  Vous  recommanderez 
au  gdndral,  qui  sera  h.  Marbais,  de  bien  s'dclairer  sur  toutes  les  directions, 
particulii^rement  sur  ceiles  de  Gembloux  et  de  Wavre. 

Si  cependant  la  division  du  gdndral  Lefebvre  Desnoiittes  dtait  trop  engagde 
sur  la  route  de  Bruxelles,  vous  la  laisseriez  et  vous  la  remplacericz  au  corps 
qui  sera  k  Marbais  par  le  3e  corps  de  cavalerie  aux  ordres  de  M.  le  comte  de 
Valmy,  et  par  le  ler  rdgiment  de  hussards. 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  vous  prdvenir  que  I'empereur  va  se  porter  sur  Sombref, 
oil,  d'apr^s  les  ordres  de  Sa  Majestd,  M.  le  marechal  Grouchy  doit  se  dinger 
avec  Ies3eet4e  corps  d'infanterie,  et  les  ler,  se  et  46  corps  de  cavalerie. 
M.  le  marechal  Grouchy  fera  occuper  Gembloux. 

Je  vous  prie  de  me  mettre  de  suite  h  meme  de  rendre  compte  h  I'empereur 
de  vos  dispositions  pour  exdcuter  I'ordre  que  jevousenvoie,  ainsi  que  de  tout 
ce  que  vous  aurez  appris  sur  I'ennemi. 

Sa  Majestd  me  charge  de  vous  recommander  de  prescrire  aux  gdndraux 
commandant  les  corps  d'armde  de  faire  rdunir  leur  monde  et  rentrer  les 
hommes  Isolds,  de  maintenir  I'ordre  le  plus  parfait  dans  la  troupe,  et  de  ral- 
lier  toutes  les  voitures  d'artillerie  et  les  ambulances  qu'ils  auraient  pu  laisser 
en  arrifere. 

Le  marechal  d'empire,  major  gdndral. 
Due  de  Dalmatie. 


XXII. 

SOULT'S  SECOND  ORDER  TO  NEY  TO  CARRY  QUATRE 
BRAS :  June  16,  1S15. 

Doc.  Indd.,  p.  31. 

A  M.  LE  MARfiCHAL 
Prince  de  la  Moskowa. 

Charleroi,  le  16  juin  1815. 
Monsieur  le  Marechal, 

Un  officier  de  lanciers  vient  de  dire  h  I'empereur  que  I'ennemi  prdsentait 
des  masses  du  cotd  des  Quatre-Bras.  Reunissez  les  corps  des  comtes  Reille 
et  d'Erlon,  et  celui  du  comte  de  Valmy,  qui  se  met  k  I'instant  en  route  pour 
vous  rejoindre;  avec  ces  forces,  vous  devrez  battre  et  ddtruire  tons  les  corps 
ennemis  qui  peuvent  se  prdsenter.  Bliicher  dtait  hier  h.  Namur,  et  il  n'est 
pas  vraisemblable  qu'il  ait  portd  des  troupes  vers  les  Quatre-Bras;  ainsi, 
vous  n'avez  affaire  qu'k  ce  qui  vient  de  Bruxelles, 

Le  mardchal  Grouchy  va  faire  le  mouvement  sur  Sombref,  que  je  vous  ai 
annoncd,  et  I'empereur  va  se  rendre  h  Fleurus ;  c'est  Ik  ou  vous  adresserez 
vos  nouveaux  rapports  k  Sa  Majestd. 

Le  mardchal  d'empire,  major  gdndral, 

Due  de  Dalmatie. 


382  APPENDIX   C. 

XXIII. 

FLAHAUT'S  LETTER  TO  THE  DUKE  OF  ELCHINGEN. 

Doc.  Indd.,  p.  63. 

A   M.  LE   DUG   D'ELCHINGEN. 

Paris,  24  novembre  1829. 

Je  voudrais,  mon  cher  Due,  pouvoir  rdpondre  d'une  manifere  plus  precise  k 
vos  questions ;  mais,  n'ayant  pas  pris  de  notes,  il  m'est  impossible,  aprfes  un 
intervalle  de  quinze  ann^es,  de  me  rappeler  les  details  que  vous  tenez  k  savoir. 

C'est  moi  qui  ai  portd,  le  16,  h.  monsieur  votre  p^re,  I'ordre  de  marcher  aux 
Quatre-Bras  et  de  s'emparer  de  cette  position.  L'empereur  me  I'a  dictd  le 
matin  de  bonne  heure,  autant  qu'il  m'en  souvienne,  entre  huit  et  neuf  heures. 

Quant  h.  celle  h  laquelle  je  I'ai  remis  h  M.  le  mardchal  Ney,  il  me  serait 
impossible  de  le  dire,  n'y  ayant  pas  attach^  d'importance  dans  le  moment. 

Aprfes  le  lui  avoir  remis,  j'ai  pris  les  devants  et  ai  dtd  rejoindre  le  gdn^ral 
Lefebvre  Desnoettes,  qui  commandait  I'avant-garde.  L'infanterie  s'est  fait 
longtemps  attendre,  mais  dfes  que  monsieur  votre  pfere  nous  a  rejoints,  et 
avant  qu'elle  fCit  arrivde,  il  a  fait  attaquer  les  troupes  anglaises.  Voilk  tout 
ce  dont  je  puis  me  souvenir;  je  regrette  que  ce  ne  soit  pas  plus  circonstancie, 
puisque  vous  tenez  h.  avoir  des  details  plus  precis. 

Croyez,  mon  cher  Due,  k  la  sincdritd  de  I'amitid  que  je  vous  ai  voude. 

Comte  Ch.  FLAHAUT. 

XXIV. 

NAPOLEON'S  LETTER  TO  GROUCHY:  June  16,  1815. 
Corresp.  vol.,  28,  p.  336. 

22059.  — AU  MARfiCHAL  COMTE  GROUCHY 
Commandant  l'aile  droite  de  l'armee  du  Nord. 

Charleroi,  16  juin  1815. 

Mon  Cousin,  je  vous  envoie  Labddoyfere,  mon  aide  de  camp,  pour  vous 
porter  la  prdsente  lettre.  Le  major  gdn^ral  a  du  vous  faire  connaitre  mes 
intentions ;  mais,  comme  il  a  des  officiers  mal  montds,  mon  aide  de  camp 
arrivera  peut-etre  avant. 

Mon  intention  est  que,  comme  commandant  l'aile  droite,  vous  preniez 
le  commandement  du  30  corps  que  commande  le  gdndral  Vandamme,  du 
46  corps  que  commande  le  gdn^ral  Gerard,  des  corps  de  cavalerie  que  com- 
mandent  les  gdneraux  Pajol,  Milhaud  et  Exelmans;  ce  qui  ne  doit  pas  faire 
loin  de  50,000'  hommes.  Rendez-vous  avee  cette  aile  droite  k  Sombreffe. 
Faites  partir  en  consequence,  de  suite,  les  corps  des  gdneraux  Pajol,  Milhaud, 
Exelmans  et  Vandamme,  et,  sans  vous  arreter,  continuez  votre  mouvement 
sur  Sombreffe.  Le  46  corps,  qui  est  k  Chatelet,  regoit  directement,  I'ordre 
de  se  rendre  k  Sombreffe  sans  passer  par  Fleurus.    Cette  observation  est 


APPENDIX   C.  383 

importante,  parce  que  je  porte  mon  quartier  gdnfral  h.  Fleurus  et  qu'il  faut 
^viter  les  encombrements.  Envoyez  cle  suite  un  officier  au  general  Gerard 
pour  lui  faire  connaitre  votre  mouvement,  et  qu'il  execute  le  sien  de  suite. 

Mon  intention  est  que  tous  les  gendraux  prennent  directement  vos  ordres ; 
ils  ne  prendront  les  miens  que  lorsque  je  serai  present.  Je  serai  entre  dix  et 
onze  heures  k  Fleurus;  je  me  rendrai  h  Sombreffe,  laissant  ma  Garde, 
infanterie  et  cavalerie,  h  Fleurus ;  je  ne  la  conduirais  k  Sombreffe  qu'en 
cas  qu'elle  fut  ndcessaire.  Si  I'ennemi  est  k  Sombreffe,  je  veux  I'attaquer ; 
je  veux  meme  I'attaquer  b.  Gembloux  et  m'emparer  aussi  de  cette  position, 
mon  intention  dtant,  apres  avoir  connu  ces  deux  positions,  de  partir  cette 
nuit,  et  d'opdrer  avec  mon  aile  gauche,  que  commande  le  mar^chal  Ney,  sur 
les  Anglais.  Ne  perdez  done  point  un  moment,  parce  que  plus  vite  je 
prendrai  mon  parti,  mieux  cela  vaudra  pour  la  suite  de  mes  operations.  Je 
suppose  que  vous  etes  k  Fleurus.  Communiquez  constamment  avec  le  g^n- 
dral  Gerard,  afin  qu'il  puisse  vous  aider  pour  attaquer  Sombreffe,  s'il  dtait 
necessaire. 

La  division  Girard  est  k  portde  de  Fleurus ;  n'en  disposez  point  k  moins  de 
ndcessitd  absolue,  parce  qu'elle  doit  marcher  toute  la  nuit.  Laissez  aussi  ma 
jeune  Garde  et  toute  son  artillerie  k  Fleurus. 

Le  comte  de  Valmy,  avec  ses  deux  divisions  de  cuirassiers  marche  sur  la 
route  de  Bruxelles  ;  il  se  lie  avec  le  mardchal  Ney,  pour  contribuer  k  I'opdra- 
tion  de  ce  soir,  k  I'aile  gauche. 

Comme  je  vous  I'ai  dit,  je  serai  de  dix  a  onze  heures  k  Fleurus.  Envoyez- 
moi  des  rapports  sur  tout  ce  que  vous  apprendrez.  Veillez  k  ce  que  la 
route  de  Fleurus  soit  libra.  Toutes  les  donnees  que  j'ai  sont  que  les  Prus- 
siennes  ne  peuvent  point  nous  opposer  plus  de  40,000  hommes. 

NAFOLfiON. 
D'apr^s  la  copie.    Ddpot  de  la  guerre. 

XXV. 

THE  2  P.M.  — June  i6th  — ORDER  TO  NEY. 
Doc.  Indd.,  p.  40. 

A  M.  LE  MARfiCHAL 
Prince  de  la  Moskowa. 

En  avant  de  Fleurus, 
le  i6  juin  k  2  heures. 
Monsieur  le  Mardchal,  I'empereur  me  charge  de  vous  prdvenir  que  I'ennemi 
a  reuni  un  corps  de  troupes  entre  Sombref  et  Bry,  et  qu'k  deux  heures  et 
demie  M.  le  mardchal  Grouchy,  avec  les  troisieme  et  quatrieme  corps, 
I'attaquera;  I'intention  de  Sa  Majesty  est  que  vous  attaquiez  aussi  ce  qui 
est  devant  vous,  et  qu'apr^s  I'avoir  vigoureusement  poussd,  vous  rabattiez 
sur  nous  pour  concourir  k  envelopper  le  corps  dont  je  viens  de  vous  parler. 

Si  ce  corps  dtait  enfoncd  auparavant,  alors  Sa  Majestd  ferait  manoeuvre* 
dans  votre  direction  pour  hater  dgalement  vos  operations. 


3^4  APPENDIX   C. 

Instruisez  de  suite  Tempereur  de  vos  dispositions  et  de  ce  qui  se  passe  sur 
votre  front. 

Le  mare'chal  d'empire,  major  gdndral, 

Due  de  Dalmatie. 
Au  dos  de  cet  ordre  est  dcrit : 

A  M.  le  Mardchal  Prince  de  la  Moskowa, 
A  Gosselies,  sur  la  route  de  Bruxelles. 
Et  au  crayon :  Wagnde 

Bois  de  Lombuc. 
Un  duplicata  de  cet  ordre  porte 

A  M.  le  Mardchal  Prince  de  la  Moskowa, 
A  Gosselies,  sur  la  route  de  Bruxelles. 

Wagnde. 
Ransart. 

XXVI. 
THE  3.15  P.  M.  —  June  1 6th— ORDER  TO  NEY. 
Doc.  In^d.,  p.  42. 

Monsieur  le  Mar^chal,  je  vous  ai  dcrit,  il  y  a  une  heure,  que  I'empereur 
f  erait  attaquer  I'ennemi  h.  deux  heures  et  demie  dans  la  position  qu'il  a  prise 
entre  le  village  de  Saint-Amand  et  de  Bry:  en  ce  moment  I'engagement  est 
trfes  prononce ;  Sa  Majeste  me  charge  de  vous  dire  que  vous  devez  manoeuvrer 
sur-le-champ  de  maniere  k  envelopper  la  droite  de  I'ennemi  et  tomber  h.  bras 
raccourcis  sur  ses  derrieres ;  cette  armee  est  perdue  si  vous  agissez  vigoureuse- 
ment;  le  sort  de  la  France  est  entre  vos  mains.  Ainsi  n'hesitez  pas  un 
instant  pour  faire  le  mouvement  que  I'empereur  vous  ordonne,  etdirigez  vous 
surles  hauteurs  de  Bry  etde  Saint-Amand,  pour  concourirkunevictoire  peut- 
etre  decisive.  L'ennemi  est  pris  en  flagrant  delit  au  moment  ou  il  cherche  a 
se  rdunir  aux  Anglais. 

Le  major  general. 

Due  de  Dalmatie. 
En  avant  de  Fleurus,  le  16  juin  1815,  h.  3  heures  un  quart. 

XXVII. 
SOULT'S  LETTER  TO  NEY:  June  17,  1815. 
Doc.  Indd.,  p.  45. 

A  M.  LE  MARfiCHAL 
Prince  de  la  Moskowa. 

Fleurus,  le  15  [17]  juin  1815. 
Monsieur  le  Mardchal,  le  gdndral  Flahaut,  qui  arrive  h  I'instant,  fait  con- 
naitre  que  vous  etes  dans  I'incertitude  sur  les  rdsultats  de  la  journee  d'hier. 
Je  crois  cependant  vous  avoir  prevenu  de  la  victoire  que  I'empereur  a  rem- 
portee.  L'armde  prussienne  a  6t6  mise  en  ddroute,  le  gdndral  Pajol  est  h.  sa 
poursuite  sur  les  routes  de  Namur  et  de  Li^ge.  Nous  avons  ddjk  plusieurs 
milliers  de  prisonniers  et  30  pieces  de  canon.  Nos  troupes  se  sont  bien  con- 
duites:  une  charge  de  six  bataillons  de  la  garde,  des  escadrons  de  service  et 


APPENDIX   C.  385 

la  division  de  cavalerie  du  gdndral  Delort  a  pcrcd  la  ligne  ennemie,  portd  le 
plus  grand  ddsordre  dans  ses  rangs  et  enlevd  la  position. 

L'empereur  se  rend  au  moulin  de  Bry  ou  passe  la  grande  route  qui  con- 
duit de  Namur  aux  Quatre-Bras;  il  n'est  done  pas  possible  que  I'armde 
anglaise  puisse  agir  devant  vous ;  si  cela  dtait,  l'empereur  marcherait  directe- 
ment  sur  elle  par  la  route  des  Quatre-Bras,  tandis  que  vous  I'attaqueriez 
de  front  avec  vos  divisions  qui,  h.  present,  doivent  etre  reunies,  et  cette  armde 
serait  dans  un  instant  detruit,  Ainsi,  instruisez  Sa  Majestd  de  la  position 
exacte  des  divisions,  et  de  tout  ce  qui  se  passe  devant  vous. 

L'empereur  a  vu  avec  peine  que  vous  n'ayez  pas  rduni  hier  les  divisions ; 
elles  ont  agi  isoldment ;  ainsi,  vous  avez  dprouvd  des  pertes. 

Si  les  corps  des  comtes  d'Erlon  et  Reille  avaient  dtd  ensemble,  il  ne 
rdchappait  pas  un  Anglais  du  corps  qui  venait  vous  attaquer.  Si  le  comte 
d'Erlon  avait  execute  le  mouvement  sur  St.  Amand  que  l'empereur  a  ordonnd, 
I'armee  prussienne  etait  totalement  detruite,  et  nous  aurions  fait  peut-etre 
30,000  prisonniers. 

Les  corps  des  gdndraux  Gdrard,  Vandamme  et  la  garde  impdriale  ont 
toujours  6t6  rdunis;  Ton  s'expose  h  des  revers  lorsque  des  ddtacliements  sont 
compromis. 

L'empereur  esp&re  et  desire  que  vos  sept  divisions  d'infanterie  et  la  caval- 
erie soient  bien  reunies  et  formdes,  et  qu'ensemble  elles  noccupent  pas  une 
lieue  de  terrain,  pour  les  avoir  bien  dans  votre  main  et  les  employer  au  besoin. 
L'intention  de  Sa  Majestd  est  que  vous  preniez  position  aux  Quatre-Bras 
ainsi  que  I'ordre  vous  en  a  dte  donne  ;  mais  si,  par  impossible,  cela  ne  peut 
avoir  lieu,  rendez-en  compte  sur-le-champ  avec  detail,  et  l'empereur  s'y 
portera  ainsi  que  je  vous  I'ai  dit ;  si,  au  contraire,  il  n'y  a  qu'une  arrifere-garde, 
attaquez-la,  et  prenez  position. 

La  journee  d'aujourd'hui  est  necessaire  pour  terminer  cette  operation,  et 
pour  completer  les  munitions,  rallier  les  militaires  isoles  et  faire  rentrer  les 
detachements.  Donnez  des  ordres  en  consequence,  et  assurez-vous  que  tous 
lea  blesses  sont  pauses  et  transportds  sur  les  derri^res :  Ton  s'est  plaint  que 
les  ambulances  n'avaient  pas  fait  leur  devoir. 

La  fameux  partisan  Lutzow,  qui  a  6t6  pris,  disait  que  I'armee  prussienne 
dtait  perdue,  et  que  Bliicher  avait  expose  une  seconde  fois  la  monarchic 
prussienne. 

Le  mardchal  d'empire,  major  gdndral. 

Due  de  DALMATIE. 
XXVII L 
vSOULT'S  ORDER  TO  NEY  :   12  M.,  June  17,  1815. 
Doc.  Indd.,  p.  44. 

A  M.  LE   MARfiCHAL 

Prince  de  la  Moskowa. 

'46  corps  d'armde  [sic],  h  Gosselies. 

En  avant  de  Ligny,  le  17  h.  midi. 
Monsieur  le  Mardchal,  l'empereur  vient  de  faire  prendre  position,  en  avant 


'This  mention  of  the  4th  Corps,  G6rard's,  must  be  an  error. 


386  APPENDIX   C. 

de  Marbais,  h  un  corps  d'infanterie  et  h.  la  garde  imperiale;  S.  M.me  charge 
de  vous  dire  que  son  intention  est  que  vous  attaquiez  les  ennemis  aux 
Quatre-Bras,  pour  les  chasser  de  leur  position,  et  que  le  corps  qui  est  k 
Marbais  secondera  vos  operations;  S.  M.  va  se  rendre  k  Marbais,  et  elle 
attend  vos  rapports  avec  impatience. 

Le  mardchal  d'empire,  major  gdndral. 
Due  de  Dalmatie. 

XXIX. 

CAPTAIN     BOWLES'    STORY    OF    WELLINGTON     AT 
QUATRE  BRAS:  June  17,  1815. 
Captain  Bowles  in  Lord  Malmesbury's  Letters,  vol.  2,  p.  447. 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  17th,  my  company  being  nearly  in  front  of  the 
farmhouse  at  Quatre-Bras,  soon  after  daybreak  the  Duke  of  Wellington 
came  to  me,  and,  being  personally  known  to  him,  he  remained  in  conversation 
for  an  hour  or  more,  during  which  time  he  repeatedly  said  he  was  surprised 
to  have  heard  nothing  of  Bliicher.  At  length  a  staff-officer  arrived,  his 
horse  covered  with  foam,  and  whispered  to  the  Duke,  who  without  the  least 
change  of  countenance  gave  him  some  orders  and  dismissed  him.     He  then 

turned  round  to  me  and  said,  '  Old  Bliicher  has  had  a  d d  good  licking 

and  gone  back  to  Wavre,  eighteen  miles.  As  he  has  gone  back,  we  must  go 
too.  I  suppose  in  England  they  will  say  we  have  been  licked.  I  can't  help 
it ;  as  they  are  gone  back,we  must  go  too.' 

He  made  all  the  arrangements  for  retiring  without  moving  from  the  spot 
on  which  he  was  standing,  and  it  certainly  did  not  occupy  him  five  miuutes." 


XXX. 

GROUCHY'S  REPORT  TO  NAPOLEON  FROM  SART-A- 

WALHAIN:  11  A.M.,  June  18,  1815. 
Grouchy  Mdm.  vol.  4,  p.  71. 

Sart-k-Walhain  le  18  juin,  onze  heures  du  matin. 
Sire: 

Je  ne  perds  pas  un  moment  h  vous  transmettre  les  renseignements  que  je 
recueille  ici ;  je  les  regarde  comme  positifs,  et  afin  que  Votre  Majesttf  les 
reqoive  le  plus  promptement  possible,  je  les  lui  exp^die  par  le  major  La 
Fresnaye,  son  ancien  page ;  il  est  bien  montd  et  bon  ^cuyer. 

Les  ler,  2e  et  3e  corps  de  Bliicher  marchent  dans  la  direction  de  Bruxelles. 
Deux  de  ces  corps  ont  pass^  h  Sart-h,-Walhain,  ou  h  peu  de  distance,  sur  la 
droite;  ils  ont  ddfil^  en  trois  colonnes,  marchant  h.  peu  prfes  de  meme 
hauteur.  Leur  passage  a  durd  six  heures  sans  interruption.  Ce  qui  a  defile 
en  vue  de  Sart-h-Walhain  peut-etre  6va.\u6  h  trente  mille  hommes  au  moins, 
et  avait  un  materiel  de  cinquante  h.  soixante  bouches  k  feu. 


APPENDIX   C.  387 

Un  corps  venant  de  Lidge  a  effectud  sa  jonction  avec  ceux  qui  ont  com 
battu  h.  Fleurus.  (Ci-joint  une  rdquisition  qui  le  prouve.)  Quelques-uns  des 
Prussiens  que  j'ai  devant  moi  se  dirigent  vers  la  plaine  de  la  Chyse,  situde 
prfes  de  la  route  de  Louvain,  et  ii  deux  lieues  et  demie  de  cette  ville. 

II  semblerait  que  ce  serait  h.  dessein  de  s'y  masser  ou  de  combattre  les 
troupes  qui  les  y  poursuivraient,  ou  enfin  de  se  rdunir  k  Wellington,  projet 
annoncd  par  leurs  officiers,  qui,  avec  leur  jactance  ordinaire,  pre'tendent 
n'avoir  quittd  le  champ  de  bataille,  le  16,  qu'afin  d'opdrer  leur  reunion  avec 
I'armde  anglaise  sur  Bruxelles. 

Ce  soir,  je  vais  etre  massd  h.  Wavres,  et  me  trouver  ainsi  entre  Wellington, 
que  je  presume  en  retraite  devant  Votre  Majestd,  et  I'armde  prussienne. 

J'ai  besoin  d'instructions  ultdrieures  sur  ce  que  Votre  Majestd  ordonne 
que  je  fasse,  Le  pays  entre  Wavres  et  la  plaine  de  la  Chyse  est  difficile, 
coupd,  et  mardcageux. 

Par  la  route  de  Wivorde,  j'arriverai  facilement  h.  Bruxelles  avant  tout  ce 
qui  sera  arretd  h.  la  Chyse,  si  tant  il  y  a  que  les  Prussiens  y  fassent  une  halte. 

Daignez,  Sire,  me  transmettre  vos  ordres ;  je  puis  les  recevoir  avant  de 
commencer  mon  mouvement  de  demain. 

La  plupart  des  renseignements  que  renferme  cette  lettre  me  sont  fournis 
par  la  propridtaire  de  la  maison  ou  je  me  suis  arrete  pour  dcrire  k  Votre 
Majestd ;  cet  officier  a  servi  dans  I'armde  frangaise ,  est  decord,  et  parait 
entiferement  ddvoud  h.  nos  interets.    Je  les  joins  k  ces  lignes. 


XXXI. 

GENERAL  ORDER  OF  PREPARATION  FOR  THE  BAT- 
TLE OF  WATERLOO:  June  18,  1815. 
Doc.  Indd.  p.  52. 

A   M.   LE   MARfiCHAL  PRINCE   DE   LA   MOSKOWA. 

L'empereur  ordonne  que  I'armde  soit  disposde  k  attaquer  I'ennemi  h.  9 
heures  du  matin;  MM.  les  commandants  des  corps  d'armde  rallieront  leurs 
troupes,  feront  mettre  les  armes  en  dtat,  et  permettront  que  les  soldats  fassent 
la  soupe ;  ils  feront  aussi  manger  les  soldats ;  afin  qu'k  9  heures  prdcises 
chacun  soit  pret  et  puisse  etre  en  bataille  avec  son  artillerie  et  ambulances,  k 
la  position  de  bataille  que  l'empereur  a  indiqude  par  son  ordre  d'hier  soir. 

MM.  les  lieutenants-generaux,  commandant  les  corps  d'armde  d'infanterie 
et  de  cavalerie,  enverront  sur-le-champ  des  officiers  au  major-gdndral  pour 
f  aire  connaitre  leur  position  et  porter  des  ordres. 

Au  quartier-gdndral  imperial, 

le  18  juin  1815. 
Le  mardchal  d'empire,  major-gdndral, 
Due  de  Dalmatie. 


388  APPENDIX   C. 

XXXII. 

ORDER  FOR  THE  ATTACK  TO  BEGIN  AT  i  P.  M.,  June 

i8,  1815. 
Doc.  Indd.  p.  53. 

Une  fois  que  toute  I'armde  sera  rangde  en  bataille,  h  peu  pr&s  k  1  heure 
aprfes  midi,  au  moment  ou  I'empereur  en  donnera  I'ordre  au  Mardchal  Ney, 
I'attaque  commencera  pour  s'emparer  du  village  de  Mont  St.  Jean  ou  est 
I'intersection  des  routes.  A  cet  effet,  les  batteries  de  12  du  ame  corps  et 
celle  du  6me  se  rduniront  k  celle  du  ler  corps.  Ces  24  bouches  k  feu  tireront 
sur  les  troupes  du  Mont  St.  Jean,  et  le  comte  d'Erlon  commencera  I'attaque, 
en  portant  en  avant  sa  division  de  gauche  et  la  soutenant,  suivant  les  circon- 
stances,  par  les  divisions  du  ler  corps. 

Le  26  corps  s'avancera  k  mesure  pour  garder  la  hauteur  du  comte  d'Erlon. 

Les  compagnies  de  sapeurs  du  ler  corps  seront  pretes  pour  se  barricader 
sur-le-champ  h  Mont  St.  Jean. 

Au  crayon  et  de  I'dcriture  du  Mardchal  Ney. 
Ajoutd  par  M.  le  Mardchal  Ney. 
Le  comte  d'Erlon  comprendra  que  c'est  par  la  gauche  que  I'attaque  com- 
mencera, au  lieu  de  la  droite, 
Communiquer  cette  nouvelle  disposition  au  gdndral  en  chef  Reille. 

AU   DOS. 

Ordres  dictds  par  I'empereur,  sur  le  champ  de  bataille  du  Mont  St.  Jean, 

le  18,  vers  onze  heures  du  matin,  et  ecrits  par  le  mardchal  Due  de  Dalmatie, 

major  gdndral.    Paris,  le  21  juin  1S15.     Le  Mardchal  Prince  de  la  Moskowa 

Pairde  France,  Ney. 

XXXIII. 

THE  10  A.M.— JUNE  iSth  — ORDER  TO  GROUCHY. 

Grouchy  Memoires,  vol.  4,  p.  79. 

En  avant  de  la  ferme  de  Caillou,  le  18  juin,  1815, 
h.  dix  heures  du  matin. 

Monsieur  le  mardchal,  I'Empereur  a  re^u  votre  dernier  rapport,  datd  de 
Gembloux. 

Vous  ne  parlez  k  Sa  Majestd  que  de  deux  colonnes  prussiennes  qui  ont 
passe  k  Sauvenifere  et  k  Sart-k-Walhain.  Cependant  des  rapports  disent 
qu'une  troisieme  colonne,  qui  dtait  assez  forte,  a  passe  par  Gery  et  Gentines, 
se  dirigeant  sur  Wavres. 

L'Empereur  me  charge  de  vous  prdvenir  qu'en  ce  moment  Sa  Majestd  va 
faire  attaquer  I'armee  anglaise,  qui  a  pris  position  k  Waterloo,  pres  de  la 
foret  de  Soignes.  Ainsi,  Sa  Majesty  desire  que  vous  dirigiez  vos  mouve- 
ments  sur  Wavres,  afin  de  vous  rapprocher  de  nous,  vous  mettre  en  rapport 
d'opdrations  et  her  les  communications,  poussant  devant  vous  les  corps  de 
I'armde  prussienne  qui  ont  pris  cette  direction  et  qui  auraient  pu  s'arreter  k 
Wavres,  ou  vous  devez  arriver  le  plus  tot  possible. 

Vous  ferez  suivre  les  colonnes  ennemies,  qui  ont  pris  sur  votre  droite,  par 


APPENDIX  C.  389 

quelqucs  corps  Idgers,  afin  d'observer  leurs  mouvements  et  ramasser  leurs 
trainards.  Instruisez-moi  imm^diatement  de  vos  dispositions  et  de  votre 
marche,  ainsi  que  des  nouvelles  que  vous  avez  sur  les  ennemis,  et  ne  negligez 
pas  de  licr  vos  communications  avec  nous.  L'Empereur  desire  avoir  tr^s- 
souvent  de  vos  nouvelles. 

Le  mardchal  due  de  DALMATIE. 
For  translation,  see  ante  p.  265. 

XXXIV. 

THE  I  P.  M.— JUNE  iSth  — ORDER  TO  GROUCHY. 

La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  p.  270. 

Du  champ  de  bataille  de  Waterloo,  le  18  juin, 
k  une  heure  aprfes  midi. 
Monsieur  le  IVIardchal, 

Vous  avez  dcrit,  ce  matin  k  deux  heures,  h.  I'Empereur,  que  vous  marcher- 
iez  sur  Sart-lez-Walhain;  done  votre  projet  ^tait  de  vous  porter  k  Corbais  ou 
k  Wavre.  Ce  mouvementest  conforme  aux  dispositions  de  Sa  Majesty,  qui 
vous  ont  ete  communiqudes.  Cependant,  I'Empereur  m'ordonne  de  vous  dire 
que  vous  devez  toujours  manoeuvrer  dans  notre  direction.  C'est  k  vous  de 
voir  le  point  ou  nous  sommes  pour  vous  regler  en  consequence  et  pour  Her 
nos  communications,  ainsi  que  pour  etre  toujours  en  mesure  de  tomber  sur 
les  troupes  ennemies  qui  chercheraient  k  inquieter  notre  droite  et  de  les 
^eraser. 

Dans  ce  moment,  la  bataille  est  engag^e  sur  la  ligne  de  Waterloo ;  le  centre 
ennemi  est  a  Mont-Saint-Jean;  ainsi  manoeuvrez  pour  joindre  notre  droite. 

P.  S.  Une  lettre  qui  vient  d'etre  interceptee  porte  que  le  general  Billow 
doit  attaquer  notre  flanc.  Nous  croyons  apercevoir  ce  corps  sur  les  hauteurs 
de  Saint-Lambert;  ainsi,  ne  perdez  pas  un  instant  pour  vous  rapprocher  de 
nous  et  nous  joindre,  et  pour  ecraser  Biilow,  que  vous  prendrez  en  flagrant 
ddlit. 

Le  mare'chal  due  de  DALMATIE. 
For  translation,  see  ante,  p.  270. 


INDEX. 


A. 


Adam,  General  Sir  Frederick,  commander 
British  brigade,  35;  his  troops  of  the 
best  quality,  315;  his  light  brigade  at 
Waterloo,  323-324,  332,  333,  335,  336. 

Albemarle,  Earl  of,  his  Fifty  Years  of 
lily  Life,  reports  story  of  Napoleon's 
secluding  himself  on  forenoon  of  bat- 
tle of  Waterloo,  30. 

Alison,  Sir  Archibald,  his  History  of 
Europe  criticised  by  Wellington  and 
the  Earl  of  EUesmere,  lO;  not  a  mili- 
tary authority,  10;  his  view  that  Napo- 
leon intended  to  throw  himself  between 
the  allied  armies,  10. 

Allies.     (See  Armies.) 

AUix,  General,  commander  division  1st 
French  corps,  25 ;  his  division  at  Water- 
loo, commanded  by  Quiot,  302,  305. 

Alten,  Lieutenant-General  Count,  com- 
mander 3d  British  division,  38;  arrival 
of  two  of  his  brigades  gives  Wellington 
an  equality  of  force  at  Quatre  Bras, 
179,  183;  position  at  Waterloo,  300; 
wounded,  his  division  rallied  by  Wel- 
lington, 314. 

Anglesea,  Marquis  of.     (See  Uxbridge.) 

Anthing,  commander  brigade  Dutch-Bel- 
gians, 36;  his  brigade  ordered  to  En- 
ghien,  83,  89;  reported  near  Aude- 
narde,  at  7  a.m.,  June  l6th,  108. 

Appendices :  — 

A.  On  some  Characteristics  of  Napo- 

leon's Memoirs,  351-354- 

B.  On  Marshal  Grouchy  and  the  Ber- 

trand  Order,  355-361. 

C.  Orders  and  Despatches,  362-389. 
Arentsschildt,  Colonel  Sir  F.,  commander 

cavalry  brigade  King's  German  Legion, 
35,  36. 

ARMIES:  — 

Allied,  in  concert  of  action  against 
Napoleon;  troops  of  England,  Bel- 
gium, Holland,  Hanover,  Brunswick, 
Nassau,  and   Prussia,  2-4;   their  can- 

390 


tonments  on  and  behind  the  Belgian 
frontier,  3,  96;  strength,  organization, 
and  internal  economy  of,  32-43. 

Anglo-Dutch,  positions  in  Belgium  be- 
fore the  campaign,  2-4;  their  extended 
cantonments,  2,  96;  commanded  by  the 
Duke  of  Wellington,  34;  heterogene- 
ous character  of,  34,  294;  organization, 
34-35;  troops  employed  on  garrison 
duty,  35;  strength  and  composition  in 
detail,  35-37,  39;  location  of  the  vari- 
ous divisions,  38-39;  merits  and  de- 
fects of,  39-40,  43;  principal  officers, 
40;  Wellington  as  a  commander,  40- 
41;  internal  economy  of,  41-42;  posi- 
tions of  troops  as  given  in  the  "Dispo- 
sition," at  7  A.M.,  June  16,  85,  n.  54; 
actual  positions,  1 1  i-i  1 3 ;  badly  served 
with  information  from  the  front,  114; 
at  Quatre  Bras,  178-179,  183;  strength 
at  Quatre  Bras  184;  losses,  184;  at 
Quatre  Bras  morning  of  17th,  214; 
position,  composition,  and  strength  at 
Waterloo,  297-299;  in  the  battle  of 
Waterloo,  294  et  seq. ;  18,000  men 
detached  at  Hal  and  Tubize,  339. 

British,  strength  and  composition  in 
detail,  35;  mainly  relied  upon  by 
Wellington,  39,  298;  at  Quatre  Bras, 
178-179,  184;  steadiness  of  infantry, 
179;  in  the  skirmish  at  Genappe,  216; 
strength  at  Waterloo,  298;  positions 
at  Waterloo,  299-300;  charge  of  the 
Union  brigade,  306-307;  suffered  se- 
verely in  d'Erlon's  assault,  310;  the 
brigades  of  Vivian  and  Vandeleur 
brought  to  the  centre  at  a  critical 
moment,  314;  repulse  of  the  Imperial 
Guard  by  the  Guards,  319-321;  skil- 
ful use  of  troops  by  Sir  Colin  Halkett 
and  Colonel  Elphinstone  in  support  of 
the  Guards,  322;  services  of  the  light 
brigade,  323-324,  332-336. 

Brunswick  contingent  (see  also  Bruns- 
wick, Duke  of)  ;  strength  and  com- 
position in  detail,  37-38;  in  the  action 


INDEX. 


391 


at  Quatre  Bras,  178-179,  183;  broke 
in  disorder,  the  Duke  being  killed,  179; 
strength  at  Waterloo,  299;  position  at 
"Waterloo,  299-300;  brought  into  ac- 
tion, 314;  driven  back  by  the  French 
divisions  of  Donzelot  and  Quiot, 
318. 

Dutch-Belgians,  strength  and  composi- 
tion of,  in  detail,  36;  positions  of,  38; 
raw  troops,  39;  occupation  of  Quatre 
Bras,  loi ;  occupation  criticised  by 
Maurice,  103;  fully  justified,  104;  the 
first  troops  to  receive  the  attack  at 
Quatre  Bras,  loi,  178;  suffered  se- 
verely, 183;  strength  and  composi- 
tion at  Waterloo,  299,  314;  Bylandt's 
brigade  badly  placed,  299;  breaks  in 
confusion,  306;  Chasse's  division  sup- 
ports the  British  guards,  314;  oppor- 
tune employment  of  Van  der  Smissen's 
battery,  320, 

Hanoverians,  strength  and  composition 
in  detail,  36;  raw  troops,  39;  at 
Quatre  Bras,  179;  fought  stubbornly, 
179;  strength  at  Waterloo,  298;  in 
the  battle,  312. 

King's  German  Legion,  strength  and 
composition  in  detail,  35-36;  posi- 
tions, 38-39;  relied  upon  by  Welling- 
ton, 39,  298;  strength  at  Waterloo, 
298;   position,  300. 

Nassau  contingent,  strength  and  compo- 
sition in  detail,  37;  in  the  reserve,  38; 
strength  at  Waterloo,  299;  position, 
300;  suffered  severely,  310;  driven 
back  by  divisions  of  Donzelot  and 
Quiot,  318. 

Prussians  (allied),  positions  in  Belgium 
before  the  campaign,  2-4;  extended 
cantonments,  2,  96;  strength  and  com- 
position in  detail,  32-33;  locations  of 
different  corps,  33;  composed  mainly 
of  veterans,  ^;i;  temper  and  spirit  of, 
34;  Marshal  Bliicher,  34;  internal 
economy  of,  42;  ordered  to  concentrate 
at  Sombreffe  on  the  14th,  70,  143; 
strength  and  positions  at  Ligny,  143- 
144,  1 51-152,  172;  in  the  battle  of 
Ligny,  154-159;  losses,  159;  Bliicher 
disabled,  158,  226,  229;  retreat  towards 
Wavre,  159,  226  ei  seq. ;  Bliicher  de- 
cides to  join  Wellington,  230 ;  admi- 
rable conduct  of  commanders  after 
the  battle  of  Ligny,  231;  pledged  to 
support  Wellington,  234,  237;  delay 
in  the  march  to  support  Wellington, 
262,  264;  the  combat  at  Wavre,  264- 
265;  in  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  307- 
309,  311,  313-314.  324-328,  336,  339- 
342.  (See  also  Battles  of  Ligny, 
Wavre,  and  Waterloo.) 


French,  condition  of,  upon  Napo- 
leon's return  from  Elba,  i,  16,  X7; 
Soult  made  chief  of  staff,  17;  confi- 
dence in  Napoleon,  17;  the  corps  com- 
manders, 18;  estimates  of  general 
officers,  19;  what  Napoleon  expected 
of  his  lieutenants,  20;  Ney  sent  for  at 
last  moment,  20;  Grouchy  suddenly 
appointed  to  command  of  right  wing, 
21 ;  Napoleon's  mistake  in  leaving 
Davout  at  Paris,  22;  estimate  of  the 
army,  24-25 ;  strength  and  composition 
in  detail,  25-28;  internal  economy  of, 
41;  assembled  near  Charleroi,  44-45; 
addressed  by  Napoleon  at  Avesnes  on 
the  14th,  45 ;  general  order  of  move- 
ment, 45-46;  desertion  of  Bourmont, 
47;  operations  on  the  15th,  47-69; 
arrival  of  Ney,  49;  delays  in  move- 
ment, 46,  50-53,  55,  I18-119,  121- 
122,  125-127,  130-132,  138,  139-140, 
157,  161,  163  et  seq.,  176-178,  180- 
187,  197  et  seq.,  2II-2I2,  252-254, 
256-257;  the  2d  corps  attacks  the 
Dutch-Belgians  at  Quatre  Bras  on 
the  15th,  loi;  operations  on  the 
morning  of  the  i6th,  116-142;  in 
the  battle  of  Ligny,  152-175;  strength 
at  Ligny,  154,  171;  losses,  159;  in 
the  battle  of  Quatre  Bras,  176-196; 
strength  at  Quatre  Bras,  184;  losses, 
184;  operations  on  the  17th,  197-225; 
force  detached  with  Grouchy,  212, 220; 
pursuit  of  the  English  on  the  17th 
led  by  the  Emperor  in  person,  214; 
skirmish  at  Genappe,  216;  Grouchy's 
march  on  Wavre,  211-213,  245-262, 
264-267,  272,  279,  288;  the  combat 
at  Wavre,  264-265 ;  position  at  Water- 
loo, 301;  strength  and  composition, 
301 ;  in  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  2S9- 
342;  unwieldy  formation  of  d'Erlon's 
troops,  304-307;  the  great  cavalry 
charges  upon  the  English  centre,  308- 
311;  the  charge  of  the  Imperial 
Guard,  315-326,  331-338;  tactics  em- 
ployed at  Waterloo,  329-331;  the  rout 
of  the  French  army  due  to  vigorous 
attack  of  Zieten's  corps  at  close  of 
the  day,  340.  (See  also  Battles  of 
Ligny,  Quatre  Bras,  Wavre,  and 
Waterloo.) 

Audenarde,  on  the  Scheldt,  one  limit  of 
Lord  Uxbridge's  cantonment,  79. 

Austria,  concentrates  a  formidable  force 
on  the  eastern  frontier  for  ulti- 
mate co-operation  against  Napoleon, 
2. 

Auvergne.    (See  La  Tour  d'Aiwergne.) 

Avesnes,  Napoleon  issued  stirring  order 
here   "to    conquer   or   die,"    on   the 


392 

evening  of  June  14th,  45;  Marshal 
Mortier  detained  here  by  illness,  June 
14th,  46. 


B. 


Bachelu,  General,  commander  division  2d 
French  corps,  25 ;  advance  to  Frasnes, 
49;  at  Quatre  Bras,  178;  position  at 
Waterloo,  302;  in  the  attack  upon  Hou- 
gomont,  304;  Ney  neglects  to  use  this 
division  to  support  his  cavalry  charge, 
309;  or  in  support  of  the  charge  of 
the  Guard,  337. 

Baring,  Major,  his  battalion  of  the  King's 
German  Legion  occupies  farmhouse 
of  La  Haye  Sainte,  300. 

Battle  of  Ligny,  143-175;  Prussian 
strength  and  position,  143-144,  151 ; 
Napoleon's  plan  of  battle,  152,  153; 
position  of  the  French,  153,  154; 
battle  begins  at  2.30,  154;  orders  to 
Ney,  154,  155;  fought  with  determina- 
tion on  both  sides,  156;  nearly  all  the 
Prussian  divisions  under  fire,  156; 
Napoleon  decides  to  put  in  the  Guard, 
^56,  157;  delay  caused  by  d'Erlon's 
corps,  157;  the  Guard  breaks  Prussian 
centre,  158;  Prussians  fall  back  to 
Brye  and  SombrefFe,  159;  Prussian 
desertions,  159;  losses,  159;  non-em- 
ployment of  the  6th  French  corps,  159, 
160;  extent  of  the  French  victory,  161, 
162;   discussion  of  the  battle,  163-175. 

Battle  of  Quatre  Bras,  176-196;  attack 
begun  by  Ney  at  2  p.m.,  178;  at  that 
hour  only  Perponcher's  Dutch-Belgian 
division  opposed  him,  178;  at  2.30 
^Yellington  arrived  and  took  com- 
mand, 178;  arrival  an  hour  later  of 
Picton's  division  followed  by  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick's  corps,  178;  the 
Dutch-Belgians  retire  after  two  hours' 
fighting,  179;  the  Brunswickers  break, 
the  Duke  being  killed,  179;  at  5  p.m. 
two  brigades  of  Alten's  division  arrive, 
1 79)  183;  Ney  even  then  has  in  action 
only  half  the  force  assigned  him,  179; 
and  is  therefore  unable  to  execute 
Napoleon's  orders,  183;  Kellermann's 
gallant  charge,  183,  184;  arrival  of 
Cooke's  division  of  the  English  guards, 
184;  the  French  retire,  184;  forces 
engaged,  184;  losses,  184;  defeat  of 
the  French  due  to  diversion  of  d'Erlon's 
corps,  184;  and  to  Ney's  disregard 
of  orders,  187;  Wellington's  skilful 
handling  of  his  troops,  187,  188;  dis- 
cussion of  the  battle,  189-196. 

Battle  of  Waterloo,  289-342;  the  field 
surveyed  before  the  campaign  by  Eng- 


INDEX. 


lish  engineers,  296;  strength  and  com- 
position of  the  Anglo-Dutch  army, 
298,  299;  positions,  297,  299-301 ; 
strength  of  the  French  army  engaged, 
301;  position,  301,  302;  relative 
strength  and  efficiency  of  the  two 
armies,  302;  Napoleon's  plan  of  bat- 
tle, 302;  the  French  attack  upon 
Hougomont,  303-304;  d'Erlon's  as- 
sault upon  the  allied  centre,  304-307; 
unwieldy  formation  of  his  troops,  305, 
306;  gains  the  crest  of  the  British 
position,  306;  deadly  fire  and  bayonet 
charge  of  Picton's  division,  306,  307; 
the  charge  of  Ponsonby  s  British  cav- 
alry, 306,  307;  repulse  of  d'Erlon's 
charge,  307;  the  French  capture  La 
Haye  Sainte  at  great  sacrifice,  307; 
Billow's  corps  (Prussian)  advances  and 
threatens  Planchenoit,  requiring  Napo- 
leon's withdrawal  from  the  field,  309; 
Ney  left  in  command,  309;  splendid 
onsets  of  French  cavalry,  309-31 1; 
repulse  of  Billow,  31 1;  return  of 
Napoleon  to  the  front,  314;  Alten's 
British  division  rallied  by  Wellington, 
314 ;  the  Brunswick  troops  brought  for- 
ward, 314;  Chasse's  Dutch-Belgian  di- 
vision placed  in  rear  of  British  guards, 
314;  the  light  cavalry  brigades  of 
Vivian  and  Vandeleur  brought  to  the 
centre,  314;  the  English  troops  ex- 
hausted, the  allies  discouraged,  much 
artillery  dismounted,  314;  the  reserves, 
with  Maitland's  guards  and  Adam's 
brigade  combined  at  centre,  315;  Ney 
ordered  to  collect  infantry  and  cavalry 
to  support  an  attack  by  the  Imperial 
Guard,  315;  the  attack  upon  the 
Anglo-allied  hne  by  Donzelot  and 
Quiot,  318;  the  broken  lines  rallied 
by  Wellington,  318;  steady  advance 
of  the  Imperial  Guard,  318,  319; 
destructive  repulse  of  the  Guard,  319 
etseq.;  persistency  of  the  rear  battal- 
ions of  the  Guard,  323-324;  timely 
charge  of  the  52d  regiment,  supported 
by  the  rest  of  Adam's  brigade,  324; 
the  rout  of  the  Guard  complete,  324; 
Zieten's  attack,  324,  325;  the  French 
right  wing  shattered,  325;  charge  of 
the  British  cavalry  brigades  of  Vivian 
and  Vandeleur,  325;  Wellington  orders 
his  whole  line  to  advance,  325;  the 
French  routed,  326;  Napoleon  borne 
away  in  one  of  the  squares  of  the 
Guard,  326;  the  victory  of  the  allies 
complete,  326;  discussion  of  the  battle, 
329-342. 
Battle  of  Wavre,  Thielemann's  corps  left 
to  defend   the   town,  264;   Grouchy's 


INDEX. 


393 


attack  without  skill,  264;  the  troops 
of  Vandamme  entangle  themselves  in 
the  attempt  to  carry  the  lower  bridges, 
264-265;  the  4th  French  corps  in 
vain  attack  the  Mill  of  Bierges,  above 
the  town,  265 ;  Gerard  wounded,  265 ; 
Pajol  carried  the  bridge  of  Limale, 
265 ;  battle  conducted  gallantly  by  the 
French,  but  without  method,  265;  re- 
sistance of  the  Prussians  worthy  of  all 
praise,  265. 
Batty,  Captain,  Historical  Sketch  of  Cam- 
paign ofiSis,  cited,  333. 
Baudus,  Lieutenant-Colonel  de,  his  Etudes 
stir  Napoleon,  cited,  193,  194,  195,  196, 
279,  292. 
Beaumont,  headquarters  of  Napoleon  on 

the  evening  of  June  14th,  45. 
Belgium,    acts    in    concert    with    other 
nations  of  Europe  against  France  and 
Napoleon,  2-4  (see  also  Armies  Al- 
lied) ;   territory  occupied  by  the  can- 
tonments of  the  allied  armies,  3,  74; 
Brussels  the  headquarters  of  Welling- 
ton, 3;  daylight  in,  from  before  sunrise 
at  4  A.M.  until  9  P.M.,  52,  251. 
Bernhard,  Prince.    (See  Saxe-Weimar.) 
Berthier,  Marshal,  Napoleon's  old  chief 
of    staff,    retired    into    Belgium  with 
Louis  XVIII.,  17. 
Berton,  General,  commander  French  bri- 
gade, reports  to  Napoleon  the  discovery 
of  a  Prussian  corps  at  Gembloux,  209; 
his    Precis,    historique,    tnilitaire    et 
critique,  des  batailles  de  Fleuriis  et  de 
Waterloo,  cited,  258,  286,  338. 
Bertrand,   Grand    Marshal   (French),  to 
whom    Napoleon    dictated    order    to 
Grouchy,  209,  210.    (See  Grouchy.) 
Bierges,    Mill    of,  Gerard    wounded   in 

attack  upon,  265. 
Bliicher,  Field-Marshal  Prince,  com- 
mander of  the  Prussian  army,  32; 
his  character  as  an  officer,  34;  hatred 
of  Napoleon,  34;  chose  the  line  of 
the  brook  of  Ligny  as  a  possible  bat- 
tle-field, 70;  orders  concentration  of 
his  army  at  Sombreffe,  70,  143;  his 
understanding  with  Wellington,  70  et 
seq.;  91,  loo,  143-145;  advises  Miiff- 
ling  of  the  concentration  of  the 
Prussian  army  at  Sombreffe,  78;  his 
cantonments  too  greatly  extended,  96 
et  seq.;  hears  from  Wellington,  144; 
determines  to  fight  Napoleon  at  Ligny 
on  independent  grounds,  143-147;  his 
reasons  for  accepting  battle,  148-150; 
his  position,  151;  battle  formation  and 
force,  151,  152;  his  position  criticised 
by  Wellington,  155,  n.  15;  leads  cav- 
alry charge   against   the   French  and 


narrov<ly  escapes  capture,  158;  key  to 
his  position  taken  by  the  French  Guard, 
158;  falls  back  to  Brye  and  Sombreffe, 
159;  result  of  accepting  battle  with 
but  three-fourths  of  his  force  unsup- 
ported by  Wellington,  162;  held  Brye 
and  Sombreffe  until  after  midnight, 
204 ;  his  retreat  toward  Wavre,  1 59, 226, 
231-233;  not  in  communication  with 
Thielemann  and  Billow  after  defeat  of 
the  corps  of  Zieten  and  Pirch  I.,  226, 
n.  3;  his  age  at  time  of  the  battle, 
229,  n.  14;  carried  from  the  field,  229; 
decides  to  join  Wellington,  230,  234; 
assures  Wellington  of  support  at 
Waterloo,  234,  237  et  seq. ;  he  as  well 
as  Wellington  desired  to  close  the 
campaign  with  a  great  battle,  235; 
advises  Muffling  that  though  ill  he  will 
lead  his  army  in  person  at  Waterloo, 
263. 

Bonaparte,  Jerome,  commander  French 
division,  2d  corps,  25;  had  nominal 
command  only,  25,  n.  13;  at  Quatre 
Bras,  178,  179;  his  division  in  the 
attack  on  Hougomont,  303,  304. 

Bonaparte,  Joseph,  advised  by  Napo- 
leon on  morning  of  June  14th  of 
his  intended  movement  on  Charle- 
roi,  45. 

Bourmont,  General,  deserted  with  his 
staff  to  the  enemy,  succeeded  by  Hulot, 
26,  n.  14,  47. 

Braine-le-Comte,  sixteen  miles  west  of 
Quatre  Bras,  82;  headquarters  of  the 
Prince  of  Orange,  102. 

Braine-la-Leud  ordered  to  be  intrenched 
by  Colonel  Smyth,  296,  297. 

Brunswick,  Duke  of,  commander  Bruns- 
wick corps,  38;  arrives  opportunely 
at  Quatre  Bras,  178;  killed  at  Quatre 
Bras,  179. 

Brussels,  Wellington's  headquarters,  3, 
74;  chief  objective  of  Napoleon  next 
to  the  dispersion  of  the  allied  armies, 
142. 

Brye,  place  of  conference  between  Wel- 
lington and  Bliicher,  108,  144,  146. 

Bullock,  R.  H.,  Journal  of,  cited,  113. 

Bulow,  General,  commander  4th  Prussian 
corps,  ly,  had  in  181 3  won  the  battle 
of  Dennewitz  against  Ney,  34;  or- 
dered to  Ligny,  70;  not  fully  informed 
of  situation,  delayed  execution  of  order, 
73;  his  arrival  expected  by  Bliicher, 
151,172;  his  non-arrival,  231 ;  on  the 
march  to  Waterloo,  262,  263;  attacks 
the  right  flank  of  the  French  army,  308, 
309;  attacks  Planchenoit  and  is  re- 
pulsed, 311;  capture  of  Planchenoit, 
325;  assures  the  allied  victory,  340, 


394 


INDEX. 


Bylandt,  Major-General  Count  de,  com- 
mander Dutch-Belgian  brigade,  36; 
at  Quatre  Bras,  102,  114;  dangerous 
position  of  his  brigade  at  Waterloo, 
299,  300. 

Byng,  Major-General  Sir  John,  com- 
mander brigade  British  guards,  35; 
position  at  Waterloo,  300. 


C. 


Caillou  house,  on  the  Brussels  road  near 
tavern  of  La  Belle  Alliance,  Napo- 
leon's headquarters  evening  of  June 
1 7th,  30,  245,  289. 

Charleroi,  the  general  objective  point 
June  15th,  46;  occupied  by  the  main 
French  column  at  noon,  June  15th, 
47,  114;  headquarters  of  Napoleon, 
48. 

Charras,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  his  Histoire 
de  la  Campagne  de  18 1^,  cited,  13,  17, 
19,  25,  28,  29,  30,  32,  34,  46,  47,  48,  49, 
50,  51,  52,  56,  57,  58,  59,  63,  67,  69, 
70,  71,  73,  77,  80,  94,  96,  97,  98,  106, 
122,  123,  124,  125,  136,  139,  144,  151, 
152,  153,  154,  156,  157,  158,  159,  160, 
163,  170,  171,  177,  178,  179,  183,  184, 
189,  190,  193,  195,  201,  209,  212,  213, 
214,  217,  222,  251,  252,  253,  258,  259, 
262,  265,  270,  280,  282,  283,  284,  285, 
289,  291,  292,  293,  298,  301,  304,  305, 
306,  307,  312,  313,  316,  317,  319,  321, 
324,  325,  326,  337,  352;  admits  no 
merit  in  Napoleon,  iv. 

Chasse,  General,  commander  Dutch-Bel- 
gian division,  38;  position  at  Water- 
loo, 300;  opportunely  brings  into  play 
Van  der  Smissen's  battery,  308;  or- 
dered to  the  rear  of  the  British 
guards,  314. 

Chesney,  Colonel  Charles  C,  his  Waterloo 
Lectures,  cited,  25,  29,  51,  69,  70,  71, 
73.  74.  76,  77.  90,  95.  loi,  104,  128, 
141,  188,  219,  221,  268,  278,  280,  339, 
349- 

Clause witz,  General  Carl  von,  his  Der  Feld- 
zugvon  181J,  etc.,  cited,  3,  10,  11,  13, 
14,  58,  59.  70.  71.  73.  96,  97.  98,  139, 
154,  163,  164,  165,  166,  167,  169,  170, 
171,  172,  173,  205,  208,  217,  218,  219, 
243,  253,  262,  280. 

Clinton,  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Henry, 
commander  2d  British  division,  38; 
position  at  Waterloo,  300. 

Clinton,  H.  R.,  his  The  War  in  ike 
Peninsula,  etc.,  concurs  with  Hooper 
in  opinion  as  to  Napoleon's  intention 
to  wedge  himself  between  the  oppos- 
ing armies,  11,  n.  7,  141. 


Colborne,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Sir  John 
(afterward  Lord  Seaton),  commander 
British  52d  regiment,  324;  resists  ad- 
vance of  the  Imperial  Guard,  324,  331- 
336. 

Cole,  Sir  Lowry,  commander  British  6th 
division,  38;  position  at  Waterloo, 
299;   not  in  the  action,  299,  n.  25. 

Colville,  General  Sir  Charles,  commander 
British  4th  division,  38;  his  division 
withheld  from  the  field  of  Waterloo 
by  Wellington,  339. 

Communication  between  allied  armies, 
lines  of,  not  to  be  confounded  with 
lines  of  supplies,  14. 

Cooke,  Major-General,  commander  ist 
division,  38;  at  Quatre  Bras,  184; 
position  at  Waterloo,  300. 

Correspondance  de  Napoleon,  cited,  5, 
14,  19,  45.  47.  52,  53,  54.  57.  64,  65, 
66,68,96,98,99,  100,  134,  135,  141, 
142,  165,  180,  191,  215,  243,  289,  317, 
332.338,351.352.353- 


Dalton,  Charles,  his  Waterloo  Roll  Call 
cited,  86. 

Damitz,  Major,  his  Histoire  de  la  Cam- 
pagne de  181J,  cited,  144,  148,  149, 
227,  285,  316,  317. 

D'Auvergne.      (See    La     Tour      d'Au- 

VERGNE.) 

Davout,  Marshal,  desired  field  service, 
but  was  left  at  Paris,  22;  would  prob- 
ably have  prevented  defeat  at  Water- 
loo, if  in  place  of  Ney  or  Grouchy, 
22;  Napoleon  writes  him,  anticipating 
battle  or  retreat  of  Prussians,  45;  his 
Histoire  de  la  Vie  Militaire,  etc., 
cited,  22,  164,  166,   173. 

Daylight  in  Belgium,  through  June  from 
before  sunrise  at  4  A.M.  until  9  p.m., 
52,  251. 

De  Lancey,  Colonel  Sir  William,  Welling- 
ton's chief  of  staff,  81 ;  instructions  to, 
lost,  81-82;  his  "Disposition"  of  the 
British  army  at  7  a.m.,  June  i6th,  85- 
86,  n.  54;  hurriedly  drawn  up,  114, 
n.  9;  is  furnished  copy  of  Wellington's 
survey-sketches,  296. 

Delbriick,  Hans,  his  Das  Lehen  des 
Feldmarschalls  Grafen  Reithardt  von 
Gneisenati,  cited,  34,  73,  78,  81,  109, 
144,  145,  146,  149,  159,  204,  226,  228, 
234- 

D'Erlon,  Count,  commander  ist  French 
corps,  18;  position  in  the  advance,  46; 
backwardness  of  his  corps,  50-56,  94, 
118,  119,  124,  127,  131,  132,  137-140, 


INDEX. 


395 


156,  19S;  his  wandering  march,  157- 
161,  170-172,  174-175,  180-182,  193- 
196;  ordered  to  halt  at  P'rasnes, 
177-178,  183;  presence  of  his  corps 
at  Quatre  Bras  would  have  assured 
Ney's  victory,  184-186;  ordered  to 
pursue  the  English  rear  guard,  215; 
in  the  first  line  at  Waterloo,  289,  301 ; 
his  grand  assault  upon  the  allied  line, 
304-307;  unwieldy  formation  of  his 
troops,  305,  329;  rallied  to  support 
the  Guard,  318,  330;  his  corps  hope- 
lessly disorganized,  325. 
Dirom,  Captain,  of  ist  British  foot-guards, 
describes  advance  of  Imperial  Guard, 

335- 

Documents  Inedits  stir  la  Campagne  de 
i8i_5,  cited,  48,49,  50,  51,  55,  67,  116, 
117,  119,  120,  121,  122,  123,  124,  129, 
131,  134,  141,  154,  155,  156,  169,  178, 
180,  182,  189,  190,  191,  195,  196,  201, 
203,  292,  302,  307,  308,  314,  326,  352. 

Domon,  General,  commander  cavalry 
division  3d  French  corps,  26;  with 
Napoleon  on  march  to  Waterloo,  212; 
reported  retreat  of  the  Prussians,  246 ; 
at  Waterloo,  301. 

Donzelot,  General,  commander  division 
1st  French  corps,  25;  in  d'Erlon's  as- 
sault at  Waterloo,  305;  supports  cav- 
alry charge,  310;  brilliant  attacks 
upon  the  allied  line  in  support  of 
the  Guard,  318,  322,  330,  337,  338. 

Dornberg,  Major-General  Sir  William, 
commander  British  cavalry  brigade,  35, 
36;  reports  Napoleon  as  having  turned 
towards  Charleroi,  80,  83;  as  to  Wel- 
lington's pledge  of  support  to  Bliicher 
on  the  i6th,  145. 

Drouot,  General,  Adjutant-General  of 
the  Imperial  Guard,  an  officer  of  great 
merit,  20;  advised  Napoleon  to  delay 
battle  at  Waterloo,  292. 

Du  Casse,  A.,  Le  General  Vandamme  et 
sa  Correspondance,  cited,  139. 

Durutte,  General,  commander  division 
1st  French  corps,  25;  in  the  advance, 
50,  129,  176,  179  et  seq.;  position  at 
Waterloo,  302;  in  d'Erlon's  assault, 
305;  his  division  routed,  325,  341. 


E. 


Elchingen,  Duke  of.    (See  Ney.) 
EUesmere,   Earl  of.  Essays  on  History, 

etc.,  cited,  10,  43,  74,  139,  239. 
Elphinstone,  Colonel,   skilfully   supports 

the  British  guards  at  Waterloo,  322. 
Erckmann-Chatrian,      Waterloo,     cited, 

306. 


Exelmans,  General,  commander  2d  French 
cavalry  corps,  27;  at  Ligny,  154;  in 
the  march  to  Wavre,  212,  251  et  seq. 


F. 


Flahaut,  General,  on  Napoleon's  staff, 
the  bearer  to  Ney  of  the  Emperor's 
plans  for  the  operations  of  the  i6th, 
121,  131,  134,  135;  returns,  bringing 
news  of  the  result  at  Quatre  Bras, 
200. 

Fleurus,  point  of  retreat  of  the  Prussians 
on  the  15th,  48,  70;  occupied  by  the 
French  army  on  the  i6th,  153-154; 
headquarters  of  Napoleon  after  battle 
of  Ligny,  159,  200. 

Foy,  General,  his  History  of  the  War  in 
the  Peninsula,  portrait  of  Napoleon, 
23;  commander  division  2d  French 
corps,  25;  in  the  advance  to  Quatre 
Bras,  49,  122,  129,  130;  at  Quatre 
Bras,  178;  at  Waterloo,  301-302;  joins 
in  attack  upon  Hougomont,  304. 

Fraser,  Letters  of  Colonel  Sir  A.  S.,  cited, 

30- 

Fraser,  Sir  William,  Words  on  Welling- 
ton, cited,  105. 

Friant,  General,  commander  division 
Old  Guard,  26;   at  Waterloo,  316. 


Gardner,  Mr.  Dorsey,  his  Quatre  Bras, 
Ligny,  and  Waterloo,  cited,  29,  105, 
249,  268. 

Gawler,  an  officer  of  the  British  5 2d 
regiment,  his  Crisis  and  Close  of  the 
Action  at  Waterloo,  cited,  22,2,. 

Genappe,  a  smart  skirmish  at,  216;  after 
the  battle  of  Quatre  Bras  Wellington 
spent  the  night  at,  233;  the  French 
retreat  blocked  at,  326. 

Gerard,  General  Count,  commander  4th 
French  corps,  18;  in  the  advance,  44, 
46;  at  Ligny,  153,  154,  157-159;  165; 
in  the  march  to  Wavre,  211;  urged 
Grouchy  to  march  to  the  sound  of 
the  cannon,  256,  257,  262;  wounded 
in  the  attack  on  Wavre,  265  ;  his  Quel- 
ques  Documents  and  Demi  ires  Obser- 
vations, etc.,  cited,  212,  247,  251,  252, 
258,  259,  267,  271. 

Girard,  General,  commander  division  2d 
French  corps,  25;  in  pursuit  of  the 
Prussians,  49;  at  Ligny,  153,  154; 
mortally  wounded,  203;  his  division 
left  at  Ligny  to  care  for  the  wounded, 
203. 


396 


INDEX. 


Gleig,  Rev.  G.  R.,  his  Life  of  the  Duke 
of  WellUigton,  cited,  92,  93. 

Gneisenau,  General,  chief  of  staff  to 
Bliicher,  an  able  administrator,  34; 
remiss  in  not  fully  informing  Biilow  of 
the  situation,  73;  believed  that  Wel- 
lington had  given  assurance  of  support 
at  Ligny,  145,  149;  assumed  command 
after  BlUcher's  injury,  226;  gave  order 
for  the  retreat  on  Wavre,  226,  227; 
his  want  of  confidence  in  Wellington, 
229,  264. 

Gomm,  Sir  William  Maynard,  Letters  and 
Jottrnah  of  cited,  83,  1 1 2,   178,  299. 

Gore,  Captain  Arthur,  An  Historical  Ac- 
cotmt  of  the  Battle  of  Waterloo,  cited, 
316,  319,  332. 

Gourgaud,  General,  Campagne  de  iSi^, 
cited,  4,  19,  52,  56,  63,  64,  66,  195, 
215,  216,  338. 

Grouchy,  Marshal,  commander  French 
cavalry  reserve,  18,  21 ;  a  veteran,  18; 
unfit  for  independent  command,  208, 
273;  given  command  of  the  right 
■wing,  21,  22,  135;  in  the  first  day's 
advance,  47,  48;  in  the  battle  of 
Ligny,  154;  given  verbal  orders  by 
Napoleon  to  pursue  the  Prussians, 
206,  209;  his  objections  to  order,  207, 
208;  the  order  dictated  to  General  Ber- 
trand,  209-21 1, 21S-221, 223,  249  etseq., 
345,  350,  358;  force  given  him  for  pur- 
suit, 209,  212,  220;  his  letter  to  Napo- 
leon from  Gembloux,  21 2-2 13, 245,  250; 
his  movement  on  Wavre,  21 1-2 13, 
245-262,  264-267,  272,  279,  288; 
issues  orders  for  the  morning  of  the 
iSth,  250;  his  letter  to  Pajol  morning 
of  iSth,  251;  makes  no  change  in 
his  orders,  252;  should  have  marched 
for  the  bridge  of  Moustier  at  daybreak, 
253;  neglects  proper  reconnoissance, 
254;  his  despatch  from  Walhain,  255, 
256;  heard  the  sound  of  the  cannon 
of  Waterloo  at  Walhain,  not  Sart-^ 
W^alhain,  256,  259,  287,  288,  345;  re- 
fused to  accept  Gerard's  advice,  256, 
257;  was  expected  to  arrive  on  left 
bank  of  the  Dyle  by  the  bridge  of 
IMoustier,  268  et  seq.,  345;  probable 
result  had  he  marched  for  Moustier 
at  daybreak,  281,  283,  284,  326-328, 
339.  342;  or  had  followed  the  coun- 
sel of  Gerard  at  noon,  261,  339,  342; 
in  the  battle  of  Wavre,  264-265;  re- 
ceives further  orders  from  Napoleon, 
265,  270;  is  supposed  to  be  bear- 
ing toward  the  main  army,  271,  272; 
carried  the  bridge  of  Limale,  271; 
expected  to  keep  off  Bliicher,  not 
to  fight  Wellington,  278;    not  solely 


responsible  for  defeat  at  Waterloo, 
328,  342. 

Guard.     (See  Imperial  Guard.) 

Gudin,  General,  Napoleon's  page  at 
Waterloo,  credited  with  story  as  to 
Napoleon's  health  on  morning  of  bat- 
tle of  Waterloo,  30. 

Guilleminot,  General,  according  to  Char- 
ras,  the  real  commander  of  Jerome 
Bonaparte's  division,  25,  n.  13,  304. 

Gurwood,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  The  De- 
spatches of  Field-Marshal  the  Duke  of 
Wellington,  cited,  39,  71,  77,  78,  79, 
80,  81,  82,  295,  328. 

Guyot,  General,  commander  cavalry  divi- 
sion Imperial  Guard,  27;  at  Ligny,  157; 
in  Ney's  charge  upon  the  allied  centre, 
310.  3"- 


H. 


Halkett,  General  Sir  Colin,  commander 
British  brigade,  35;  assists  in  oppos- 
ing charge  of  Imperial  Guard  at  Water- 
loo, 320,  322,  331. 

Hamilton,  Lieutenant-General  Sir  F.  W., 
his  Grenadier  Guards,  cited.  III. 

Hamley,  General  Edward  Bruce,  The 
Operations  of  War,  etc.,  cited,  221, 
222,  280,  281,  339. 

Hardinge,  General  Sir  Henry,  English 
military  attache  at  Bliicher's  headquar- 
ters, gives  Wellington's  criticism  of 
Bliicher's  position,  155;  lost  his  left 
hand  at  Ligny,  229;  story  of  discus- 
sion between  Bliicher  and  Gneisenau 
as  to  remaining  in  communication  with 
the  English,  230. 

Harlet,  General,  commander  4th  regi- 
ment grenadiers  of  the  Guard  at 
Waterloo,  316. 

Henrion,  General,  commander  4th  regi- 
ment chasseurs  of  the  Guard  at  W'ater- 
loo,  316. 

Heymes,  Colonel,  Ney's  aide-de-camp, 
67;  regarding  interview  between  Ney 
and  Napoleon,  49,  n.  18,  67,  68;  re- 
ports account  of  Ney's  interview  with 
Napoleon  at  midnight  of  the  15th,  116; 
reports  conference  between  Ney  and 
Reille,  116;  as  to  the  inactivity  of  Ney 
on  morning  of  i6th,  119;  as  to  arrival 
of  the  3.15  P.M.  order  to  Ney  from 
Napoleon,  195,  n.  19;  overestimates 
Napoleon's  loss  in  taking  La  Haye 
Sainte,  307,  n.  41;  denies  that  Ney 
ordered  Guyot  to  charge  upon  the 
allied  centre,  311. 

Hill,  Lieutenant-General  Lord,  com- 
mander 2d  British  corps,  38;   a  valua- 


INDEX. 


397 


ble   man,  40;    orders  to,  morning   of 

the  1 6th,  82,  88,  89. 
Hisloire  de  P Ex-Garde,  cited,  326. 
Hooper,  George,  his  Waterloo,  cited,  li, 

77,   104,  155,   182,   183,  184,  190,  222, 

282,  307. 
Hougomont,  Chateau  of,  description  of, 

297;    occupied    by  the    English,  300; 

French  attack  upon,  303,  304,  329,  330. 
Hulot,  General,  succeeded  General  Bour- 

mont  to   command    of    division    4th 

French  corps,  26;  at  Ligny,  153,  n.  7, 

154. 


I. 


Imperial  Guard,  strength  of,  26;  leaves 
Paris,  44;  ordered  to  advance  45-46; 
leaves  its  commander,  Marshal  Mortier, 
behind,  ill,  46;  a  division  of  cavalry 
of,  supports  Ney  at  Frasnes,  49,  157; 
in  reserve  near  Fleurus  at  beginning 
of  battle  at  Ligny,  154;  led  by  Napo- 
leon in  person  at  Ligny,  157,  158;  loss, 
161,  197;  pursues  the  retreating  Eng- 
lish, 214-216;  position  at  Waterloo, 
301;  in  defence  of  Planchenoit,  309, 
311;  attack  on  the  English  line  by  the 
cavalry  of,  309,  311;  the  elite  of  the 
army,  312;  position,  condition,  and 
strength  of,  315-318;  charge  of,  and 
repulse  by  British  guards  and  Adam's 
brigade,  318-324;  the  attack  pressed, 
but  again  repulsed,  323,  324;  resisted 
heroically  to  the  last,  326;  the  Emperor 
finally  forced  to  take  refuge  in  one  of 
its  squares,  326;  the  charge  of,  re- 
viewed, 331,  332,  335-338- 

Inniskilling  Dragoons,  a  part  of  the 
British  Union  brigade  at  Waterloo, 
300. 


Jomini,  General  Baron  de.  The  Political 
and  Military  History  of  the  Campaign 
of  Waterloo,  cited,  12,  56,  59,  63,  66, 
71,  139,  142,  153,  158,  170,  176,  177, 
186,  192,  193,  200,  205,  253,  280,  281, 

357- 
Jones,  George,   The  Battle  of  Waterloo, 
cited,  125,  144,  146,  2C30,  235,  317,  332, 
334,  338. 


K. 


Kellermann,  Count  of  Valmy,  commander 
3d  French  cavalry  corps,  27;  at  Quatre 
Bras,  183,  184,  197;  in  reserve  at 
Waterloo,  301 ;  in  the  charge  upon 
the  allied  centre,  309-310. 


Kempt,  l\'iajor-Gcneral  Sir  James,  com- 
mander British  brigade,  35;  at  Water- 
loo, 306,  312. 

Kennedy,  General  Sir  James  Shaw,  —  his 
A\jtes  Oft  the  Battle  of  Waterloo,  cited, 
96,  97,  99,  100,  250,  268,  274,  278, 
280,  284,  294,  299,  301,  308,  310,  312, 
339.  349- 

Kielmansegge,  Count,  commander  Hano- 
verian brigade,  36;  his  brigade  unable 
to  hold  its  position  at  the  close  of  the 
battle  of  Waterloo,  312. 

Kruse,  General  von,  commander  Nassau 
contingent,  37;  did  not  arrive  at  Quatre 
Bras  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  action, 
113- 


La  Haye  Sainte,  farm-house  on  Brussels 
road,  301 ;  attack  upon,  by  the  French, 
305,  307;  captured  shortly  before  4 
P.M.,  307,  n.  42,  308,  312. 

La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Prince  Edouard  de,  his  Waterloo: 
Etude  de  la  Campagne  de  181J,  cited, 
13,  46,  51,  56,  59,  63,  69,  71,  118,  130, 
136,  146,  154,  157,  158,  177,  202,  248, 
250,  251,  257,  270,  304,  306. 

Leeke,  Rev.  William,  an  officer  of  the 
British  52d  regiment,  333;  his  History 
of  Lord  Seaton's  Kcgimetit  at  the  Battle 
of  Waterloo,  cited,  ill,   -i,},},,  334,  336. 

Lefebvre-Desnouettes,  General,  com- 
mander division  of  cavalry  Imperial 
Guard,  27;  in  support  of  troops  at 
Frasnes,  49,  157;  in  the  charge  upon 
the  allied  centre  at  Waterloo,  309. 

L'Heritier,  General,  commander  of  divi- 
sion 3d  French  cavalry  corps,  27;  his 
division  at  Quatre  Bras,  183. 

Life  Guards,  Historical  Record  of  the, 
cited,  113. 

Ligny.     (See  Battle  of.) 

Lines  of  supply,  4. 

Lobau,  Count  of  (Mouton),  commander 
French  6th  corps,  18,  26;  in  the  ad- 
vance on  the  15th,  46;  delayed  in 
reaching  Ligny,  160;  as  to  non-em- 
ployment of  his  corps  at  Ligny,  160; 
at  Waterloo,  301;  made  gallant  de- 
fence of  Planchenoit,  311,  325,  331. 

Lock  hart,  J.  G.,  his  History  of  Napoleon 
Buonaparte,  cited,  238,  239. 


M. 


Mackworth,  Sir  Digby,  on  Lord  Hill's 
staff  at  Waterloo,  describes  advance 
of  Imperial  Guard,  332. 


398 


INDEX. 


Maitland,  Major-General,  commander 
brigade  British  guards,  35;  repulses 
attack  of  Imperial  Guard  at  Waterloo, 

319-323.  331-335-        ,     ^.        ^     ,    , 

Malmesbnry,  Letters  of  the  First  Earl  of, 
cited,  81,  233. 

Marbot,  Colonel,  his  Memoires,  cited,  247, 
254,  258,  268,  269,  270. 

Marcognet,  General,  commander  division 
1st  French  corps,  25;  position  at 
Waterloo,  302;  in  d'Erlon's  assault 
305;  forced  to  abandon  his  position, 
325,  341. 

Marette,  Chateau,  at  Walhain,  255,  288. 

Marmonl,  Marshal,  Alhnoires,  cited,  246, 
247. 

Maurice,  Colonel  J.  F.,  his  Articles  on 
Waterloo,  cited, "46,  47,  55,  71,  73,  74. 
75,  76,  80,  83,  84,  85,  86,  94,  103,  106, 
167,  204,  220,  221,  224,  227,  230,  237, 
238,  241,  250,  262,  263. 

Memorandum  on  the  Battle  of  Waterloo, 
cited,  72,  74,  90,  95. 

Mercer,  General  Cavahe,  Journal  of  the 
Waterloo  Campaign,  cited,  216,  310. 

Michel,  General,  commander  brigade 
chasseurs  of  Imperial  Guard  at  Water- 
loo, 316. 

Milhaud,  General  Count,  commander 
French  4th  cavalry  corps,  27 ;  at 
Ligny,  154,  157-159;  at  Waterloo, 
301 ;  in  the  charge  upon  the  allied  cen- 
tre, 309. 

Morris,  William  O'Connor,  his  Great 
Commanders  of  Modern  Times,  and 
the  Campaigji  of  181J,  cited,  69,  307. 

Morvan,  General  Poret  de,  commander 
3d  regiment  grenadiers  of  the  Imperial 
Guard  at  Waterloo,  316,  317. 

Mortier,  Marshal,  commander  Imperial 
Guard,  taken  ill  just  before  the  open- 
ing of  the  campaign,  20,  46. 

Mouton.     (See  Lobau.) 

Mudford,  William,  his  Historical  Account 
of  the  Campaign  in  the  Netherlands  in 
1815,  cited,  105. 

Muffling,  General  Baron  von,  his  Passages 
from  my  Life,  cited,  39,  42,  71,  77,  78, 
80,  81,  105,  109,  144,  145,  146,  159, 
229,  233,  340,  341. 

Muquardt,  his  Precis  de  la  Campagne  de 
18 IS,  cited,  118,  159,  177,  338. 


N. 


Napier,   General   Sir   William,  Life  of, 

cited,  24,  191,  33S. 
Napier's  battery  at  Waterloo,  317,  318. 
Napoleon,  his  return  to  Paris  from  Elba, 

I;    general  military  situation,  2;  his 


reasons  for  taking  the  offensive,  2,  3; 
his  plan  of  campaign,  4-15,  45,  59 
et  seq.,  343,  34S;  his  army,  16-28; 
gives  Ney  command  of  the  left  wing, 
21,  49;  his  bodily  strength  and  vigor, 
23,  24,  29-31,  140,  200,  202,  290,  347, 
348;  leaves  Paris  for  the  field,  44;  as- 
sembles his  army  near  Charleroi,  44, 
45 ;  issues  general  order  of  movement,  I 

45,  46;   the  advance  to   Fleurus,  46-  " 

53,  55  et  seq.;  fixes  his  headquarters 
at  Charleroi,  48;  as  to  verbal  orders  to 
Ney  to  seize  Quatre  Bras,  52,  62-69, 
343;  midnight  conference,  with  Xey  on 
the  15th,  54,  116,  129,  130,  132,  140; 
orders  to  Ney  on  the  1 6th,  120-125, 
130,  131,  134,  141-142,  154-156;  his 
reasons  for  delay  on  morning  of  i6th, 
132-142,  163;  his  arrival  at  Fleurus 
about  II  A.M.,  152;  examines  the  posi- 
tion at  Ligny,  152;  his  plan  for  the 
battle,  152-153,  164  etseq.;  battle  of 
Ligny,  152-175;  delays  decisive  blow 
upon  the  unexpected  appearance  of 
d'Erlon's  corps,  157-158,  160,  161, 
170,  171,  174,  198;  spends  the  night 
after  the  battle  of  Ligny  at  Fleurus, 
159,  200;  his  skill  conspicuous  at 
Ligny,  171;  not  responsible  for 
d'Erlon's  wandering,  182,  \<^T^etseq.; 
his  delay  on  the  morning  of  the  17th, 
197  et  seq.;  loses  the  opportunity  of 
overwhelming  W^ellington  at  Quatre 
Bras,  199-202,  344,  348;  orders  to 
Ney  on  the  17th,  201,  203  (see  Ney); 
his  march  to  join  Ney,  203,  213-214; 
misconceives  movement  of  Bliicher, 
203-206;  his  neglect  of  proper  recon- 
noissance  on  the  morning  of  the  17th, 
205,  217,  218,  223-225,  344,  348; 
gives  verbal  order  to  Grouchy  to  pur- 
sue the  Prussians,  206,  209  (see 
Grouchy)  ;  the  Bertrand  order  to 
Grouchy,  209-211,  218-223,  248,  249, 
274,  345 ;  leads  pursuit  of  the  English 
from  Quatre  Bras,  214,  215;  not  to 
blame  for  not  pursuing  the  Prussians 
on  the  early  morning  of  the  17th, 
217;  expects  Grouchy  to  arrive  by 
the  bridge  of  Moustier,  247,  268  et 
seq.,  290,  293,  294,  345;  orders  to 
Grouchy  on  the  i8th,  265-272,  291; 
his  headquarters  at  the  Caillou  house, 
289;  reconnoitres  the  field  of  bat- 
tle of  Waterloo  at  i  A.M.,  289;  his 
conduct  on  the  morning  of  the  i8th, 
289-294;  his  plan  of  battle,  292,  302 
(see  Battle  of  Waterloo)  ;  decides 
to  defer  the  main  attack  until  about 
I  P.M.,  292,  302;  the  attack  upon 
Hougomont,  303,  304,  329;  called  from 


INDEX. 


399 


the  front  to  resist  Prussian  attack  upon 
his  right  flank,  308-309,  311  f/  seq., 
330,  345,  346;  returns  to  the  front, 
314;  organizes  general  advance  upon 
the  British  position,  315-317,  33^;  the 
attack  of  the  Guard  repulsed,  318-324, 
331-338;  his  efforts  to  rally  the  Guard, 
325;  his  army  routed,  326;  borne  from 
the  field  in  a  square  of  the  Guard,  326. 
Napoleon  ct  Waterloo,  cited,  48,  50,  51, 

69,   157,   181,  214,    215,    222,    247,    269, 
270,314,319.357-  ,        ,,, 

Ney,  Marshal,  placed  in  the  field  at  the 
last  moment,  20,  21,  49,  55;  given 
command  of  the  left  wing,  21,  49; 
overtakes  the  army  near  Charleroi,  49; 
movement  on  Quatre  Bras  on  the  15th, 
49-54»  55.  56,  62,  69,  139;  verbal 
orders  from  Napoleon  on  the  15th  to 
seize  Quatre  Bras,  52,  62-69,  343; 
midnight  interview  with  Napoleon  on 
the  15th,  54,  116,  129,  130,  132,  140; 
lacks  a  competent  staff,  55,  119,  129, 
140;  his  defective  preparations  and 
disobedience  of  orders  on  the  l6th, 
I16-12S,  140,  176-183,  1S6-187,  191, 
344,  348;  orders  from  Napoleon  on 
the  l6th,  120-125,  130,  131,  134,  141- 
142,  154-156;  in  the  battle  of  Quatre 
Bras,  178-196;  prevented  Wellington's 
aiding  Bliicher,  187;  makes  no  report 
of  the  result  of  the  battle  to  Napo- 
leon, 200,  202;  orders  from  Napoleon 
on  the  17th,  201,  203;  his  neglect  to 
pursue  Wellington  on  the  morning  of 
the  17th,  214;  with  Napoleon  in  pur- 
suit of  Wellington  to  Waterloo,  214 
et  seq. ;  his  great  attack  with  d'Erlon's 
infantry  upon  the  allied  line,  304-307 ; 
the  capture  of  La  Haye  Sainte,  307; 
cavalry  attacks  upon  the  allied  centre, 
309-31 1 ;  non-employment  of  infantry, 
309,  311,  318,  324,  337;  responsible 
for  mistakes  in  assaults  upon  the  allied 
line,  311.?/  seq.,  329,  330,  345 ;  his  lack 
of  preparations  for  an  attack  by  the 
Imperial  Guard,  315,  317,  337.  338, 
346;  leads  the  charge  of  the  Imperial 
Guard,  318-324,  331-338;  contrasted 
with  Wellington,  338. 


O. 


O'Connor  Morris,  William  (see  Morris). 
Oldfield,  Major  John,  his  Letters  on  the 

Battle  of  Waterloo,  cited,  89,  105,  296, 

301. 
OUech,  General  von,  Geschichte  des  Feld- 

zuges  von  i8ij,  cited,  72,  73,   76,   77, 

83,  84,  85,    106,   109,    134,    136,  143, 


144,  145,  149,  154,  205,  20S,  209,  226, 
227,  228,  229,  231,  232,  233,  238,  258, 
262,  263,  285. 

Ompteda,  Colonel  von,  commander  bri- 
gade King's  German  Legion,  35;  his 
brigade  nearly  annihilated  near  La 
Haye  Sainte,  312. 

Orange,  Prince  of,  commander  British 
1st  corps,  38;  character  as  an  officer, 
40;  hears  of  the  French  advance,  76; 
notifies  Wellington  at  Brussels,  77 ;  at 
Quatre  Bras,  102,  178. 


Pack,    Major-General    Sir    Denis,    com- 
mander British  brigade,  35 ;  at  Water- 
loo, 306. 
Pajol,  General,  commander   ist   French 
cavalry  corps,  27;  in  the  advance  on 
the  15th,  46,  47;  at  Ligny,  154;  in  pur- 
suit of  the  Prussians  after  Ligny,  205; 
with  Grouchy  in  the  march  on  Wavre, 
212;  in  the  battle  of  Wavre,  265. 
Papelotte,  small  village  in  front  of  Wel- 
lington's position    at    Waterloo,    297; 
occupied  by  Zieten's  corps,  324. 
Pascallet,    M.    E.,    Notice   Biographiqiu 
sur    M.    le     Afarkhal    Marquis    de 
Grouchy,  cited,  209,  357. 
Perponcher,    General,   commander    divi- 
sion Dutch-Belgians,  38;     at   Quatre 
Bras,  102,  103,  112,  178;   his  position 
at  Waterloo,  299. 
Picton,    Sir    Thomas,    commander    5th 
British  division,  38;   a  man  of  energy 
and  capacity,  40;  at  Quatre  Bras,  178; 
in   battle   of  Waterloo,  299;  repulses 
d'Erlon's  charge,  306,  307. 
Pirch    I.,  General   von,   commander   2d 
Prussian    corps,    32;    headquarters    at 
Namur,  33;   at  Ligny,  143,  151,  159; 
falls  back   towards  Wavre,   159,   226, 
232,  246,  339,  340,  346;    delayed  in 
leaving    Wavre,     262,    263,    supports 
Billow's    assaults    upon    Planchenoit, 
325,340. 
Pire,     Lieutenant-General,     commander 
cavalry  division  2d  French  corps,  25; 
in  the  advance,  49;   at  Quatre   Bras, 
178;   at  Waterloo,  301,  337. 
Planchenoit,   313,  n.  52;    attacked  suc- 
cessfully by  Billow,  retaken  by  Napo- 
leon, 311;   gallantly  defended  by  the 
Young  Guard   and  Count   de   Lobau, 

Ponsonby,  Major-General  Sir  William, 
commander  Union  brigade  English 
cavalry,  35;  his  charge  at  Waterloo, 

306, 307.  in- 


400 


INDEX. 


Porter's  Hhtory  Royal  Engineers,  cited, 
296,  312. 

Powell,  Captain,  1st  British  footguards, 
334;  describes  advance  of  Imperial 
Guard  at  Waterloo,  319,  324. 


Quatre  Bras,  value  of  the  position,  3  ei 
seq.,  12,  13,  61  ei  seq.,  94  et  seq.  (See 
Battle  of.) 

Quinet,  Edgar,  Histoire  de  la  Campagne 
de  18/S,  cited,  II,  58,  282. 

Quiot,  General,  commanded  Allix"s  divi- 
sion at  Waterloo,  302;  assigned  to  the 
task  of  capturing  La  Haye  Sainte, 
305 ;  brilliant  attacks  upon  the  allied 
line  in  support  of  the  Guard,  318,  330, 
337- 


R. 


Raguse,  Due   de,  Memoires,  see   Mar- 

MONT. 

Rebecque,  General  Constant,  chief  of 
staff  to  the  Prince  of  Orange,  orders 
Perponcher  to  the  support  of  Prince 
Bernhard's  brigade  at  Quatre  Bras, 
101-103. 

Reille,  General  Count,  commander  2d 
French  corps,  18;  in  the  advance,  44, 
46,  48,  50,  loi;  conference  with  Ney 
on  the  1 6th,  116;  his  Notice  Historiqite, 
cited,  121;  disobedience  of  orders,  121- 
122,  168,  176,  192-193;  his  corps  at 
Quatre  Bras,  178;  position  at  Water- 
loo, 301 ;  attacks  Hougomont,  303- 
304,  314,  n.  54,  329,  330,  337;  failed 
to  realize  his  opportunity  for  retreat, 
326. 

Relation  Beige  sur  la  Bataille  de  Water- 
loo, cited,  320. 

Rogniat,  his  Considerations  de  FArt  de  la 
Guerre,  and  Reponse  aux  Notes  Cri- 
tiques de  Napoleon,  cited,  12,  56,  57, 
58,  164. 

Roguet,  General,  commander  brigade 
Imperial  Guard  at  Waterloo,  316. 

Royal  Dragoons,  a  part  of  the  Brit- 
ish Union  Brigade  at  Waterloo, 
300. 

Russia,  sets  her  army  in  motion  for  the 
general  attack  upon  France,  i;  ex- 
pected to  reinforce  the  Austrian  army,  2. 


Saint  Hilaire,  Emile  Marco  de,  Histoire 
de  la  Garde,  cited,  3 1 9. 


Saltoun,  Lord,  at  Waterloo,  320; 

Sart-^-Walhain,  Grouchy  orders  troops 
there,  250;  erroneously  supposed  to  be 
the  place  where  he  heard  the  cannon 
of  Waterloo,  255,  286-288. 

Saxe-Weimar,  Prince  Bernhard  of,  com- 
mander brigade  Dutch-Belgians,  36, 
36,  n.  5;  driven  from  Frasnes,  49,  loi ; 
at  Quatre  Bras,  90,  101-103;  his  posi- 
tion at  Waterloo,  299. 

Scots  Greys,  a  part  of  the  British  Union 
brigade  at  Waterloo,  300. 

Scott,  Sir  Walter,  Lije  of  N^apoleon, 
cited,  93. 

Siborne,  Captain  W.,  History  of  the  War 
ijt  France  and  Belgium  in  /S/j,  cited, 
13.  34,  35,  71,  73,  75,  77,  80,  82,  83, 
84,91,  III,  112,  114,  139,  154,  158, 
159,  179,  1S3,  184,  191,  192,  199, 
205,  212,  229,  232,  234,  237,  238, 
254,  258,  261,  262,  270,  279,  283, 
284,  285,  298,  301,  306,  310,  312, 
319.   322,   333- 

Sidney,  Rev.  Edwin,  The  Life  of  Lord 
Hill,  cited,  332. 

Sombreffe,  its  military  value,  12-14; 
57  et  seq. ;  point  of  concentration  for 
the  Prussian  army,  70;  the  centre  of 
the  Prussian  army  at  the  battle  of 
Ligny,  151. 

Somerset,  Major-General  Lord  Edward, 
commander  cavalry  brigade  British 
guards,  35;  position  at  W'aterloo,  300; 
charge  of  his  brigade,  307,  313. 

Soult,  Marshal,  succeeds  Berthier  as 
Napoleon's  chief  of  staff,  17;  unfit 
for  the  position,  18;  told  Sir  W. 
Napier  that  Napoleon  fought  Waterloo 
without  examination  of  the  enemy's 
position,  24,  n.  10;  not  at  fault  on 
the  morning  of  the  i6th,  128;  orders 
Ney  to  envelop  the  enemy's  right,  155; 
told  Sir  W.  Napier  that  Ney  neglected 
his  orders  at  Quatre  Bras,  191 ;  of  no 
assistance  to  Napoleon  on  morning 
of  17th,  202;  opposed  to  detaching 
Grouchy  with  so  large  a  force,  279,  n. 
7;  negligent  as  a  staff  officer,  246, 
348. 

Stanhope,  Philip  Henry,  5th  Earl,  Notes 
of  Conversations  with  the  Duke  of 
Wellington,  cited,  42,  46,  155,  230. 

Steinmetz,  General  von,  commander  di- 
vision Prussian  ist  corps,  32;  at  Water- 
loo, 324-325. 

Supplementary  Despatches  of  the  Duke  of 
Wellington,  edited  by  his  son,  cited, 
72,  74,  85,  90,  374  et  seq. 
Supplies,  lines  of,  not  to  be  confounded 
with  lines  of  communication  between 
the  allied  armies,  14. 


INDEX. 


401 


T. 


Thielemann,  General  von,  commander  3d 
Prussian  corps,  33;  at  Ligny,  144,  151, 
159;  his  corps  placed  where  it  could 
not  aid  Zieten  and  Pirch  I.,  204;  in 
the  retreat  to  Wavre,  231,  232,  234, 
261;  his  corps  left  alone,  defended 
Wavre  against  Grouchy,  264-265.  (See 
Battle  of  Wavre.) 

Thiers,  M.  A.,  his  History  of  the  Consu- 
late and  the  Empire  of  France  under 
Napoleon,  cited,  10,  24,  29,  30,  66,  1 54, 
193.  292,  354- 


U. 


Union  Brigade,  British,  commanded  by 
Major-General  Ponsonby,  composed  of 
the  Royal  Dragoons,  Scots  Greys,  and 
the  Inniskilling  Dragoons,  at  Water- 
loo, 300,  306,  307,  313. 

Uxbridge,  Lord  (afterwards  Marquis  of 
Anglesea),  commander  of  combined 
cavalry  of  British  and  King's  German 
Legion,  38;  leads  charge  of  Somer- 
set's cavalry  at  Waterloo,  307;  calls 
Wellington's  attention  to  danger  of 
pursuit  of  the  French  with  weakened 
battalions,  341. 


Vandamme,  Count,  commander  3d  French 
corps,  known  as  a  hard  fighter,  18;  de- 
layed in  the  advance  on  the  15th,  47; 
at  Ligny,  153,  154,  157-159;  delayed 
in  the  march  with  Grouchy  to  Gem- 
bloux,  211,  252;  his  troops  entangled 
in  attempt  to  carry  bridges  at  Wavre, 
264,  265. 

Vandeleur,  Major-General  Sir  John,  com- 
mander British  light  cavalry  brigade, 
35;  his  position  at  Waterloo,  299; 
brought  to  the  centre  with  Vivian's 
brigade  at  a  critical  time,  314;  in  the 
final  charge,  325. 

Van  Loben  Sels,  E.,  Precis  de  la  Cam- 
pagne  de  18 1^  dans  les  Pays-Bas, 
cited,  49,  76,  77,  92,  loi,  102,  112, 
279,  280,  284,  291,  310,  312,  317. 

Vaudoncourt,  General  Guillaume  de, 
Histoire  des  Campagnes  de  18 14  et  18 13 
en  France,  cited,  59,  289,  291. 

Vivian,  Major-General  Sir  Hussey,  com- 
mander British  light  cavalry  brigade, 
35;  his  position  at  Waterloo,  299; 
brought  into  action  at  a  critical  mo- 
ment, 314;   in  the  final  charge,  325. 


W. 


Walhain,  where  Grouchy  heard  the  can- 
non of  Waterloo,  255,  256,  259,  286- 
288. 

Waterloo,  the  field  of,  296;  surveyed  by 
English  engineers  before  the  opening 
of  the  campaign,  296.  (See  Battle  OF.) 

Waterloo  Letters,  cited,  83,  1 12,  233, 
299.  300.  310,  312,  319,  321,  322,  323, 
324,  332,  m,  334,  335. 

Wavre,  regarded  by  Napoleon  as  the 
proper  point  of  concentration  for  the 
Prussian  army,  98;  the  Prussian  ren- 
dezvous after  battle  of  Ligny,  233. 
(See  Battle  of.) 

Weather,  198,211,  216,  289,  291,  292, 
348. 

Wellington,  Duke  of,  headquarters  at 
Brussels,  3,  74;  his  qualifications  as  a 
commander,  40,  41 ;  his  army,  34-40, 
43,  294,  302;  anticipates  French  ad- 
vance by  way  of  Mons,  74-77;  his 
understanding  with  Bliicher,  70  et 
seq.,  91,  346;  delays  advance  upon 
Quatre  Bras,  77-115,  346-347;  at 
Quatre  Bras  on  the  i6th,  106,  109; 
his  conference  with  Bliicher  at  Brye, 
108,  144-146,  150;  disapproves  of 
Bliicher's  position  at  Ligny,  155,  n. 
15;  in  the  battle  of  Quatre  Bras,  178, 
179,  183-185,  187,  188;  retreats  from 
Quatre  Bras,  214,  233,  297;  learns  of 
Prussian  defeat  at  Ligny,  233;  did 
not  receive  assurance  of  support  from 
Bliicher  until  the  morning  of  the  i8th, 
234,  238,  347;  his  ride  to  Wavre  to 
consult  with  Blucher,  238  et  seq.,  347; 
his  preparations  for  the  battle  of 
Waterloo,  294-297;  occupies  Hougo- 
mont,  297;  his  command  at  Waterloo, 
297-300 ;  fortifies  La  Haye  Sainte, 
301 ;  his  justification  in  accepting  bat- 
tle based  upon  assurance  of  support 
from  Blucher,  294,  295,  302,  327;  his 
efi"orts  to  restore  his  shattered  line,  310, 
312,  314,  318;  his  imminent  peril,  314; 
repulses  charge  of  the  Imperial  Guard, 
31S-325,  332-336;  final  advance  of 
his  whole  line,  325,  340,  341;  his 
retention  of  18,000  men  at  Hal  and 
Tubize,  339;  contrasted  with  Ney, 
338.  339- 


Yonge,  C.  D.,  Life  of  Wellington,  cited, 

296. 
Young,  Rev.  Julian  Charles,  A  Memoir 

of  Charles  Mayne    Young,  Tragedian 

cited,  239-241. 


402 


INDEX. 


Zieten,  General  von,  commander  ist 
Prussian  corps,  32;  headquarters  at 
Charleroi,  33;  resists  French  advance 
on  the  15th,  47,  70,  77;  at  Ligny,  143, 
151;  falls  back  toward  Wavre,  159, 
225,  232;   delay  in  movement  on  the 


1 8th,  262;  arrival  of  his  corps  at 
Waterloo,  324;  his  probable  course 
indicated  if  Grouchy  had  detained 
Biilow  and  Pirch  I.,  328;  his  interven- 
tion not  anticipated,  336;  his  appear- 
ance and  decisive  attack  upon  the 
right  flank  of  French  army  assured 
the  allied  victory,  340,  341. 


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